Szalapski

I'm asking you to accept that as a premise. If you don't want to, it's going to be hard to get anywhere. I'm not saying it might be moral, rather I am saying that it is obviously immoral, but under Objectivism, consistency with flourishing life is the standard of morality. That would seem at first to indicate that a donut habit and stealing are both immoral, but you say that the donut habit may not be immoral even though it is inconsistent with a objectively healthy life because the value of benefiting that life with enjoyment may indeed be objectively better. Why can't I apply the same logic to stealing? Why can't I say the value of benefiting my own life by stealing outweighs the value of upholding the victim's rights?

I am concerned you could be right but no one will listen to you. I'm also concerned that the fact that no one listens to me may indicate that I am not as right as I think.

I think there are things that are self-evident. My amateur philosophy may fail me and others may correct me, but an axiom is a claim whose inverse is self-contradictory. For example, I can say "I exist" is an axiom, because I assuming that I don't exist, I would not be able to say "I exist", so therefore that assumption must be false, so therefore I must exist. Does this qualify as a meaningful self-evident truth?

Right, and these people are considered the fringe and not taken seriously. I'm afraid by advocating this we aren't even getting a seat at the table.

I'd agree that we can make a moral argument for zero taxation for the public good. But so few will accept it as to render such an argument fruitless, and I am saying that this rejection is not one of style or superficial aspects, but one of the very substance of the Objectivist position--so much so that there is no hope of gaining ground. Most people simply find a degree of taxation obviously good and desirable and they just won't buy it no matter how persuasive and charismatic the Objectivist "movement" becomes. In other words, it's not "all right", but it isn't even up for consideration.

There's some truth to that, but it strikes me that we are so far short of ever considering Objectivism as a competitive worldview. For example, take an issue like health care in the United States--I think persuasion, education, and discussion by different people than we have now could result in some kind of repeal and replace of Obamacare, or it could result in maintaining the status quo, or it could result in moving closer to single-payer socialized health care. On the other hand, the idea that we might phase out Medicaid is laughed out of the room. Do we need to advocate for some ideas that we can actually move toward and make some progress?

It isn't a dichotomy, and this isn't a matter of deigning to choose an acceptable lie over a rejected truth--rather, I see much truth in Objectivism, but I also see flaws, and it does strike me as a flaw that its core tenets are simply anathema to the vast majority. I don't think there is a lack of sufficient persuasion, or a lack of charisma, or a lack of people who will wake up, or the curse of tradition or culture--no, the core beliefs of Objectivism will always be rejected by a large majority.

So then why not steal from a vulnerable person--knowing that it violates his rights, knowing that it hurts him but judging that it helps me more? I know that Objectivism says this is immoral because it is inconsistent with life and existence. But then why is a decision to be unhealthy also inconsistent with life and existence?

Right. So why is it immoral, supposing I accept the drawbacks? Suppose I think that it is likely that my donut habit might shorten my life or affect the quality thereof. Couldn't I choose to accept that consequence and "live for today" if I think that it is worth it--that is, if the enjoyment from frequent high carb consumption is a higher value than a somewhat longer and healthier life?

Is he more speaking of the deductive approach of Plato versus the inductive approach of Aristotle? Do we figure out truth before applying it, or do we figure out truth by applying it? So recognizing axioms is deductive and Platonic, in that axioms are understood apart from experience, application, or testing. To your first question, yes, it does seem to me that Rand takes "A is A" and "A is not non-A" more as a guide to wisdom and not a formal logical axiom--that Objectivism is more inductive than deductive.

In TVoS 11, Rand decries both outright socialism, for example in Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. Since her writing, its failure has been made even more clear by the horrible results in the U.S.S.R. and more recently in Venezuela. She was equally vehement against the failings of the democratic socialism in the U.K. in the 40s and 50s, but Britain's outcomes did not head in the same direction as the Soviet Union's. Instead, democratic socialism has been firmly established as perhaps permanent in nearly all of Western Europe, especially U.K., France, Germany, and the Nordic countries, but these nations have had nowhere near the same downward spiral as the U.S.S.R. or Venezuela. Far from the disasters that full socialism brings, these "mixed" social democracies seem to have a somewhat sustainable model in place. At least in the countries with some degree of work ethic and natural resources, they have achieved more than Rand might have predicted. It hasn't worked in Spain, Greece, or Italy as well, but isn't Sweden is rather capitalist overall even with high government spending and regulation? Isn't Germany's economy is strong despite pessimism there? And doesn't Brexit show the strength of the U.K. economy to blaze a middle road with indeed lots of government spending though determined by themselves and not by the community of nations? In short, it seems that the looters and moochers have found a system that they can at least claim works well and is flexible, unlike the despair and hopelessness found in, for example, *We The Living*. In TVoS 13, Rand claims that all mixed economies are either on the road to freedom or full dictatorship. Since most countries in the world are in this state, and many are stable, hasn't she been proven wrong? Or do you really believe that the whole world will eventually be ruled by dictators? So should we continue to make the same doom-and-gloom argument against social democracy that we can more easily make against full socialism? Or is the current state of Europe one that doesn't quite fit Rand's model, and so we should adjust it?

In TVoS 10, in response to the question, "In a Objectivist society, what will happen to the poor?", Rand cites Barbara Branden approvingly saying, "If *you* want to help them, you will not be stopped." Rand goes on to say that nature makes no provision for providing basic needs, so neither should the collective "society". Does it matter that more and more people will never find this convincing, that such an argument will never win the day? In other words, do you admit that, while perhaps Rand is right, it will never matter enough to make a difference? Does it matter that most people are willing to accept the "degree of force" required to sustain a program like Medicare? That they have made the judgment that giving up 2.9% of their income (for now) is worthwhile so that the old and disabled can have health insurance, as long as everyone else is forced to as well? If so, does the sheer inability of the Objectivist argument to carry the day--the impracticality of it--indicate at all a flaw in Objectivism? Shouldn't a philosophy be convincing and persuasive and not just right?

I'm not really understanding the point of your questions--thus why I didn't reply months ago. I don't understand what "wariness of wet stone" means or the contrast you are trying to show. I'll return to my question: What makes the pursuit of mildly unhealthy but enjoyable values immoral?

In TVoS 7, Rand says that generally no compromise is needed or is even good. "Offering a burglar a single teaspoon of one's silverware would not be a compromise, but a total surrender." Really? A total surrender? Seems to me a total surrender would be to give the burglar everything he wants. If a burglar is coming to my house and threatening force, I could resist with all my might, or, presuming he wants only things of high value and has no interest in harming me, give him all those things knowing that insurance will cover it and that I will preserve my life and safety. I will be out a significant deductible and have had a unsettling experience, but the party most harmed will be the insurance company--who has already contracted with me to take that risk. Meanwhile, the compromise I reach is: my family is not physically harmed, and I do not attempt to do any harm (in self-defense) onto the burglar. So this is what Rand objects to: the above scenario is not a free exchange by two rational parties. I am not so sure that we can cleave such a stark dichotomy between "irrational" and "rational", between "free" and "forced". No doubt the burglar believes it to be rational, but Rand would call him a unthinking brute. Nonetheless, I must deal with such a person if this scenario comes up. And so I must deal with everyone I meet. Some are slightly irrational and others are more irrational. One person may be a trader who gives me value for value but wants me affirm my belief in a cause, religion, or ideology that I might disagree with; another person might be a burglar or a con man with whom I must resist, avoid, or confront. There are all varying degrees of irrationality and surely no one is 100% rational even if they are nowhere near as irrational as the burglar. Still, with the trader, I compromise, surrendering a little. With the burglar, I surrender a great deal. So this is both surrender and compromise, isn't it? Rand says that I am recognizing his right to my property. I think I am simply pleading "no contest"--I recognize his might over me, not his right, and I would fight him if I could hope to prevail without harming myself, but since I cannot, I look for a "compromise"--certainly some degree of capitulation, but not giving up everything. Rand then claims there is nothing to stop the burglar from returning for the rest. Maybe I could steel myself against it if I think that likely--weapons, security systems, surveillance, dogs, etc. But most burglars never return to the same targets. Perhaps Rand meant "burglar" as a symbol for the greater looters and moochers of society, but in the immediate context of a literal burglar, I don't see him likely returning, as I have not established a pattern of total capitulation, but only been taken for vulnerable at one point in time. Pretending to share my employers ideas "is a compromise" to Rand, and I ought not do so. But I must speak for my employer when I represent him, and I must not allow my own desires, however rational, to overwhelm my contracted duty to uphold my employer's slightly irrational ideas, right? Say I think that my company, of which I am a minority shareholder, should not beholden itself to donate a strict percentage of its profits to charity, but my employer's official position is to donate 5%. It would be wrong of me to do anything but "toe the company line" in representing the company's position to others. I shouldn't even say "I disagree with it" in any official capacity--but this is a good compromise, I think. I suppose I do not understand the distinction between falling short of a desire and surrendering a higher value for a lesser one. If I give up ten dollars for a cheeseburger, I presumably have judged the value of the food as higher than that of the money. If I withdraw my opposition to a government expenditure for the benefit of being accepted by a certain clique, I have judged the value of the acceptance higher than my abstract governmental ethics. What is difference--nothing but what is the objectively better value? I would like to save some of that ten dollars, maintain my outward ethics, get a cheeseburger, and be accepted by the clique--but I can't have it all, so I compromise. My decision may be objectively right or perhaps there will be flaws in it. In the end, I do think on matters of morality and personal choice, we do indeed too often compromise or surrender, but I am not convinced that any hint of such compromise in any situation is evil. I must by and large think independently and avoid being pressured into adopting the slightly irrational views of others, but refusing ever to do so strikes me as unnecessarily extreme.

I'm not so sure Rand's writings are as clear, easy to follow, or as comprehensive as you say. Could you at least point me to the chapter in TVoS that addresses this question that I might reread it and ponder?

I am not sure how life can give values meaning or morality. I'll start with an Objectivist example as follows. I value eating lots of doughnuts, but pursuit of this value is unhealthy and therefore contradictory to having a flourishing life. I also value eating lots of lean protein, and pursuit of this value is healthy and generally contributes to a flourishing life. That much is clear. However, I am having trouble moving from "is" to "ought". What if I want to indulge the unhealthy value? What if I decide that my short-term enjoyment is better--the emotions and the sensations I get from frequent doughnut treats is worth whatever unknown distant health drawback that might occur? What makes the pursuit of this value immoral? Is it only that I am doing something that is contradictory to my life? If so, does not subjectivism creep in? After all, I cannot hope to judge that which is contradictory to my life, but only to judge my own compromised, biased, flawed understanding of what is contradictory to my life.

Just start merging several forums as an experiment, and see how you like it. I think it will be better to have fewer to keep track of. The only reason to have separate subforums is when they get too active to keep track of, so that visitors can focus on the subforums they care about the most. However, having a subforum for aesthetics and a subforum for literature and arts. I understand the differences between the two, but niether one is popular enough to stand on its own. See also: https://blog.codinghorror.com/dont-make-me-think-second-edition/ We want to make the users think about Objectivism, not about the forum nuances.

I posted this in a longer thread, but I thought I would bring it up here for further discussion in its own right. Suppose I try to start with basic priniciples and work my way to more integrated ones through sound reason and small steps in logic. Informally, my line of thinking is the following. Is this Objectivism rightly understood? - Things exist. A is A. - Living things exist and act in order to live. Their life is their existence - People exist and act on the basis of thoughts according to their free will. Their thinking and their life are their existence, their identity. - A person will make choices that enhance or detract from that person's life. - A person's values are the objects of his actions--what a person acts to gain or keep. - Values would be meaningless without life, but life gives values meaning. - Values are moral if they are in line with life--if they are consistent with existence, with reality. - Some people may have immoral values: values that contradict life. - Since people are only individuals, this judgment applies to individuals. - The individual's own life is his own ultimate value. - Achieving one's values is the way to happiness. - Humans must use volitional and abstract thinking to survive. - Observation is required, gaining knowledge, in order to survive. - The individual must integrate our observation into concepts, generalizations, and principles that correspond to reality so that we can act in order to survive. - Only physical force (including fraud) from others can prevent such action and cause us to act otherwise, to act in bondage. A human life is a life guided by the judgment of one's mind. - Government should exist to prevent such force and not to initiate such force itself.

As a newcomer, it strikes me that there are too many subforums. Would you consider combining some?

I consider the core to be that an individual's life is the standard of morality, and the most moral person is the one who uses reason to enhance that life, to live out his or her own purpose, and who has the self-esteem to continue to do so, and who seeks to live in non-contradiction with the objective reality that exists--and that all other concerns from himself and others must be secondary to these. How's that for a paraphrase? No doubt you will scrutinize that as well. What is extreme? To advocate no government except police, courts, and military is extreme. No taxation is extreme. No consideration of the common good is extreme. Labeling religious believers as blanket unreasoning mystics and looters and moochers of the spirit is extreme. Labeling altruists and collectivists as effectively non-living is extreme. Being uncompromising is extreme. Again, extreme doesn't mean incorrect--but I like to acknowledge that these positions are extreme.

Hmm, you are branching off into many topics. I'll just respond to some. I meant "extreme" in that it is beyond the range of reasonable possibility for many to consider. I think we need to be pulled toward Rand's positions; it would do many a lot of good to get one step closer to Rand, even if they are unwilling to get any closer than that. In short, I agree that we need some at the extremes so that, even if nothing else, the non-extreme may seem more reasonable. To use examples from American politics: we needed Goldwater to get Reagan, and we needed Ron Paul to get Rand Paul. I suppose that's a risky topic to bring up right there--I hope you interpret it as I intended. [Here's a hint: It is not a blanket endorsement of Rand Paul's or Ronald Reagan's positions.] As for "more conservational crowd," I meant "conversational". Just a mobile phone typo there.

Just watched an episode of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine that has strikingly Objectivist themes. Check it out; it is season 3 episode 18 entitled "Distant Voices"; if you have Netflix, it is at https://www.netflix.com/watch/70205869 . In it, Dr. Bashir (the space station's medical officer) is confronted with his own thoughts and motives...I won't spoil it right away, but if anyone watches it and wants to comment here, I'll have more comments later.

I am glad you agree with the label "extreme", and I also agree that I mean "extreme" while I withhold judgment as to whether it is substantially right or wrong. However, I do mean that I personally hold it to be extreme in my opinion, and as such, would require extra scrutiny for me to accept it, as against a non-extreme philosophy, which might be easier to accept. However, I also think it merits this scrutiny and consideration, and so here we are.

Would Rand want me to make a podcast mainly for the benefit of others?