Well…here goes…
DavidOdden writes:
The point you didn’t seem to understand is that there exist many animals with consciousness, but no conceptual faculty. Dogs are an example. You should think about that particular point; and then I’d suggest that you read some of Rand’s writings, since that might help you to understand Objectivist epistemology. I don’t particularly care if you decide to reject Objectivist epistemology for rational reasons, but you do at least need to get a clue about what it is.
Response:
I don’t believe that I am confusing our “conceptual faculty” with consciousness. But I am saying that there is a clear material (i.e. logically) link between such a faculty and that of consciousness. Objectivism, unless it divines a clear boundary between a consciousness possessing a “conceptual faculty” and one that does not, will not survive. Why would dogs not have a conceptual faculty? Dogs clearly identify and classify patterns and even react to such patterns in a very abstract way—though clearly on a lower level than human beings. A dog knows that a collision is a collision, whether it is into a tree, rock, building, or vehicle. A dog reads a grin (for some humans, a sign of glee and welcome) as a “showing of teeth”—a sign of aggression from the one grinning. Dogs clearly form “concepts” at a lower neurological level, forming classes of response to fit with the classes of stimuli that accumulate over time. Whether the dog chooses to “verbalize” concept internally or externally does not detract from its forming some kind of neurological organization and classification—which is the primordial groundwork leading to “abstraction” and “conceptualization.”
Jmegan writes concerning my “baseless assertion” that anti-foundational epistemologies are baseless.
Baseless assertion. But, of course, this must make it correct, no, because things that HAVE a basis are INCORRECT just for that very reason.
Response:
There is a difference between an epistemology without a foundation and a baseless assertion. In our everyday discourse, we justify baseless assertions daily—we like to call them “axioms,” “postulates,” or in plain English, “self-evident propositions.” But adding a predicate “self evident” to a proposition and stating that the proposition is true based on its own statement is radically anti-foundational. To say that a proposition is true is because it is “self-evident” is to direct the forces of justification (a mild metaphor) in the garb of “propositional authority” in order to justify a propositional attitude. In being anti-foundational, you assert that a self-evident proposition is clear by the very act of stating the proposition—then you have said that your proposition, in fact, says nothing at all. “Self-evident” propositions (i.e. propositions that ARE self evident) are not more or less demanding of evidence than regular propositions. If the evidence of the truth of a proposition is contained in the very act of stating the proposition then you have actually not said anything at all. One startling example is to assume you have two propositions which are each self-evident. By stating the first proposition, you assert the evidence that it is true as well as the second by stating the same. The propositional attitude of “manifestly true” or “necessarily true” means
The proposition “[proposition]” is necessarily true because we just stated [proposition]
And now we have to formulate the rules for meta-propositions to discuss what it means to attach predicates to propositions and then meta-predicates for meta-propositions requiring. . . —what easier way to maroon oneself outside the boundary human reason than to support such a program!?
Fascism is the political system whereby the state dictates the use of private property. Ayn Rand advocates laissez-faire capitalism, you dolt, whereby the state has no control whatsoever of private property. The ideas are antithetical and opposed. But wait, I forget, capitalists are fascists because they oppose communism, and the only two alternatives are fascism and communism.
Response:
To have a command economy over land and capital resources might be refutable, since government interventionism leads to chaotic planning and irresponsibility toward market forces. Nevertheless, any state having absolutely no control over private property is impotent—anyone owning land property could clearly hold off constitutionally any attempt for the government law enforcement and state national guard to apprehend the subject if guilty in violation of another law. Laissez-fair capitalism is just a code word for international corporate fascism which can thwart and change at will the political currents and eddies of any state considered “socialistic” or “anti-capitalistic,” U.S. State Dept. code words for real thriving democracies.
On the other hand, do not think that I am an advocate of Stalinism, or that my understanding is fundamentally “Marxist”—a code word for the corporate fascists, meaning “those who endanger our profit margin.”
Descartes was a proponent of the primacy of consciousness, a theory that is thoroughly repudiated by Objectivism. That phrase, “the unity of the acting being of man” contains elements of both Hegelianism and Pragmatism, as well as being a baseless and undefined assertion
Descartes was a proponent of the primacy of consciousness—but primacy here means something that is “irrefutable” vs. something doubtful. Other beings, chimeras, and events, are doubtful at best, while the Cartesian cogito has itself as evidence of “existence.” Objectivism repudiates the skepticism that leads one to affirm alone the cogito—but the proposition that will make or break objectivism is nothing more than the identity principle.
To say that “A is A” is as useful/useless as saying A, depending on what precisely A is. It is just as meaningless to say that “A is A” as it is to say
“ ‘A is A’ is true from the fact A.”
Perhaps a not-so-cynical expansion of the “A is A” would stand better—viz, “A is A” means precisely that A exists independent of the person asserting “A exists” But then another would say that I as the author of the last statement would require paraphrase:
“ ‘The fact that any given thing is what it is independent of the person asserting this statement’ is a fact independent of the person asserting or realizing the this statement”
A very good example of what Douglas R. Hofstadter calls a “strange loop.” My point is that such statements as “A is A,” paraphrased properly to fit what the objectivists are really trying to say gives us no true epistemology. Instead, we are forced to accept a foundation asserted violently against all need for justification—hidden within the twists and turns of self-reference. You cannot obliterate the qualitative by infusing identity and numeration toward the quantitative. At the source of all “objective” phenomena is a link to how a person “feels” or is “consciously aware” or has “felt needs or responses” to the phenomena. At this juncture, the existence of a thing is highly dependent upon these qualitative accounts given by the consciousness—and the statement “A is A” does nothing to assert the identity of a thing aside from the qualitative account.
Consciousness is the faculty of perceiving reality. In order to perceive, you have to perceive via some means, which means you have to have a faculty of perception, and that faculty is consciousness. Q.E.D.
Do you perceive the means to perceive the faculty of perception? Your argument sounds like another “strange-loop”
[(A is C) & (C implies M)] implies M is A
Proposition 1: Consciousness is the faculty of perceiving reality
Proposition 2: Perceiving implies a means of perceiving [of which is now by reductio imperceptible!]
Conclusion : Therefore consciousness is means of perceiving or the “faculty of perceiving reality.”
Why didn’t you just stick to “A is A”?
TomL writes:
Nowhere did Ayn Rand or anyone else claim that perceptions “circumvent the domain of the ego”, and I don’t even know what that means. If you mean there is a short-circuit between the senses and something you can’t name (awareness?), where reason is bypassed, then you are mistaken.
Your right of course about Ayn Rand (as I thought about it more, I realized that her own epistemology—or really faux epistemology—is like a snap-dragon at her feet) , in humans as well as animals, reason is bypassed daily by the unconscious—both in dreams and in states of insanity.
(In response to my statement “Perceptions, on the other hand, are not necessarily conscious actions of the organism in general, but can stem from both voluntary and involuntary processes–circumventing the domain of the ego.”)
You are confusing consciousness with a conceptual faculty. They are not equivalent. Animals have consciousness, but they cannot and do not form concepts.
Actually, I am not. Consciousness is a necessary condition for conceptualization, without consciousness—there is no conceptualization. But in all consciousness, there is conceptualizing on many different levels, both verbal, nonverbal, action and inaction. The only criterion objectivists assert between conceptualizing consciousness and the non-conceptualizing consciousness is the fact that the conceptualizing consciousness is “aware” of the fact that they are forming concepts. But, as I (should have) said before, there is no reason to suppose that conceptualizing (i.e. organizing and categorizing classes of stimuli and developing classes or categorical responses to stimuli) is solely limited to organisms in possession of an ego.
As far as where you say this fallaciousness stems from, to what logical proposition are you referring?
Actually, the proposition is that conscious integration and differentiation is precisely what we call conceptualizing. My point is that conceptualizing has qualitative roles within the unconscious domain of integration and differentiation—and these roles can be examined phenomenally within our own dreams, myths and legend. These qualitative roles are seen by the sheer nature of the “willful” and “goal oriented” impulses within the simpler domain of unconsciousness. Conceptualizing is not a program inaugurated by the ego—but an ending, or a tag to a vast program of unconscious activities of perceptual and internal somatic conditioning. Whereas Rand (and Mises) assert that the ego commands the whole of the human psyche, I say that the ego does nothing more than to haphazardly place sticky notes over the entire dominion of all rude phenomenon that enter by force.
Also, do not fall into the trap of using science to define philosophy. Philosophy is the arbiter of measurements. Without philosophy one cannot create a system of math, define numbers, or anything upon which the physical sciences depend. All science is philosophy, but philosophy – as a science involving consciousness, which defines all other science – does not and cannot use numbers or math.
Take it or leave it—philosophies eventually tumble down the black hole named ALL THAT IS SHOWN BY NATURE TO BE FALSE. Philosophy is the (sometimes asinine) laws of thinking and analyzing of what we say to each other and making damn sure they (our statements) conform to reality. Rudely speaking, Science is the study of reality. Without philosophy standing in the way, we can see reality in a better frame of mind.
“The physical sciences can validate or invalidate philosophy, but they cannot prove or disprove philosophic premise #1.”
Which is precisely why philosophy is unscientific and has nothing to do with reality. In a better example, try proving the following:
Vulcan is the planet closest to the sun.
Proof: Either the statement “Vulcan is the planet closest to the sun” is true or false, if false, then “Vulcan is the planet not closest to the sun” is true…etc
So a statement and its internal negation give you no way to find out the truth of the statement—but yet we also have the problem of having two contradictories being false, so logic using the law of excluded middle is useless. In like manner, we realize that statements asserting things that have no bearing on reality are—in fact—meaningless, and therefore you might as well say they are false.
One is using a particular espistemology in either performing the science experiments, doing the math, or reading about the conclusions afterwards. There is an epistemological process involved in all of the above, and there’s no way around it. If the underlying philosophy is bad, then so is the science.
Science is not epistemology. It has nothing to do with “truth verification certificates” concerning propositions. The data at hand from multitudinous experiments and observation, provides at best a way to point to generalized propositions useful for continual testing—but no science asserts the primacy of a propositional attitudes (developed by the hacks of “epistemology”) over the eventual impeachment of propositional attitudes by experiment!
[Cf. s.v. “fallibilism” and the “problem of induction”]