DonAthos

No. You did not "merely" take issue with what I've presented. You've also made clear that you don't think there can be any common aspects to "religion" -- "it is not possible": And given that this is your position -- either there isn't any such creature as "religion" or Objectivism must count as one -- of course we'll never have agreement as to what's true of religion. Or, if you've misspoke and you do have a concept of religion that you can propose, perhaps that would be more helpful to subsequent discussion. Otherwise, we're just treading water.

I think the problem isn't with my concept of religion; it seems, rather, that you don't have any concept of religion from which we can proceed. After all, if you hold that religions have nothing in common -- nothing that gives them the particular character of being "religious" -- or, as the alternative, that they are only united by things so general as to include "worldviews" such as Objectivism, and etc. -- then how could we ever decide what's true of "religion"? It makes me wonder, if these "very disparate ideas" don't have a "common aspect" such that they can be "lumped together" (it is "not possible")... then how do we even know what is meant by "religion" in the first place? And if you're unable to distinguish between Objectivism and a religion, then how could I ever convey the substance of my argument, which is about religion and not that which is not? You see trees, but not the forest.

I think you and I are talking at cross purposes at the moment. The "great religions of the world" typically encompass hundreds of years of history, dense books and treatises attempting to explain their ideas, multiple conflicting sects, and a vast multitude of diverse individuals who each put some spin unique to themselves on the way that they present their faith. There's no question that among religions, and then among sects within any given religion, and then among individuals within any given sect, that some people will be more rational than others, or more disposed to science than others, or etc. If you say that Islam has a certain relationship to science, pretty good during the Middle Ages but not so much recently, I won't argue the point; if you'd like to insist that Catholics have it over Protestants, or that Thomas Aquinas had it over Augustine, that's fine, too. The central question we're considering, however, is whether there is anything characteristic of religion qua religion when it comes to an overall attitude towards science. To answer such a question, we must have an understanding of what religions have in common with respect to their understanding of the world. I would say that, fundamentally, to be religious means to ascribe supernatural causes to observed phenomena. And since science is concerned with determining the natural causes of observed phenomena, science and religion are necessarily at loggerheads. Perhaps you're right in that Thomas Aquinas didn't see it that way? Maybe he felt that his views in divinity were perfectly compatible with his scientific views. I would guess, however (pulling this speculation strictly from out of you-know-where), that he found frustrating some earlier thinkers and some of his contemporaries who too quickly would resort to supernatural causes as an explanation for the natural world. Perhaps he removed God as a cause for that which he could find a natural explanation, but reserved God for that which he could not...? I'm sure you're familiar with the "God of the gaps" argument, and that's really what we're facing here. The final expression of this sort is probably deism: God made the world and its natural laws, sure, but he has nothing to do with anything which goes on today. It's a belief system I find pretty unnecessary and arbitrary, but I imagine that I'd generally get along with Aquinas better than Augustine, the Founding Fathers better than Loyola or Francis, and possibly Catholics better than Fundamentalists. I don't hold all religions as equivalent, nor all religious people, but these religions do have some things in common. And where science is concerned, religion is fundamentally opposed to it by the nature of what religion is, and quite apart from its individual (and varying) expression.

Ultimately one must decide whether the universe is understandable or whether it is not. If the former, then there must be some process by which it is understood. Science, in my view, is that process we've determined is best for understanding the universe. (Or rather, it is the name for the process which we've laboriously fashioned in order to understand the universe.) I think that religion comes down to deciding that the universe is not ultimately understandable. That there is "mystery," in the sense of ancient bacchanals, or in the sense of Job's questioning Yahweh, or speaking in languages, or transubstantiation, or salvation through grace. Why do things happen the way they do? "God works in mysterious ways," says the religionist. Faith buffers his belief; it is not proof he seeks, but that which "goes beyond" proof in the form of strong feeling; that he is convinced, is sufficient. And morality is subsequently based on obedience. Since one cannot fathom the mystery, it is judged wicked (or at best useless) to try; ours is not to reason why.... But the scientist brings out his test tube and microscope, because he's determined to get to the bottom of any so-called mystery. And if others wish to damn him for this, so be it. This is the fundamental divide. And while there can be players who straddle this gulf, either as individuals or as institutions (like the Catholic Church), depending on the specific era and scenario you're considering, it still exists. To the extent that Thomas Aquinas sought for explanations apart from "God's will," he was acting as a scientist and not as a religionist. But if, at any point, he withdrew from seeking some natural answer and instead deferred to the divine -- to the mystery -- then it was at that point where he headed in the other direction.

All that Trebor has provided in his response to you is good for the purpose of introduction to this topic. However, I also feel obliged to add that, through the course of this thread, I have also developed a position that what Fitts does (along with most others who discuss these issues) is to present a false dichotomy and then argue one side of it. For a full presentation of what I'm talking about, I can only direct you to the content of this very thread beginning from post #107 (though it would do no harm to start at the very beginning). Along the way, it will probably be necessary to read other commentary and documents as referred by the various posters.

I'm going to attempt to speak to the discussion you and whYNOT have been having in light of the Essential System that I've proposed throughout this thread. Advisable of me? Probably not. But if I err, I'll count on your kindness and patience to set me straight. I think that whYNOT's essential meaning is this: that whether or not there's ever shown to be a contradiction within "Objectivism's principles," the fundamental fundamentals -- Reason, Reality, etc. -- are not going anywhere. Should such a contradiction ever be demonstrated with respect to something like a theory of proper taxation, we will not up and conclude, "ah, well, reason must be flawed; time to resort to divine revelation" -- we will instead know that the problem must lie with the theory of taxation. In this sense, our investigation is a "one way street," because there is nothing, nothing at all, which could ever lead us to reject reason and reality. Conversely, I believe that Trebor is discussing the Objectivist theory of proper taxation in full context. Meaning that he grasps that the Objectivist theory of taxation comes from Objectivist theories on politics and ethics, which in turn come from reason and reality, so that to accept the fundamentals, the essences -- to be an Objectivist -- is to accept all that which comes from them. Thus reason, reality, rational self-interest, laissez-faire, and voluntary financing of government are all one -- an integrated, interconnected system that stands and falls together. (Or rather, just stands.) In this way, Objectivism is very much a "two way street." I think that both arguments are correct, which is part of the problem in resolving the dispute. There's no question in my mind that Rand's view on taxation was correct. Taxation is coercive. Is theft. Is immoral. And a proper government would need to be financed voluntarily (the details of which to be worked out by political science, proceeding on the correct fundamentals of Objectivism). And so I am of Trebor's "two way street." However, just as an earlier example we've discussed -- the "Christian-Objectivist," who believes that Objectivism is compatible with a belief in the divinity of Christ -- there could exist someone who accepts all of the Objectivist essentials, but fails to grasp their proper relationship to taxation. Let's say that such a man joined us for this discussion. We might proceed as follows: we would ask him to argue for his case. How would he do that? His effort, if he wanted to be convincing, would have to entail demonstrating that his views on taxation are consistent with the essentials of Objectivism. In contrast, we would argue that he was mistaken, and show him that his views on taxation are actually inconsistent with those essentials. In short, our conversation would proceed on the assumption that the flaw in reasoning (which he would believe is on our part, and we would believe is on his) is with respect to the view on taxation and not the essentials of Objectivism. That is, we would argue as though it is a "one way street." And this is proper, because to be an Objectivist means accepting the essentials first, foremost, and foundationally, and then accepting all of their implications. If, in our argument, we allowed for the possibility that "reason" and "reality" were actually in err, we would no longer be arguing within the system of Objectivism; we would no longer be arguing as Objectivists.

LOL! As to the remaining confusion, to be frank, I'm not sure that we do have any substantial disagreement. But we may, and if we do, I'm sure we'll figure it out eventually. This thread hasn't (apparently) been resolved to peoples' satisfaction in the six years since its creation -- or at least not to mine -- so we don't have to rush to a conclusion just yet. In the meantime, you've spoken about reviewing the relevant historical writings, and the thread, and I'm doing those things too. We'll deal with issues as they come up, one at a time.

Allow me, for now, to address this -- we'll see if, in so doing, I can clear up some other confusion. Objectivism is what it is. In reality, it is what it is. And it is not "what each individual believes Objectivism to be", but "what Ayn Rand identified it to be." However, it is true that "if one person holds that Objectivism is compatible with the divinity of Christ," he may well conclude that "that is Objectivism." You and I know that he is mistaken. In such a case, if we were discussing matters with him, we might point out how his belief in the divinity of Christ -- or rather divinity as such -- is inconsistent with that which we can all agree is Objectivism; i.e., by reference to the essentials. (If we cannot agree on those essentials, then the person we're talking to does not understand "Objectivism" at all, and further conversation is useless.) If we were to successfully demonstrate this inconsistency, the "Christian-Objectivist" would then have a choice. He could reject his belief in divinity, in keeping with the essentials of Objectivism, or he could keep his belief in divinity by rejecting and/or modifying one of the essentials of Objectivism. In the latter case, he would no longer be an Objectivist. In reality, there is no such thing as a Christian-Objectivist. However it is also true that a given person might be confused on this point. Contradictions do not exist in reality, and they do not exist in Objectivism, but they can exist in the mind of someone who is trying, but failing (however temporarily), to understand Objectivism.

Yes. And to that issue, I argue for an Essential System which I present as being opposed to the Open System and Closed System as they are popularly understood. The Essential System, in essence (heh), argues for precisely what we've agreed to: that Objectivism is a comprehensive view of life, established through those essentials which Ayn Rand identified and integrated and etc. This Essential System is "closed" in the sense that Rand's essentials do not change, and neither do any of the positions with respect to philosophy reached when those essentials are "understood, defined, proved, and applied." The comprehensive view of life which Objectivism provides, when it is properly understood, is one thing and one thing only. It is immutable. The Essential System is "open," however, in the sense that any given person may not have completely "understood, defined, proved, and applied" Rand's essentials. Nor has that happened in terms of a collected body of philosophical work. And so, as Peikoff said, "new implications, applications, integrations can always be discovered." Where it differs from "Closed System" advocates, as established through earlier quotes and discussion in this thread, is that I hold that this work does not need to be done by Ayn Rand alone, or approved by her personally, but can be done by any Objectivist insofar as he does so in total consistency with Ayn Rand's essentials.

No, you have completely mistaken me. My argument is that she did provide a comprehensive view of life -- through her essentials. Yes. So far as I can tell, you and I agree exactly except that I am not criticizing Objectivism or Rand (in the negative sense); I do not think she's fallen short. I think she did exactly what she set out to do.

To the other participants of this thread: I owe you an apology for engaging Grames in the manner I have. As soon as my conversation with him took the turn that it did, I should have recognized it and desisted from participating. As to the arguments he's presented, if anyone else is confused on any of these points, I would be happy to discuss them with you. As a portal to such a discussion, here is my position with respect to "Philosophy versus 'a philosophy'": A man acts according to the ideas he holds. Ultimately, according to his philosophy. A man has no relationship to Philosophy, as such, except that he holds some particular philosophy (or different snatches of different philosophies). In this, he has no choice: if he is to act, he must hold some ideas upon which to act. Ayn Rand, as a philosopher, wanted man to act upon the correct ideas. If the "task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life," she sought to give man the correct comprehensive view. Because it would not be sensible to try to write out all of the possible ideas a man might need for action (or hold them in the mind, or even discover them individually), she sought instead to find what was essential -- those key and fundamental ideas which would ultimately lead to all of the rest. The manner in which they would do so is thus: through understanding, defining, proving, and applying her fundamental ideas. She felt that in acting in this manner, a man would thus have access to that "comprehensive view of life" which was her ultimate aim; that is, her philosophy, which she called "Objectivism."

I have asked you to cut the rhetoric, then told you to be civil. In either instance, you could simply have agreed, or even just stuck to arguing what's important -- it's not like I was looking for an apology or anything, though you probably should have offered one. After all, insults are unnecessary to reasoned discussion, so why not respect a specific call for manners? But instead you've chosen to defend being insulting? And also to persist? (And to anticipate what I think would otherwise be coming: ad hominem and "insult" are not synonymous.) Sorry, but I don't have time for this kind of "discussion." I'm interested in talking philosophy as a sincere mutual enterprise to better understand things, not as gamesmanship. I don't need to be friends with everyone I talk to, but I do need the conversation to be pleasant. You've chosen to make it unpleasant. And that's disappointing, but I'm not going to try to make it otherwise anymore, because you're clearly not interested in what I am.

The word "comprehensive," as you should recall since I've provided it before in this thread, comes from this quote (emphasis added): If this is Ayn Rand's view of philosophy, then what do you expect she was attempting to do, as a philosopher, through the creation of a "full philosophical system"? You think I'm stretching if I say that she was attempting "to provide man with a comprehensive view of life"? Since you bring up some specific fallacies later, I should observe that this is a non sequitur. The argument/syllogism that I provide (in opposition to your straw man of my argument) does not depend on the quote, per se -- the quote is used for illustrative purposes. The word "comprehensive" belongs in my conclusion statement C because it was introduced in my premise statement B. No, I liked utilizing the quote as I did because I thought it added a stylistic flourish. While I understood that this might otherwise be confusing, I depended on your understanding of the arguments presented and evidence offered throughout this thread; I depended on your interpreting these statements in view of the context of what has come before. I mistook in so doing, and I apologize. I agree that "total consistency" is redundant. I imagine that Rand was redundant in that way, not accidentally, but to avoid the very kind of connotation you seek to convey with "mere consistency." She elaborates on this issue of "total consistency" as follows: There is nothing about that which sounds "mere" to me. What two phrases have I brought together, each containing the word "consistency"? I only count one phrase -- Ayn Rand's phrase -- presented several times. Unless you're talking about your use of the term, which I quoted, and to which I was responding? But your use of the term is an attempt to represent my argument. And you are doing it incorrectly; that is the point that I was making. What I mean when I say "total consistency" -- which is precisely the "promiscuous" standard to which I would hold philosophical positions with respect to their inclusion in Objectivism -- is what Ayn Rand meant when she said "total consistency." It appears to be her standard as well. I believe that neither of us mean what you do when you say "mere consistency," and I think that such a characterization of my argument is a bald-faced straw man. As to whether I will spend longer composing replies, I'll address that below. Practically, what do you think constitutes the guidance that Objectivism is not supposed (or unable) to provide? I suppose that if it doesn't have to do with "minor virtues," or presumably "minor vices," it wouldn't have to do with the routine, daily decisions that a man makes? (At least, in so far as he is "an Objectivist.") After all, we want to avoid "a dogma that will provide the answers to every question of your life." If philosophy is not up to this task -- to providing the answers to our every question -- then where ought a man appeal for those answers? If Objectivism, as a philosophy, is not so equipped, then ought a man be an Objectivist and additionally have other, more delimited philosophies and philosophical opinions to deal with the day-to-day? Or would that also be dogmatic, and thus unideal? To avoid dogma, should a man proceed randomly so long as he's not taking on one of the big, specific, Rand-approved issues such as Liberty vs. Statism? And if a man accomplished this -- held Objectivism for "the biggies," but other philosophical opinions or more delimited "philosophies" on all of the "minor" topics -- and then wanted to summarize his philosophy on all topics and give it a name, what name would you suggest? (Since "'Objectivism' is already taken.") Ah, I see. This is, at least in part, why my last reply was rather terse and what discourages me from spending longer composing replies to you. I stopped having a taste for high school style argumentation shortly before leaving high school. The other part is because your replies have made straw men of my arguments, and shown no real effort on your part to understand what I've been investing an enormous amount of energy in trying to explain. It is very disappointing. If you'd like to continue discussion, then be civil. If you are unable to be civil, let me know and we'll leave it here. But since we are here, now, I'll note that "that is inexcusably silly" is not an argument of any kind. You'll notice that I never once accused you of ad hominem; stop mischaracterizing what I say. Instead, I called it rhetoric, and that's exactly what it is. I've tried to keep my posts to explaining my arguments, not my "evaluations" of yours. Trust me, my evaluations would not be kind. But that is neither here nor there. If you believe that I have set up straw men, then establish the fact through argument and that will be enough to speak for you (just as I did by presenting your wildly inaccurate, nigh-satirical "syllogism of my views" against my own syllogism). Finally, if you would truly like to "take down" my arguments with emphasis -- and I invite you to try -- you would be advised to demonstrate that you understand them first.

I think you may be slightly confused as to what I'm saying; my apologies if I've caused the confusion. This is closer to my reasoning: A. Objectivism is "a full system of philosophy." "If you held these concepts with total consistency, as the base of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life." B. A full system of philosophy will provide a man "a comprehensive view of life." "If you held these concepts with total consistency, as the base of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life." C. Objectivism provides a comprehensive view of life. "Mere" consistency? Or total consistency? "If you held these concepts with total consistency, as the base of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life." If, in contrast to my position, you would like to say that Ayn Rand was wrong when she said, "If you held these concepts with total consistency, as the base of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life," it would be clearest for you to do so directly. I think we can do without this sort of rhetoric, don't you?

I've been trying to come up with an analogy for my Essential System which will allow others to visualize what I "see." Though any extended analogy is likely to run into trouble, here's what I've come up with: Imagine philosophy as geometry. Within philosophy, it is held that there are a series of points which are "true points." Taken together, these points -- which are philosophical positions or tenets or principles or valid applications -- represent "true philosophy" or "truth." And so, philosophers search for those points, and system builders search for a line that will define them. Ayn Rand proposed an equation which defines a line. She defined the precise terms of her equation and also proceeded to demonstrate its use, to show how the points generated fall on the line, and how those points relate back to her equation. The purpose of the equation is to find any given point on this line, when that point is required. Over the course of any given human's life, it's unclear which points he may personally require -- which positions/tenets/principles/applications may serve his particular needs at any given moment -- but, by reference to the equation, he is able to access those points that he needs. Fundamentally what he needs is the equation (and the ability to apply it), because it is this tool which enables him to access everything else on that line with precision. Other philosophical systems are other equations defining other lines (or possibly other geometric figures). They may intersect with Rand's line at one or more given points, or they may run parallel with it (meaning: not to intersect at any point, which is complete disagreement on which points are "true"), in which cases we can say that they are certainly not Rand's line. Or, if "another line" was to have point-for-point agreement with Rand's line, it would be Rand's line. It would not do to have limited agreement with respect to some line segment to claim that some other line was also Rand's; it would have to agree on every point. Those who view Rand's system as "Closed" would hold that Rand's line is, in total, only those points which Rand personally demonstrated arise from her equation. Those who view Rand's system as "Open" would hold that Rand's line is defined by the line of "true points," whatever they ultimately turn out to be, and without respect to the equation which Rand initially proposed (the parts of the equation itself may be "modified" to better hit upon true points). Neither view is correct. Rand's line consists of every single point which follows from her equation, and only those points. Rand's line is defined by her equation, not by her body of published works (though obviously that is where most of us first encounter her equation), nor by "geometry," nor "philosophy," nor even "truth," per se. Recently, Grames proposed that there might be points which are true, but do not fall on Rand's line (-- valuable, non-Objectivist philosophy). This is essentially the same as the Closed System view, though he would extend Rand's line by x number of points (arrived at by deduction via "implication"). He fears that, if Rand's line is ultimately point-for-point identical to the line of true points, then Rand's line is necessarily no longer defined by her equation but solely by "true points, whatever they ultimately turn out to be," which is the Open System. And thus he presents the same false dichotomy which the Essential System is attempting to resolve. However. If Rand's line is ultimately point-for-point identical to the line of true points, the only meaning that this really conveys is: that Ayn Rand hit upon the correct equation. After all, it was to achieve this line of true points that she set out to design an equation in the first place. As a corollary, we can take it that if Grames (and by extension, all Closed System advocates, though I do not take it that Grames has/had yet identified his own views as such) is correct -- if there are points which are true but do not fall on Rand's line -- then Ayn Rand has failed in her purpose. Her equation is faulty. There are gaps in her line where there should be points. Further, Grames might claim that there is no possible equation which could calculate all the points on that line, because any proposed philosophical system (or here, equation) is by-it's-nature cut off from further "induction," allowing for the possibility of valid (/"valuable") philosophical work outside of the system. (The only possible way for Grames' claim to be correct -- and Objectivism still otherwise valid/Rand's equation correct to her purpose -- would be if we introduce "skew lines." Those would be lines of true philosophy appropriate for creatures with other natures, thereby existing on "other planes.") It does not mean that Rand's equation ceases to be that which defines her line, nor does it mean embracing the Open System to say, "I believe that Ayn Rand's equation is correct; I believe that Rand's line is also the line of true points." Saying such a thing -- believing such a thing -- is precisely what makes one an Objectivist.

This is all starting to get a touch too abstract for my tastes (though I promise I'll come around to this quote again). For now, let me reintroduce the context in which this discussion found its genesis (emphasis added): The context is David Kelley's work on benevolence, the subject matter of which I would surmise as falling within the realm of "ethics." Ayn Rand, via Objectivism, purported to create a "full system of philosophy," the purpose of which being to "to provide man with a comprehensive view of life." She defined certain concepts as being "essential" to her system -- one for each of the branches of philosophy -- including for ethics and for those disciplines upon which a theory of ethics rests, metaphysics and epistemology. It cannot be that Ayn Rand succeeded in her pursuit, yet her philosophy does not encompass some philosophical position with respect to Kelley's "benevolence." The details of Kelley's theory are irrelevant to my claim, the question of "implication" doesn't matter, and neither does a dichotomy between deduction and induction. Either Kelley's work is fully consistent with Rand's fundamentals or it is not; in the former case it is Objectivist and in the latter case it is not. It is "either/or" here because we are treating Objectivism as a "full system," providing man with a "comprehensive view of life." "Benevolence" is not outside of ethics, let alone life, and thus does not escape Objectivism's purview. The only other case a person could make here is that Ayn Rand failed in creating a "full system of philosophy." With respect to the present case, the argument would also have to maintain that either she failed to define her ethics according to essentials, or that there is some inconsistency between her ethics and her metaphysics and/or epistemology, or both. But any of those conclusions would entail the failure of Objectivism as a system, and, should we so conclude, we shouldn't be Objectivists. If what is "newly discovered" is ruled out of Objectivism, then Objectivism is in no way a "full system." Is it? And it would certainly fail to provide a "comprehensive view of life." Wouldn't it? And Rand could not say for certain that "if you held these concepts with total consistency, as the base of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life." Could she? How could that system -- or any system ever -- be assured "to guide the course of your life" if it could not take into account "what is newly discovered"? But how can Objectivism fail so, if it correctly provides essential concepts to form the base of every branch of philosophy? I've mentioned before, and I'll reiterate now, that I don't know that any given philosophical position could be "fully consistent with" but not ultimately "implied by" Rand's essential concepts. If Rand has correctly identified the essential concepts fundamental to every branch of philosophy, then how could any higher-up concepts possibly escape some form of "implication"? Where induction itself is concerned -- an area of epistemology, I believe -- suppose there were a method of induction which was fully consistent with (and if you insist, "implied by") Rand's essential concepts (as I believe Leonard Peikoff would maintain, given that he claims to have an "Objectivist solution" to induction). Would the results of those inductions performed through this Objectivist method thus be Objectivist? I disagree. Whatever road Rand traveled is available to anyone else. And if new inductions or integrations or deductions or what-have-you are available, they can even possibly travel further down that same road. Remember that the ultimate purpose of philosophy is to provide a man with "a comprehensive view of life"; "a base, a frame of reference, for all his actions, mental or physical, psychological or existential", "[telling] him the nature of the universe with which he has to deal (metaphysics); the means by which he is to deal with it, i.e., the means of acquiring knowledge (epistemology); the standards by which he is to choose his goals and values, in regard to his own life and character (ethics)—and in regard to society (politics); the means of concretizing this view is given to him by esthetics." By divorcing induction from deduction as you say, you would make the same mistake the "Closed System" advocates do: you would force a man to stop from a final integration of all of his internally consistent views -- the ability to sum his outlook on life into one coherent philosophy. And why? Because some of his views involve "induction" whereas others were formed "deductively"? This is not an essential difference and it serves him no purpose. Ultimately, I guess you're kind of right. And kind of wrong. But not at the same time and in the same respect. Uh, let me explain... I define Objectivism according to Rand's essential concepts. It is a full system of philosophy; it has a position with respect to every possible philosophical topic (though not all have been written down or otherwise discovered). And because I accept Rand's essential concepts, I also accept everything which is fully consistent with them. And yes, because I believe Rand's essential concepts to be true, I hold everything fully consistent with them to be equally true. In this way -- in this specific context -- I do believe that "everything true in philosophy is Objectivism." This is, in fact, what I mean when I say that I am "an Objectivist." This is not the same as to assert that "philosophy is Objectivism." It can only appear so to someone who has already accepted these essential concepts; that is, to an Objectivist (to whom, as a matter of personal outlook on life, philosophy is Objectivism). But there still exist, and always will, other ways of approaching philosophy. Other essential concepts which run contrary to Rand's. A person can always be a Kantian, for instance, or at least use that model to contrast his own views. Kantian philosophy is incorrect, of course, though the Kantian would not agree. To the Kantian, ultimately philosophy is Kantianism. (That a word?) What distinguishes Objectivism from Kantianism, per philosophy, is not "one is true and one is false"; what distinguishes them are their particular views with respect to the branches of philosophy -- their positions on every topic, as defined by their essential concepts. If you believe that "the whole universe is consistent with the essentials of Objectivism," then that doesn't collapse Objectivism into philosophy, rendering it indistinguishable from Kantianism... nor does it mean that you're unable to engage in deduction or induction in a manner fully consistent with the fundamentals of Objectivism and thereby discover or formulate new Objectivist positions... It just means that you're an Objectivist.

I agree. Yes. But I think we would be wrong to remove the possibility for such induction from Objectivism, i.e. a "full philosophical system." I believe that this is incorrect. The borderline between what is Objectivism and what is not is that which is fully consistent with the essentials of Objectivism, not alone what is "implied" by them. Boydstun did bring that up, and I did respond to him in this manner: Boydstun has not as yet replied to this, but as you have brought the subject matter back, it seems like I was right in my initial take on the issues involved. Objectivism is, per Rand, a "full philosophical system," and regarding philosophy, in Rand's words: "Philosophy is the science that studies the fundamental aspects of the nature of existence. The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life." If Objectivism as a philosophy can accomplish this -- if it can "provide a man with a comprehensive view of life" -- then surely it has a position with respect to Kelley's claims on benevolence, and every other philosophical claim. Yes, it is wrong to do those things. I am not doing those things. I am not claiming that "Philosophy is Objectivism." I am instead claiming that a full philosophical system (such as Objectivism) will ultimately have a position on every philosophical topic, if one "understands, defines, proves and applies" the concepts essential and fundamental to the various branches of philosophy with total consistency. This a philosophy must do if it is to be certain to "guide the course of your life." These fundamental identifications, however, will necessarily lead to certain positions on every philosophical topic... if they are "understood, defined, proved and applied." And yes, in that way, Objectivism will be comprehensive. (Again note Rand's language: "The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life." Her use of "comprehensive" was not in error.) The question is not "will Objectivism have something to say on X given philosophical topic?" But "what is the Objectivist position with respect to X given philosophical topic"? My answer is: "whatever position is fully consistent with the essential concepts of Objectivism." This is in contrast to other possible answers such as "whatever Ayn Rand said it was," or, "whatever is reasonable." While we understand a concept according to its essentials and fundamentals, that does not mean that the particulars cease to exist or cease to be relevant. Objectivism is not its essential concepts alone. Objectivism is its position with respect to every possible philosophical topic, whether or not those positions have formally been identified, discovered, or understood.

I fear that crucial meaning/understanding might be getting lost in trying to translate these things into the terms you seem determined to use. Because I don't want to confuse things any more than they already are, I'll stop here and not try to relate what I mean into "conditions," superior or otherwise. I hope, at least, that your initial question has been answered to your satisfaction: whatever it is that we Objectivists mean by "rational self-interest," it isn't refusing to share your food with your friend in a survival situation when he's your best chance of getting out of it alive, and thereby hurting your own chances to live. That's not rational self-interest... to act that way is just dumb. Otherwise, I think that others here have shared some valuable links to information. Since it seems like you're just starting with all of this, I highly recommend tracking that information down and spending some time thinking about all of it. I'm certain that other questions will come to you in the process, and when you're ready to ask 'em, we'll be here to answer!

I think that these are meant as follow-up questions for me, so I'll respond. No, I am not saying those things. The rationally self-interested action does not take those things you mention ("supremacy/equality of position or condition") into consideration. It only asks: what is it best for me to do, for myself? In the extreme scenario you've provided, the best thing for a person to do, for himself, is to help keep his friend with the survival skills alive.

No. I am saying that in the specific scenario you've provided, it would be in your rational self-interest to help keep your friend with the survival skills alive.

By the way, this thread is already running out of control with animosity. Please don't make me regret replying to you; it's possible to talk about these things civilly, and we should try to do it. On definitions, don't get caught up in one dictionary versus another. Dictionaries are written by people, and those people are coming from different philosophical backgrounds which colors (read: biases) the way that they choose to formulate their definitions. I could, if I wished, write and publish my own "dictionary" on my own website. Then use my "authoritative source" to "win" my arguments for me. Dictionaries are often useful tools, but they are not the sum and substance of our philosophical discussions.

Howdy and welcome. The crucial thing where selfishness is concerned is not to act with "no regard to others," but "to serve my own well being." If an action decreases your chance of survival, that's not likely to be the "rational action" in terms of "rational self-interest." Consider that Objectivists, Ayn Rand included, have friendships and get married and enter into business projects with others and etc. It's not an orgy of taking the other man's food for a temporary boost in our own nutrition, or whatever. We cultivate those relationships because they pay enormous dividends in ways both spiritual and physical. That's rational self-interest. Where your scenario specifically is concerned, work backwards. By allowing your friend with the survival skills to die, you severely hurt yourself; is that the rationally selfish thing to do -- to hurt yourself?

Just out of curiosity, but if this were so -- an actual possibility -- then do you think that would call into question the idea that Objectivism is a "full philosophical system"? The way I take Rand's meaning with that phrase is that Objectivism (in the manner proper to a full philosophical system) should ultimately address everything properly philosophical -- a guide to the totality of man's thought and actions. (Consider her quote on the nature and purpose of philosophy, which I provided in an earlier post.) And if that were so, and if she were right about the fundamentality of Objectivism's essential concepts, then as a matter of principle I don't think that there could be philosophy non-contradictory (in full) to Objectivism that was not Objectivism. I expect that every philosophical position will ultimately contradict Objectivism somewheres... or be Objectivism, itself. I have to tell you, this brought a smile to my face. There have been times where I've wondered whether anyone was following along, or whether my arguments were compelling (or hell, intelligible) to anyone other than myself. So, anyways, thank you for replying to say this.

I can't expect you to have read the entire thread in one go -- my verbosity makes it sadly impossible. And I would greatly prefer if you didn't butt out. I am eager to engage with intelligent individuals on these issues! The trouble that you've taken in your transcription is much appreciated, though, as my "analysis" suggests, I'm not sure that the substance of Peikoff's statement really adds much to the ongoing discussion. Which is disappointing and counter-intuitive given who he is, and given the common understanding as to the origin of this debate... but what can I say? As to one thing leading to another, I completely understand. I admit to some growing frustration, because I feel as though there are specific issues that I'd like to try to resolve (and what's more, I now believe that they are resolvable), but I have rarely felt engaged by others on those specific issues, which I've gone to some length to try to define. I sometimes suspect that people would rather argue about specific personalities and histories, rather than ideas. But no matter. We're talking about ideas now -- aren't we? -- and that's really all that I ask. The use of language is important to me. Not for its own sake -- I care about the meaning far more -- but still, I know that Peikoff is intelligent, and I expect that he's (generally) careful in his phrasing. When I hear the word "tolerate" in conjunction with a philosophy, it just leads to a bit of confusion on my part, because I don't normally think of a philosophy as having a consciousness in the way that I normally would think of something which "tolerates" or does not "tolerate" something else. My initial inclination is to respond: "a person can tolerate or not tolerate a contradiction; a philosophy, which may or may not be internally consistent, does neither." I recognize that "tolerate" can fairly be used the way that Peikoff does here, just as a bridge can only tolerate a certain load, but on my initial read it produces the reaction in me that I've tried to describe. It's possible that this is only my issue (and not a big one), and no one else's. As to why I've asked that question when I also appear to have answered it, the reason is because I was approaching the Peikoff quote a bit at a time and producing my responses as they came to me, as honestly as I could. I asked myself the question prior to arriving at the answer that I did, and I wanted to preserve a bit of my thought processes here for examination. But as for the important stuff, I believe that we can count ourselves agreed: a system with contradictions fails as a system. If a person is an Objectivist, he must hold that Objectivism is a system without contradiction. If he believes that there are contradictions within Objectivism, then he ought not be an Objectivist. As one (minor?) observation, but if there is a contradiction among Objectivism's principles (which, remember, is the pre-condition for this "major undertaking"), then wouldn't the Objectivist's commitment to Objectivism necessarily be "in spite of truth"? Anyways, I believe that it is the nature of a contradiction (between, let's say, A and not-A) that it guarantees us that either A is correct or not-A is correct. However, it does not tell us which is which. And so, should the system of Objectivism collapse due to a contradiction, the Objectivist would have to re-evaluate all of the specifics of his personal philosophy to determine which were valid and which faulty. And that sounds fairly major to me. As a personal anecdote, in my youth I was friends with a fundamentalist Christian. She eventually rejected the Church. Over time, I found that her personality and beliefs changed wildly -- her morality, her tastes, everything. Eventually I realized that her commitment to Christianity was far more than simply particular views on the question of "did Christ turn water into wine?" or things like that. Her Christian beliefs had been so fundamental to her philosophy, as such, that when her system crumbled, no part of it was immediately salvageable. She had to justify each belief anew. While I wouldn't count that process as anything other than, as you say, "a gain, the discovery of truth," it was still a major undertaking. I'll be here. I am not yet fully convinced that there is one consistent "Closed System" view, which is part of the difficulty we all have in discussing these matters. However, I did try to examine that view, as expressed by its seeming proponents, in this post. For your convenience, here is one quote from that post which I believe is the most succinct demonstration of the view to which I refer: From the policies of the Harry Binswanger list:

We don't want to deal with the issues I've raised or the arguments I've made? We'd rather discuss Peikoff or Kelley, and try to figure out what they "really think"? Really? Okay then, let's get to it... Is Objectivism an "interconnected system of principles"? Yes. Are those principles "immutable"? Yes. Can they "tolerate any contradiction"? (? What does this mean exactly? What would be doing the "tolerating" in this case?) I'll say this: I believe that there is no contradiction within Objectivism, once Objectivism is properly understood; this is why I am an Objectivist. There are no contradictions among Objectivism's principles. Would the system "collapse" if there were such a contradiction among the principles? Yes, absolutely. If one found a contradiction among Objectivism's principles, properly understood, then one should not (necessarily) abandon reason or rational self-interest or anything else, except one should abandon "Objectivism" as a system and then reassess the various points individually. For any Objectivist, this would be a major undertaking. I can find no point on which to disagree with the Peikoff quote provided. Here's "the problem." Peikoff's quote and his definitions do not appear to encompass the "Closed System" view as it has appeared to have developed in the Objectivist community. Moreover, it does not appear to argue against the "open system" that David Kelley (to my understanding) has argued for. This is especially problematic because the very terminology of "open" versus "closed" was developed in response to Kelley's statements and views; thus Peikoff's formulation should deal with Kelley's directly, and it does not. However, it does take on a particular "Open System" view popular in the Objectivist community, which has increasingly begun to look like a straw man of Kelley's original views. So, in summary, while I'll thus far say that Peikoff's statement appears uncontroversial, it does not seem to deal substantively with the actual issues raised either by David Kelley, or by the Objectivists in this very thread (both pro-Closed and anti-), or by me. Taking this statement of Leonard Peikoff's alone, I as-yet have no reason to believe that he, David Kelley, and myself don't actually all agree on the question of "what is Objectivism?" This leads me to believe that either the Objectivist community has been sold a large bill of goods through this debate, or Peikoff's quote does not get to the heart of the matter. (Or both.)