Vladimir Berkov

The problem is that you are looking at the issue from the wrong direction, essentially resulting in begging the question. Your argument, boiled down, is actually just, "Rights are violated when rights are violated." You keep relying on the phrase "initiation of force" but what I am asking is really where initation of force actually occurs and WHEN rights are first violated. The intellectual challenge here is not making a blanket assertion that initiation of force is immoral but rather defining and explaining what types of thoughts or actions constitute an initiation of force and WHY they are immoral. For instance, why is the intent to commit murder not an initiation of force in your opinion? Yet how is a mere preperatory act which could never result in harm to the potential victim an initiation of force? Simply repeating that attempted murder is an "initiation of force" and thus wrong gets us nowhere as the question is actually what constitutes "initiation of force" and why should the line be drawn where it is. I have given you the rationale behind the current law but I have yet to see any rationale behind your purportedly objectivist position.

You have no need to try to convince me of the necessity of having laws against attempted murder and other inchoate offenses. I wholeheartedly agree with them. The problem we are dealing with here is whether any actual rights are violated during the attempt, not whether the crime of attempt is necessary to protect rights which would be violated in the actual murder. Saying that "initiation of force" includes originating an action to cause physical harm to another person simply shoves the burden of proving your argument back on Ayn Rand who is not alive to debate the point. It is of course easy to define "initiation of force" to include anything you wish, from the mere thoughtful intention to murder to the actual pulling of the trigger or anything in between these two extremes. We need a reasoned basis for deciding at what point any rights are violated here, not a mere semantic reshuffling. You say that it requires thought plus action to do someone harm yet that is beside the point, as we are talking about inchoate offenses in which by definition the acts of the perpetrator didn't actually cause the harm intended. I am beginning to think that in actuality none of the objectivists here have a rational basis for saying that inchoate offenses themselves violate rights. I am seeing plenty of utilitarian reasons for having inchoate offenses (which I agree are important.) I am also seeing plenty of mere unfounded declarations. So I will ask again. What right does the perparatory overt act of an inchoate offense violate? How does it violate it? And why doesn't a fully-formed intent without an overt act also violate the same right?

Again, you need to explain why attempted murder constitutes an "initiation of force" and in a broader sense, what "initiation of force" even means. You say that the purpose of the law is to spell out what manner of "initiation of force" will not be tolerated by society, but that simply brings us back to the question of what the law should be. Since you are obviously not a legal positivist you can't mean that the written law determines what constitutes a violation of a person's rights, thus there has to be some extra-legal rationale for how you define "initiation of force" and at what stage legal culpability should result. For instance, you state you don't support the idea of "thought crimes" but based on your argument it is hard so see why not. After all, if you think the "initiation" part is key, the obvious initiating cause of an attempted murder is the person's thought, their intent to murder. As seen in my example above everything else follows from the thought. The law doesn't like the idea of thought crimes as I said because it is largely an evidentiary matter. The requirement of an overt act in an inchoate offense is largely just a procedural and evidentiary safeguard against convicting somebody who in truth, didn't have a real intent/thought to murder. The rationale is that only a person with a true intent would do such acts, thus they had a strong possibility of following their intentions to their murderous conclusion. You reject this evidentiary purpose but substitute nothing in its place except your dislike of "thought crimes." If you think an overt act is a violation of rights, why isn't a fully-formed murderous intent? Neither actually harms the potential victim. Both can lead to an actual murder. Turning to the current law, you seem to ignore the fact that the law is at root primarily concerned with the violation of people's rights. The reason we have laws against attempted crimes is because as a society we feel that the parent crimes infringe on the rights of the individual in such a serious way that we wish to penalize people who even attempt such a violation. We want to punish people who have the intention of violating the rights of another regardless of whether or not they actually reach that objective. This is because in our legal system we recognize that what matters is the voluntary, intentional choices of individuals for good or evil. We want to punish those who act with bad intentions, attempting to violate the rights of others. Our system isn't primarily concerned with effects although they matter too. This is why the mere fact that one man killed another doesn't mean that it was murder. He may have acted with an insufficient mental state for intentional murder (such as negligence or recklessness) or perhaps even had no culpable mental state at all. In such a system it makes perfect sense to have inchoate offenses because they directly punish people's intentions to violate the rights of others rather than simply punish those who commit the consumated crimes. As the Model Penal Code explains for instance, the mental state in each instance is the same and thus the severity of the crime should be the same.

With your last post I am not really sure what you point was in this argument in the first place. My original point was that the law DOES recognize that injuries (such as murder) violate the rights of individuals and that in an attempt to deter such injuries, the law penalizes the proven wrong intentions of individuals who seek to cause them. This is much more reasonable argument than saying that wrong intentions themselves violate someone's rights. I have yet to see you or any other person in this thread explain how they do, in fact, if such a thing is even possible. What you have essentially done in your last point is voice your agreement with the current rationale behind the current law. Obviously there needs to be a penalty for inchoate offenses simply as a means of detering the "parent" crimes. The question is thus not should we have inchoate offenses but what types of inchoate offenses should we have and what is the rationale for them? And as it stands, you have no disagreement with the current offenses or rationale.

I am honestly not quite sure what Odden is after in his line of replies. In discussing these kinds of issues it simply isn't productive to ask loaded, ambiguous questions and then demand "yes or no" answers. The first step is to define the problem and define your terms. I think we have a fair handle on what the problem is, but the terms being used have still not been defined. For instance, before I can answer Odden's question I need him to define what he means by "initiation." That term is so packed with ambiguity that as it stands his question is essentially circular. Perhaps an example of the problem will help people to understand the nature of the problem, as well. Look at this chain of hypotheticals for instance: A thinks "I really don't like B, perhaps I should kill him?" A thinks "I am positive I want to kill B." A thinks " I am going to buy a gun, wait outside his house and shoot B tomorrow." A writes the previous thought down on paper. A tells C his plan to kill B. A buys a gun. A parks outside B's house but B doesn't notice him. A takes aim at B. A shoots and misses, but B thinks the noise was just a firecracker going off. A shoots and misses, but this time B realized he is being shot at. A shoots and hits B. The challenge of philosophers in this situation is to first define which if any of B's rights are at issue and at what link in the chain they are violated. THe challenge of legal scholars is to find the best point in the chain to establish legal culpability to best protect B's rights while still being sure A isn't being unfairly punished for innocent or coincidental actions. As I said before, the current state of the law is that B's rights are violated ONLY once some action harm occurs to him (the last two links in the chain.) The fact that B can be found guilty of attempt further up in the chain doesn't result from him violating B's rights, it results from his proven intention to do so. Thus for objectivists like Odden and Rationalbiker who wish to say that the acts or intention itself violates rights they have to show what types of acts or intentions they are talking about. They also have to show what rights these things violate. The fact that the crime of attempt is useful to deter the crime of murder is entirely irrevelent to this. Everyone would agree that that is the case, but it doesn't have any bearing on whether attempt is a crime which itself violates any rights.

The question is what is meant by "initiation of force." I don't believe anywhere in the objectivist literature the term is defined. Ayn Rand was more concerned with the difference between aggresive force and defensive force. Thus attacking someone with a knife is differentiated from a person punching a man who is attacking him with a knife. Attacking someone with a knife can be easily seen as a rights violation because the victim is aware of the attack, with the obvious mental and emotional distress which results (as in assault.) The problem area for the rights-based approach is when the victim is completely unaware that someone is attempting to murder them. For instance, it is easy to imagine a situation in which the intended victim only learns of the plot after the would-be murder has been arrested, charged and is in jail. If you think such attempts are rights violations you have to explain what right they violate and in what manner. Further you have to explain why attempt should be punished and not mere thought. The legal rational for the crime of attempt is that it allows the law to penalize the intent to do wrong. Any overt act requirements exist as an evidentiary matter, they flow from the idea that the overt act shows manifest evidence of the intent to do wrong. From what I gather you don't see the overt act in an attempted murder to be evidentiary but rather an actual rights violating. If so, why isn't the mere thought without the overt act a rights violation? The same level of intent exists, and there is no more or less harm to the victim in either case. The only difference is the evidentiary value, and that situation may change. (IE a "Minority Report" hypothetical)

This really doesn't tell me anything, it is the equivilant of saying, "attempted murder is a rights violation because Objectivism says it as a rights violation." You are going to have to explain why you think it is a rights violation, because I can tell you that the rationale in the law for attempt is not based on the idea that inchoate crimes themselves violate rights. It is based on the idea of punishing intent.

I don't want to get on a sidetrack over whether roads should be private. My point was just that drunk driving really can't be prevented by private actors without radical changes to our legal system, essentially changing it to its very core. It would not only require the ability of private entities to prosecute, convict and imprison citizens for civil violations but it would also require a complete restructuring of the common law right-of-way which has existed going back for hundreds and hundreds of years in both American and English law.

"Acting" as you put it, to do murder is NOT itself a violation of someone's rights. I am of course talking about an attempt at murder in which the victim is unaware of the attempt. Otherwise the attempt itself might constitute the crime of assault. The reason why we punish attempt is not because it violates rights but because as a society we think that the intent to do wrong is blameworthy regardless of whether the intent leads to an actual rights violation or not. No legal action instituted by a private property owner could ever approach the effectiveness of government prosecution. For instance, even a waiver which exacts a large monetary penalty is going to be less effective than a prison sentence. Also, there is no really practical way to have all streets be privitized. Private highways/tollways are entirely feasible but since access to a public right-of-way is enshrined in property law there are going to be "public" roads or routes in which no private property owner could even attempt legal action to prevent drunk driving. I am not sure what you mean here. I was simply replying to the person who thought that intent made the difference whereas in my argument the presence of intent makes no difference at all.

The intent to murder is not itself a violation of rights, just as using meth is not itself a violation of rights. The similarity is that in both cases the law decides to punish the initial act in a comprehensive scheme to prevent the probably future harms (murder, etc.) This is why they are essentially the same. Whether the meth user has the same level of intent as a person attempting murder is an issue of degree, not of kind. The problem is that private property owners don't have the same capacity to deter drunk driving as the government. As the private owner of a highway you can't prosecute a driver for drunk driving with the penalty of prison, revocation of license, etc. You would be able to remove the driver and vehicle from your highway, perhaps ban him from future use and then have him arrested for trespass if he returns. This is a pretty weak punishment compared to most government prosecutions for drunk driving.

There is the issue of inchoate "attempt" crimes however, and others such as drunk driving, etc. A person who attempts the murder of another has not exactly violated their rights yet, they simply attempted to violate their rights. The crime of attempt does not require a 100% proof of certainty that the attempt would have succeded. In fact, you can be convicted of an attempted murder which in all likelyhood would have failed. The main purpose of inchoate offenses is simply to try to deter crimes by attacking them further back in the causal/historical chain of events. This is essentially the same rationale behind the criminalization of meth as described earlier in the thread.

I would agree that "greed" in the pejorative sense means aquiring more than what is earned or alloted by or to you. For instance, let's say you are at a party and see a plate of scones on the table put out for the guests. It would be greedy to take all of the scones, leaving none for the other guests. This is the type of situation in which greed truly is a negative trait.

It really is pretty irrelevant to try to trace back the historical owners or sovereigns of a territory back past a certain point. Regardless of how it was obtained, the law (both domestic and in international law) is eventually going to "forget" about the past and require that the current borders or owner should stand. A good example is that the borders established by colonial powers in Africa are still the established borders of many independant African states. The same can be said of the US/Mexican border, or the territory of the US in general vis a vis the Indians.

Is there any hard evidence that this is actually the libertarian position?

From what I remember of Dawkins' book his thesis was essentially scientific, not philosophical. From the viewpoint of the propagation and continuation of genetic material, reproduction IS more important than the quality of life any one individual organism has. This is why many species die after mating or reproducing. The fact that humans have interests and goals outside of reproduction doesn't invalidate the purpose of genes or DNA, it simply means that humans are complex organisms with multiple goals.

The fact that all American citizens have a stake in the US government and obligations under US law which lead to voting rights doesn't mean we should let more people in just so they should also have equal rights. My point is that a free country requires a liberal voting franchise but a liberal voting franchise coupled with a large influx of anti-freedom people will eventually lead to the country becoming less free. That is the only legitimate goal of border and immigration control that I can see. In a free country, welfare benefits for illegals or increased competition for low-wage labor are non-issues. The only issue is a corruption of the freedom of the country itself.

In the strict sense of a US national defense, it is not defensive. US citizens take on a share of risk when investing in a foreign country. Economic claims can likely better be handled by international law than by use of force.

There is a big difference between restricting internal franchise and external franchise. All Americans have a stake in government, regardless of their property or riches. For example, even those with no property have an interest in US foreign policy, domestic criminal law, etc. (incidently this is why a property qualification to vote is a bad idea) Those external groups who are not US citizens have no legitimate stake in the US government for the obvious reason that they live outside the jurisdiction of the United States and thus are not governed by US law.

But in a state founded on the idea of popular sovereignty, there is a great deal to worry about as in America changing popular ideals are what determine the laws and the organization of the state. Even permanent instruments like a constitution, or non-elected bodies such as an independant judiciary cannot stand forever in opposition to a popular will. At best they are only temporary bulwarks against popular whim. Thus who gains entry into the country (and hence into the voting franchise) can ultimately determine what type of government and law the country has. For instance, if opening the borders for some reason means a huge influx of Marxists, given enough time, we will have a strongly Marxist government.

I think you have hit on the essence of the problem. It is not an issue of civilization vs. primitivism or of a simple defense against an unprovoked and unexpected attack. The problem is that the US seems to harbor two contradictory goals in its foreign policy. We want to be a global imperialist power able to further our political interests with military force, yet we refuse to accept the implications of being a global imperial power. The US has to pretend as if all foreign policy is either justified as a defensive military action (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc) or as altruistic protection of a third party (Somalia, Kuwait, etc.) We refuse to accept the fact that being an imperialist power requires waging war and using force for political goals beyond military defense or humanitarian reasons. It means using force to occupy countries which harbor useful natural resources. It means using force to prop up puppet or colonial regimes to pacify unstable regions. This is why both the democrats and the neo-cons have failed in their foreign policy. The democrats believed international cooperation was the key, but never managed to get everyone to cooperate via world organizations like the UN. The neo-cons believe that if everyone is westernized then peace will result, but that force, rather than cooperation is the means to that end.

Remember that to challenge this on a free-exercise ground like the UDV case you need to be covered by RFRA or a mini-RFRA at the state level. UDV turned out the way it did because it was a federal law issue, not a state one.

It is hard to see how any objectivist could agree with Lincoln's objectives in the Civil War. Then again, the objectives of the CSA were hardly any better. The question of a "popular mandate" I think is the most interesting one, since the American Colonies certainly didn't have a popular mandate when declaring independance and fighting the Revolutionary War.

It really depends on the industry. In some there were competitors and private firms at the time the government started to enter the market (utilities), in others the government entering a market with virtually no competitors. (schools) There are several reasons why the government would enter such a market. For one, government companies are seen by many to be safer than private ones. Too, government often got involved in industries with many private competitors, thus government intervention seemed to create economies of scale which didn't exist before. Lastly, government companies are an easy way to give people things they couldn't afford from the private sector. For instance, public schools give people an opportunity to educate their children even when they couldn't afford a private school. Thus it is easy to see why people would want the government to enter the market in many places.

Indeed. Sacagawea dollar coins anybody?

I would guess that cash transactions would be rounded off and electronic transactions would still use virtual "cents" even though no real pennies would exist. The problem is really just a symptom of a country which has gone off the gold standard and uses monetary policy as a political policy. Give it enough time and we will have to talk about getting rid of nickels and dimes as well.