Why cannot the future be random? (or: invalidating axioms?)

Metaphysics and Epistemology
61

ITOE said:

More later Don.

Hey Plasmatic,

I’ve been waiting for your continued response before replying; hopefully that’s still forthcoming, but it has been long enough that I figure maybe I should pop back in, just in case you’ve forgotten about me. :slight_smile:

While I’m here, I’ll mention that I don’t disagree with any of the quote you’ve provided… nor do I honestly see how it contends with the post to which you’re replying. But perhaps you can help me to understand how that quote relates to what I’d said?

If/when you do reply more substantively, I would also really appreciate your analysis of the example I’d provided, if possible. As a reminder:

 

…imagine if I were discussing matters with someone else who made the claim that – oh, I don’t know – “free will” means that drug addicts shouldn’t ever require any sort of rehabilitation, because they could simply “will” themselves to stop. Or that there’s no reason why Charlie Manson (if he were ever paroled) couldn’t make for a perfectly fine babysitter – because “free will” means that he could simply opt to be a different man from one second to the next, and as good as Galt.

Suppose that I attempted to argue with him on these points, and in reply he said something like: “I don’t even have to consider your ‘arguments’ or your ‘evidence.’ You’re arguing against free will and you depend upon free will to do so, therefore your position is necessarily self-contradictory.”

Well that wouldn’t be very helpful, I don’t think, for either of us. I would want him to understand, at the least, that he might be mistaken in his interpretation or application of “free will,” and to give my argument a fair hearing and assessment before dismissal. For his own sake, I believe that he should want the same thing.

Isn’t that important? Isn’t that right?

And…

I suspect that maybe your response would be something like this (though please correct me, if need be): that yes, this guy should be willing to reexamine his concept of “free will” in the face of apparently contradictory evidence or argument – because he’s got it wrong.

But I should not be willing to do the same thing, because as an Objectivist (insofar as I am one), I have the axioms correct, and therefore I know that they cannot be modified or contradicted by any possible evidence or argument.

Is that your position?

1 Like
62

Should there be a concept for what people often mean when they speak of ‘possible’ colloquially?

I don’t think there needs to be another word. I suppose I’d say that possibility refers to fallibility either in regard to amount of evidence, or in regard to cognition being volitional. I’m open to using a better word if you have one in mind. I actually can’t imagine a scenario where the three axioms are false, so I’m not talking about “possible worlds”.

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Don, I havent forgot about you. Ive been spending alot of time on a post that will contextualize this whole discussion for the thread. I will repond to you soon.

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Let’s review the reason for the current discussion.

 

The OP came to this Objectivist forum and asked:

 

"

The law of casualty of course … But what if all things can potentially “jump out of existence”? The things’ future will then be “random”.

 

What is the objectivist respons?"

 

 

And Kristen also said:

 

“I don’t know much about physics but isn’t such “jumping” observed in the field of quantum physics?”

 

 

Notice Kristen specifically asked " What is the objectivist response" to a question concerning quantum physicist making claims about the philosophical subject of existence. She specifically was cognizant that this was related to  " the law of Identity", an axiom of Objectivism.

 

We can state this as "The law of Identity says things are what they are and they have to act accordingly (causality), but physicist say they have “observed” things “jump out of existence” and are therefore able to act “randomly”, What does Objectivism counsel one to do with such claims?"

 

I will call this “Scenario X”

 

Peter Morris made the contextually relevant claim that this scenario is an example of " physics" " corrupted by bad philosophy":

 

“No. Even if a particle disappears from our ability to detect it, that is not existentially going out of existence. Current physics is corrupted by bad philosophy. There’s a lot on this kind of thing within the Objectivist community. David Harriman’s lectures and book are fantastic if you are interested. The key point is that observation requires rational interpretation. Evidence is crucial but without the mind it is just sense data. It is the mind that intergrates and understands what it means.”

 

 

It is at this point that ludicious came into this Objectivist forum where a new member has requested an Objectivist view of Scenario X and said:

 

 

Right! I forgot! Science and reality have to obey Objectivist philosophy, otherwise we just offhandedly dismiss the both of them as having a severe case of bad philosophy.

 

 

I don’t actually know anything about physics, but I tend to trust the statements of physicists over the statements of philosophers when it comes to physics. It itches me the wrong way that you’d suggest that physics is “corrupted by bad philosophy.” Physics is corrupted by the choice to use the evidence of reality. Sorry if it doesn’t fall in line with what your philosophy would have you believe…

 

 

 

So, in spite of the established context of the forum in general, and the OP in particular asking for Oist to comment on Scenario X, (physicist making claims about matters that are axiomatic and therefore philosophical) ludicious makes the context dropping statement that, in spite of the fact that he doesn’t "actually know anything about physics, He tends to, “trust the statements of physicists over the statements of philosophers when it comes to physics” 

 

Its clear from the rest of what he said that he doesn’t actually know much Objectivist philosophy either, for if he did, he would understand that:

 

 

-The OP is asking whether Scenario X is consistent with Oism

 

-Objectivism is a science based on “the evidence of reality”

 

-Scenario X is not an instance of physicist making claims about physics but about physicist confusing philosophical matters with physical ones and making bad philosophical statements.

 

-If he doesn’t know any physics then he couldn’t know if the OP is actually a description a physicist view of “evidence of reality” as against some supposed Oist rejection of science, evidence and reality, and this makes his whole rant arbitrary.

 

 

At this point Louie makes the comment in post #9 about Lud’s response to Scenario X that:

 

to say physics is corrupted by bad philosophy is only to say that physicists make unwarranted conclusions that stem from philosophical errors. It doesn’t mean that the observations are false or bad science even. Of course, saying “it’s bad philosophy” might mean failing to understand the science.

 

 

And Lud responded:

 

#11  I don’t have a problem with pointing out flaws in science. But science has a specific method for dealing with errors, and that method works. Bringing your philosophy into it doesn’t help anything. As right as we all may think our philosophies are, there’s currently no great way for reassuring everyone that one particular philosophy is objectively better than all others, so basing scientific contentions on philosophical beliefs is not a very good way to do… well, anything.

 

Again Lud asserts the context dropping claim that “Scenario X” is an instance of “bringing philosophy” into an attempt to “_ pointing out flaws in science _” and " basing scientific contentions on philosophical beliefs"

 

Particularly relevant to the current problem between louie , Lud and I, is the unambiguous claim that _" there’s currently no great way for reassuring everyone that one particular philosophy is objectively better than all others"  , and that " science has a specific method for dealing with errors", which is contrasted with the unhelpful attempt to " bring philosophy" in where the " specific method" of " science" _ for " dealing with problems" belongs…

 

So Lud explicitly contrasted the scientific method against philosophy in post #11

 

 

OSO points this error out to Lud in #12

 

You say science has a specific method for dealing with errors. You are presumably defending the scientific method. If you believe in the scientific method (as I do), that is part of your philosophy, in particular your epistomology. You’re bringing your philosophy “into it” just as much as anyone else. That is because there can be no science without philosophy.

 

 

 

And louie in # 19:

 

 

That makes the scientific method a philosophical belief which scientific contentions are based on. Sometimes bad science is simply bad observations. Other times, bad science is undermining the scientific method or undermining one’s basic observations.

 

In post #21 Lud continues the vein of believing the method of science based on “choice to use  the evidence of reality” (remember that he contrasted this method against the context dropping “unhelpful” attempt to solve “scientific” problems by “bringing philosophy into it”:

 

 

Empirically, it does work. There’s nothing in science where you cannot, through some means, point to how the theory or idea relates to reality and what it does. Even the most abstract theories exist because of some real world phenomena.

 

But that’s not really why I believe in science. I believe in science because I have no choice but to believe in it. The scientific method formalizes our only means of proving anything about reality from the evidence of reality - i.e. it formalizes induction. If I don’t believe in it, then I can’t really believe in anything. If I don’t believe in induction, then how can I have a belief in anything? Believing something requires evidence, and if I don’t believe in evidence… well, nothing can help me then

…

 

 

Suddenly he drops the context of his own claims in #8 and #11, and from one paragraph to the next in #21 where he asserts that science " formalizes induction", and " The scientific method formalizes our only means of proving anything about reality from the evidence of reality"  by going on to say:

 

I would agree that the scientific method is derived from philosophy. The only route to science is through philosophy, whether implicitly or explicitly. But that does not mean that philosophy gets a say in the evidence of reality. If a scientific theory doesn’t jive with your philosophy and you can’t find a scientific reason for why that theory is wrong, then your philosophy is wrong. Philosophy gave us induction, and from induction, science. Philosophy did not give us reality, and it cannot take it away. If the evidence of science disagrees with your philosophy, your philosophy has nothing to stand on. If a scientific theory is wrong, there’s a scientific reason why.

 

 

 

So science " formalizes induction" and_ has its own method based on the evidence of reality _ and bringing any philosophy into science (since there all indeterminate concerning objectivity ) on this is _ unhelpful ,_ but the scientific method is derived from this unhelpful philosophy which also gives us induction at the same time that science formalized induction as it method. We don’t know which philosophy could also give us induction because there is no way to be sure which philosophy is objective compared to the others. Scientific evidence based on reality can be used to take away that which philosophy stand s on, because philosophy didn’t give us reality, and cant take it away… We don’t know if science gave us reality or can take it away, so we cant say yet if Lud thinks this is why science is also better than philosophy…

 

If your head is spinning, just wait, it gets worse…

 

 

In post #22 Marc addressed Lud concerning Scenario X as it relates axioms by asking:

 

"

Here is an article from the past week essentially saying that some scientists have evidence that free will is an illusion, that free will doesn’t exist.

Do you think that such a thing could ever be proven?

 

Let us say that some “scientists” do “prove” that free will is an illusion. Should we take them seriously? Why or why not?"

 

 

Notice the scare quotes as evidence Marc understands that Scenario X is about physicist parading into philosophical matters…

 

 

This is where the issue of proof of axiomatic concepts enters the discussion making the second issue …  Marc is giving Lud the benefit of asking him Socratic questions in order to tease out ludicious’ premises concerning the fundamental issue at the heart of the foundational nature of philosophy, the basis of proof, and certainty…

 

 

Nicky asks rhetorical questions in post #24 that should have reduced Lud’s comment to absurdity in his mind in order to show the futility of doubting axiomatic truths:

 

Is that a rejection of free will, or are you just using imprecise language when you claim to have “no choice”?

 

 

Now in #25 louie takes all the contradictions in green and focuses on a single thing lud said that he finds agreement with and throws the rest out as bad choice of words or as Nicky’s query put it “imprecise language”…:

 

 

 the only disagreement you have is over word choice.

 

As though the contradictions cant be in Lud’s actual premises because he said one thing that is consistent with the philosophy Lud previously rejected…

 

However, the very next post made by lud in #29 in response to Nicky, Lud says:

 

 

_ I’m using precise language _ but leaving out what I figured to be a given. I have no choice but to believe in science, assuming that I believe in logic and reality. Science is formalized induction. If I don’t believe in science, than I don’t believe in induction. If I don’t believe in induction… well then, what can I believe in?

 

 

Lud hear unambiguously says he is being _ precise _ with his word choice! This is a clear demonstration that Lud may go on to use the language of Oism concerning axioms but has not actually understood what the words he is using mean…

 

Yet, in spite of the statement that he is being precise with his words about proving the axiom of volition to himself lud responds to Louie’s bizzare conclusion in #29:

 

I think you’re mostly spot on with your interpretation

 

 

 

Yet, Lud later claims that the disagreement between he and I (#46) concerning the fact that he contradicted himself regarding his understanding of what it means for proof to presuppose axioms, is his misuse of terms :

 

 

Your disagreement here seems to lie in _ me misusing terms _, I suppose. No, if an axiom is truly an axiom, it cannot be disproved. Axioms are not subject to truth values.

 

Now when Marc tried to reign in the discussion back to the context of Oist axioms in particular, and get at the obvious confusion in Lud’s posts in #47:

 

Talking about all “philosophies” and all “axioms” in general, as if they all describe reality correctly and are all equally valid is absurd and obviously untrue. _ Since we are on an Objectivist forum, why don’t we talk about Objectivism _.

Do you think Ayn Rand’s identification of existence, consciousness and identity as the three principle axioms is true? Do you understand her argument? Do you understand why these three are axioms and what the characteristics and identifying features of an axiom are? If so, have you validated this knowledge for yourself?

In other words, do you agree and accept that these three are actually axioms and that they truly describe reality? Meaning: there would be no science if existence didn’t exist, there would be no science without conscious beings examining what exists, there would be no science if the thing you were examining could be itself and something else at the same time?
 

 

 

Louie then chides Marc in #48 as though the ignorance and misuse of terms -contradiction is Marc’s:

 

He was very clear in explaining in his post that since people are infallible, our understanding of the axioms is fallible too , as in it is possible to discover that something you think is an axiom never was an axiom to begin with. That isn’t even saying “existence exists” isn’t valid, it just means that along with all knowledge, we must observe the world as it is.

 

To be blunt about it, I’m not sure you understood Rand’s argument. You seem to be saying you could not POSSIBLY be wrong, that is, you take it as a priori truth that the axioms are true based on logical necessity alone. The fact is to grasp an axiom requires observations of the world, so by the same reasoning, our understanding of axioms can change with new observations. Insofar as the axioms are consistent with what we observe, nothing will change. It just so happens that attempts at denying consciousness completely fail, and what we hold to be axioms will probably never change.

 

Yes, I said “probably”. But possibility of being wrong doesn’t erase certainty.

 

 

 

These were relevant questions considering the confusion Lud displayed earlier. The confusion that led louie to claim the problem in this thread with Lud was a “_ disagreement over word choice _”. So Lud is obviously " very clearly" making poor choices of words and “misusing terms” enough to simultaneously have lud confess to precision and misuse of terms and louie proclaim the problem to be lud’s poor choice of words  and very clear explanation. The explanation that lud claims was made so much clearer by louie in #48

 

 

And yet again Eiuol says what I’m thinking more eloquently and concisely than I ever could.  :thumbsup:

 

 

… Yep, were sounding like Objectivist now!

 

 

Just for bonus…In #30 Dream Weaver says:

 

 

If you understand that the concept of “proof” presupposes free will, then _ there is no need to take any such claim seriously, not even for a moment. . _

 

 

To which lud responds:

 

_ Right _, and that’s something that you arrived at through a deductive line of reasoning…The point I was making is that, if the evidence of reality contradicted that conclusion, _ I would have to at least consider the possibility that my deduction was wrong _, that my deductive abilities were off.

 

So, Weaver was _ right _ to claim one should dismiss claims like the scientist in Scenario X and Marc’s article without taking it seriously even for a moment but he should also at least consider the possibility that this alleged deductive reasoning " was wrong"…

 

Just to return to the context dropping issue on Scenario X… Lud is still talking about this issue as if someone claimed that this was an issue of philosophy where science belongs instead of “science” meddling in philosophical issues and making themselves subject to philosophical correction. Louie has joined him in this confusion.

 

louie said:

 

To call a scientist a bad philosopher is to just say the scientist undermines his or her ability to do science in the first place. That’s why it is considered a philosophical error rather than strictly a scientific one.

 

Yet, when I said:

 

What I said means that the special sciences are subject to _philosophica_l veto when they make philosophical errors.

 

louie responded:

 

I think you are very wrong here.

 

 

 

So a scientist can be called a bad philosopher  when he undermines his own ability to do science and makes a _ philosophical error, _ but the scientist in the special sciences are not subject to philosophical veto when they make these _ philosophical, rather than special science errors _…

 

Amazing

 

I’ll be responding to Don and louie directly later. I need to catch up on sleep…

 

 

 

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I was hoping you’d give an integrated response instead of a linguistic analysis.

Discuss the ideas, not the particular words. I find Iud easy to understand, and my original post was to point out that the accusation of “bad philosophy” need not be a dogmatic clinging to ideas. In this case, it means that the physicists easily or frequently undermine the axiom of existence. I’m not going to make a big deal of terms, lest I become Wittgenstein and declare that all philosophical problems are only problems of language. All I see is a dispute over language in your post, not of content or of ideas. What is the point you want to make?

I found it quite presumptuous of you, Marc, and Nicky to take it that the disagreement is rooted in denying axioms or thinking axioms can be proved. It is more productive to correct errors and point out better terms to use.

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To which lud responds:

 

So, Weaver was _ right _ to claim one should dismiss claims like the scientist in Scenario X and Marc’s article without taking it seriously even for a moment but he should also at least consider the possibility that this alleged deductive reasoning " was wrong"…

Deduction presupposes induction. The identification of axioms and axiomatic concepts lie in the fact that they have to be accepted in order to try to deny them. Validation is not a process of deductive reasoning. 

Right, and that’s something that you arrived at through a deductive line of reasoning. You were not born with that knowledge in your head. You do not know it inherently. No God has given that knowledge to you through divine will. You deduced that axiom by understanding what it means and the context it fits into. 

 

One of the other areas touched upon is the idea of “man as a fallible being”. Prior to discovering that one can be wrong is the requirement to be able to distinguish such a case from a case of one being right. This crucial distinction lay within the domain of distinguishing infallible knowledge from fallible knowledge. The skeptic does not accept any knowledge as infallible, while the mystic tries to substitute something other than the data of sense as the final arbiter. Validation is the method of establishing an idea’s relationship to reality by correlation to the directly perceived, i.e., by correlation to the evidence of sense.

 

Deduction deals with the application of the laws of logic as outlined by Aristotle, moving from two premises connected by a middle term, to an inferenced conclusion, valid by the nature of the structure of the argument.

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This crucial distinction lay within the domain of distinguishing infallible knowledge from fallible knowledge.

Uh, are you saying that some knowledge is infallible?

68

iTOE said:

Prof. E: The question is: insofar as we are

to arrive at knowledge of the content of

consciousness, what is the stand-in for the

evidence of the senses—the incontestable,

infallible data which are the foundation for

all subsequent inference?

AR: That’s an interesting question. I

would say the foundation there is the same

as in extrospective knowledge. In other

words, the base is that which you can

conceptualize directly and which

corresponds to that same level of conceptual

development in the extrospective world.

Everything else has to be built on that.

Edit:

Their peculiarity lies in the

fact that they are perceived or experienced

directly, but grasped conceptually. They are

implicit in every state of awareness, from the

first sensation to the first percept to the sum

of all concepts. After the first discriminated

sensation (or percept), man’s subsequent

knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts

designated by the terms "existence,

“identity,” “consciousness”—these facts are

contained in any single state of awareness;

but what is added by subsequent knowledge

is the epistemological need to identify them

consciously and self-consciously.

69

Uh, are you saying that some knowledge is infallible?

Yes. First-level concepts fall into this category. Once you’ve learned what tables are, only under conditions such as too dark to clearly see, or too far away to clearly make out, you may be mistaken in your judgment of what the object is. Aside from borderline cases, there is little disagreement as to what is/isn’t a bird, tree, etc.

70

He was very clear in explaining in his post that since people are infallible , […] [emphasis added]

You mean as clear as you are here? OK, that was a needle, maybe you are just demonstrating your point, but your point is unclear because of the imprecise wording you use:

 

[…] our understanding of the axioms is fallible too, […]

People are fallible, axioms either describe reality or they don’t, i.e., they are either true or false, ones understanding is either correct or incorrect. The “particular words” you use are important, no matter how much you want to denigrate their usage.

So, is this some semantic game I’m playing, as I’m sure you’ll claim, as you have been claiming about Plasmatic? No, it bears directly on the point I was making to ludicious, before you so rudely interrupted.

The point is, it makes no sense to talk about “axioms” in general. It is like talking about the shape of the earth. I suppose you would say “well it is probably spherical, though we are fallible, and people did think it was flat for a long time, we must leave room for the possibility that it might be some 5 dimensional shape that we are currently unable to describe.”

Being fallible is not a license to be a skeptic.

The question is, do the axioms Ayn Rand identified truly describe reality? Even though Ayn Rand was fallible, is she correct in this case? Don’t worry, agreeing with Ayn Rand doesn’t make one dogmatic, nor does it make her a god, you should try it sometime.

 

[…] as in it is possible to discover that something you think is an axiom never was an axiom to begin with.

More equivocation on axioms in general like the “axioms” of Kepler or Descartes, which I suppose allows you to continue to evade the point, even after I had already set the context as Objectivism.

The question is, is it possible that the axioms identified by Rand are not axioms? The answer, I’m happy to inform you, is NO!!! It is NOT POSSIBLE!!! There will never be a time that existence doesn’t exist, or that there will be evidence of the non-existence of that same evidence, or that there will be evidence gathered by a consciousness that proves that we are not conscious, or that there will be evidence proving that a thing is itself and not itself at the same time.

If Ayn Rand’s axioms are truly axioms, and they are, then even if some later discovery creates a new context in which we know something even more fundamental, that will not invalidate her axioms or their axiomatic nature in this context. You should have learned that from ITOE. It is incorrect and disrespectful to say Isaac Newton was wrong as some skeptics do today. He was right in the context in which he himself described.

It is skeptical and unproductive of you to focus so heavily on what Ayn Rand and you might possibly be wrong about in a different Universe since non-knowledge gets you nowhere. Instead, you should spend your time trying to understand the world as it is, and, if you are inclined to Objectivism, to understand and discover what things Ayn Rand got right.

 

That isn’t even saying “existence exists” isn’t valid, it just means that along with all knowledge, we must observe the world as it is.

Right. So does “existence exists” describe the world as it is? Still no answer from you or ludicious. If everything you know and are certain about depends upon existence existing, it would take the most dogmatic skeptic in the world to deny its certainty.

Now you are going to rant and rave and indignantly point out that you said the exact opposite, to wit:

Yes, I said “probably”. But possibility of being wrong doesn’t erase certainty.

 

But your claims to certainty are contradicted by the other things you write, including in the sentence prior to this one:

It just so happens that attempts at denying consciousness completely fail, and what we hold to be axioms will probably never change.

Yes, I said “probably”. But possibility of being wrong doesn’t erase certainty.

You don’t even understand what it means to say something is “possible”. To say that the axioms will “probably” never change means that you think it is possible they could. To say that something is “possible” requires at least some evidence, there is NO evidence that the axioms of Objectivism are wrong, NONE. In fact everything we know points to their truth, EVERYTHING.

To say that I could be wrong about some unknown isolated fact somewhere is one thing. It is quite another to say that I am wrong about a particular fact. And it is still quite another thing to say that not only am I wrong about everything I think I know, but that everyone is wrong about everything they think they know and that all the gathered knowledge of the ages is wrong. It defies reality and is not true. And no new discoveries or understandings will eradicate any or all past knowledge. That past knowledge will remain true, even if delimited to a restricted context. Which is to say nothing new or provocative, since ALL knowledge is contextual.

 

To be blunt about it, I’m not sure you understood Rand’s argument. You seem to be saying you could not POSSIBLY be wrong, that is, you take it as a priori truth that the axioms are true based on logical necessity alone.

This is your personal animus toward me showing through again. These phrases, “a priori truth” and “logical necessity” when directed at an Objectivist are insults, which is of course what you meant them to be. Please quote something I said that indicates or even implies that that is what I think? And please be specific. When you are unable to do so I hope you will have the integrity to retract them and apologize.

Of course, you left yourself an out by prefacing them with “I’m not sure” and “You seem to be saying”, confirming and hiding behind your skepticism once again.

No, it is not possible that I am wrong about the axioms of Objectivism, but I know that is hard for you to accept so leave me out of it, and besides, it is not what I asked. The question is: was Ayn Rand wrong about the axioms? Is her identification of the three axioms correct? Are they true? If so, don’t be afraid, you can be just as certain as she was and I am.

Your semi-accusation amounts to a charge of rationalism; that my argument is purely deductive and completely disconnected from reality. Again, I have no idea where you are getting that from. First, I didn’t really make an argument, I mostly asked questions. But, OK, maybe there is some sort of rationalistic implications in my questions. Let’s see, I imply that proper axioms should “describe reality correctly”, I guess that’s not what you are talking about. I ask ludicious if he has “validated [his] knowledge”, which is asking if he has connected his knowledge back to reality, that doesn’t help you. I ask if the axioms “truly describe reality?”, nope, that’s not rationalism.

Maybe you are thinking that everyone talks like you, asserting one thing while saying the opposite a little while later as I pointed out above. Perhaps I just assert that things need to be connected to reality but my examples do just the opposite, let’s see:

 

If some “scientist” came up to me claiming to have evidence that I didn’t exist, I was not conscious, or that the coffee I was drinking could be a pile of shit, I’m not sure what I would do first, there are too many logical options. I suppose a slap in the face could defeat his entire line of argument quite eloquently. When he protested I would say, protests, slaps, my hand and the two of us don’t exist, certainly, neither of us is conscious so we must be dreaming, and anyway, it wasn’t actually a slap, it was a kiss.

Nope, my example is quite reality based, a slap to the face of a skeptical scientist. How much more real could it get? Maybe that is what you need.

Your charge fails on all counts. Moderator indeed, maybe you should moderate yourself.

 

I found it quite presumptuous of you, Marc, and Nicky to take it that the disagreement is rooted in denying axioms or thinking axioms can be proved. It is more productive to correct errors and point out better terms to use.

I don’t know where ludicious’s problem is rooted or if he even actually has a problem, perhaps he is mistaken or disagrees with Objectivism or doesn’t understand it. I was busy giving him the benefit of the doubt. Unlike you to me, I was kind to him and not rude in the least. In fact, if you could be bothered to take off your blinders, you would see that I was asking him questions to tease out just these sorts of things; it is called the Socratic method. Letting a person come to a conclusion themselves is one of the most harmless, most beneficent ways of demonstrating a point I know. How is it that you could possibly see the opposite? I know how. Check yourself.

And frankly, I find it quite presumptuous of you to be telling other posters how they should argue. That is not your job. It is too bad he has assigned you to be his mouthpiece; he was doing much better on his own.

What I would like to know, from either or both of you, is if he still maintains and you endorse his statement that:

 

This is why evidence contradicting an axiom has to be considered: because either the conclusion drawn from the evidence is wrong, the evidence itself is wrong, or your identification of an axiom is wrong. That’s three points of failure, each of which are equally valid.

Is each of the three “points of failure” “equally valid”? In other words, would it be just as logical to start your examination of where the failure is by examining your axioms?

Which is what started this whole tete a’ tete.

 

 

71

Plasmatic, quotes are fine, but it is not an argument for anything you say. I can’t put together your argument. Give me reasons and examples.

First part you bolded is the question. Rand doesn’t comment on where Prof. E said “infallible data”. The response is saying that the foundation that stands in for the senses at a conceptual level is what you conceptualize directly. Given the whole book, “conceptualize directly” is a first level concept.

The second quote is saying that subsequent knowledge does not itself “add to” an axiom. There is nothing more to say about existence. However, “grasped conceptually” is to learn by a conceptual method, that is, we are not given at birth knowledge at birth of axioms. To the extent of learning a concept, we all must volitionally consider information and only then can a concept be formed. Axiomatic concepts are no different. What you perceive is what it is, but what you say about what you perceive is fallible. I cannot say this any more clearly.

Use your own words. Please don’t quote ITOE again unless you use it to develop an argument.

************************

dream_weaver, that wouldn’t be infallible knowledge, you are fallible with regard to misunderstanding or misapprehending what you learned tables to be. I don’t mean mistranslation of the sort where what you call a trampoline I call a table. The concept may even be invalid. You may mislabel what sort of concept a table is. There are arguaubly infallible aspects of first-level concepts, but there is no Reality Guarantee that you formed it validly. In any case, the axioms aren’t first level. It just so happens that what we refer to as the three axiomatic concepts are validated daily. So we call them axiomatic. They are undeniable and cannot be proven for this reason.

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dream_weaver, that wouldn’t be infallible knowledge, you are fallible with regard to misunderstanding or misapprehending what you learned tables to be. I don’t mean mistranslation of the sort where what you call a trampoline I call a table. The concept may even be invalid. You may mislabel what sort of concept a table is. There are arguaubly infallible aspects of first-level concepts, but there is no Reality Guarantee that you formed it validly. In any case, the axioms aren’t first level. It just so happens that what we refer to as the three axiomatic concepts are validated daily. So we call them axiomatic. They are undeniable and cannot be proven for this reason.

I would concur that axioms are not first level, but the quotes earlier regarding being implicit from the first awareness, and subsequent awareness not adding to them is not an issue of distinguishing fallible from infallible knowledge.

 

Kids delight in learning what is what. Short of the adults present in their lives at the time being totally incompetent to teach them the correct words for the various entities encountered, or malicious enough to intentionally give them the wrong terminology, the first words children learn are pretty much ostensive connections between the objects and the audible sounds they learn to articulate..

 

In order to grasp that you are wrong or mistaken about a particular, what are you going to use to distinguish or differentiate it from? How do you learn to rightly identify what is wrongly identified?

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Don said

I don’t disagree with any of the quote you’ve provided… nor do I honestly see how it contends with the post to which you’re replying. But perhaps you can help me to understand how that quote relates to what I’d said?

I can’t blame you for thinking that was a response to your post because I addressed you at the bottom, but I was just killing two birds with one stone(post). It seemed silly to make another post saying so little. The quote was addressing the issue of the Oist position on the foundational nature of philosophy to the special sciences.

Don said:

I consider the case I’m making to be somewhat subtle. Or maybe I’m just flat-out wrong to try to draw a distinction here, between an axiom (which may never be mistaken) and one’s understanding or identification of an axiom (which might)? But let me attempt to make the case anyways, and maybe we can figure it out. Maybe this is simply some remnant of skepticism infecting my ideas.

I’m quite on board with the idea that one cannot “disprove” those ideas which themselves make proof possible. Yet a person could be mistaken in his identification of which ideas those are. Couldn’t he?

Again, we need to keep the context of this discussion. I am not discussing some arbitrary hypothetical axiom yet to be discovered. If you are asking me if its possible to be mistaken that Existence, Identity, Consciousness, causality, or volition are axioms the answer is no. One can make some symbols with language that equal a contradiction about axioms but one cannot doubt these axioms meaningfully. Meaning that one can speak-type words thinking that they are challenging them but all they are doing is equivocating-contradicting themselves. To conceptualize axioms is to recognize this fact, that all you are doing is making sounds that have no connection to the self evident-perception.

I believe in free will. I do not believe that there can exist anything which would demonstrate free will to be false, primarily based on my experience of my own will, but also in recognition of the fact that to “demonstrate” in this sense is itself an appeal to my volition. To “demonstrate” presumes free will.

Yet imagine if I were discussing matters with someone else who made the claim that – oh, I don’t know – “free will” means […]

Don, I don’t see what this scenario really has to do with the contention at hand. The only thing I can gather is that this:

Suppose that I attempted to argue with him on these points, and in reply he said something like: “I don’t even have to consider your ‘arguments’ or your ‘evidence.’ You’re arguing against free will and you depend upon free will to do so, therefore your position is necessarily self-contradictory.”

Well that wouldn’t be very helpful, I don’t think, for either of us. I would want him to understand, at the least, that he might be mistaken in his interpretation or application of “free will,” and to give my argument a fair hearing and assessment before dismissal. For his own sake, I believe that he should want the same thing.

is a commentary on someone’s choice of argument in this thread? If I were in the scenario with the person I would point out that they were equivocating the axiomatic status of volition with effortlessness. If they couldn’t understand that this is not a challenge to the axiomatic status of volition then that is something I cant make them do.

Don said:

Thus, if someone were to approach me with an argument that holds that I’ve made some mistake in either the choice, formulation or application of that which I hold to be “axiomatic,” oughtn’t I at least give the claim a hearing? If it turns out that their argument presupposes or relies upon the very thing that they seek to reject (as for instance, free will), then I can identify that fact and subsequently dismiss their claim (and maybe/hopefully even help them to do the same). Yet my rejection would depend on my identification (that is, in conclusion, following my having assessed it), and not on rejecting it before such an identification, on the basis of it being judged to be an attack on some axiomatic position or belief, as such.

Again, if you want to ask me “if someone were to approach me with an argument that holds that I’ve made some mistake in either the choice, formulation or application of Existence, Identity, Consciousness, causality, or volition, oughtn’t I at least give the claim a hearing?”

My answer is, first, “formulation and application”, is totally different from the issue that is being contended in this thread. What’s being argued is whether one can rationally doubt the axioms listed above, and if one can meaningfully-rationally state any scenario that doubts these axioms are axioms. My answer is unequivocally NO.

The statement _ "If it turns out that their argument presupposes or relies upon the very thing_ (insert the axioms of Oism) that they seek to reject (as for instance, free will), then I can identify that fact and subsequently dismiss their claim." is a non sequitur. One who speaks the word " axiom" meaningfully “_ ought”_ to be certain that the only thing one will find is the particular form of the contradiction-stolen concept will take. Therefore, IF one is in the mood-finds value in this person enough to hear them speak nonsense and try to point this out to them, then they ought to pursue that value.

Yet my rejection would depend on my identification (that is, in conclusion, following my having assessed it), and not on rejecting it before such an identification, on the basis of it being judged to be an attack on some axiomatic position or belief, as such

Same thing. It is not rational to even consider that any such argument could “hold”. As soon as you set the context to THE axiom s, then its certain to be only a matter of what form the error is going to take. You only validate the axioms truly once. After that you can never doubt them meaningfully, or hear someone doubt them without seeing this as a string of sounds disconnected from meaning-referents as a contradiction.

This whole problem is a misguided attempt to reject what is mistaken as rationalism. The axioms can never be doubted once understood because of what has already been experienced via direct sense perception. I KNOW The statement “what if your wrong about the axioms of Oism your fallible after all” is certainly impossible because of what I have already experienced. That is NOT “prior to experience” but because of experience.

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Just to be double clear, when I said in #64:

 

So, Weaver was _ right _ to claim one should dismiss claims like the scientist in Scenario X and Marc’s article without taking it seriously even for a moment but he should also at least consider the possibility that this alleged deductive reasoning " was wrong"…

 

 

 

This is a narration of what Lud is saying, not me asserting anything about what Weaver “should” do myself.

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I KNOW The statement “what if your wrong about the axioms of Oism your fallible after all” is certainly impossible because of what I have already experienced.

This is a lot of what I am trying to say. The only other thing I’ve been saying it is possible to misapprehend what I experience and create an invalid concept *of* my experience. My formulation may be wrong. That is, it is metaphysically possible to be wrong in the same sense it is metaphysically possible for my computer to explode in that it is consistent with the identity of humans and computers. I do not need to go into a fetal position worried about skepticism, precisely because I am implicitly experiencing existence at all times. I am certain that my computer won’t explode. I am not possibly wrong epistemologically, in the way existence is unavoidable and in all the knowledge I ever acquired (and will ever acquire, just as ALL concepts work). My certainty is absolutely dependent on the axioms, yeah, unless I as an individual discover Rand to be wrong, just as Rand as an individual discovered Descartes to be wrong. Just as Rand discovered “existence exists” is more fundamental than god’s existence, which utterly invalidates god. It’s not as though Rand discovered a form of infallibility.

If you think Rand really thinks that axioms are infallible knowledge, for the sake of this being an Objectivist forum, I’d really like to see this claim drawn out from Rand’s writing. I don’t doubt any of the axioms, I know them to be true.

 

I’ll put it this way: How do you know Descartes was wrong about his axiom? He arguably didn’t get his axiom all wrong, but I doubt anyone here thinks his “cogito ergo sum” formulation and therefore apprehension of consciousness was right. This is a socratic question to help me understand your points.

 

In order to grasp that you are wrong or mistaken about a particular, what are you going to use to distinguish or differentiate it from? How do you learn to rightly identify what is wrongly identified?

Yeah, that validates A is A. I don’t see where first-level concepts are infallible is demonstrated?

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Clarification: “will ever acquire” is wrong, it should be “it applies to past, present, and future”.

77

Louie said:

 

“Axioms are, metaphysically speaking, the basis to knowledge, but our recognition of axioms must be discovered.” -me

Discovery =/= Proof.

 

 

Its hard to believe you drop context like this so often on accident. I have already made it perfectly clear that I am not challenging the need to validate-discover the axioms by abstracting these fundamental facts from all facts in #52

 

If my problem was with the fact made clear by Ms Rand that we discover the implicit fact of axioms from all facts, I would have asked you to quote her saying that. I asked you to defend the claim that anything in Oism supports the idea that axioms are to viewed as a type of conditional truth that by your account could have been otherwise_-“just happen to be true_”.

 

.

 

And again in #55, the very post you are responding to:

 

 

In particular I made it clear that I was _ NOT debating the need to discover that axioms are implicit in all facts. _ I used the word conditional to describe your comments treating the axioms as “derived” or “discovered” from a specialized context as though a new context _migh_t invalidate them.

 

It’s the "specialized" that is the relevant difference you are missing. This has been a consistent point in my posts.( “specialized vs general”)

 

 

Louie said:

 

 

Your awareness of an axiom may be brought on by a specialized science,

 

So what? That doesn’t make the axioms specialized knowledge or justify skepticism of the axioms…“Implicit in all facts” includes all facts…

 

Louie said:

 

 

and if we EVER observe an inconsistency, as with Kepler, our philosophy may be wrong. Kepler probably had his mind totally blown that none of his observations worked with the universe of perfection created by god.

 

Again “our philosophy” in this context is referring to the axioms of Oism. Kepler’s philosophy has nothing to do with those axioms.

 

louie said:

 

From that realization, provided by special science of astronomy, that brought on the EVENTUAL axioms Rand discovered.

 

Absolute, complete nonsense! You are actually claiming that Rand abstracted the axioms from some astronomical observation???

 

Louie said:

 

So, this is what I mean by confusing metaphysical facts, ontology if you will, from our conceptual development. I am only making an epistemological claim that by the very reason we discover axioms, we can be mistaken in what  we identify as an axiom. We could use poor methods.

 

 

Specifically you are claiming that the axioms of Objectivism could “possibly” be wrong and “just happen” to have been true in the past. Not some hypothetical axiom. This _means could be disproven. _

 

louie said:

 

This is rhetoric absent of facts to support it. It sounds pithy, but explain yourself more. Descartes basically treated “cogito ergo sum” as axiomatic. But it had issues despite how great it sounds. He wasn’t 100% wrong, and it can’t be proven wrong, but further philosophical and scientific developments allowed for the realization that simply thinking isn’t the whole story to consciousness being conscious.
 

 

 

Ive already given facts but you ignore them. This whole Descartes nonsense is irrelevant, unfactual, and ignores the onus of proof principle (cant be disproven)

 

louie said:

 

 

 It is difficult to phrase it exactly right, so don’t crucify me if I don’t pass the linguistic analysis test.

 

Its clear you don’t know what linguistic analysis is. My statement:

 

 

You and ludicious keep doing this. You make a ridiculous comment and then when your pressed you try to say something other than what you said before. But what you said before that was wrong is still present in what your saying now.(I’ll address this in detail in a bit)

 

Is the very antithesis of what you want to accuse me of. You change your words but you keep saying -meaning the same mistakes is the opposite of linguistic analyst who play with symbols apart from meaning…

 

 

Louie said:

 

Yeah, axioms are themselves incontrovertible, but that doesn’t mean 5,000 years in the future we won’t find that Rand wasn’t 100% right.

 

 

 

You cannot know what incontrovertible or axiom means and make this statement. Rand said the axioms are incontrovertible-they are axioms and she was 100% right. Is your future going to exist, be what it is and are any conscious being gonna be conscious?

 

 

louie said:

 

Possible is referring here to fallibility, where an individual could be wrong about what is true. I am not referring to the presence of counter-evidence. That’s why I said “awareness of an axiom” rather than “evidence of an axiom”. You can mistake a rhino for an elephant, even though there is no evidence that the rhino-mistake is an elephant because the trunk couldn’t be seen. Similarly, you can mistake a provable fact for an axiom. This is fallibility.

 

 

There is no other meaning to “possible”. Mistaking a rhino for an elephant is not an instance of a being validating axiomatic self evidencies. There is something and you are aware of it, it is something in particular. That it is impossible to be wrong about! That information given directly by the senses Is infallible! Categorization is fallible, not perception, and direct perception is the key to the validation of the axioms. And one who _ knows _ that Oist axioms are _ not provable _ cannot mistake them for a provable fact! You and Lud claim to be one of those people.

 

louie said:

 

 

I found it quite presumptuous of you, Marc, and Nicky to take it that the disagreement is rooted in denying axioms or thinking axioms can be proved. It is more productive to correct errors and point out better terms to use.

 

You and Lud have been quoted doing exactly that. That is not a presumption! Having contradiction pointed out is very productive for me… 

What would be more productive is to admit you have contradicted your claims about axioms, figure out what axiom means so you can then recognize your own contradictions before you post them, and simply say what you mean.

 

 

Plasmatic, quotes are fine, but it is not an argument for anything you say. I can’t put together your argument. Give me reasons and examples.

First part you bolded is the question. Rand doesn’t comment on where Prof. E said “infallible data”. The response is saying that the foundation that stands in for the senses at a conceptual level is what you conceptualize directly. Given the whole book, “conceptualize directly” is a first level concept.

The second quote is saying that subsequent knowledge does not itself “add to” an axiom. There is nothing more to say about existence. However, “grasped conceptually” is to learn by a conceptual method, that is, we are not given at birth knowledge at birth of axioms. To the extent of learning a concept, we all must volitionally consider information and only then can a concept be formed. Axiomatic concepts are no different. What you perceive is what it is, but what you say about what you perceive is fallible. I cannot say this any more clearly.
 

 

I’ve given you direct quotes of you saying two different things yet you somehow don’t get that as argument…

 

Those quotes are directly related to the issue.

 

 

 what is the stand-in for the
evidence of the senses—the incontestable,
infallible data which are the foundation for
all subsequent inference?

 

Is actually hyphenated to link the “evidence of the senses” with " foundation". Ms. Rand then says “the foundation there is the same as in extrospective knowledge. In other words, the base is that which you can conceptualize directly and which corresponds to that same level of conceptual development in the extrospective world.” " Base" and  “level” are synonyms of foundation and  directly   refers to "direct sense perception. The _ infallible _ data is sense perception.

 

The second quote is to show you that the axioms are 1. experienced directly (infallibly), 2. nothing one learns after the first sensation adds anything to our knowledge of the axioms, so no specialized context is going to change what is already there in and from the first sensation. Learning that this is true explicitly adds nothing to the direct experience of these primary facts.

 

 

louie said:

 

 

The second quote is saying that subsequent knowledge does not itself “add to” an axiom. There is nothing more to say about existence. However, “grasped conceptually” is to learn by a conceptual method, that is, we are not given at birth knowledge at birth of axioms. To the extent of learning a concept, we all must volitionally consider information and only then can a concept be formed. Axiomatic concepts are no different. What you perceive is what it is, but what you say about what you perceive is fallible. I cannot say this any more clearly.
 

 

It is impossible to be wrong that you exist or are conscious and have identity once you know what that means. Validating them is a process of becoming aware of your awareness of them and what it means to refer to them. Its impossible to be wrong that there is something, I am aware of it, it is something in particular.

 

For this reason I disagree about categorizing particulars as infallible. But one cannot be wrong that “it”, “that”, what ever one is perceiving, exists, has identity, and you are the one aware of it. (“without yet knowing what it is”)…

 

I used to be a complete paradox embracing skeptic before discovering Oism. It was only when I realized that nothing in my experience of the world led to these beliefs that I realized I was taking the words of scientist (superpositions, duality, etc.) as reality and not my direct experience of the world.  Then Oism taught me how that foundation relates to meaning and this made me realize that I cannot even state the opposite meaningfully-without contradiction.

 

Once a skeptic similar to you and Don on this issue of fallibility, asked me to state what evidence I would accept as disproof of identity. I said to him “I can say the words “show me something that is not what it is”, but these words are actually nonsense. I am just making sounds with my mouth”… “To be honest I’d have to say;_  "Nothing, _ what you just said is a contradiction and I wont accept it as meaningful!” 

 

 I used to say “we cant know anything for certain, but I know that is a claim to knowledge” I just didnt know a way out… I wish someone could have said to me during those years of meaninglessness embracing paradoxes, “look out, can you see anything that is not what it is?”

79

 

Yeah, that validates A is A. I don’t see where first-level concepts are infallible is demonstrated?

 

Interesting. I had not put that forth as an effort of validating A is A. The example I’m trying to paraphrase came from Peikoff’s Intro to Logic, and boiled down to there are facts of which we know for certain, and facts which we can be mistaken about. I may have imported first-level concepts as facts about which we are certain.

 

These two examples may help address the question of how do we know we are fallible:

  • Prior to the practice of branding cows, we are certain that the cow we observe in the field is a cow, but is it farmer Joe’s cow that wandered into farmer Pete’s field, or farmer Pete’s cow, is a fact not obvious via direct inspection. The distinction being of facts available and unmistakable to the evidence of sense, vs., facts which are possible to be mistaken about, that the immediate evidence of sense does not provide.
  • Consider the oft used stick appearing bent when partially submerged in water example. Note that the attack on the senses was not done via the stick, the water, or the partial submergence, rather it was done on the appearance of being bent. The stick, the water and the partial submergence are unmistakable facts, given by direct evidence of the sense, where the explanation of the bent appearance relies on subsequent observations integrated in accordance with the methods described in Newton’s “Optiks”,
80

Categorization is fallible, not perception

I never was talking about perception. I’ve been emphasizing in different ways that I’m talking about one’s understanding and categorization of axiomatic concepts.

As for the rest of your post, Don’s post expresses what I’m thinking pretty well.