Introspective evidence for measurement-omission?

[msb]

Let me begin by saying that I think AR's theory of measurement omission in concept-formation is correct. Sometimes it is difficult to figure out how measurement omission applies to a particular concept, but it is always possible in the end, and once you figure it out you can see that that is, in fact, how the concept is organized.

My problem is specifically in regard to the possibility of introspectively observing your mind omitting the measurements during the formation of a concept. I absolutely cannot do it. The best I can do is watch myself grasping similarities against differences. As far as what particular quantities are being omitted from what qualities, I have to sit down and figure it out later. As I said, sometimes it's quite difficult.

It also seems like a somewhat rationalistic process, at least the way I do it. It doesn’t involve much, if any introspection. It’s more just sitting down and thinking about what would "work" in this situation, what previous concepts it would depend on and what measurements those omit, and so on.

Since concept-formation is a volitional process, I'm inclined to think that it should be possible. But it all seems to happen so fast. One moment I'm noticing some similarity, the next moment I have a concept. I feel like having active, first-hand experience in omitting measurements would be helpful. I'm also baffled why the process seems to be so automated, even though I know it requires mental effort.

The way I try to observe the process is by reading up on scientific and mathematical concepts that I'm unfamiliar with. Perhaps this isn't the best way of going about it, but I'm not sure what else to do.

I don't think I'm an unusually poor introspector, but I don't know where to start here. Any thoughts/advice would be welcome.

[MinorityOfOne]

I don't think it can be directly introspected. Lots of subconscious processes are like that. Think about writing a sentence, if this idea seems weird to you. The words you use aren't picked consciously, at least not most of the time: you direct or manage your mind through giving your subconscious orders, but you don't "handpick" each and every word. You get an idea that you want to express, and your subconscious throws words up at you. Can you introspect the process by which it selected those words? I sure as heck can't.

I do think there are subconscious processes that you can introspect about, at least to some degree: for instance, I can learn more about my reactions to art through introspection. Even then, though, I find that it's pretty difficult, and it doesn't really seem like I'm introspecting the process itself: rather, I'm introspecting about my values, and inferring how my subconscious must be applying them. Sometimes it goes the other way, and by seeing how I react to something, I learn more about my subconscious value-judgments; then, again, it's a process of inference about the subconscious based on (say) a surprising intensity of emotional reaction, or perhaps a conflict between an emotional reaction and my consciously held values.

I'd be interested in hearing if anybody can think of subconscious processes that one *can* directly introspect about. I'm not inclined to rule it out just because they're subconscious, since it's certainly possible sometimes to bring things out of the subconscious and into awareness: Binswanger, in his work on psycho-epistemology, gives a lot of examples of this. (Probably the most obvious one is memories.) I wonder if the distinction here isn't between content and processes -- i.e., that subconscious content can (at least sometimes) be introspected, but that subconscious processes can't? Any thoughts?

[msb]

Is concept-formation a subconscious process??

[MinorityOfOne]

I think so, at least as regards measurement-omission, for the reasons I stated above. We're conscious of similarity and difference, but not of the mathematical aspects.

Uhh... let's see. Just for the hell of it, I poked around in ITOE and OPAR to see if Rand and Peikoff had any insights on this. The closest I could find is on OPAR 85-6:

"The process of measurement-omission is performed for us by the nature of our mental faculty, whether anyone identifies it or not. To form a concept, one does not have to know that a form of measurement is involved; one does not have to measure existents or even know how to measure them. On the conscious level, one need merely observe similarities."

The next paragraph suggests that Peikoff thinks the process can be "implicit": in other words, that you can perform the sort of measurement involved in concept-formation without explicit knowledge of measurement itself, or how to perform it. (He doesn't actually contrast this implicit measurement to subconscious measurement, so I don't know what he'd say about it.)

I don't have any knock-down arguments to demonstrate that it's subconscious, but it sure seems like it is.

Oh, just found another reference. On ITOE p.140, Professor B says: "To describe the process of concept-formation on a conscious level, one wouldn't have to refer to omitting measurements. Is the purpose then of discussing it in terms of omitting measurements to stress the metaphysical basis of the process?" Rand's answer is, in part, that measurement-omission is an analysis of what similarity is. She writes: "... similarity is perceptually given, but the understanding of what similarity means has to be arrived at philosophically or scientifically. And similarity, when analyzed, amounts to: measurements omitted."

You might say that all there is in concept-formation is conscious observation of similarity, and that observation of similarity can be analyzed into measurement-omission and the rest of Rand's distinctive epistemological views. I don't think that's right, but I'm open to arguments. That view seems too much like it's saying "measurement-omission is a theoretical construct, a way of explaining similarity." I think it's a genuine process, and since it's not performed consciously (again, I just get this through introspection), I think it has to be subconscious.

[msb]

This is interesting. So what is given in perception is similarities (and differences). What that, in fact, means is: omitted measurements of common characteristics. A very rough analogy would be: color is given in perception, and science tells us what color actually consists of is varying wavelengths of light. But that doesn't change the fact that all we perceive is color, just as what we perceive is similarities. Is that in the right ballpark?

[MinorityOfOne]

Yeah, but I'd be careful about taking the analogy too literally. First, concept-formation itself isn't an automatic process, as is color perception. Second, not all similarity is at the perceptual level: that's the issue of hierarchy. (I'm sure there are other disanalogous aspects, too.) So long as you just use the analogy to highlight the distinction between the experience of a process and the underlying mechanisms, I think it's ok.

(I know you're aware of all the above, by the way. I say that more for the benefit of other readers.)

[msb]

Right. This actually makes a lot fall into place for me. There's a lot more to be said here, but here's a preliminary thought:

The color analogy (despite its obvious limitations) applies in another way: concepts of color sensation are axiomatic, and so is "similarity" how it is generally meant. But it is possible to analyze both concepts further, not in terms of their perceived base, but in terms of what they consist in.

You'll never get "beneath" color sensations, but that doesn't mean that you can't figure out what they are: wavelengths of light. Likewise, you'll never get "beneath" similarity, but that doesn't mean you can't say what it is: an algebraic abstraction of measurements.

[MinorityOfOne]

Similarities definitely aren't philosophical axioms, so I'd object to that use of it. I think what you mean is that they're given, but I'm not even sure that's true. Sense perception is a given: all you have to do is open your eyes, and you'll see. The same isn't true of similiarity. Similarity is implicit in your sense perceptions, but the actual observation of a particular similarity requires work. You don't just open your mind and let similarity act on you -- that'd be an intrinsicist model of concept-formation.

That said, I think you're definitely on the right track. (Me too, I hope -- I've definitely learned some stuff in the process of thinking through this.)

By the way, in addition to welcoming more discussion of this, I'm still interested to hear what you think about what I said above about subconscious content being introspectible, but subconscious process not being introspectible. I haven't really sat down and thought through a lot of examples of each to see if this is true... nor have I thought much about what implications it would have if it IS true. I guess the most obvious one would be that it'd imply the necessity of coming up with particular methods of monitoring one's conscious thoughts in order to determine one's subconscious processes. (I'm not sure if that's really different from the "applied psycho-epistemology that Binswanger discusses in his courses. I'll have to re-listen to PE II; I just listened to PE I again, and got even more out of it than the first time through.)

[msb]

"Similar" (and "different") are definitely axioms. They aren't fundamental axiom like the Big Three, but they are axioms. It's like "change." All of these are fundamental, inherent in perception, etc.

I don't think see how this implies that observing similarities doesn't require work (intrinsicism). (I don't mean that you perceive an entity called "similar." But you don't perceive an entity called "identity" either.) I think you might be under the impression that I'm reifying similarity. I'm not; it's certainly a relationship--but it's axiomatic.

I'll think about the subconscious stuff for later this weekend.

[MinorityOfOne]

Ok, yeah, that was stupid. I must have been groggy when I wrote that or something, because I conflated the concept similarity with particular similarities -- very different issues.

I'm leaning more now toward thinking that similarity is an axiomatic concept. But I'm concerned about the fact that it's analyzable; doesn't this make it importantly different than other axiomatic concepts? (I get the feeling that I'm missing something obvious here...)

[y_feldblum]

Epistemologically (I dunno if I'm using the term right...), the concept similar is based on the concept different; it is an abstraction away of differences. Two dogs are similar: abstract away the difference in color. If we don't abstract away differences, we are left with two entities, one of which is white and vicious and the other of which is grey and vicious. (If you don't like vicious dogs - one of them is white and sweet, while the other is grey and sweet.)

[msb]

I haven't listened to HB's Psychoepistemology courses. But after some thought, I think that subconscious content can be introspected with varying degrees of difficulty by using various techniques. Subconscious processes and mechanisms are more complicated. They can't just be brought into consciousness; they have to be inferred. Is this what you meant?

I don't think the fact that similarity is analyzable disqualifies it as an axiom. As you've been saying, what we're really analyzing is the subconscious mechanism by which our brain picks out similarities. That doesn't change the fact that we _perceive_ similarities--are directly aware of them in consciousness. This is where my analogy really applies: what we are learning in physics and physiology about the physical reality of color increases our knowledge, but doesn't change our perceptual experience.

I've been tossing around the idea that "quantity" and possibly "quality" were axioms, but now I'm not so sure. They clearly have to be built-in to our brains in some way, since in perceiving similarity we distinguish between quantities (to be omitted) and qualities. But just because they are part of a subconscious mechanism doesn't mean they are axioms. I'm still at least leaning towards "quantity" being an axiom, just because I can't think of any way to conceivably define it except ostensively.

y_f: How would you abstract away differences if you didn't perceive a similarity? A similarity has to be in awareness before abstracting, or else you wouldn't be able to start. In your example, two dogs are similar both before and after you abstract away the difference in color. After you abstract color and the other relevant measurements, then you have a concept for dog. But even before that, you perceive both similarities and differences.

[MinorityOfOne]

Yeah, that's a good point, Feld. (Can I call you that?)

Similarity can be reduced to difference. It amounts to "there is less difference between these things than there is between these things and that other thing, with respect to this characteristic." That's why you need more than just two objects to see a similarity, at least at a basic level. On the standard example, if you see a wicker chair and a recliner, you'll perceive them as different; but if you put them next to a table, you'll see them as the same. That's because there's less difference between them than there is between them and the table.

Leaning back the other way... leaning... leaning... I FELL! Similarity is not an axiomatic concept. And I don't think difference is, either. They're both very fundamental, and they're both perceptually self-evident (for similarity, in a certain context), but I don't think they're axiomatic. I might still be persuaded re: difference, though.

Matt, yeah, that's exactly what I meant about subconscious processes and content... I'm thinking you've got pretty loose standards for axiomaticity. Definitely, something isn't axiomatic just because it's involved in a process of consciousness; if that were the case, "wavelength" would be axiomatic because it's involved in visual perception. But it's clearly not -- it's an advanced scientific discovery. Also, there are plenty of things that aren't axiomatic which you can only define ostensively. "Red", for instance, can only be defined ostensively, but it's not axiomatic: you could live your whole life without seeing a red thing, and it wouldn't bother you one bit.

I will say that I've been bothered somewhat by the idea of characteristics or qualities lately... I won't elaborate on that, though, because I'm a little fuzzy about what's even bothering me. (We're studying universals in my metaphysics class, and it could be that the realist/nominalist dichotomy is creeping into my brain in some way I can't pinpoint.) I am dubious about the idea of quality being "built in", though. I know you don't mean that in the innate idea sense, but it still seems pretty Kantian. Maybe you could elaborate on what you mean there?

[msb]

What are you distinguishing difference from here? How could you say there is less difference? How could you differentiate between degrees of difference--without having classified differences by similarities?

The more I think about it, the more sure I am that "similar" is axiomatic.

Concepts are formed by abstracting away varying measurements from common characteristics. "Common" here is given--perceived. This definition is an analysis of what similarity means in a particular context to a conceptual consciousness, not a definition of similarity. You perceive similarity before you ever form a concept. Similarity, difference, and change are given in perception along with entities--which is also an axiomatic concept.

If measurement-omission were a conscious process, then I think quantity and quality would have to be axioms. As it is, I'm not so sure. The subject needs more thought. I'm very inclined to say that "quantity" cannot be defined except ostensively, and that it's particular instances are simply perceived. But I'm far from wedded to the idea.

I don't think there are "plenty of things" that can be only defined ostensively but that aren't axioms. Conceptualized sense experiences are the only other things besides axioms that require exclusively ostensive definitions. "Similar" is certainly not a conceptualized sense experience.

EDIT: No no no. I don't mean the concept quality is built-in. It couldn't be. But we could have a mechanism for picking out particular instances of quality, as against quantity (and we could not have such a mechanism if there weren't instances in reality to pick out (differentiating myself from Kant here)). We definitely have one for picking out similarities against differences. I'm not sure about this and don't really know where to go with it, so I'd just prefer to table it for now (in regards to quality).

[Tom]

I'd be interested in hearing if anybody can think of subconscious processes that one *can* directly introspect about.

What is a subconscious process?

It's a mental process whose particular actions aren't known by you presently but whose outputs are directly perceivable.

How do you come to know their existence?

You are immediately aware of the output, but you aren't aware of the causes. The causes are not directly perceivable. You must identify the causes with your mind.

After doing this repeatedly for a number of emotions, you eventually form a concept of emotion. You grasp that an emotion is an evaluation of some input according to some value(s) or standard(s).

You infer the actions of the subconscious process from the nature of its outputs.

In short, the actions are not directly perceivable, but the output is.