Ilya Startsev

Because you called existence a concept, therefore a thought. But you are right, it's pre-conceptual in a way, and not explicit but implicit. Basically what I wrote to you.

No. Read what you wrote. Existence as the concept is implicit in all concepts. How can you think of all concepts? A thought of all concepts is not explicit or particular in any way. It's like taking all the concepts in your brain, or even your brain, and everything beyond your brain that you made a concept of and... guess what happens next. Concerning her thought in the lexicon quote, it's not very accurate. She made blunders when she rationalized her philosophy on children (we saw this explained by Binswanger in Perception). Rather, Rand only guessed how implicit concepts work, as she defined the thing in the first place. Her definition of this sort, by the way, is very similar to what Kant called an analytic a priori, like bachelor being a single man. This means it's inaccurate. The reason it's inaccurate, I think, is that Rand didn't have an ontology. Without an ontology a thought cannot be as sharp or as accurate as it can be. Ontology is the lesser you must grasp before rising to the greater. If the concept of existence only existed in one's head, then this would not be different from Kantian epistemology. But existence is not an epistemological concept. The point of all this is that Rand wasn't perfect. Her flaws are exactly those I've repeatedly pointed to on these pages. No, it's you with SL who are reducing all metaphysics to being in your head, in a Nietzschean manner. Metametaphysics that I present here is seemingly beyond the grasp of materialists. But why? That's the pity because you surely know what nonexistence is, as that's your primary goal. It's in the Direction of your very consciousness. If X isn't metaphysical, then concept of X may or may not be metaphysical, if my logic is right. The metaphysical 'concept', if you like to call it that, will not be the same as any other concept because it is a concept of all concepts. It's a metaconcept, an implicit, not an explicit one. This is too easy to take as dogma and mix with epistemology in the brain, which is what Rand had done in her division of existence and nonexistence. To me, if Existence is a metaconcept, then Nonexistence is also a metaconcept, since they are related. Bah, I will need to study him as well. Thanks for the tip to you, and also to KyaryPamyu. However, I am not a Buddhist, nor am I interested in their way of thinking, especially if it's in Gautama's tradition. I hate Zen Buddhism too. Also, reading this part: Perhaps this is a reduction to Nonexistence in the style of Gautama. Unless, if Nagarjuana is not mat8, he means that Nonexistence is in all existents. Then that would be right, since Nonexistence and Existence form a continuum, out of which all ontology and its relationships differentiate. On the other hand, I know Buddhists do not believe in dualism and hence mix everything in the single nihilistic concept. I do not mix things like that. I am an integrator because I strictly delineate concepts, metaconcepts, ideas, categories, metacategories, you name it, before I can put them together in a single whole.

A very relevant quote I've come across while reading John Amos Comenius (translated by me from Russian, not original): It may be useful for pedagogical purposes, especially for mat8 like Eiuol and StrinctlyLogical.

How can a thought not be a thought? You contradict yourself by contradicting me, SL. By the way, Rand called existence an implicit concept. edit: your comment is a psychological projection, as you obviously unable to conceive of existence as it is, you must reduce it to a mere thought. You aren't an idealist, SL.

Putting our differences of understanding epistemology aside, Eiuol, a concept is a thought, which obviously exists in our brains. However, Existence is not a thought. If it were, it would have existed in our brains.

I will study him, but if he is the same guy who taught breathing practices for the brain, and not the heart (like in HeartMath Institute), then he is not a mystic but an idealist. The difference is between being centered in the heart and in the brain.

Before anything following the discussion, I would like to point out two things that need to be considered by my opponents: A collection or sum of things cannot be reduced to things because it ignores spacetime as a context, which serves as the condition of the sum. Here is something relevant I wrote on my blog: to claim that reality only exists as objects is to claim that reality is a solid. If we say that a group of swans on a lake is merely individual swans – then there is nothing, no spacetime, to separate swans from each other. Saying that forests only consist of trees would mean that we would go through the trees and not ‘around’ them, since anything ‘around’ them would not exist. Imagine a solid only consisting of trees, or a society only consisting of people. What this would actually ‘prove’ is that we are all living in a solidified state prohibitive to movement, in a world that only consists of objects as if these objects were our reality, were our contexts, as immovable as cadavers frozen in cement or stuck behind a wall in one of Poe’s stories. An identity, or a something, is a necessary outcome of any metaphysical proposition, but then it becomes ontological. To understand what metaphysics is one must understand the condition of something becoming ontological before it so becomes. Hence I am not arguing that there is nothing specific to derive from existence or nonexistence nor that these don't lead to anything specific. Rather, I am arguing that we need to understand the differences between ontology and epistemology before we integrate ontology with metaphysics. If you look at the logical square (not square of opposition), you'll find that the higher level (really meta-level, but whatever) is metaphysical, whereas the lower is ontological, but the two are evidently connected, for otherwise there would be no logic. Reductions would ignore the higher level.

It's realism, but sense data you seek reduce it to materialism, which can never grasp the whole. It's not a bald claim at all, except to a materialist who cannot understand reality. Here is something that Rand wrote in ITOE: And here she directly relates reality to context: So SL, did Rand make a bald assertion? Yes, but it proved accurate, as my Model shows. But you ignore this evidence. Then the only evidence you can get is Kantian in the illustration I've provided in this thread. Have you read it? Do you agree with it? Properties of quality, quantity, relation, and modality are your sought evidence of the senses. And Kant was surely no mystic because he opposed exactly the mystical features of the philosophies of Aristotle, Bacon, and Locke (the latter of whose things-in-themselves he claimed to not be knowable, in contrast to what all realists/mystics -- integrators -- claim). The evidence is the entirety of reality and human knowledge, which is the Model, proven again and again. I haven't found a contradiction to it. I haven't found any other metaphysics that can structure all this evidence. Now, you may be opposed to metaphysics, like Kantian logical positivists are, such as Wittgenstein and Carnap. Then, that's a different topic. If you reject metaphysics, there is nothing to discuss here but your scientific evidence. There would be no philosophy to it. It's only science, you see? Philosophy and science are not the same, even the philosophy that I propose is not a hard science but a special kind of science, which only allows one to study human consciousness based on the Model. Now, I could go on and show, as an example, how the Model would change to accommodate new evidence, such as of new particles found from the collider, if the supersymmetry theory proves to be true. But I guess you would simply dismiss this. What kind of evidence do you seek? That applies and oranges exist? Sure. Or that there are computers or cell-phones (like all the things you see in front of you)? You want this discussion to lead to trivial scientific evidence, and this discussion is not concerned with trivialities. It is concerned with metaphysics, which is the things in themselves. Got it? Jungle is a context but not an existent, since it cannot be reduced to trees or whatever other existents that may be there. (If you think otherwise, then you are a mat8 like Stefan Molyneux, who claims this because he doesn't understand what a context is). What the Model shows with its 17 physical contexts (jungle is a form of Environment) is that each context ontologically is represented as Non-identity. Non-identity is a form of nothing, thus making context, or physical reality, a nothing. This, of course, is different from absolute nothing, which is closer associated with Nonexistence. The difference between ontology and metaphysics is that the first organizes our knowledge of physical evidence, while the latter organizes the organization of this knowledge. The organization of organization is thus not only the structuring but also the nature of this evidence in itself. In contract to the right side of the Model, which consists of contexts, the left side consists of identities, somethings, which are represented as objects, or parts of wholes/contexts. There are 17 objects of different levels. Neutrinos are Particle (l. 1), and galaxies are represented by Hole (l. 13), since there are no galaxies without black holes. (Galaxy could have been presented as a context of Hole, but there is currently no way to differentiate clusters from superclusters by a more technical term, 'group,' 'neighborhood,' and 'constellation' notwithstanding.) Physical reality and metaphysical reality (i.e. existence) are not the same, also as per Rand's quote above. You are calling metaphysics 'mysticism' in the tradition of all Nietzschean materialists, whose metaphysics is based on Body (l. 8), rather than somewhere at the Cosmos, looking from above it, from the metacosmic level of all idealists. In Rand this level (15) is called existence. It is metaphysical, not physical. A true Objectivist (i.e. Randian idealist) should know this. Yes, the sum is called existence. However, you cannot point to this sum because it involves also the sum of contexts. No, it cannot, since you cannot point out what it is - pointing to physical environment is not the same as 'Existence,' since environment only exists immediately in relation to your body but not to all that is. Existence is neither in your mind nor in reality. Rather it is something you can grasp by your mind only when you understand all the realities there are (all the levels of the Model), or the reality as a whole, to then be able to make necessary propositions concerning the nature of this reality. Anything more specific is a reduction to a particular level at which you may seem comfortable but surely not metaphysically competent: that is, you won't be able to make metaphysical conclusions concerning your part of reality that you directly perceive.

Basically, Eiuol, the point I am trying to make is that existence exists regardless of any existent, hence it cannot be reduced to a mere existent. I understand a concept, like dog, refers to an existent and hence itself can be considered an existent (as a correctly integrated thought). However, existence is not a dog, or an orange, for that matter, because it doesn't refer to anything particular, even an existent as a concept. Hereby you may understand the reason for there to be Nonexistence. Only it can allow us to understand Existence. A side-note: while Nonexistence and Kant's noumenon are equivalent, Existence is not phenomenon because phenomenon is something specific. There is no equivalent of Existence in Kant's philosophy. That's why I consider Kant a materialist: he reduces everything to something without regarding everything as a whole. Rand, on the other hand, does regard everything as a whole, but she does so unjustifiably while reducing it to something.

Existence is everything, reality, which is not an existent. How can reality, or the entire context of every existent and everything as a whole, be a mere something? The fault in logic is Rand's and anyone's who follows her reduction.

I would try to get them out of their comfort zone. But this is not my duty. It's merely something I'd do out of interest.

Oh, no, she didn't do it like that. Rather she decidedly kept those Objectivists in an epistemological stasis, unable to progress beyond the boundaries of reason she set down with an iron fist. Or, rather, a boundary. The rest was like an invisibility spell that made them think that there is no need to try to understand what you don't understand. You can simply dismiss it as a 'word salad.'

Right. Ignoring your calling ontological logic 'mysticism,' I have to say you don't understand existence that is not epistemological but metaphysical. Rand clearly delineates the two. However, the delineation, as we can see, doesn't help because she fails to provide a clear ontological hierarchy. With Peikoff's metaphysical model put aside, there is currently no ontology as complete as mine, and to understand this ontology as it is in itself you need to think -- metaphysically -- in terms of continua and boundaries. The boundaries of the Model are twofold: Existence and Nonexistence. To say there is only metaphysical Existence but no Nonexistence (because, presumably, it's not metaphysical) is to completely reject the ontology that I put forward (which you obviously do). However, I am ever of the mind that in anything, even metaphysical concepts, there are ever boundaries, there are always pairs of things, concepts, or whatever we can speak of. To say otherwise is to submit to one-sided dogma, which is evidently false. There is nothing one-sided in existence, including existence itself. Now, considering that I've mentioned language, to which you seemingly want to reduce nonexistence (and, for that matter, also existence, since those are related), I have to say this: behind the language you are hiding an epistemic fault, namely that language does or should refer to anything concrete. However, we have metaphysics to reject your premise, metaphysical waving of hands or some other mumbo-jumbo notwithstanding. It's like saying Oh, look at this particle that is at the same time a wave! The logical conclusion is: whenever you mix ontology with epistemology you get nothing, a reification of.

This is absolutely correct, and I agree with this completely, but it's not in Rand. existence =/= existent, if it's used to subsume the concept of the whole

A negation of a thing that exists is not a something. That's pretty clear. However, this not a something is related to nonexistence in Rand's words. Calling ontological logic Hegelian is pretty funny. Hegel accepted that, since thought is being, epistemological contradiction also exists ontologically. Thus, for Hegel there is no difference between the two logics. But to the normal few, there is a difference. I reject epistemological logic because it is a self-contradictory logic, as we've seen with mathematical logic of Frege et al. So, what I am using here is not Hegel's but Aristotelian analysis, albeit a more advanced one. When Rand switches from ontological to epistemological logic like that, she makes you poor Objectivists believe that it's okay and that that can be done. However, it is Hegel who showed that it can only be okay if thought (like a fact) is also being (like a fact). In her way of dismissing nonexistence shows her hidden Hegelianism. Nonexistence cannot be real as an existent because nonexistence is Kant's noumenon. There can be nothing said about nonexistence that is related to an existent without reducing the concept to something that it's not, neither something nor not a something. Nonexistence is nonexistence, and can only be related metaphysically to all that is, the whole of existence.

"existent that has ceased to exist" is taken by Rand as an epistemological fact. She switches logic to epistemological in 4-5, thus equivocating absence in 5 with absence in 2. The reduction is parallel to the one she had done with existence (everything is something): nonexistence is not a something. It is not a negation. Just follow the right hand side of the square. Additionally: Rand is concept-stealing by using nonexistence to do away with it.

" existent that has ceased to exist " sounds like not a something taken as something in order to 'disprove' nonexistence

And I've seen others write the same as well. Yes, Eiuol, I was remembering what Objectivists wrote to argue the (meta) point of existence, so you basically interpret Rand's idea of nonexistence the same way as I do. I can go through her quote as well, but this should be the rehash of what I've already been telling you. Nonexistence is not a 'fact' - yes, because it is metaphysical, not epistemological. Nonexistence is the 'absence' of a fact - yes, like it is the absence of epistemology. Nonexistence is a 'derivative' concept pertaining to a 'relationship' - yes, derivative in that we don't know it before we examined all scientific evidence, and yes - a relationship, but to what? Nonexistence is "formed or grasped only in relation to some existent that has ceased to exist" - no, this is a reification of nonexistence through a reduction of it to 'not identity' and then contradicting nonexistence by starting at 'not identity', thinking that nonexistence is within 'not identity' - that's a second subaltern contradiction, as absolute nothing cannot be derived from 'not something', as then 'not something' is reified as 'something' being contradictorily related to nothing, thus nonexistence cannot be known, and following Rand's contradiction - cannot be 'formed' or 'grasped' " One can arrive at the concept “absence” starting from the concept “presence” " - how is this exactly? this is a contradiction, but no contradictions can be seen in reality, only in one's mind. If one is arriving to absence from presence conceptually, one is not grasping essential features or the essential change of an existent. Instead this merely shows the conceptual direction of Rand toward nonexistence " one cannot arrive at the concept “presence” starting from the concept “absence,” with the absence including everything " - yes, because nothing and something contradict each other, regardless of whether you first look from nothing or from something. However, Rand completely ignores that nonexistence metaphysically relates only to existence, that is, nothing relates to everything, not to something. Because she is implicitly contradicting everything through something she thinks it's the same, but relating nothing to everything and relating nothing to something are not the same. Just look at the square of opposition, or listen to Peikoff's lecture on it.

Why? I think it perfectly shows your own limitation in terms of not being able to overcome the current paradigm of normality through revolutionary means.

Actually, Existence does not depend on the existence of 'the' academic philosopher, unless you follow their subjectivist philosophy, that is. Any body, however, even that of your philosopher, is a part of the whole that is shown to be structured by Existence and Nonexistence. This sounds like Kantian logical epistemology. I connect logic to metaphysics, not epistemology, so this is going in opposite directions, hence you cannot understand what I am writing. I am writing based on Aristotelian ontological logic, connecting it to metaphysics through Rand's Existence is Identity axiom. If you prefer our senses to follow logic differently, then please refer to Critique of pure reason. And then also consider my illustration of its epistemology. The logical square is the logical structure of my ontology, but your 'method of grasping' cannot grasp my ontology because ontology is not a 'method of grasping'. It's a description of reality based on the 'method' of the logical square, or logical metaphysics, which does not depend on consciousness, as it isn't in our consciousness per se, just as consciousness is not within thought. In other words, metaphysics, as provided here and partially in Rand, is beyond thought and cannot be reduced to thought, although it includes all thought, whether physical or not, as considered by most philosophers. No, you are getting it backward, like in Kant, by thinking that metaphysics needs to be validated as knowledge (i.e., needs to be epistemological). The ironic thing is that neither Kantian metaphysics, nor Rand's, can ever be so validated, although academic philosophy surely believes Kant's epistemology. I agree with Aristotle and Rand that metaphysics is NOT epistemology, and in fact, it does not serve epistemology like it does in Kant and many, many others. In order for there to be anything to perceive, like ontology, there had to be an a priori structure for it to exist, regardless of how we perceive it, but as long as we do we can grasp it, however partially. Thus, understanding is epistemological, but ontology and metaphysics is not understanding per se. This a priori actually precedes any Kantian structures, even Kant himself, or any validation of knowledge that can ever be. The metametaphysics I am showing here doesn't depend on philosophical knowledge but is derived from science and structures our consciousness. The structure of my consciousness, which allows me to understand all this, is different from others. The beautiful thing that I describe with the square is actually an axiomatic 'proof' (a new axiom), showing that Rand's metaphysics is not completely wrong, but instead it is incomplete. The reason it's incomplete is that Rand started from existence as her primary axiom (i.e. existence exists, or existence is identity, or everything is something). Existence can only be 'validated' logically, if you can even think of this as 'validation' which has epistemological overtones to its connotation anyway. On the other hand, knowledge from perception is validated epistemologically. These two -- logic and epistemology -- are separate ways of understanding in my philosophy (epistemology in my philosophy is not considered the absolute or completely accurate way of understanding). The first does not completely apply to percepts but applies to concepts already derived from them. The second only applies to how we read knowledge presented, thus subjectivizing or internalizing such knowledge. To dig in this point further: epistemology, in my sense, is not science but philosophy. Epistemology can only be subjective, or it's not an epistemology. This, by the way, is also the academic view. Logic, as ontology and metaphysics, on the other hand, are not subjective but objective in the sense that they are independent from our subjects (this doesn't include symbolic logic developed by Kantians). However, logical proofs, as we see here, are not all self-evident, but instead they are true regardless of whether we understand or respect them or even regard them in any way. I claim that logical proofs of metaphysical nature are axiomatic and can be discovered in Aristotelian fashion, just as knowledge is verified in philosophy and discovered in science. Now, this point is debatable only to the extent of my usage of the term 'proof', since this generally doesn't apply to metaphysics or to the square of opposition (see below). However, this proof only shows that Rand's axiom cannot be the only one but instead other axioms exist to complete it. If you don't like my usage of this term, then consider it a heuristic. I am using Aristotle's ontological logic, as shown below. However, one way to understand its nature, which works for me, evidently (as I understand -- as far as I can -- what I am talking about), is to understand Aristotle's philosophy: how potentials as forms actualize in our consciousness as essences. Based on my examination of what KyaryPamyu wrote, SL's evaluation does not seem to be logical, at all. Instead he likes to think himself being logical in the dogmatic sense conveniently provided by Rand. The issue is not that only those theories that could be understood by Objectivists are true or whether what I am presenting is not true because it's not understood by you. The issue is that what we think of as 'understanding' is not metametaphysical or ontological in the broadest sense. Understanding is subjective and should not be confused with logic, even though we surely follow different logics based on how we think.

Yes, why? That's a good question. I prefer a serious discussion, however. As for the discussion on 'nothing' in Rand, that's interesting, especially how Eiuol is trying to understand what I meant when I said 'nothing' beyond existence. SL, however, is correct that the quotation marks don't mean a thing except to emphasize the 'nothing' part. This part is repeatedly mentioned by Objectivists and also by Rand (in the quotes linked she seems to even try to 'explain' nonexistence away -- also here -- but without relating it to existence, which is impossible, as it always recurs in thoughts) when a discussion involves questioning her metaphysics. The problem is that indeed you are reifying 'nothing' in order to support the dogma of her metaphysics. This reification, however, is implicit, since you do not question what you are actually saying, that is, you do not try to understand your words and thus do not mean explicitly 'nothing' when you are saying it. You say 'nothing' but give no thought to nothing. In psychology, this is known as 'ironic process theory.' In other words, the content of your words just as the content of your thoughts at the moment of saying there is 'nothing' beyond existence is precisely that - 'nothing.' Hence you are not avoiding the question but merely suppressing it. What Objectivists or Rand seem not to understand that logically (and thus also verbally) there indeed need to be a category that means 'nothing,' namely nonexistence. The point in this, however, is not to 'reify' nonexistence but to show (as I have shown) that existence logically depends on nonexistence in order for existence to be TRUE. To ignore the logical proof of the factuality of existence is to, basically, conform to dogma. Academia doesn't and never will accept Rand in this case. My purpose is to find a way to get academia to accept Rand, but you are not helping. You are merely perpetuating the gap that she and her followers created between academia and general public, which is reflected in that non-communicative barrier between Democrats and Republicans, leading the US to a civil war (about which I've warned you in 2014). The reason I am on this forum is not because I am your enemy but because I am your friend. I am honestly critiquing Rand, trying to find the spot that will be acceptable to academia, a point that can be discussed academically. I always think of communication first, regardless of what others may believe in contrast to my attitude. To say that 'something comes from nothing' is an obvious ontological contradiction. The point is to lead to identity (something), but not contradictorily. The following is a non-contradictory way to come to identity.

This is how objective reality is structured ontologically; it's a pure ontology that has nothing to do with any epistemology or ways of looking, reading or understanding it. That you find some things 'fantastical' or 'imaginative' is your lack of knowledge and understanding (and even your disintegrative tendency), rather than what reality holds for all people, regardless of what they actually see or want to see. The Model, as I describe it with heuristic theory of nested concepts (based on Rand's theory of concepts) includes sensation, perception, and conception in every element. Moreover, there are infinite possibilities between each pair, so this is not dualism as such. All you've shown with your reply is that you are not interested in objective reality. Instead, as most people, you are only interested in your own perception of reality, which is structured by your subjective epistemology. The Diagram, based on the Model, shows different types of consciousness and how they are mapped to the Model (referring to reality). Now, just because you do not see any hints at epistemological integration in the Model does not mean that it is meaningless. It's only meaningless to you because you are not interested in understanding it, or even unable to understand it, based on your type of consciousness. As an addendum to those interested: I have yet to find a person who understands both the Model and the Diagram. I know someone who understands the Model and someone else who understands the Diagram (more or less), but nobody besides me who understands both.

To say that there is 'something' beyond existence is a contradiction. I do not claim that there is 'something' beyond existence. I claim that logical metaphysics is much greater than what Rand presumed. There isn't only existence or identity in metaphysics, but also nonexistence and non-identity, neither one of which can be simply reduced to 'something,' nor can both of them be reduced to 'nothing.' Existence is not 'a thing' as a whole, neither unitary nor fragmentary. Existence is absolute everything. Everything is not 'a thing' (ignoring the linguistic ambiguity). In other words, there is existence before there is identity, but there isn't only existence before there is identity. The ultimate evidence is the Model, which is structured by a priori metametaphysical categories of Existence and Nonexistence.

No, I am saying Rand failed to make a distinction between a set of absolute everything, the ultimate meta-set, and every single thing that exists. Knowing what a subset is doesn't help her. Her problem is that she saw 'nothing' beyond existence. This construct of 'nothing' is the limitation on her metaphysics that didn't allow her to ask metaphysical questions and thus kept her metaphysics in a kind of stasis, an 'open' question that nobody can ask. And because existence becomes 'every thing' in Rand, it is not treated as a unitary thing, and yet it is because it is metaphysical!

With cats, however, that discussion would change, as cats is a whole different topic.