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Veritas

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  1. Is this not an inaccurate represntation of Rand's views? "age 428 in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. I suggest all Christians read this book at least once at some point. Moreland and Craig counter general forms of 'ethical egoism'(EE hereafter)which is what Rand's philosophy amounts to. They produce three pretty strong arguments against EE. The most interesting are the last two, being, firstly: EE is inconsistent with love, friendship, etc. which leads to a paradox. In order to pursue EE effectively it may be that you have to abandon it at some points. Secondly, another paradox of EE is that for something to be a moral rule it would seem to have to be universalizable, But, they argue(pages 429-430), suppose we have two people--A and B--who will die if they don't get a kidney. Suppose a kidney comes available for transplant. It seems like from A's perspective both A and B have a duty to act according to A's self-interest. But from B's perspective, B and A have a duty to act in B's self-interest. So there is a contradiction, A and B both a moral duty to act in their own self-interest and not to act in their own self-interest. There's more. Suppose the ethical egoist says that A should want B to act in B's own self interest because it is in fact B's duty to do so. Another problem arises. A should think B should act in his own self interest. But B's acting in his self-interest would be thwarting A's acting in his own self-interest. It seems like a problem to think A has a moral duty to thwart B's moral duty; and B has a duty to thwart A's moral duty. Having a moral duty to thwart someone else's moral duty seems a strange thing. I don't think ethical egoism has a leg to stand on, myself. So, for a psychological explanation: I think that's it's popular in the United States because we've become very individualistic and it appeals to our individualism. It also has an air of intellectual superiority in its labeling. "Objectivism" sure sounds better than "ethical non-realism" or "deontologist ethics" or "emotivism."" (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=message_board)
  2. My only question is if he has arranged things in a certain way so that we would believe his truth only. How could we conceive of the contrary? A magician can make us believe in an illusion. Yet, we know that it is an illusion because we understand certain laws that exist in nature. It doesn't make sense for a being to make us believe certain things and we have the ablity to negate them. In other words, if he wants me to believe that no earth exist than how could I conceive of the contrary? For if I can than my mind has the power to overthrow his intentions by being able to deny them. How weird is it that we can perceive of a being that can decieve us. Would he want us to know that he is possibly deceiving us?
  3. I see. Although, I can see how identity follows from existence. If x exist it must be x that exist. How does consciousness floow though?
  4. Isn't it also true that the basic conclusion that Descarte came to (Cogito Ergo Sum) is simply an admission of the reality of all three axioms in Objectivism? I - (identity) think - (Consciousness) therefore I am (existence)
  5. Someone had mentioned the primary of cosnsciousness. So in other words are you suggestiong that since the consciousness is not primary than the only way the Evil Genius could do make us believe something is simply like a magician would make a person believe in an illusion?
  6. What do objectivist make of Decarte's "Evil Genuis"? Can this idea be invalidated?
  7. This area specifically is very confusing to me. 5.1. THE VALUE OF LIFE I said earlier that what is wrong with Rand's attempted derivation of ethics is that it requires the evaluative presupposition that life is good, which has not been and cannot be inferred purely from observations. Some Objectivists say that life actually isn't good, but everything which promotes life is good. I think this (i.e. the first part of that claim) is obviously false, besides being a distortion of Rand's views, but not to press that - this view has the same problem as all attempts to bridge the is/ought gap, i.e., it just raises the question, how do we know that what promotes life is good? One way to answer this might be to say that this is just the meaning of "good", i.e. "good" just means "promotes (my) life." If you take the Objectivist theory of meaning, however, which rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction and identifies meaning with reference, then this sort of answer cannot be legitimate. It cannot ever be legitimate to answer "How do you know that A is B?" by saying that this is implicit in the meaning of "A". For on the Objectivist theory of meaning, everything that is true of A is implied in the meaning of "A", and everything that is not true of A contradicts the meaning of "A". Therefore, if something's being implied in the meaning of our words was a sufficient explanation for how we knew it, we would be omniscient. That is, if we know every fact that is implied in the meanings of our words (every fact the denial of which is contradictory), then, if the Objectivist theory of meaning is also correct, we know every fact. Since this is not the case, the Objectivist has to say that even the things that are implied in the meanings of our words need to be proven - specifically, they require observational evidence. For example, when asked how we know that gravitational attraction is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the bodies, it is not correct to say we know this because the denial of it is contradictory. The denial of it is contradictory, on the Objectivist theory, but that does not explain how we know it. To explain how we know it, one would have to detail certain scientific experiments and observations of the solar system. For the Objectivist scientist, to defend a theory by saying the denial of it is contradictory, is just begging the question. We don't know whether it is contradictory until we first find out whether it is true. Thus, it can not be an adequate answer to my question, "How do you know that what promotes life is good?" to say that the denial of this proposition is contradictory or that it is implied in the meaning of "good", if the Objectivist theory of meaning is correct. For such a reply would simply beg the question - the denial of the proposition in question is a contradiction, on the Objectivist view, if and only if it is true that what promotes life is good. We still need an explanation of how we know it is true - i.e., what observations lead to this conclusion, and exactly what is the form of the inference by which they lead there. In other words, even if "good" means "promotes life", on the Objectivist epistemology and philosophy of language, you still have to prove that this is what "good" means, by empirical (sensory) evidence. I have never seen such a proof. On the other hand, suppose we take up my theory of meaning, in which there is an analytic/synthetic distinction, and only a small subset of all true propositions are analytic (i.e., such that their truth is implied in the meanings of the words involved and such that their denial is contradictory). In that case, it does not beg the question to say that we know what serves life is good because this is the meaning of good, because what the word means can be known immediately, by reflection (without this leading to omniscience) - at least, you can know what you mean by a word by reflection, although you need empirical evidence to determine whether others mean the same thing. However, the reply now faces a different problem: The claim that "good" means "promotes life" is now simply false, and it is refuted by Moore's 'Open Question Argument'. That is, given that we make a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, we can repeat the "Jocasta/Oedipus" argument to show that "promotes life" does not mean the same as "good". Consider a person who decides to commit suicide. This person believes (let us suppose) that (G) Ending his life is good. But he does not believe that (P) Ending his life promotes his life. since he knows that ending his life will destroy his life. It is evident, then, that "good" can not mean the same as "promotes life," for the same reason that "Jocasta" can not mean the same as "Oedipus' mother." (It means something more like "worthy of being chosen" - though I would not claim this is a completely accurate definition either.) It is possible for a person to not know that what promotes life is good, just as Oedipus did not know that Jocasta was his mother. Therefore, some explanation is required of how we find out that what promotes our life is good. Note that when I say "an explanation of how we know this" is required, I am not expressing doubt about it. I mean simply what I say: given that we know it, how do we know it? Do we know it based on observation, or do we know it a priori? If we do know it, but no observations can be found sufficient to justify it, then we must conclude it is a priori. That is the point of the present discussion. In more general terms, you can see that this sort of appeal to the meaning of "good" can not be valid, since if it were, it would be a way of 'validating' any claim whatsoever. Any person could take whatever ethical views he has, and claim that they are true in virtue of the meaning of good. I might propose to define "good" to mean "promotes the production of chocolate ice cream," and thence deduce that every person ought to produce as much chocolate ice cream as he can. This is silly, of course. I can't simply claim that this is what "good" means. It is not what "good" means, and if I want to claim that producing chocolate ice cream is good, I need to give a substantive reason for thinking so. And the same holds no matter what is substituted for "chocolate ice cream." Claiming that "good" means "promotes x" is not a way of showing that it is good to promote x. Similarly, one could use the strategy to validate any descriptive claim. Suppose I want to show that the sky is red. I say, "Well, 'red' means the color of the sky during the daytime." That is not what "red" means, and that does not give a reason for thinking the sky is red. Nor does the parallel validation work if you substitute "blue" for "red". If asked how I know the sky is blue, I also can not merely say, "'Blue' means the color of the sky during the daytime." That isn't the meaning of "blue" either, and it is not a reason for thinking the sky is blue. The only reason for thinking the sky is blue consists in going outside and looking up. You don't define the sky to be blue. You observe its color. About my proof that everyone should produce chocolate ice cream: an Objectivist might say that the difference there is that he (the Objectivist) has given a correct definition, because it really is good to promote life, whereas the proposed ice-cream definition is not correct. But this just begs the question - how do you know that your definition is correct, and not the chocolate-ice-cream definition? Of course, anyone with any ethical views whatever is going to claim that his views are correct, and therefore, if the Objectivist strategy is permissible, may propose a 'definition' of good that makes his theory of ethics necessarily true, and may respond to all objections in exactly the same manner the Objectivist can.
  8. Has anyone read and responded to the claims on this sight. Or does anyone know of any books that respond to modern critiques of Objectivism? http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand.htm
  9. Veritas

    Peoples Rights

    Why do people have rights and why should they be respected? To be more specific, why is it immoral to rape someone in the Objectivist view?
  10. I am reading Leonard Peikoff's book "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" and I am stumped by something. I don't understand his reasoning. Can someone please say what he is saying in a different way or explain this differently so that I can grasp his reasoning? The question is why should a person chose to remain alive as opposed to not? He says, "The commitment to remain in th realm of that which is is precisely what cannot be debated; because all debate (and all validation) takes place within that realm and rests on that commitment." pg 212 Can anyone clarify please?
  11. Are the any Mp3's of objectivist teaching online for download? Thanks
  12. What would one be valuing for themself by joining the army? What would be their basis for such a decision of going knowing that they might give up their life?
  13. Ok, so just to clarify. Man needs a code of values because life is a value pursuit and in order to pursue values he hasto have principles, which are the codes of values? I have been reading and re reading The Objectivist Ethics, but am still unfiliar with the nuances of objectivism to help make the idea clear to me. Thanks for the help
  14. I just want to know if this is accurate. The need for a code of values is because we are living organisms that presuppose the action of survival and that our nature does not make us survive automatically like lower organisms. We have to survive by making choices, therefore we need a code of values to dictate how we are to survive. The ultimate value is life, since life is that this which is needing to survive. Are these statements accurate? Thanks.
  15. I just meant a regular outline compared to a logical construct, such as several syllogisms. I don't have access to those books where I am do you know of anywhere online that would have her ethics in an outline form?
  16. Does anyone know where I could find a good formal outline for Objectivst Ethics?
  17. What is the Objectivist take on the virtue courage? Where can I find out more information on this?
  18. What is the relationship between what we know and what we will in Objectivism? To sum a platonic thought, "to know the good is to do the good". How is this in conflict with Objectivism? How does the will relate to our knowledge? In Christian thought (dogmatic christian thought) our will is depraved. They believe that our nature is incapable of naturally choosing that which is good on our own. They say that we do not have the will power to chose what we "know" is right. What is the objectivist response to this according to the philosophy of Ayn Rand? Thanks.
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