I know that personal tastes are subjective, but I haven’t established that about emotions.
When one is experiencing an emotion, it is as real as any idea, or concept in one’s consciousness.
In fact it can be identified, and ‘objectified’ via introspection - and to a degree, even traced back to its root cause: something one did or didn’t do, and so on.
(Ayn Rand said “there can be no causeless emotion.”)
She also said, “It is a response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards.”
In other words, not that dissimilar to a conscious thought.
As the OP wrote, can one’s consciousness be conscious of itself? I believe so. And if an emotion can be separately observed by consciousness, then doesn’t it follow that it exists?
(Even if only to oneself). Therefore it is Objective.
I’ve been considering this for a long time, and would appreciate some input.
The Lexicon says, “The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.” An emotion, as such, is neither arbitrary nor subjective (nor objective nor intrinsic) but a causal physiological response, and an attribute of a subject. The two senses of the word emotion come from two contexts: emotion is arbitrary and subjective epistemologically while metaphysically emotion is a fact within a causal universe and cannot be arbitrary in the sense of uncaused.
The basis for calling an emotion arbitrary is that relying upon an emotion as guide to the truth about the external world is invalid procedure, emotions tell one nothing about the world. Emotions do not pertain to the world or the objects in it, they inform one about one’s own premises and evaluations, they pertain to the subject, they are subjective in the factual, metaphysical sense. Emotions are not intrinsic to objects, nor are they relations to objects as perceptual forms are, nor are they hierarchically related to percepts as concepts are. Emotions inhere in subjects, they are subjective.
Objectivity is willful adherence to reality by a specific valid method of thought. Emotions can never be objective, they are either properly regarded as facts of consciousness or they are arbitrary interlopers that corrupt a process of thought. As facts of consciousness emotions are always experienced internally, subjectively. As epistemological corruption, they are always subjective in the sense of being the product of the the method of subjectivism. Emotions are subjective, in all ways.
Reason is a faculty of awareness; its function is to perceive that which exists by organizing observational data. And reason is a volitional faculty; it has the power to direct its own actions and check its conclusions, the power to maintain a certain relationship to the facts of reality. Emotion, by contrast, is a faculty not of perception, but of reaction to one’s perceptions. This kind of faculty has no power of observation and no volition; it has no means of independent access to reality, no means to guide its own course, and no capacity to monitor its own relationship to facts.
Emotions are automatic consequences of a mind’s past conclusions, however that mind has been used or misused in the process of reaching them. The ideas and value-judgments at the root of a feeling may be true or false; they may be the product of meticulous logic or of a slapdash mess; they may be upheld in explicit terms, or they may be subconscious and unidentified. In all these cases, positive and negative alike, the feeling follows obediently. It has no power to question its course or to check its roots against reality. Only man’s volitional, existence-oriented faculty has such power.
Feelings or emotions are not part of the method of logic; they are not evidence for a conclusion. The fact that a man has a certain feeling means merely that, through some kind of process, he earlier reached a certain idea, which is now stored in his subconscious; this leaves completely open the question of the idea’s relationship to reality. To identify this relationship, one needs a process of validating ideas, i.e., a process of reason.(5)
Although reason and emotion by their nature are in harmony, the appearance of conflict between them, as we have seen, is possible; the source of such appearance is a contradiction between a man’s conscious and subconscious conclusions in regard to an evaluative issue. When this occurs, the conscious ideas may be correct and the subconscious ones mistaken. Or the reverse may be the case: a man may consciously uphold a mistaken idea while experiencing a feeling that clashes with it, one that derives from a true subconscious <opar_160> premise. In both kinds of case, however, the real clash is between the two ideas. And the only way to resolve the conflict, to know which side is correct, is to submit both ideas to the bar of reason.
Even if its intellectual root happens to be true, a feeling cannot know this fact; it cannot judge cognitive status. Only the mind can decide questions of truth.
In chapter 1, from a study of the primacy of existence, I concluded that feelings are no avenue to truth. Introspection, I said, is not a means of external cognition. Now, through a study of man’s means of consciousness, this earlier discussion has been confirmed and completed. Metaphysics and epistemology unite. They unite in declaring that “emotions are not tools of cognition.”(6)
An unanalyzed emotion, an emotion whose intellectual roots one has not identified and validated by a process of reason, is merely a subjective event of one’s consciousness. It may be compared to a floating abstraction, or to a higher-level proposition that one has not reduced to perceptual data. It is a mental state disconnected from reality, a state whose relation to fact one does not know.
To which I would add, an analyzed emotion is not objective because it is the intellectual root that is identified and validated not the emotion itself. Emotions simply are, even when they are in harmony with all of one’s reasoned convictions.