DonAthos

Does she continue to have a vagina, and he a penis? If so, then she can continue to feel that he is the penetrator (which sounds like a porn parody of "The Terminator," but I digress). Because he is. Right? Is he heroic? Then she can continue to "worship" him in that respect, if she's so inclined. At what point, and in what specific manner, will his smelling of violets rather than pine render these things impossible?

Well... I'm not really interested in continuing to try to tease out this distinction here and now, but I'm not quite sure that "Prof. Post" helps to clarify this issue for me. In what he quotes to elaborate his point -- Prof. Townshend, I suppose -- there's a distinction made between "the property" and "the reputation"; specifically, that reputation is not itself protected. While property is, and while perhaps he infers certain property as resulting from reputation, it implies to me that Townshend does not see reputation as property. (For we protect a person's property, do we not?) That's different from the conclusion that Post draws, however, and even apparently from that very quote. I'm certain that it must be my own issue, and that others reading along (should any exist) are understanding just fine. But for my part, Post's statement amounts to a hazy and indistinct presentation of what reputation is... or property, for that matter. You know, it's just that I find a statement like "reputation is property" to need a bit of explanation. I'm interested in property -- in rights generally -- and if a person owns his reputation (which I continue to believe is comprised of other peoples' opinions; has that been shown false?), then I need to adjust my understanding of the concept. Over the course of our discussion, however, we've determined that we're actually discussing a "subset" of reputation (not reputation in total, which can include other things which for some reason don't belong in a court of law); that this is reputation in a specialized legal context, and we can't expect our normal understanding of the concept to apply; that we're talking about the results of reputation and not the reputation itself; that reputation is immaterial, and therefore not property in itself (as there is no such thing as immaterial property). I don't know, but it seems to me that this amounts to more than/different from the original claim which caught my eye: "reputation is property." Then, when we're talking about the damages in a defamation suit, in terms of actual tangible property ("material" property; the only kind), we're talking about property that we believe a person would have acquired had the defamation not occurred. Those are really the (tangible) property rights at stake, are they not? Those rights I have over property I've never acquired, through trades I've never made. If I'm selling refrigerators, and we conclude I would have sold one to you (though did not in reality), then we've concluded that I have a right to your money? Because we suppose that in a world where the defamatory action had never taken place, you would have gone through with this purchase? (Though in practice we wouldn't force you to buy my refrigerator, but instead take an equivalent amount from my defamer.) But how do I have a right to your money before you've agreed to trade it to me? Because it's "reasonable" that you would have done so? Doesn't this discount your agency, and the fact that you might have chosen to do otherwise? I can "own" my reputation and seek to improve it all I'd like, but I can't compel you to purchase from me at any point, nor say with certainty that you will do so in the future. So how can I claim with certainty what you would have done in the past under X circumstances? Is this just skepticism on my part? While I am certain about the sun rising on account of its nature, it seems to me that the nature of man, and specifically the nature of man's volition, makes similar "certainty" as regards man's actions impossible. Isn't a claim to "property I would have had, if not for defamation," ignoring the distinction between the metaphysical and the man-made? I continue to be stymied by my (lack of) understanding of this idea. It makes me think: suppose I own a house and I'd like to put it on the market. I think it has a certain value, and perhaps that's borne out by statistical analysis. Yet a week before my sale, my neighbor goes ahead and sells his house for some drastically lower price -- we'll even call it an "unreasonable price." My neighbor's actions have "damaged" my home's value, perhaps; I can say (though as above, I don't know I can guarantee) that, had my neighbor not done so, I would have made more money through my own sale. But does this mean that I ought have recourse to sue my neighbor? Have my rights been violated? Clearly this is a different issue altogether -- perhaps it doesn't belong in this discussion... And yet, I find compelling similarities in what I take to be the principles at stake. Where the "value" of our possessions lies in the assessment of other people (as it does with my home's market value)... I don't know that we own, or have right to, the value in that sense... or that we have rights over the physical, tangible property that we believe ought (in reason) emanate from that value. I just can't get around that yet. Then what is "defamatory" depends on the composition of the "surrounding society" as much as anything else, and the value of a person's reputation may lie in their being known as a Christian, or atheist, or etc. This does say clearly to me that a person's reputation is an aggregate of the evaluations of others, though I know that we've disagreed on that point previously; we're forced to consider, not simply the facts of a man's life as assessed by a "reasonable person," but as assessed by his particular community, though it may be comprised of fundamentally irrational people. Among a community of Satanists, after all, it would be defamatory to accuse someone of else-than-Satan-worship. What's defamatory to us in the USA might not be defamatory in China, the difference being how others in society alter their evaluations and subsequently their economic activities. While we may sue for what we believe to be the resultant difference in economic activity, the change to reputation lies in how others evaluate us. In claiming to own our reputation, we are claiming to own the appraisal of other people. Given everything else that you've said, to the extent that I've understood it (which come to it, may not be all that far...?), I don't understand this distinction. Doesn't "small claims" have to do with the value, and not the nature, of the suit? But I don't know at all, and concede whatever correction you supply. Rather, if we believe that a person creates his social identity -- his reputation -- and owns it a real sense, and is entitled to the fruits of his reputation... then how does this not hold true for the kinds of relationships and damages I've questioned here? If I have a girlfriend and realize specific goods from it -- let's say pizza once a week, she cleans our apartment, we have sex, etc. -- and if a defamer's actions lead to my losing all of that, why exactly doesn't my case have merit? Aren't I being "deprived of my actual past" in precisely the manner by which you've previously claimed that reputation functions? If the claim is that I can't put a monetary value on my losses, I'd ask "why not?" While I may not be able to give a dollar amount to every aspect of my hypothetical relationship, there are ways of supplying a fair market value for pizza, for maid service, for escort services, and generally for those activities which I'd now have to pay for out of pocket (in addition to the "replacement cost" of finding a new girlfriend). That's real economic loss, isn't it? And if we can attribute these losses directly to my defamer (according to the same "reasonable man" standard we've previously agreed to), then why shouldn't it be recognized in a court of law? Not that I believe it should. I just don't understand the distinction between this and your case generally, and that leads me to conclude that I still don't understand these matters in principle. It's not you, I'm sure, it's me. And with that, I think I've expressed my confusion as well as I can. You're welcome to respond to any or all of this post, and if I see an opportunity to contribute more I will... but I don't want to just belabor the point that "I don't get it," so I may not respond further. Thanks again for your patience; I'll continue to reflect on all that you've said.

Huh. It sounds like you're saying that reputation (or that legal subset of reputation we're discussing) is not property in itself, as it is immaterial, but is represented by the whole of that physical property which "stems" from one's reputation. I'm known as, say, a good and honest refrigerator dealer, thus we say that the money I've realized through the sales of my refrigerators are indicative of the "property value" of my reputation. Should someone claim that I worship Satan, and my refrigerator sales subsequently decline, we would say that my reputation (as property) has declined that much? And if I do not in fact worship Satan, that I have a suit against the person who claimed it? Or does it matter that a "reasonable person" might not care whether I worship Satan, pursuant to buying a refrigerator from me? Suppose the charge was that I am an Objectivist, when I'm not, yet we recognize both that 1) a reasonable person would esteem me the more for that, and perhaps be better inclined to buy a refrigerator from me; and 2) that my sales have in fact declined. Would I have recourse to sue against he who's claimed that I'm an Objectivist, when per a reasonable person standard such should have no negative impact on my reputation or my sales? Conversely, what if someone makes some claim, perhaps a false claim, which adds to my reputation and drives my sales; are they legally entitled to some share in my profit, for their work in increasing the value of "my property"? And going back a bit... when we say that my reputation-as-property is really the tangible results of my reputation, that means that my reputation-as-refrigerator-dealer is the profits that I realize from my refrigerator sales. Where profits are cash money, it is certainly those sales I make to my customers... but is that all that profits can mean here, in total? Doesn't having my refrigerators in my customers' homes have a demonstrable value as word-of-mouth advertising? (Couldn't I produce an advertising expert in a court of law to say so, and produce a chart to that effect?) What about the future sales that this advertising would generate? Aren't these also part of the value of my reputation? Could I sue my slanderer for this sort of "generational effect"? Or would it relieve me better to have injunctions which would require those who we believe would otherwise have purchased refrigerators from me to buy them, in light of the fact that I do not worship Satan and am thus entitled? Well, all right. Suppose I'm dating a girl and she treats me to pizza every Friday night. I'm slandered against -- my reputation as a lover comes under unfair/untrue assault -- and my girlfriend subsequently dumps me, leading to a loss of pizza (among other things). Could I sue my slanderer for that loss? Suppose I decide to patronize a prostitute, on account of losing sexual relations with my girlfriend? Could those be damages? And when I court a new girlfriend, what of the funds that I'd spend on dinners/movies/flowers/etc. to woo her? *** Sorry. I recognize that I'm still more questions than answers at this point, and I don't really expect you to answer me point-for-point. Rather, I ask them all in an effort to try to define the (as-yet) unclear edges of my continued ambivalence on this topic. If you can divine the central misunderstanding I have, you're a better man than I... But I'll keep on trying to understand, and thank you for your patience.

All right, I'm curious. Suppose I wear a gender neutral scent and thereby suffer from gender "blurriness." I lose awareness of my feelings about my own maleness (though I'm not precisely certain what that means, or how it's meant to follow from wearing a particular scent...). What kind of harm, specifically, will that produce for me? Clearly, "gender blurriness" is meant to be bad -- but how?

I find the substance of most you've said in this thread to be reasonable, and yet I don't know if it speaks to the heart of my concerns. (Or perhaps I just don't understand it sufficiently as yet.) I've seen it claimed in this thread that "reputation is property," and I'd like to understand that better. Granted that this is a delimited understanding of "reputation," the definition of which would come from a law dictionary and neither Merriam-Webster nor my common sense understanding (which perhaps calls into question my ability to understand your answer, given that law-as-a-special-science is neither my strength nor a particular interest). If reputation is property -- if we are owners of the "social identity" that we create through our actions (in the minds of the reasonable, at least) -- then why isn't my reputation as a friend or lover equally property and equally defensible in a court of law? Wouldn't the creation of that subset of my reputation have proceeded in the same way as the others we're discussing? Couldn't I suffer legitimate and demonstrable harm through the unfair destruction of that property? And if so, oughtn't I receive recompense? Also, I believe you've said before that there is no such thing as "immaterial property," yet I'm having a difficult time putting that together with the concept of "reputation as property," as whatever else it may be, I do consider reputation to be "immaterial." Perhaps you could speak to that confusion?

The issue of order isn't "why the universe is the way it is" in the sense of what makes the grass green... Were the grass blue, there would still be some ultimately apprehendable reason for that. Or yellow, or what have you. As we speculate about other possible universes, one thing that would remain constant is: that things would act in accordance with their nature. The reason why questioning "order" itself is invalid is because, were "order" anything other than it is -- were contradiction metaphysically possible -- then a person would not have any grounds upon which to question anything. A scientist is able to investigate the nature of the universe (and discover that chlorophyll is the cause of plants' greenness) precisely because he understands that there exists order in the sense we're discussing. To remove that understanding -- to take seriously the idea that "there might be a universe in which things do not behave according to their nature" -- would eliminate the very possibility for science, or rational thought generally. If things did not behave according to their nature, then we would have to allow for "square circles" and the independence of cause and effect, and the possibility for eating one's cake and having it too, and... you see? It just doesn't make any sense at all. (Incidentally, it would also render moot your suggested axiom where things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another; given contradiction, this is not necessarily so.) Earlier you mentioned your mathematician friend and the long odds against this universe, and I consider these related issues. Here's how I see it: Suppose you win the lotto. You're stunned (beyond the boon of winning) because your winning was highly improbable, which is indisputably true. The chance that your particular combination of numbers would come up was always microscopic... and yet... that doesn't mean that there was some particular design behind it. Some combination of numbers was always bound to come up, and the chances of any combination of numbers was equally small. Sometimes I feel like we're cosmic lottery winners, marveling at the fact of having won. While it's true that many things had to "fall right" for us to have this conversation, had it been some other way, perhaps other people (though differently constituted) would be discussing how "perfectly designed" their universe was -- just so as to allow for their lives -- and how that order constitutes evidence for an intelligent designer (in their image, naturally).

I think I agree with freestyle (he can correct if I'm wrong on this). Whatever it is we mean by "chicken" -- I guess that thing which clucks and whatnot -- there was certainly a first. And if by "egg" we mean that thing which held our OG chicken, then the egg came first; if by "egg" we mean that egg which was laid by a chicken, then the chicken came first. Once we are asking a specific question -- the meaning of our terms clearly defined in our mind -- there's bound to be a specific answer. It isn't a sexy answer, and it doesn't really mesh with what's intended by those who pose this question in the first place. I think that the question is typically asked to play up apparently paradoxical implications of cause and effect. "To have a chicken, you need an egg... but to have an egg, you need a chicken... but to have a chicken, you... o dilemma!" So, in that way, I find freestyle's answer satisfactory. The question is meant to be unanswerable (like others of its kind: "irresistible force vs. immovable object"; "tree falls in the forest"; "one hand clapping"; etc.), but clarity in one's terms results in questions getting answered.

I respect that you don't have unlimited time to discuss this topic. Neither do I. I do want to question the above, however, and if you're unable to respond, I'll understand. You suggest that an adult homosexual should re-examine his choice to be homosexual. All right. But what choice is he supposed to have made originally? For what it's worth as context to my comments, I'm heterosexual. I first considered myself to be "in love" when I was seven. To my knowledge, I never sat down (at any age) and asked myself "what gender ought I find attractive?" I do believe that we are born "tabula rasa," and that my sexuality stems from certain early-life experiences/choices, but I can't imagine that any of those experiences/choices were explicitly sexual in nature. Hell, when I had my crush on little Sarah, I didn't even know the specifics of our biological differences or what sex was. I didn't have it on my mind to reproduce. I didn't, to my knowledge, hold any particular views on the issues of masculinity or femininity -- concepts that I continue to find at least questionable. And so, if I wanted to "question my choice" at this stage in my life, and since I don't strictly even know the origin of my original "decision," how would I do that exactly?

I don't really have any problems with a personal/social identity model, as such; I was only trying to demonstrate that I believe my earlier surmise -- that one's reputation is the aggregate of the evaluations of others -- is supported by what you'd quoted in response. Come to it, I'm not sure it's quite so clean and straightforward as personal identity -> social identity; the particular society under discussion plays a vital role, in that it is responsible for doing the evaluating. Again, note the language in your source (emphasis added): We're dealing directly with the estimations of "society," which is, with respect to any given individual, "other people." I generally like a "reasonable person" standard, but I have to wonder slightly about its application here. Do we really assess a person's reputation according to what a "reasonable" man would make from the facts of a person's life? Or can a person have a legally defensible reputation which is out of sync with what a "reasonable person" would otherwise conclude? Can't we, as reasonable people, conclude that someone does not generally deserve their reputation... yet also acknowledge that they do have that reputation? I agree with the substance of what you're saying, but I just don't quite understand the application. I believe that someone may have a reputation which is false in the sense that they are not the kind of person that they're reputed to be. Or that society, in general, may have concluded poorly with respect to a person's character. When Merriam-Webster defines reputation as an "overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in general," I find that jibes with my understanding. But there's no requirement there that these people be "reasonable." Perhaps you're right in that there is a different legal standard? I certainly don't know one way or another, except to defer to your say-so. But in my experience, and according to how I believe the term is typically used (and including the source that you quoted in response), "reputation" is something that exists in other peoples' minds. It is their evaluation of a person, for better or worse. Fair enough. Well, okay. I'm just trying to make sense of the idea of "attacking facts." Don't think I'm there yet, but I'm not giving up on it. I think this is compelling -- particularly the idea of "creating a false reality" -- though I remain unsure about "attacking facts." I find them fairly unassailable. I do think that slander/libel/defamation is an attack on a person -- potentially on their livelihood -- and that such is fine grounds for a lawsuit. Does this mean that reputation is property? I don't know... the next quoted section just makes me feel hopelessly confused on the subject. Well... okay, but if there is no such thing as "immaterial property," what then do you mean when you say that "reputation is property"? Certainly reputation is not, itself, material. Right? Even if damage to a person's reputation can often be measured in terms of physical property, or recompensed in same fashion, does this mean that reputation is physical property? On a bit of a tangent, does it make any sense to speak of a person's reputation in a non-business sense? For instance, that a person might have a reputation as a friend or a lover, which might also suffer unfair assault? Would that be "material" in the same way? Property in the same way? Do you think that such should also be actionable in a court? Agreed absolutely.

I disagree wholeheartedly. I believe we're losing sight of the nature of the action -- which is intentionally taking someone's life with malice and all that, i.e. murder -- on the basis of the means by which it's committed. If I cut brakes on a car and then sell it to you, intending that you will die, and that happens... it isn't simply "fraud" because I didn't tell you about the "faulty" brakes -- I'm not less at fault because you decided to make the purchase. I have taken purposeful action to kill you. And sometimes speech has the character of "action." I'm not sure about the source of your disagreement here. I wouldn't deny that "someone's doing some thinking" in a sweatshop... I don't think I have a problem with "sweatshops" generally, actually... But if we're talking about Nike or whatever (assuming that I'm not running the risk of libel with such a suggestion ), I'd still say that the sweatshop's "product" is shoes. Perhaps you can clarify the source of our apparent disagreement?

Hmmm... I'm not saying that you're wrong about that. However, I don't think you've adequately made that case in your reply, and I'm not yet convinced it isn't true. It certainly seems to me that reputation is an aggregate of the evaluations of others. For instance, let's examine this, from the quoted material you've provided: Okay. So this develops a notion that a person has "two identities" -- one "personal" and one "social." A "personal identity" is "not constituted by [their] social regard." I infer then that the second type of identity -- "social identity" -- *is* thus constituted. That is, reputation is one's "social regard." Directly preceding the above quote, we have: Here we have an equation of a reputation to "society's present estimation of an individual." Who is "society"? And what does it mean for society to have an "estimation of an individual"? In short, doesn't the quoted material you've provided explicitly support the idea that reputation is an aggregate of the evaluations of others? I'm not certain that I can agree that we all share one process by which we judge another person's character, or that it always proceeds fairly or rationally. But relevant to my earlier question as to the nature of reputation, I don't see how this disagrees. I've asked whether reputation was an aggregate of the evaluations of others, and you're here saying that we're discussing the basis for "judgement [of a man's] character." Isn't that an evaluation? The "facts" are attacked...? If I were to claim that the Earth is flat, do you mean that I would somehow be "harming" the fact of the Earth being round? I apologize, but this just doesn't seem to make any sense to me. I do not believe that a person can "attack a fact." I also disagree that peoples' subsequent opinions are somehow derivative to this matter; that the damage is done "to the fact," which is only made apparent in shifting public opinion. Were we considering a case where "facts had come under direct assault," but nobodies opinion had demonstrably changed (with regard to monetary "damage"), I'm sure you'd agree that the case had no merit. I'm not sure that any force outside of speculative fiction can deprive a man of his actual past... But I agree with you that we seek to form proper judgments of others, based on truth. How this disagrees that reputation is an aggregate of the opinions of others, however, I continue to be unsure. And more to the point, I'm not sure that we're discussing an actual species of property in "reputation." I had this difficulty, too, in a discussion of intellectual property, as such, and never felt that the question was satisfactorily answered. Perhaps the difficulty is my own. From the Ayn Rand Lexicon, and on the subject of "property rights," Ayn Rand said the following (from "Man's Rights," emphasis added): Also, from "The Property Status of the Airwaves," emphasis added: I do not mean to therefore contend that there cannot be any immaterial form of property... but I do believe that I'll need to see the case developed more fully first. So far, claims to immaterial property seem to me to be claims to the (otherwise) private actions of others... and in the case of reputation, to their thoughts as well. I think it is a claim that you "own" my evaluation of you. *** Incidentally, on the matter of "reputation," I also looked up that term in the Lexicon, with one result. This is certainly not a definitive assessment, but I found it at least interesting (from "The Establishing of an Establishment," emphasis added): It would be foolish to try to weasel out a "position" re: reputation from this, but I will say that it doesn't sound as though reputation is being treated as a piece of personal property, necessarily formed from correct judgments of the facts of a person's life, and thereby possessing a determinable and objective market value. Actually, it sounds a little skeptical about this "reputation" business... doesn't it?

A couple of questions... For Mnrchst: Suppose I tell someone that a glass of water is safe to drink, when it is not -- I know it is poisoned. And he drinks it and dies. Is this murder on my part? Or is this man responsible for his own death in that he decided to trust me and act on that information? Granted that I've done nothing here except for "speak"; does it follow that this is nothing but a question of "free speech"? For Grames: What is reputation? Isn't it an aggregate of the evaluations of others? And where does an "evaluation" reside? To wit, your reputation exists (in part) as my evaluation of you. If you "own" your reputation, does that mean that you somehow "own" my evaluation of you? If so, how? What would that kind of ownership entail?

I *think* that I've already expressed my sentiments as well as I'm able in this thread, so I'll simply acknowledge my continued disagreement. However, with respect to this reply to 2046 and the metaphorical "law of the jungle," I'd just like to observe: if "civilization," as opposed to the jungle, exists only when that civilization is respected by all -- if it is at the mercy of anyone who would choose to act as though it is a jungle, and disappears when those who disrespect our notions of what it is to be civil choose to act -- then we have surrendered civilization altogether. If you suggest that we act according to the law of the jungle when our enemies drag us into it, then it is always the law of the jungle and nothing but. Objectivism has no place there.

This is true. However, the "circumstances" matter greatly. When is it valid for a government to initiate an attack against another government? In response to the initiation of force. Or, if I'm abusing your intended sense of the word "initiate" -- if you mean outside of such a response -- I would say only in reasonable anticipation of an initiation of force. That is, should someone rear back his fist to punch you, you do not have to wait for his fist to be thrown to execute self-defense. Here we have a crucial disagreement. Note the passive construction of "force has already been initiated"; this leaves out by whom. When force is initiated against a man, this does not give him carte blanche to act out against one and all. Nor is "force" an undifferentiated lump triggering one fixed reaction -- we can recognize the sources of force against us, and assess their severity, and etc. If Nazi Germany, et al., are pursuing global enslavement or some such, then yes, they have initiated force against me and my neighbor. But unlike your earlier suggestion, this does not make it somehow impossible for me or my neighbor to initiate force against one another, which persists as an easily recognizable distinction. Nazi Germany's actions make a response of force necessary, it is true, against Nazi Germany. Contrarily, your arguments seem to suggest that any action I would take for the general purpose of defeating Nazi Germany, up to and including instituting a draft; concluding secret alliances with "lesser evils"; targeting innocents; and ultimately the wholesale sacrifice of my neighbor; etc.; that this should all be seen as moral (or perhaps somehow outside of morality altogether). That, once "force has been initiated against me," I am now completely free of any moral concerns whatsoever. And I disagree with that. I think it is proper to respond with force against one's aggressors, but inherent to that is the recognition that there is a difference between one's "aggressors" and those who are innocent and must be treated accordingly. I don't think I understand the full meaning here, so I may err in my partial interpretation (please correct if necessary), but I'd like to respond briefly to this: "those getting taxed/private police aren't obviously/visibly/tangibly doing harm by not paying taxes/submitting to a monopoly police force, but they are because of context" As an anticipatory nod to my earlier claim -- that there is a difference between "aggressors" and "innocents" -- you're now claiming that there are no innocents; that a failure to "submit" is, itself, an act of force. And frankly, I find this a chilling sentiment. It seems to suggest that we are each of us bound by a moral duty to one another, and that breach of this duty invites just punishment. And... I don't know how to respond to this, except to say that I am not responsible for your defense, as I am not responsible for your life. It may well be that you and I would often have common cause in defense. Were the barbarians at the gate, I'm sure that you and I would do what we could to keep them out. But that's a decision I would make out of self-interest, not because I feel beholden to you and your interests. I do not recognize your "right" to enslave me for any purpose, and I think you should reassess claiming one.

At risk of being accused of not properly responding to this topic, I have a question in response to this summation you've provided. Are you saying that, should you feel threatened by some third party, you would have the right to point your gun at me and demand that I rescue you? How do you think I ought respond to such a thing?

I don't mean to disrespect your OP by not responding to it substantively... but I have a question: if the police and armed forces provide people with a good (and I would say they do; I like having police and military), why wouldn't people be willing (that is: voluntarily) to pay for them?

It is an interesting observation, but one with which I'm not sure I can agree. Imagine a man enslaved for five years. Have his rights only been violated once, in his enslavement? Or are there fresh initiations of force against this man throughout? Let us revisit your initial statement: All right. And so I try to imagine some context in which your statement might apply. Suppose you and I are lawmakers. We live in a land in which there is slavery, and neither you nor I believe that there ought to be slavery. However, I argue for slavery's immediate abolition whereas you think that there should be a "transition period," during which (I presume) slavery would continue. For argument's sake, we will put that period at five years. During those five years, I expect that your plan will put the force of law on the side of the slave masters; that is, it will commit force against those enslaved, insofar as they resist their "owners." While you may claim that those slaves who will suffer throughout these five years have already had their rights violated, and so having the law continue to support said rights violation does not have the same moral character as an actual initiation of the use of force, I do not agree that there is either one undifferentiated rights violation, or that there is a moral difference between the first initiation of the use of force and the second. If one man attacks another and punches the victim in the face, I don't believe that the second punch he throws is any more moral (or any less immoral) than the first had been. And if we observe a man getting beaten down in this manner, I do not believe it would be any less immoral for us to join in and kick that man while he is down. If one man enslaves another, how can it be less immoral for us -- and less an initiation of the use of force -- to put our governmental power behind the slaver, and not the slave? And in supporting a "transition period" as opposed to immediate abolition, isn't that precisely what we'd be doing? It seems that you would claim that this transition period is the pragmatic, the practical, the wise route to take; that route which is most likely to secure the slaves' freedom in the long term (or other goods, such as "stability"). And I admit that this is a persuasive argument. But if our "wise route" involves supporting, sanctioning, and committing outrages against actual human beings and their rights, then aren't we simply saying that our ends justify our means? And aren't we also saying that we've determined it to be acceptable (or even moral) to violate others' rights -- if temporarily -- if it is "for the greater good"? And finally, aren't we doing this in the name of appeasing those irrational persons who do not respect rights, and allowing them to continue to "profit" from their abuses with an apparent legitimacy that we would thereby grant them? In pursuing such a course of action, have we considered everything which we might stand to lose? I don't know. I'm not sure I'll have much more to add to this conversation -- I have more thinking to do, at least -- and I thank you for the time you've taken to explain your statement.

I hope you don't mind my pressing these issues a bit further. Right now, I can't help but feel that you're challenging certain ideas that I've considered... fairly central to my understanding of Objectivism. So in the interest of expanding/revising that understanding (and perhaps that of others), I'd like to keep going... Agreed on both counts. We recognize no distinction between the moral and the practical, and we don't hold to any sort of moral duty. But when I take this all together, and with your other posts in this thread, I believe that what you're saying is that it may, at times, be judged "impractical" to respect others' rights. If that were so, and given our (presumed) agreement above on "the moral and the practical," could I say that it would be immoral to respect those same rights in those situations? In the instance where you judged a transition from slavery necessary (the more practical) -- as opposed to its outright abolition -- then slavery's abolition would be immoral. It would amount to choosing lesser values over greater; a sacrifice. Right so far, or have I misstepped? In that case, it would be moral to violate the rights of others; it would be moral to initiate the use of force. In saying that we ought to continue to enslave people, even if only for a "transitional period," I believe that this is where we've unavoidably wound up: advocating the initiation of the use of force, and defending its initiation in the name of morality. I must be wrong. Right? That can't be the correct development of your position. I must be wrong here, somewhere, and I'd be greatly appreciative if I could be helped to see where.

But we're not necessarily talking about the South anymore. We're talking about "slavery." While I can understand your saying that we don't want a "poor transition" -- nobody wants anything "poor," right? -- I'm trying to understand this in terms of actual, real human lives. We can't talk about the Civil War because we're not experts, which is fair enough, but we should be talking about slavery. Imagine that I was a slave in a given society. Since any situation of slavery will necessarily have *some* context, I have to imagine that our conversation might go something like this: Me (the slave): Eiuol, slavery is immoral. I demand that my servitude end yesterday, because nobody has the right to enslave me. Eiuol: Not so fast. Before we put an end to it we have to examine the impact of doing so. We need to have a good transition. Me: A good transition for whom? My rights are being violated; slavery is wrong; and it needs to end immediately. Eiuol: While it is wrong, you need to get back to work until we've ensured that the economy of those who've enslaved you doesn't suffer too much. I assure you, this does not make me happy. *** And I mean... huh? How can we want anyone enslaved to be forced to continue for even one more minute? Out of concern for the welfare of the slave masters? What regard do we owe them, and on what basis? Because they've chosen to enslave people, and tied their economic well-being to that monstrous decision? Shouldn't they suffer the misfortune of losing their slaves, and whatever that entails? Isn't that justice?

All right. I don't mean to make this a discussion of the Civil War specifically. It's just that you said, "Even suddenly ending slavery would be worse than having a transition period," and I'm trying to understand that idea. Because I'm having a hard time imagining the situation where I would call for "the end of slavery... but not right away." Do you think that a slave -- from before the Civil War or in any other context that you can supply -- would be content with a "transition period," during which, I imagine, they would remain enslaved? Why should they want anything other than their rights to be respected immediately? Why should they settle for anything less than liberty? And why should I do anything other than agree with him?

I'm trying to understand this. So... let's say that there was no Civil War, and instead we're discussing the proper method of ending slavery -- a transition period. I've heard "5 years" discussed elsewhere in this thread as being a reasonable amount of time for people to adjust to radical social change, and certainly the ending of slavery in the antebellum South would have been a radical change. In that case, would we have proposed a (roughly) 5 year transition period for the South to end slavery? To the slave who might have said, "Thanks kindly, but I'd rather my forced servitude were ended immediately," would we reply, "Society, and your owners, need a transition period. They've been relying on your labor for such a long time that it wouldn't be just to expect them to live without it immediately. Therefore, we need you to keep on picking cotton for a few more years"? Maybe this isn't what you're saying. But I can't imagine advocating prolonging actual, in fact slavery versus its absolute and immediate abolition. Which is the only thing I can think that a "transition period" would entail. Or do you mean something else?

I don't know that they are property in the full sense of the term... but let that pass. If tomorrow we decided that there ought not be "public property" -- and to return all such possessions to their rightful owners... gosh, what a nightmare that would be, to try to sort out faithfully. I don't know that it could be done. Surely it would all have to be liquidated and the funds dispersed in some manner, but I couldn't say which manner at present. Earlier, Jonathan13 introduced the concept of a thief. Since that's essentially what we're discussing as well, let's suppose that a long-lived thief stole copious amounts of money from a multitude of individuals over decades, and spent that money in a variety of ways. Some items purchased in this process remain, but others do not. Some of the individuals stolen from are alive, but others have passed away. Were we to catch this thief, and wish to return the stolen goods to their rightful owners, how would we accomplish this? To take any given piece -- or the collection in total -- could we say who the specific owner(s) are? Would the disposition of these artifacts revert to a majority vote of the survivors of the victims? How would a criminal court proceed? I don't really know. However, if I were to construct a list of all those who have a legitimate claim on the property, the very last on that list would be the thief, himself. After the thief (or, as he's "the very last," it is more accurate to say "those not even making the list") would be those entities which do not have any capacity for property rights, such as the color orange, the planet Mars, the Buddha, and "the public." If the streets and schools are property, it is property currently occupied by thieves and attributed to entities which by-their-natures cannot own any property at all. We do not make anything better by deciding that, while the thieves hold this property, they also have rightful possession of all of the pursuant rights of property accorded to those who ordinarily deserve them. We do not better protect our property rights by forfeiting our rights to life and liberty while on this stolen land. And we do not better argue for those rights by seeking to tell others what to wear, what to read, what to say, etc., in our capacity as a citizen.

1) We're agreed that context is key, always. 2) As to which public places we're discussing, I've assumed that our discussion pertains to those areas traditionally thought of as being "public." I believe that schools, parks, and "the streets" have been mentioned. I'd also like to introduce the airwaves. Do these meet your criteria? Or do you have something else in mind with "public places"? 3) All right. So if we voted for a rule -- a non-discriminatory rule, equally applied to all individuals -- that neither reading of Ayn Rand's works nor discussing her ideas would be permitted in public places... you would say that this is not "a fundamental rights violation"? I.e. that this is not censorship? I must voice my disagreement with your perspective. It is absolutely true that property rights entail the choice of allowing someone use of that property, or refusing it. In my household, I can make a rule that there is to be no discussion of Objectivism, and should you flout my rule? I can insist that you leave. This is not censorship. But the character of "the public" and "government" is fundamentally different than that of an individual. The "public," cannot, in truth, own anything. It cannot have property rights in the same way that I can. And so when we try to treat "public property" as though it were private property, it's bound to be a disaster. That the public claims "property" is a violation of our rights. If we apply ourselves to treating that as property, in fact, and awarding the public (via popular vote, or legislative decree, or executive fiat) all consequent powers which come with being a righteous property holder, then we do not maintain the sanctity of property rights... instead, we simply sacrifice the rest of our rights. The public banning of Ayn Rand's works, or discussion of those works, is censorship. So much so that I'm sure we can all recognize it. We don't do ourselves any favors by pretending as though the public is entitled to do this, because we respect property rights, as such. The public has no property rights, and never did. Of course, we live in a world where certain areas are treated as "public property." And I wouldn't advise littering in the park, or running down the street naked, for a variety of reasons. But in my capacity as a citizen, I would vote against littering laws, and vote against laws against nudity, and vote against laws censoring Ayn Rand, long-awaiting that time when I can vote against the "public property" itself, because I would like my fellow citizens to keep what rights they can in the interim. On my property, I may well have certain standards of dress and decorum which all those who wish to continue to use my property must obey. But outside of my property -- and the city streets are not my property -- I will not tell others what to wear (or that they must wear anything at all).

These kinds of conversations get so easily confused because, in order to have them, we must temporarily grant "public property," which is something of a contradiction... Ultimately there is no ideal solution within public property; the only solution is to abolish it altogether. However. Since this discussion is here, I have to ask about the "right to property" trumping one's "right to free expression" within the context of public property... If the government, according to the normal processes of representational democracy (up-to and including amending the Constitution), outlawed Ayn Rand's books in all public spaces... outlawed public discussion of her ideas... would you consider that fundamentally a violation of rights (i.e. censorship)? Or a further application of the "public's property rights"? (As the "right to property trumps the right to free expression" -- and, given public property, we must argue for the majority's right to restrict such expression as it sees fit.)

The "house" that is mainly built upon the foundation of philosophy -- and Objectivism in specific -- is a life-well-lived. To that end, we can expect that most people will have a need for certain basic understandings of sciences, like nutrition and health, household chemistry, and the physics of making their car brake on time. Some people, primarily those who choose to follow a career path which depends on a more intensive study of one or more branches of science, will need to know more. But it is not required for an Objectivist, as such, to be a master of all branches of science. An Objectivist could be, for instance, a plumber, and doubtless that would make many demands on certain areas of his scientific knowledge. But there are also several areas of science that he will not necessarily need, and the time he would otherwise have spent gaining that knowledge might be better spent in a variety of ways that will more directly impact his individual affairs.