DonAthos said:
between an axiom (which may never be mistaken) and one’s understanding or identification of an axiom (which might)?.. I’m quite on board with the idea that one cannot “disprove” those ideas which themselves make proof possible. Yet a person could be mistaken in his identification of which ideas those are. Couldn’t he?
This. This is what I’ve been trying to get at, apparently less successfully. Yes, an axiom presupposes all proof - but one’s identification of an axiom could be wrong. This is why evidence contradicting an axiom has to be considered: because either the conclusion drawn from the evidence is wrong, the evidence itself is wrong, or your identification of an axiom is wrong. That’s three points of failure, each of which are equally valid.
I did qualify that if evidence existed to contradict an axiom, the axiom would not be the first place I’d look for a failure. I’d re-examine the evidence and the conclusion endlessly, because presumably if I hold an axiom to be true, I’ve repeatedly re-affirmed that the axiom is necessary for all other things I encounter.
Plasmatic said:
What your forgetting is that ludicious claims to accept that proof pressuposses the axioms. If he understood that, the statement that its possible they are wrong would be something he could be certain was impossible. Once you understand the axioms you can never rationally entertain the idea that they arent inevitable-inescapable. This is central to the Oist philosophy.
It seems to me that I’ve either mis-stated my case or you’ve misunderstood what I’ve stated.
I agree that any kind of proof presupposses the axioms that I hold to be true. My issue is that the axioms were not handed down to me by divine will - I identified them myself, and I am fallible. If evidence contradicted my identification of the axioms, I’d be very hard pressed to accept the evidence or the conclusion drawn from it… but if the evidence and conclusion proved incontrovertible, I would have to re-examine my identification of the axioms, because I am fallible and I may have mis-identified or misinterpreted the axioms.
Specifically that you think the axioms “could be wrong”, which contradicts the statement that you “understand that axioms aren’t provable and that any proof would necessarily imply them”
Your disagreement here seems to lie in me misusing terms, I suppose. No, if an axiom is truly an axiom, it cannot be disproved. Axioms are not subject to truth values.
I, however, am. I’m entirely capable of mis-identifying an axiom. I’m entirely capable of misinterpreting an axiom. I can make mistakes. So if the evidence of reality truly, incontrovertibly, contradicted something that I believed to be an axiom - well, I’d be forced to consider the possibility that I mis-identified it as an axiom, or I misinterpreted the consequences of that axiom. If such a thing ever happened, it would imply that the axiom is, perhaps, not an axiom at all.
However, as I have said previously, it would take a whole hell of a lot of examination, re-examination, and re-re-examination of the evidence and the conclusions drawn from it before I would even entertain that possibility. An axiom is considered so because it is necessary for me to believe anything that I have seen up to that point. Something that tells me my belief in an axiom is wrong would have to be convincing enough to also make me think that everything else that I’ve seen and believed in my life to that point is also wrong - and proving that to me would be one hell of a feat.
My issue was originally with someone criticizing a scientific idea on account of it being “bad philosophy.” My contention is simply that that’s not an appropriate response to scientific evidence and a scientific conclusion. If there is an absolutely miniscule chance that I mis-identified an axiom, there’s still a chance. I’m not saying that I would immediately assume my philosophy to be wrong if science contradicted it - but I would also not use my philosophy as a basis for criticizing the scientific idea. I’d examine the idea, the evidence and the conclusion drawn from the evidence on a scientific basis until I found where the fault is in its conclusion.