So my objection is not that some extra non-material stuff has been left out, but that you need to add more material.
It’s debatable what would happen to a mind if it was completely disconnected from sensory input. But considering the fact that we sleep and that does not seem to kill us, I think that we can take a bit of sensory deprivation. Who knows, the artificial mind might dream.
But in case we simulated a mind, we would want to interact with it somehow, or let it interact with some kind of environment. So this is no a problem for my argument.
Intuition is never good enough, agreed. But when you introspect and identify an emotion you are feeling that is perception. When you introspect and perceive your power of choice, that is perception. A perception is ‘evidence of the senses’ and so certainly is good enough basis for accepting that which is perceived.
Certainly, senses are right about what they tell us—but how does your senses tell you that a choice is part of a deterministic chain of events or that it is a ‘first cause’? I don’t think it is unfair to ask for some evidence for such a thing.
And I don’t see any reason there would be no way to explore free will by means of reason. Or is it holy, or perhaps outside the possible grasp of our reason? Or are some people born blind to the free will, just like some are colorblind?
There is a difference between introspection and intuition. Introspection does give us directly the nature of our mind, including the fact that we have free will. If you are calling introspection into question, then you cannot confirm free will
So do you mean that by introspection we can declare our free will to act as a ‘first cause’? I don’t see where I’m calling introspection in question—introspection just as perception must be correct in what it actually tells us. But the nature behind what it tells us is not mystically unveiled merely by observation. In no way do I see the inside of an orange just by looking at one, but I can always peel it…
I don’t see exactly how you see my previous post as stabs against free will. If you look at what you quoted and insert “God” instead of “real choices” and “free will” perhaps you will see why those are bad arguments.
So at what point are you affirming that we have free will?
How about the bolded part:
If we now were to simulate a human brain on a computer under these premises, we would find that free will is not capable of “real” choices, but is acting perfectly deterministically. It could of course be tested by letting the simulation run a specific scenario a couple of times, and resetting it each time (there would be ethical issues as this is a human brain after all).
So now either one of the premises is false, or we don’t in fact have ‘real’ choices (though we will still experience them as such).
Oh and by “real choices” I mean choices that are ‘first causes’. Free will is perfectly possible without that ‘first cause’ property. It does of course have some implications, but that would be the whole reason why this problem is interesting in the first place. That determinism and free will are compatible has been show countless time before.
Free will is validated introspectively. We don’t yet know the relationship between the human brain and the ability of free will; nonetheless we have that ability. Your position amounts to saying that we cannot affirm the power of vision until we know exactly how all those pieces that lead to perception are put together, instead of just being aware that we can see.
Not at all, what I’m saying is that we cannot know what causes free will just by introspection, just like we cannot know the underlying cause of the experience of redness before we inquire in the nature of the senses and whatever we experience as red.
We have free will and that is self-evident to introspection; one does not need to dissect the brain in order to find it. Similarly, one does not have to dissect a brain to find thoughts and emotions and awareness.
No we don’t, but to know the actual nature of those things we do have to understand the workings of the brain. While most people (if not all) have experienced happiness and many of those may know what caused them to be happy, I don’t think most of them understand what it is that makes such experiences possible. The same problem obviously applies to free will.
What you and others are basically saying is that you have this conception of causality that you call determinism, and that it covers everything, and therefore there can be no free will, no fundamental prime mover types of decisions. According to you, that is simply impossible, and one may well assert that if one agrees with free will then one might as well say one believes in God. In other words, you are claiming that free will is a version of mysticism. Well, it isn’t; it is an application of causality, that we are what we are and that we have free will because we are what we are. And if that doesn’t fit in with your metaphysics, then I strongly suggest that you check your premises.
The argument that I constructed in my first post in this tread does in no way require the assumption of determinism. It states simply that; either it is impossible to create a mind with a computer, or that the concept of ‘first cause’ must be abandoned in the case of free will (provided my other premises are correct).
So determinist is not where I started, but merely the conclusion of the argument. If my argument requires any further metaphysical assumptions than is held in the premises, I would appreciate if you showed them to me.
Oh and I don’t take my argument for granted, I still consider the premises to be on shaky ground and I had hoped to see if someone with more extensive knowledge might have some objections.
Firstly, human volition is not a contradiction of the Law of Causality. The Law of Causality states everything in the universe acts according to its nature. That’s all it says, nothing more.
If everything in the universe did not act according to its nature, it would mean things could be something other than what they are when they act. But that would be a contradiction of the Law of Identity. Nothing can exist, whether in the course of action or otherwise, apart from, or against its own nature.
Unfortunately that doesn’t say anything, the law of causality as you have put forward together with the law of identity still leaves the door open to all kinds of ‘mysticism’. Mystical things would just need to act in accordance to their (mysterious) nature.
So if a billiard ball’s motion is ruled by mechanical causation that’s one instance of causality in the universe. Likewise, if an animal’s actions are determined by automatic knowledge and values that’s another instance of causality in the universe. Finally, if Man’s behavior is governed by the primary choice to focus or not that’s still another instance of causality in the universe.
So it hardly makes sense to say everything in the universe is governed by a single instance of causality, namely, deterministic causation. That would be like saying a car is nothing more than a specific model. Just as a concept unites all the units subsumed under it, a metaphysical law integrates all the instances covered by it.
It’s interesting that you distinguish between different kinds of causation, what would be the proper way to categorize causations as different types?
Secondly, just as existence and consciousness are axiomatic concepts in metaphysics, sensory evidence and human volition are axiomatic concepts in epistemology.
An axiomatic concept, according to The Ayn Rand Lexicon, is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts. It is implicit in all facts and in all knowledge. It is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced, which requires no proof or explanation, but on which all proofs and explanations rest.
And what is God an axiomatic concept in theology?
Under what kind of authority should we consider existence, consciousness, sensory evidence and human volition outside the realm of inquiry?
Saying that those things cannot be analyzed makes no sense. Perhaps it is meant in a philosophical way, because science is obviously already trampling holy ground.
So it hardly makes sense to deny human volition because if Man cannot choose to activate his own consciousness then he cannot focus on things in reality at all. Hence no assertion he makes, including the arbitrary one denying his own volition, refers to anything in reality!
Likewise it hardly makes sense to deny sensory evidence because if Man’s senses are invalid then he cannot reduce his own assertions to the evidence provided by his senses. Hence no assertion he makes, including the arbitrary one denying his own senses, can be tied to reality!
I cannot grasp that it is not clear yet; I have not denied nor do I intend to deny that we have volition! Nor did I deny that we have free will. What my argument shows is that (in case the premises are not mistaken) is that free will is not the ‘first cause’ kind of free will.