Hey everybody, this is my first post. I’m primarily interested in metaphysical matters in philosophy, but I also like ethics.
Okay, nakt, where did you get that avatar?
Hey everybody, this is my first post. I’m primarily interested in metaphysical matters in philosophy, but I also like ethics.
Okay, nakt, where did you get that avatar?
Did you write all of that of your own free will? Did you sit down and decide to consider our arguments? Did you then decide to answer them point by point of your own free will?
Did I write of my free will? Of course, no one put a gun to my head, nor am I a philosophical zombie. It thought these things where obvious, and if you look at the first post I made in this tread you will see that I made out quite clearly (IMO) what I was talking about.
Whenever choices are necessitated (thus not really being choices) or not is certainly an interesting topic.
I don’t think there can be any mistake that I was not talking about the psychological concept of freedom. In fact I cannot grasp that anyone could actually interpret my writing as such a discussion.
I never thought this would be necessary to mention in a philosophy forum, but when philosophers talk about free will they talk about its metaphysical status, not if we are zombies or not. I don’t think any sane person would suggest such a thing. So I don’t understand why you bring that up again and again.
If you think that the question of the free will’s metaphysical status is a misconceived question or that it is uninteresting or perhaps impossible to answer, well then how difficult is it to just say that?
I would say that it is possible to create a mind (but not just with a ‘computer’) and it would necessarily have some free will in it to be recognizable as a mind. After all, our biological means of human reproduction is similar to nanotechnology. If people can have free will, then so can other suitably constructed entities.
I’m curious, would you care to speculate on what more would be needed than a computer to create a mind?
You are looking for free will in the wrong place. Free will is not a physical or metaphysical idea. Category error.
Well I’m not “looking for free will” I’m looking for how it works. As I’m sure you understand the point of the argument I presented earlier (the one in my first post in this thread) is that free will is not a metaphysical “first cause” if the premises are upheld. I think I made it clear that a metaphysical “first cause” is not necessary to uphold free will.
I agree that free will does not need to be a metaphysical concept, but there are certain consequences for such a view. Under such a concept of free will, if an entity with a specific identity (as all entities certainly have if the law of identity is metaphysical) was put in a certain situation, only one outcome becomes a possibility, something that I thought Objectivism wanted to altogether avoid.
And the next question that come to mind, why does Objectivism reject determinism, that itself is a metaphysical concept, if the upheld view of free will is not (a metaphysical concept)?
That existence, consciousness and volition can not be analyzed is meant strictly in ‘a philosophical way’. That is the context in which the statements are made and the only context in which they can be understood. The specific way in which they are philosophical is their epistemological content. By ‘reason’ you mean by science, an investigation which is inherently materialistic and reductionist. Epistemology is not a ‘science’ that can be so reduced, but that doesn’t make it mystical.
What a weird way to distinguish science from philosophy! It’s certainly very unorthodox, but while I understand the practicality of such solution I do think that it has its share of problems.
Aristotle wrote “All men by nature desire to know.” This small statement is not just a meditation on human nature but also the nature of knowledge. The will to know is an epistemological first cause , not a metaphysical first cause. The will to know is not a metaphysical first cause because it does not make possible the existence of anything, existence is prior to and independent of consciousness. The will to know is an epistemological first cause because it makes possible any and all knowledge.
Thank you for making that clear, but then Objectivism is entirely compatible with determinism. So the Objectivist approach to free will is compatibilism? Or are there some distinctions?
The Law of Causality is formulated after observing what exists and how they act (or are acted upon) in reality. Whereas a belief in mysticism or mystical things is arbitrary because they are based on nothing in reality and have no relation to Man’s knowledge of it.
Clearly, someone would not believe in god for no reason. So I’m sure that a religious person would contest that their faith is based on nothing in reality.
By simple observation. One sees inanimate billiard balls being acted upon without acting to pursue anything. Then one sees animals acting automatically to pursue values based on automatic sensory knowledge. Finally, one sees men (including cavemen) choosing to discover the values required for their survival and taking the actions necessary to obtain them.
Back in your previous post you mentioned “deterministic causation”, so what other types of causation are there? And under what criterion is the differentiation made? Just saying that it is observed does not say anything. Causation is a metaphysical concept, but I can’t see these types as metaphysically different.
And one needs no authority (except one’s independent perception of reality) to identify existence, consciousness, sensory evidence and human volition as self-evident primaries in philosophy.
Philosophy is the study of the fundamental nature of reality, of Man, and of Man’s relationship to reality (from Philosophy: Who Needs It by Ayn Rand.) So it is the only science in human knowledge which deals with the broadest abstractions possible.
This means none of the special sciences (be it the physical or the social) deal with the most fundamental truths because they study only specific aspects of reality or of Man.
So there’s absolutely nothing (emphasis added) they can discover about anything in reality which can invalidate the axioms of philosophy or the immutable fact that they are irreducible (since they are at the base of all knowledge, both philosophic and scientific.)
Such a distinction between philosophy and science gives at best an impoverished philosophy, and at worst reducing it to the obvious.
In fact, no scientific knowledge could even be possible if these axioms are not implicitly accepted by every scientist. As example, take the current bankrupt state of physics in which physicists routinely reject the primacy of existence by their arbitrary claim that subatomic particles come into existence only after they have been detected by Man! That is like saying if a tree fell in a forest uninhabited by any animal, no sound will be transmitted since there’s no one to hear the sound! This is what happens when a scientist’s bad philosophy eventually corrupts his science.
No offence, but you clearly don’t have any idea of what you are talking about. Not that it has anything to do with the topic, but I’ll do you a favor to show you your mistake.
Physics is about one thing and one thing only. That is to make observations and to create models that predict accurately predict the observations. If you take a course in quantum physics you will most likely never hear anything about the Copenhagen interpretation, or the many world interpretation and rightfully so, as they are not science. They are philosophical interpretation—purely metaphysical concepts which attempts to provide the “why?” behind physics.
Physics is not metaphysics—for obvious reasons—so there is no “bankrupt state of physics”. As long as the predictions are accurate, there is nothing to object. Or do you believe that some results nature shows us are “wrong”? Physicists are not out to paint a beautiful painting or to make an esthetically pleasing sculpture, that is outside the scope of science. Science is not normative, nor should it ever be. And the only philosophy scientists need to keep making a good job is the scientific method that provides the rails that science can never stray from.
And if you still think that modern science is “corrupt”, perhaps you ought to consider that the very device you are using right now is made possible by “bankrupt” science.
Considering how successful their “corrupt” philosophy is, they ought to indulge even more! Imagine what wonders that would bring!
How did you form the concept “choice”? Obviously by experiencing it as you admit. You could not have formed it by observing anything external to you. So there is no other way in which you could have formed it. Then you go ahead and deny it. That is concept stealing.
Sigh…
Where do I deny choice?
To say that choices are superficial is not the same thing as to deny that there are choices…
Did I write of my free will? Of course, no one put a gun to my head, nor am I a philosophical zombie. It thought these things where obvious…
Well, yes, they are obvious, so why are you calling them into question? If you wrote it of your own free will by your own motivation, then congratulations, you are beginning to discover your volitional capabilities!
I don’t think there can be any mistake that I was not talking about the psychological concept of freedom…I never thought this would be necessary to mention in a philosophy forum, but when philosophers talk about free will they talk about its metaphysical status, not if we are zombies or not. I don’t think any sane person would suggest such a thing.
Maybe we are talking past one another.
Yes, the metaphysical status of free will or volition in man is that it exists absolutely. Free will is a fact, and an indisputable one; that is what it means to say that it is axiomatic in man. One cannot deny it without affirming it, unless one wants to claim that one is a mind dead zombie; in which case, one wouldn’t be claiming anything, let alone that one doesn’t have free will. Volition is a fundamental fact about the nature of man’s consciousness; and it is fundamental because we observe it directly via introspection – that is, we are directly aware that we have free will.
Free will is a metaphysical first cause in the sense that you choose what to do with your mind; whether to think or not (and what to think about) is under your direct control. It is an epistemological starting point in the sense that one begins by observing one’s capabilities to have control over one’s thoughts and one’s actions, as you confirmed by stating that you wrote your posting of your own free will.
Well I’m not “looking for free will” I’m looking for how it works.
One first finds out how it works introspectively, such as one has direct control over one’s thoughts but does not have direct control over one’s emotions or other subconscious processes.
If you are looking for how it works in terms of what do we need to have in order to have the power of free will (such as a pre-frontal cortex or something like that), well that is not a philosophic question. It is a specific scientific question. However, one doesn’t answer that question by claiming that we don’t have free will because it is not acceptable to a pseudo-causality of determinism. We do definitely have the power of free will.
And the next question that come to mind, why does Objectivism reject determinism, that itself is a metaphysical concept, if the upheld view of free will is not (a metaphysical concept)?
Objectivists consider determinism to be invalid because it wants to assert that we do not have free will and also because it says that everything acts according to that which acts on it or do to some mechanical internal process. Objectivism holds that an entity is what it is and does what it does because it is what it is. And man is such that he has the ability to control his conscious mind and to act on his choices – those are metaphysical – i.e. real – facts. Your choices do not come about because of some internal strictly mechanical pingings of neurons or synapses. The ability to have free will may well depend on having a brain of a certain type, but you deciding to write a reply to this is by your own choice and not due to some neuro-biochemical process that just happened to get your fingers moving over the key board. You chose to reply.
Sigh…
Where do I deny choice?
To say that choices are superficial is not the same thing as to deny that there are choices…
To say that choices are superficial or not real choices or are illusions is to claim that free will does not exist as a fact, but only as some sort of psychological trickery done by our brains (or something to that effect). Objectivism rejects this approach to the introspective. Introspection is valid, and gives us the nature of our minds – i.e. thoughts, emotions, processing information, considering facts, imagination, etc. are all facts about man’s consciousness; and these can only be validated introspectively as the first observation of the nature of man’s mind.
Clearly, someone would not believe in god for no reason. So I’m sure that a religious person would contest that their faith is based on nothing in reality.
How does having a ‘reason’ for believing in God prove its existence? How does a religious person’s assertion that their faith is based on reality prove its basis? God does not come into existence merely because a theist has ‘reasons’ for his irrational belief or because he arbitrarily claims God’s existence.
Back in your previous post you mentioned “deterministic causation”, so what other types of causation are there? And under what criterion is the differentiation made? Just saying that it is observed does not say anything. Causation is a metaphysical concept, but I can’t see these types as metaphysically different.
Why does one need to know the metaphysical differences between the instances of causality one observes in reality before one can integrate them to formulate the Law of Causality? It’s the task of science, not philosophy, to discover any such differences.
So it hardly makes sense to say that unless and until one scientifically knows what in reality makes possible living organisms as against inanimate matter, or volition in Man as against automatic behavior in animals, one can never really conclude that things in reality act in accordance with their nature, no matter how much one observes them acting that way.
Such a distinction between philosophy and science gives at best an impoverished philosophy, and at worst reducing it to the obvious.
This is nothing but an assertion for which no reasons have been given. So simply making such assertions proves nothing.
No offence, but you clearly don’t have any idea of what you are talking about. Not that it has anything to do with the topic, but I’ll do you a favor to show you your mistake.
Physics is about one thing and one thing only. That is to make observations and to create models that predict accurately predict the observations. If you take a course in quantum physics you will most likely never hear anything about the Copenhagen interpretation, or the many world interpretation and rightfully so, as they are not science. They are philosophical interpretation—purely metaphysical concepts which attempts to provide the “why?” behind physics.
Physics is not metaphysics—for obvious reasons—so there is no “bankrupt state of physics”. As long as the predictions are accurate, there is nothing to object. Or do you believe that some results nature shows us are “wrong”? Physicists are not out to paint a beautiful painting or to make an esthetically pleasing sculpture, that is outside the scope of science. Science is not normative, nor should it ever be. And the only philosophy scientists need to keep making a good job is the scientific method that provides the rails that science can never stray from.
You say physics is about nothing but making observations and creating models which accurately predict the observations. Observations of what? And models about what?
This is such a sloppy description of physics which says nothing about the specific aspect of reality it studies that one can barely distinguish it from any other science which also makes observations and creates models for predicting them. So it’s you who clearly don’t have any idea of what you are talking about here.
What I said about the philosophic bankruptcy of physics has been discussed at length by Dr. David Harriman in his lecture: The Philosophic Corruption of Physics. So I would suggest that you listen to his lecture if you are seriously interested in understanding what physics was at one time and what it has become now.
It is epistemology which prescribes how Man should gain knowledge of reality. So it would be impossible for the scientific method to prescribe what a scientist should do to gain knowledge of the specific aspect of reality which his science studies, unless it implicitly followed the fundamental principles of knowledge discovered by epistemology to begin with.
And if you still think that modern science is “corrupt”, perhaps you ought to consider that the very device you are using right now is made possible by “bankrupt” science.
Considering how successful their “corrupt” philosophy is, they ought to indulge even more! Imagine what wonders that would bring!
The very device I’m using is a product of technology/engineering which applies the principles discovered by scientists of a better era who, unlike modern physicists, did not fantasize about things coming into existence only after Man discovered them!
No offense, but the more you argue in this forum, the more it appears that you know little or nothing about the crucial role of philosophy in Man’s life, and the logical dependence of all fields of human knowledge, including science (and its method), on philosophy, particularly epistemology. So I’ll do you a favor and suggest that you read the following:
Philosophy: Who Needs It by Ayn Rand,
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand, and
Objectivism: The Philosophy of Any Rand by Dr. Leonard Peikoff
I’m curious, would you care to speculate on what more would be needed than a computer to create a mind?
I already did in post #31 of this thread. To summarize, a mind can’t exist without a body, a means of perceiving and interacting with the world. What elements of a body can be dispensed with, and what minimum requirements remain is not yet known. Beyond the notion that some body is required I have no theory on how much body is necessary.
Well I’m not “looking for free will” I’m looking for how it works. As I’m sure you understand the point of the argument I presented earlier (the one in my first post in this thread) is that free will is not a metaphysical “first cause” if the premises are upheld. I think I made it clear that a metaphysical “first cause” is not necessary to uphold free will.
I emphasized the epistemological nature of free will so I could make the following point. Looking for how free will works as a scientific investigation is like investigating ideas scientifically. Ideas don’t exist physically or metaphysically and neither does free will, so the pursuit is chasing a ghost.
I agree that free will does not need to be a metaphysical concept, but there are certain consequences for such a view. Under such a concept of free will, if an entity with a specific identity (as all entities certainly have if the law of identity is metaphysical) was put in a certain situation, only one outcome becomes a possibility, something that I thought Objectivism wanted to altogether avoid.
And the next question that come to mind, why does Objectivism reject determinism, that itself is a metaphysical concept, if the upheld view of free will is not (a metaphysical concept)?
The ‘single possibility for action’ idea is not a necessary consequence of moving free will from metaphysics to epistemology. The idea is wrong on more fundamental terms.
Determinism can be refuted without reference to free will. The determinist principle that each action entails a single possible consequent action is an arbitrary assertion that cannot be proven. Considered as a simple restatement of the causality principle determinism fails because it unjustifiably restricts what is possible. Unjustifiable, because philosophy can not be normative by specifying apriori what physics must discover. Philosophy can only specify what kind of thing is impossible, a contradiction.
Determinism also invokes an infinite regress of causes unless there actually was a metaphysical first cause. But if determinism can have one first cause then it can have others and ‘single possible consequent action’ is a false premise.
What a weird way to distinguish science from philosophy! It’s certainly very unorthodox, but while I understand the practicality of such solution I do think that it has its share of problems.
Well it wouldn’t be very practical if the problems were serious, so I wonder what problems you have in mind.
Thank you for making that clear, but then Objectivism is entirely compatible with determinism. So the Objectivist approach to free will is compatibilism? Or are there some distinctions?
I have relied upon SEP Compatibilism as a background explanation of compatibilism. Because Objectivism denies the determinist premise of a single possible consequent action, and a rigorous denial of this premise was not listed as one of the compatibilist arguments, Objectivism is not compatibilism.
I emphasized the epistemological nature of free will so I could make the following point. Looking for how free will works as a scientific investigation is like investigating ideas scientifically. Ideas don’t exist physically or metaphysically and neither does free will, so the pursuit is chasing a ghost.
I’ve been debating about replying to this or just letting the thread die, but I have decided that this needs to be answered.
Epistemology is the study of man’s mind, and the only way to study it is via introspection. One might read something like Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and say one got it via extrospection, but without introspectively verifying what one reads about the nature of the human mind, one is not grounding the theory properly, because that requires observations.
Also, I don’t know if you intended this or not, but it comes across as you saying that one’s mind, thoughts, ideas, imagination, memory, free will, etc. just isn’t real, when you say it isn’t metaphysical. Of course these are real, they are a fact of reality. If you meant it is not a branch of metaphysics, then in a sense you are right and in a sense you are wrong. Metaphysics studies the fundamental aspects of existence – i.e. what is the real nature of the universe – and the real nature of the universe includes consciousness. That is, one has to realize via introspection that the three axioms apply to human consciousness: it exists, it has identity, and it is consciousness. There is something there that I am aware of includes one’s own awareness of one’s own consciousness and aspects of it, such as ideas, emotions, free will, etc.
It has always baffled me that some people do not consider their very own minds to be real, or that introspection doesn’t tell one anything about the true nature of our minds. I mean, I discovered my mind when I was a very young child, so when an adult asks a question or implies that the mind isn’t real, then I don’t know what to say except to introspect and discover your own mind. And that is how one discovers free will, that one has control over one’s conscious mind, which has control over what you decide to do. A is A even for human consciousness, and consciously deciding to think about something and consciously deciding to do something about it is free will. And it is fully real.
So, qua fact of reality, human consciousness and free will is real; it exists; which makes it metaphysical in that sense.
I’ve been debating about replying to this or just letting the thread die, but I have decided that this needs to be answered.
…
So, qua fact of reality, human consciousness and free will is real; it exists; which makes it metaphysical in that sense.
Thanks for your clarification, your point is valid. I should have emphasized that the fallacy of reification should be avoided: free will isn’t going to be found as a thing in the brain because it is something the brain does. Reductionist dissection and analysis isn’t going to find free will. Still, you have motivated me to write a paragraph addressing the metaphysical nature of free will.
That which exists is neither true nor false, it simply is. Existence is the standard of truth in the sense that any idea which is true can be reduced to an existent (or relation among things that exist). What makes ideas metaphysically different and unmetaphysical is that they can be true or false. Free will, because it is the means by which we steer our thoughts correctly or incorrectly, is the cause of the ‘true or false’ nature of abstractions, the fallibility of knowledge. Free will then cannot itself be judged true or false but must be accepted as metaphysically given.
I apologize for taking my time with this reply; I’ve had some other things on my mind lately.
Free will is a metaphysical first cause in the sense that you choose what to do with your mind; whether to think or not (and what to think about) is under your direct control. It is an epistemological starting point in the sense that one begins by observing one’s capabilities to have control over one’s thoughts and one’s actions, as you confirmed by stating that you wrote your posting of your own free will.
Correct me if I’m misunderstand what you are saying, but when you say that free will is a “metaphysical first cause” do you mean in the sense that in the brain we would have a bunch of neurons and then ex nihilo we have a neuron that fires? That would be downright uncanny stuff, enough to make neurologists seriously reconsidering dualism.
If you are looking for how it works in terms of what do we need to have in order to have the power of free will (such as a pre-frontal cortex or something like that), well that is not a philosophic question. It is a specific scientific question. However, one doesn’t answer that question by claiming that we don’t have free will because it is not acceptable to a pseudo-causality of determinism. We do definitely have the power of free will.
Well it definitely isn’t harmful to have some a priori speculations about it, there is certainly a bit of work on free will that can be done on the philosophical side of things, for example if we where to conclude that free will is impossible under any circumstances other than with a first cause, then we would know that either science is doing something wrong (as a first cause is contradictory to everything in science so far) or that our preconception of free will are flawed.
We clearly have free will in some context, but how wide that context is something we can speculate about, hence my posts about this topic. If you think a philosophical approach is fruitless perhaps you could tell me why you think that is the case.
Objectivists consider determinism to be invalid because it wants to assert that we do not have free will and also because it says that everything acts according to that which acts on it or do to some mechanical internal process. Objectivism holds that an entity is what it is and does what it does because it is what it is. And man is such that he has the ability to control his conscious mind and to act on his choices – those are metaphysical – i.e. real – facts. Your choices do not come about because of some internal strictly mechanical pingings of neurons or synapses. The ability to have free will may well depend on having a brain of a certain type, but you deciding to write a reply to this is by your own choice and not due to some neuro-biochemical process that just happened to get your fingers moving over the key board. You chose to reply.
But determinism clearly does not ignore the “internal” part of the equation; to say that what’s on our minds doesn’t matter is not determinism but rather behaviorism. If I’m eating icecream it would not be because my body on its own had decided to do so, but because I wanted to do so, however under determinism our wants and wills are part of what is determined. There are of course solutions to this “problem” (I don’t think it should be considered as such) like dualism, but as usual, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence…
To say that choices are superficial or not real choices or are illusions is to claim that free will does not exist as a fact, but only as some sort of psychological trickery done by our brains (or something to that effect). Objectivism rejects this approach to the introspective. Introspection is valid, and gives us the nature of our minds – i.e. thoughts, emotions, processing information, considering facts, imagination, etc. are all facts about man’s consciousness; and these can only be validated introspectively as the first observation of the nature of man’s mind.
But introspection only gives us the nature of minds on a psychological level, not on what is actually happening in our brains (neurology), therefore introspection is just superficial. It would be quite surprising if someone knew what was going on in her head while introspecting! Many parts of our psychological activity is also completely transparent to introspection (subconscious) so introspection should not be taken beyond what it is actually capable of, lest we want it to be completely unreliable guesswork.
That is not to say that I believe that we are not in control of ourselves, or even carefully deceived, I’m just asserting the clear limits.
I’ve just thought up a little thought experiment that may make you think a little more about choices.
Does a chess playing program have the ability to choose? There is no denying that there are different possibilities for it to take, but can it be said that it choose from its options?
Since you assert that human beings (or at least most of them) are capable of “real choices” (I’m not denying that we have) perhaps we should take a look exactly where the choice/not choice distinction starts to blur.
Perhaps you are familiar with the sort of intrusive neural implants that have been made on animals as research. One intriguing experiment consisted of controlling the movements of a mouse with a computer. This was done not by controlling the impulses directly to make it move its limbs in a specific fashion—as this would have been more complicated—but rather by manipulating what the mouse wanted to do. When they wanted to make the mouse go to the left, they just made it want to go left, and it did!
Surely, a person would notice such an impulse and we would feel controlled. But what if it was a lot more subtle?
Now to the thought experiment:
Lets say that a group of evil scientists (seems like they always are in experiments such as this one
) want to win a chess contest by any means necessary. No one of them are good enough and they don’t have the time to learn to master the game so they decide to use a subject—let’s call him Joe—to win the game for them. They face the same problem with Joe as with anyone else, they don’t have the time to train him so they come up with a devious plan; What about implanting a chess program in his brain? The AI would be able to defeat any human player, and as it would not be noticed that Joe had a computer in his head (a tiny one obviously) they could easily win.
But how would they make the AI “talk” to Joe? It might send auditory signals, but then Joe would be aware that he is being helped, and could give away the evil scientists plot.
The ideal way would be to give Joe cues that seemed perfectly natural, how about using the AI to direct his will? He could of course play in any way that he wanted, but somehow he feels inclined that he should make his moves exactly as the AI tells him to.
Now Joe ends up winning the contest, and he (to himself) seemed to play in complete accordance to his will.
But did he play of his free will?
Now I’m not saying that this is the way our lives unfold, but I think that will is something that requires careful consideration.
The very device I’m using is a product of technology/engineering which applies the principles discovered by scientists of a better era who, unlike modern physicists, did not fantasize about things coming into existence only after Man discovered them!
No offense, but the more you argue in this forum, the more it appears that you know little or nothing about the crucial role of philosophy in Man’s life, and the logical dependence of all fields of human knowledge, including science (and its method), on philosophy, particularly epistemology. So I’ll do you a favor and suggest that you read the following:
Philosophy: Who Needs It by Ayn Rand,
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand, and
Objectivism: The Philosophy of Any Rand by Dr. Leonard Peikoff
For the fact that most of what you are saying sound more or less like things quoted directly from those books, I would say that I am familiar with them. Seriously, are you trolling? As nothing you bring up has anything to do with the topic, I’m going leave your post at that. If you want to talk about the “bankruptcy of physics” feel free to make a new tread and I’ll try to clear up whatever misunderstanding of modern physics you might have. You should however not expect me to buy some obscure book, as I’m sure you could put down in your own words (or link to something on the web I can access).
I already did in post #31 of this thread. To summarize, a mind can’t exist without a body, a means of perceiving and interacting with the world. What elements of a body can be dispensed with, and what minimum requirements remain is not yet known. Beyond the notion that some body is required I have no theory on how much body is necessary.
Yet we dream, you can try if you are aware during a dream to feel anything of your external body, you won’t feel a thing.
So if a mind could be kept dreaming (can probably be done with the right substances) there would be no reason why we couldn’t still be alive with the appropriate life support.
I emphasized the epistemological nature of free will so I could make the following point. Looking for how free will works as a scientific investigation is like investigating ideas scientifically. Ideas don’t exist physically or metaphysically and neither does free will, so the pursuit is chasing a ghost.
I completely disagree with this. To say that ideas don’t exist physically is like to say that the pictures on my hard drive don’t exist physically. It is certainly true that they aren’t expressed the same way (there is no picture in “1” and “0”!) but to say that they don’t exist is completely missing the point. Ideas are made out of something (something that thinks… hmm), when I look out the window at the sharp sunlight slipping through the canopy of the trees you surely wouldn’t say that all that is actually physically in my head (I mean, there wouldn’t even be room for such things unless my head is one of those sci-fi multidimensional spaces or maybe the objects are just really small!
) .
But when I get such pictures in my mind, there is some neural activity that makes those pictures!
Perhaps with tools of enough sophistication we could take a peak in someone mind. Likewise, there has to be something that free will reduces to. It would not just disappear, but it might present itself in an altogether different way that we expect it to—but it’s there somewhere. The only way it could “disappear” is if in fact free will as a folk psychological concept is dead wrong, just a complete misunderstanding. But you seem pretty ardent that free will is actually real, with such confidence there is nothing to fear right? The ghost must be there.
It’s easy to throw around such words such as emergence and hope the whole deal to be swept away under the rug but the thing is that such features are also subjects of science. Imagine if a physicist walked in the office of a biologist and declared that living organism did not exist anymore (scientifically), since they have been reduced to particles!
The ‘single possibility for action’ idea is not a necessary consequence of moving free will from metaphysics to epistemology. The idea is wrong on more fundamental terms.
Determinism can be refuted without reference to free will. The determinist principle that each action entails a single possible consequent action is an arbitrary assertion that cannot be proven. Considered as a simple restatement of the causality principle determinism fails because it unjustifiably restricts what is possible. Unjustifiable, because philosophy can not be normative by specifying apriori what physics must discover. Philosophy can only specify what kind of thing is impossible, a contradiction.
Well the idea of determinism is considered justified by induction and it is as old as science itself. The actions considered are of course actions on a more basic level than human action, but if science is upheld as metaphysical fact, then determinism seems inescapable, with the exception of quantum physics, but even that randomness is just… well, random. It does naturally face the usual problems of induction, but nature seems quite strict to play along the rules. You could of course always bring up emergence, but the thing is; emergent properties emerge from whatever it consists of, not from nothing.
For example, when temperature in a gas is said to emerge from the average kinetic energy of the particles it consists of, that property comes from the particles, not from magic.
While it’s perhaps a bit early to speculate about the human mind (considering the sorry state of the theories of consciousness, or rather the lack thereof) there is no reason to believe that different rules would apply to it. But there is always the safe way out by upholding dualism (I do consider that to “cheat”).
Determinism also invokes an infinite regress of causes unless there actually was a metaphysical first cause. But if determinism can have one first cause then it can have others and ‘single possible consequent action’ is a false premise.
Your reduction to the absurd there is invalid, as you rely on a hidden premise. Even if determinism implied an infinite regress or a first cause or any other (arbitrary) oddity, it could always be solved by an (arbitrary) ad hoc hypothetic.
And when people counter an ad hoc hypothesis used to save an argument from an arbitrary claim by another ad hoc (also perfectly arbitrary) solution I think it’s best to leave such speculation aside
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Well it wouldn’t be very practical if the problems were serious, so I wonder what problems you have in mind.
I might just be reading a bit too much into it, but it seem to me as if you are drawing a “hard” line between the subjects. Sort of like putting yourself in a corner where science will never reach and say: this is philosophy. Science is not inherently reductionist; in fact there is the usual heated debate of holism vs. reductionism among other things, even in such fields as physics which I believe is often seen as reductionist.
If you would choose to draw the line of philosophy about timeless things that could never be disproved (or believed to never be disprovable) where does all that stuff that does not really fit into science end up? Should all the rest of philosophy be thrown in the dustbin? But some of that stuff I really useful, not only as inspiration, but also as a way to find what we are looking for in the first place ( i.e. possible ground for science).
If I understand you correctly, you seem to say that something will be lost in the reduction and this is something that I disagree with. But maybe I’m just over-interpreting what you are saying.
I have relied upon SEP Compatibilism as a background explanation of compatibilism. Because Objectivism denies the determinist premise of a single possible consequent action, and a rigorous denial of this premise was not listed as one of the compatibilist arguments, Objectivism is not compatibilism.
So that means that there are multiple consequent actions? Could you perhaps show me where the same effect can indeed lead to different results (that’s what you are saying right?).
That sort of causation clearly does not apply to physical objects bouncing around, so I must say I’m at loss of where such causation happens.
If you want to give it exclusively to human being then I have an objection unless you cheat here (dualism). To say that a different kind of causation applies to the human will then I think that is quite an extraordinary claim and to say simply that it is so because the nature of free will, is simple dodging the question using circular reasoning. If the free will is indeed different, then it must be different in virtue of something. This something is what I want to find.
But introspection only gives us the nature of minds on a psychological level, not on what is actually happening in our brains (neurology), therefore introspection is just superficial. It would be quite surprising if someone knew what was going on in her head while introspecting! Many parts of our psychological activity is also completely transparent to introspection (subconscious) so introspection should not be taken beyond what it is actually capable of, lest we want it to be completely unreliable guesswork.
If you think that introspection does not give you the nature of your mind, then you are effectively making yourself unreal to yourself. However, that is the nature of your argument, that we cannot know our own minds until we figure out what is going on in detail in the brain.
Your stance would lead to no epistemology, the study of how the human mind works; and no philosophy in general, since knowing if your mind is in accordance with reality or not requires introspection; and no science, not even neurology, because a man has to know how his mind works in order to become a scientist.
With that said, I’m through discussing the issue with you, as it is completely against the Objectivist stance that the human mind is real and is accessible via introspection. If you deny that, then you won’t every be going in the right direction on this topic.
The brain is not the mind any more than the eye is sight.
Since this is the debate forum and presentations of non-Objectivist ideas are permitted, I think I need to clarify my position of why I don’t want to argue certain points. Some things are simply not debatable because they are given directly.
Perception is one of these. I mean if someone wanted to have a debate about whether or not the glass in front of me is real or not, past a certain point I would have to say it is not arguable that it does indeed exist. And if he said something like, “Well, it is not really a glass because it is really a puff of sub-atomic particles whirling about,” then I could point out to him that while it is composed of sub-atomic particles whirling about, it is still really a glass, and furthermore that perception gives us what the glass is directly via observation.
Introspection is similar to perception in that we observe our mind directly. We observe what it is doing and the various entities of the mind, such as concepts, imaginations, memories, etc. It’s true in a sense that we don’t have direct access to the sub-conscious, but via introspection we can determine what is going on in our sub-conscious, and correct it when necessary, though this requires introspection.
In short, if one is going to throw out introspection as not being valid or just being trivial, then one might as well say it is OK to cut out one’s eyes, since perception is trivial.
As I have pointed out before, I don’t think this is necessarily evasion of the facts, but rather a kind of blindness to the facts coming about due to bad philosophy. In this kind of issue, to some people, pointing to the facts is of no concern to them because they think they are trivial and not real reality. It is Platonic and Kantian in nature, and past a certain point they simply cannot be argued with. Eventually it is possible to come out of this morass, but that is entirely up to the person who considers perception or introspection to be trivial. I’m in a position whereby I cannot point to a fact of reality to make my case, because the person I am arguing with has decided that those facts are trivial, and so how can I build up my case based on the facts and reason?
I’m in a position whereby I cannot point to a fact of reality to make my case, because the person I am arguing with has decided that those facts are trivial, and so how can I build up my case based on the facts and reason?
This really is the central problem I’ve found with so many of these kinds of discussions. How does one proceed with a reasoned discussion when the other party’s goal is to undercut the validity of reason? Of course, that party will have to use reason and logic as they attempt to undercut both… :pimp:
But determinism clearly does not ignore the “internal” part of the equation; to say that what’s on our minds doesn’t matter is not determinism but rather behaviorism. If I’m eating icecream it would not be because my body on its own had decided to do so, but because I wanted to do so, however under determinism our wants and wills are part of what is determined. There are of course solutions to this “problem” (I don’t think it should be considered as such) like dualism, but as usual, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence…
A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole (or even of every proper part). The argument that if the brain consists only of neurons, molecules and atoms none of which have free will, then the brain as a whole cannot have free will is an instance of the fallacy of composition. It really is as simple as that, and I thank you for this discussion which has brought me to my new favorite refutation of determinism because it is so short.
I completely disagree with this. To say that ideas don’t exist physically is like to say that the pictures on my hard drive don’t exist physically. It is certainly true that they aren’t expressed the same way (there is no picture in “1” and “0”!) but to say that they don’t exist is completely missing the point.
No, you just blew past the entire point. There is no picture in “1” and “0”. There is no free will in neurons, molecules and atoms.
Well the idea of determinism is considered justified by induction and it is as old as science itself.
Determinism goes back at least as far as the greek sophists, predating science by centuries. It has always been a fallacy.
Oh by the way, “justified by induction?” How long have you been keeping secret your refutation of Hume’s skeptical attack on induction? Because mainstream, non-Objectivist philosophy has not yet come up with one.
if science is upheld as metaphysical fact,
LOL, this is very revealing. The process of science is not a simple fact. Science is a highly abstract endeavor which presumes an entire philosophy of science based on logic, the evidence of the senses, primacy of existence and free will (in other words, the whole of epistemology, the quintessential philosophical field). You continue to commit the stolen concept fallacy by putting the cart before the horse when using scientific ideas and perspectives to undercut the philosophy that makes science possible. This is a real head-banger :pimp: Until you come to grips with the idea that science is dependent upon and made possible by logically prior philosophical ideas which science cannot be permitted to ever contradict, there is no more to say.
You could of course always bring up emergence, but the thing is; emergent properties emerge from whatever it consists of, not from nothing.
For example, when temperature in a gas is said to emerge from the average kinetic energy of the particles it consists of, that property comes from the particles, not from magic.
While it’s perhaps a bit early to speculate about the human mind (considering the sorry state of the theories of consciousness, or rather the lack thereof) there is no reason to believe that different rules would apply to it.
You have summarized the state of the art in neuroscience (human consciousness somehow emerges from its component parts).
Your reduction to the absurd there is invalid, as you rely on a hidden premise. Even if determinism implied an infinite regress or a first cause or any other (arbitrary) oddity, it could always be solved by an (arbitrary) ad hoc hypothetic.
And when people counter an ad hoc hypothesis used to save an argument from an arbitrary claim by another ad hoc (also perfectly arbitrary) solution I think it’s best to leave such speculation aside
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This was too brief for me to follow. What hidden premise? What do you mean by ‘ad hoc hypothetic’ and please give an example. The possibilities of infinite regress versus a first cause are together mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, so there is no element of the arbitrary there. My argument stands.
So that means that there are multiple consequent actions? Could you perhaps show me where the same effect can indeed lead to different results (that’s what you are saying right?).
That sort of causation clearly does not apply to physical objects bouncing around, so I must say I’m at loss of where such causation happens.
Quantum mechanics and human volition are two separate examples (I do not know or need to claim that human volition is actually quantum in nature).