[Objectivistic Cosmology]

The universe is eternal; the universe does not exist in time, rather time exists in the universe.

Is that your view or the common objectivistic view? And either way, why is it as you say it is? Where's the argument?

Time is merely the relative change of various entities relationships to one another. What do you find vague about that?

I can't make sense of time as "the relative change of various entities relationships to one another" if I don't have an idea of time already. Your explanans seems to presuppose the explanandum. Might as well say "time is time". Not saying that that's not correct, but it's not like it has a lot of explanatory value.

[Product of Environment]

If a human being has control over the type of environment they are in then there is a large element of volition involved just because of that.

That depends on what you take 'to have control over something' to mean.

I might say my computer's processor has control over what I see on my monitor, yet I wouldn't want to call my computer's processor volitional.

You'll probably want to object that my computer's processor doesn't control what I see on my monitor, but rather that it is merely one of the many factors determining what I see on my monitor. It doesn't have control, you'll want to object, because it doesn't have a choice but to do what is its fuction. It obeys it's nature.

The question then, is whether man is in control of his environment, or whether he is just following his nature too.

[Why "Animal" for the genus of man?]

God is also equipped for thinking, a la Aristotle. Arguably, he is either "more complex than" or "more simple than" man, depending on in what sense you mean.

More complex, more simple... Whatever be the case "more perfect" would be accurate right?

Interesting btw. I don't know whether Aristotle calls God a rational animal too. Then again, it's never very clear what Aristotle is saying when he talks about God. I'll see if I can find something about it somewhere.

[Objectivistic Cosmology]

Ayn Rand said explicitly (in the Question-and-Answer session after her West Point talk) that she disagrees with Aristotle's cosmology.

I bet she did.

Isn't the question of the origin of man a scientific one, not a philosophical one?

Then what are the philosophical grounds of Rand's disagreeing with Aristotle on cosmology?

The universe has no origin; it simply is. One explains things in terms of the universe.

How am I to interpret this? Are you saying that the universe (= being?) is eternal (that is, temporal, but without beginning and/or end), or that it is timeless? Or are you saying that whether it is eternal, timeless or whatever is besides the question? Or what..?

Time is the change in the relationship of entities.

That seems more like a vague paraphrase than an explicating definition.

[Does everyone have the potential for greatness?]

I think it is important to note, though, that this is done by the person themselves.

That is exactly what I carefully avoided saying. That way even diehard determinists may accept my conclusion.

[Do people "choose" their beliefs?]

Well, I'm speaking from the situation of a man already wanting something.

E.g. a lot of people want to be millionaires, and this is, for intents and purposes, the spark you speak of. Importantly, even with this initiating spark, many people not only don't become millionaire, most of them don't even try beyond cursory efforts.

Someone could argue (ineffectively IMO) that such a desire to be a millionaire isn't chosen, but from the context that a person does have wants/"sparks", the "unthinking" man does motivate himself, so to speak.

I'd say that someone wanting to become a millionaire but who doesn't make any reasonable efforts towards it, doesn't really want to become a millionaire.

[Do people "choose" their beliefs?]

Before you can choose to think your mind must be in focus, and that's the even more fundamental choice someone must make. But I'm not sure what you are trying to say. Do you mean that a man who has already gotten into the habit of not thinking cannot rekindle his mind on his own, or that it is simply impossible for any human being to initiate the process on its own?

I'm not sure what the implications are of this, either. From observing small children it'd seem obvious to me that virtually all of them are very eager to learn more about the world, so it does seem like a child can focus his awareness without anyone telling them that they should do so. After that point I think this behavior just reinforces itself further because it pays off for the mind to be in focus, which is more reason to do it more, etc.

What I'm saying is that if you aren't already, you can't choose to 'from now on be volitional'. Things don't start (or stop) rolling without something to initiate that rolling. I'm talking about the principle of inertia here, basically. That means that unthinking / non-volitional people are powerless to do something about their situation. One either has to be born volitional, or be as fortunate as to somehow become volitional during one's life. But non-volitional people can't become volitional all by themselves.

[Re-Entrant Mapping and Consciousness]

Ahh, well... I don't understand what you are asking. To me it sounds confused. I did not say that any activity of "higher level" mental functions has to be initiated by an activity of neurons that encode lower level functions (coming from the senses).

Then how do you suppose higher level mental functions would function? You said you think there're neurons that encode concepts, and also ones that encode for principles. How do the higher level mental functions fit in the big picture?

[Re-Entrant Mapping and Consciousness]

As for the meaning of neurons that "watch over" other neurons... it doesn't imply that they have consciousness: it's metaphor that means that those "watcher neurons" are getting their input from these neurons that encode concepts. Now before you jump all over me, as far as I know it has not been observed yet that certain neurons encode concepts, but I think that there must be such neurons. And then there also much be neurons connected to those neurons that encode principles. I view the brain as a pyramid that starts from the senses and converges to build more and more big and abstract concepts and principles. And those neurons that encode principles and concepts are (so I speculate) connected to a system that analyzes the patterns of activation, while taking under account the meaning of each neuron (what it encodes and what is the meaning of different patterns of activity).

You seem to be describing a bottom-up kind of awareness. But, what's the use of the top of the pyramid? That is, does the thing that calls itself 'I' and 'me' still have a function? I can't imagine it does, in your pyramid. I mean, if all the forming and analyzing of concepts and principles is done by neurons, that doesn't leave 'me' much to think about, does it?

If my meager knowledge of objectivism serves me right, awareness should be thought of as a top-down kind of thing. The top does the thinking and deciding, the lower levels do the encoding and transmitting, resulting in actions.

[Do people "choose" their beliefs?]

But in terms of choices, everyone still has the capacity to choose their beliefs and choose to see whether their beliefs conform to reality.

A fire can't kindle itself. There has to be a spark if ever la lumière naturelle is to shine. What motivates a man think - to really think? I don't know, but one thing's for sure: It's not the unthinking man himself.

[Does everyone have the potential for greatness?]

I think any new-born baby (mentally handicapped ones aside) has roughly the same potential for greatness. (Can't get around genetics these days, can we?)

Of course a child's environment may do a lot to either stimulate or supress (or even kill, I guess) its potential for greatness.

And there is also the lame factor of plain good or bad luck. Little greatness among adolescents caught in fatal car crashes.

My conclusion is that because greatness has a lot to do with character, and because character is something built up in the course of one's life, the initial roughly equal potential for greatness will either wither if the character does so (regardless of whether it does so because of environmental causes or not), or flower into an actual greatness - again, if the character does so.

[Objectivistic Cosmology]

Ayn Rand was obviously inspired and influenced by Aristotle's work, but for some reasons I can't imagine her view (if any) on cosmology to be like his, so - what is the Randian cosmos like? As in, where do man and the universe come from; what is time; etc.? Did Rand adopt the popular scientific theories, or what? I'm interested in the metaphysical implications, especially those concerning the difference between Aristotle's identification of the prime mover and Rand's.

Thanks,

Jan.

[Product of Environment]

Technically everything is a product of it's "environment" i.e. of cause and effect. The issue is one of volition.

You mean you consider yourself part of your environment?

[Why "Animal" for the genus of man?]

I have a question about the definition of man, which has troubled me.

Why is animal the proper genus? As opposed to mammal, life form, primate, etc.?

I don't know whether this is of any interest to you, but following Aristotle (who is commonly credited with dubbing man as animal rationale), the explanation is that animal means something like 'ensouled entity' (the Greek 'anima' means soul).

Aristotle distinguished between five parts or functions of the soul: Growing, perceiving, desiring, moving and thinking. Plants only grow. What we nowadays call animals also do so, but they have to move around to get the food needed for their growth, so they need to be able to desire moving to their food, and if they are to be able to do so, they must be able to move in the first place, and moving without knowing (that is, somehow preceiving) where you're going (or where you need to go, in the first place) is no good, so they need to be able to perceive as well. As the animal soul is more complicated than the plant soul.

The only thing more complex still is the human soul, because it also has the function of thinking. Because there is no other entity that has a soul equipped for thinking, animal and rationale are the necessary and sufficient constituents of the definition of man.

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

That isn't a sufficiently strong reason to claim a difference between free health care and free food. For one, free health care is vastly more extensive (and expensive) than emergency-room treatments. It refers to treatment of colds, chronic diseases, medical consequences of bad lifestyle decisions, and childbirth, among other things. You can in fact go for years without seeing a doctor, but you can't go more than a few days without food. And let's not forget shelter and water. Shoes are part of what constitutes shelter. And being realistic, internet access is pretty important in this day and age, also a washing machine, a decent bed so that you can get some sleep. And a car or a bike.

Well then perhaps a good argument as to why not everything one could ever wish for should be provided for, is that it would be impossible to realize. However, if one extreme of the continuum is absurd, does that mean we should clutter at the opposing extreme? Good old Aristotle advocated a golden mean...

But that would of course be an entirely different argument - one I do not want to examine right now.

Medical treatment isn't actually that hard to get, except in countries with socialist medicine. The reason why it takes 6 months to schedule that surgery is because your friendly government has restricted access to medical services by making doctors thralls of the state.

Yes, but that doesn't mean that government-provided healthcare is necessarily a crappy thing (that is, not in the way a stone I throw to the sky (in my garden, which is located on Earth) necessarily comes falling down again).

It may be, but it's my right to decide what's best for me. So I decide that it is not in my interest to have my money stolen from me to pay for the medical costs of some other person. There may be rich philanthropists who for some reason think it is in their interest to provide free health care, in which case they can establish a private fund. The objection is not to everybody having health care, it is to using force to confiscate my money in order to pay for this stuff for other people.

There is a fundamental and important difference. A hurricane is by nature incapable of reason, and men should and do know this. The concept "civilized society" does not preclude the possibility of a hurricane, and men must each take whatever preparations are necessary to withstand or avoid a hurricane. Barbarians on the other hand are beings with a rational faculty, and can grasp the concept of rights and the idea that by nature, man lives according to reason and not brute force. The concept of "civilised society" does preclude barbarian hordes and thieves. The function of government is exclusively to control the use of force by men, in order to have a civilised society (which then gives rise to the peaceful endeavors that create food, medical treatment, shelter, internet access).

I really don't get it. Me falling down a stairs, breaking a leg; barbarians coming for my money, life and wife; or a meteor, just coming - they're all a danger to me, they all bring with them the possibility of my freedom being violated; and (assuming real mad barbarians), none of them can be negotiated with. I will need and want to protect myself from them.

The original idea was (but let me formulate it differently now) that it might be a good idea to set up a fund all would contribute to, in order for all to be guaranteed protection and/or compensation when needed. Don't be tricked by the 'for all' in this, because one might as well say that each is doing the best for him- or herself. I have called this obligatory taxation, but one might as well think of it as a very attractive alliance; give up some, gain a lot. We can even weaken the obligatory part: If you don't like the membership fee of this alliance and'd rather be an objective individualist; fine, just make sure to leave our territory and never bother us again. See?

But there is no such thing. There is no "common good". So your basic premise is false without even considering any other B-statement.

If 'involutary taxation for the common good' is not acceptable, how about 'involuntary taxation for the well-being of every single man'?

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

Yes, but nobody is initiating force. Also, I'm going to quote Heinlein on this one: "A nation that cannot find enough volunteers to defend itself will not survive -- and does not deserve to."

As I said in my previous post, adding 'deserving' to the picture, though attractive use of language it may seem, doesn't explain anything.

It is obvious that you don't know what "initiation of force" is, or how it is distinct from retaliatory force.

What do you mean to say?

A service that keeps people safe from initiation of force requires certain means to operate, and where do these means come from? They are provided voluntarily by moral peope? Voluntarily you say?

YES.

Here you switch the definition of the word "force." Which is about as intelligent as asking if you are gay [happy], and when you say yes, accusing you of admitting to being gay [homosexual].

The definitions being switched are "force" as in "the use of violence" and "force" as in "circumstances provide no other option."

In both cases of the meaning of 'force' there's the option between violence and submitting means in order to sublimize this violence.

In the case of obligatory taxes, the government forces the choice between violence and submitting means.

In the case of no taxes at all, the B-people force the moral people to choose between violence and submitting means - or in any case, a choice between violence and submitting (probably) more means than they would have in the case of obligatory taxes.

If you accept that death is not an option, then in the case of no obligatory taxes, the non-B-people are still forced to provide, and the B-people are provided for. Therefore, "if A, then B; but B is absurd; so -A" is not a viable argument in this case.

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

There's a limit on the number of quotes allowed in a single post.

Then let's hope there's not a limit to the number of posts.

Do not presume to know what I give thought to or not simply because we disagree. One can equally state that you have not given enough thought to the implications of legalizing robbery, or in believing that the end justifies the means, which are clearly the two primary principles involved, aside from the issue of individual rights being violated.

I'm not presuming; I'm merely saying what things seem to be like to me.

And also, does a group of people (in this case a nation) deserve to survive if they are almost wholly unwilling to provide for that survival for their own sake? I think not; nor do I think that it would come to that in the case of the US.

I don't think there's any 'deserving' figuring here. If a nation manages, or doesn't manage to survive, this is not because it deserves, or doesn't deserve to; but simply because of the things it does or doesn't.

It doesn't matter that some people may benefit from the voluntary donations of others who are acting in their own rational self-interest (as those contributors are still directly benefitting from their own offerings). It is in the nature of all rational acts that all men benefit anyway as actions one person takes to provide for their own life relieve all other men from having to do so.

No, there's a distinction between actions in one's own interest that benefit others as well; and actions in one's own interest that benefit no-one else: Me planting a tree in my garden in order for me to have some shade in case of violent sunshine might benefit my neighbours as well if my garden is small enough or the tree big enough; but me eating a sandwich in order for me not to starve benefits only me.

It's far better that leeches benefit by chance rather than by the sanction of the government where productive men are not merely giving freely, but are being punished for being productive since money is pried from their hands and used for things from which they receive absolutely no benefit. Taxed money never stops at providing services that all men need. When the government takes money by force, nothing stops them from spending it however they want. In a society that does not support "leeches" by involuntary taxation, there will be far fewer "leeches" as they will not be able to provide for themselves. Either that, or necessity will force them to be more productive for the sake of their own lives in which case they will still be less of a drain on other men as they are allowed, if not governmentally encouraged, to be now.

People have a right to life, but not a right to have that life provided for them.

I'm sure the street robber appreciates your plight. If he sticks a gun in your face and demands money from you, be comforted by the fact that perhaps he or someone else needs your money more than you do. That will make it right.

I agree with you on this, but it just is not an argument against the original line of thought presented in the first post.

[Classical Music]

I see a lot of names of composers I like, but I'm just wondering why nobody mentions Orff's Carmina Burana?

[WHAT ARE METAPHYSICS?]

Yes--not in its essentials, anyway. As I said before, there were still remnants of (theological) Platonism--but theology in Aristotle is so weak and inessential to the rest of his system, that I think it is appropriate to consider Aristotle's metaphysics as primarily secular, and as the basis for subsequent (more consistently) secular systems.

I'm affraid you're wrong there. Aristotle's account of nature and the explanations he gives for the natural phenomena have explanatory force only if you accept his 'first philosophy', or 'theology' (this is the translation of a Greek word Aristotle himself employs; I can look up which word if you like). The goal-directedness, or teleology of nature he posits is theological through and through, and is essential to his account of nature / philosophy.

Well.. the onus of proof is on you.

I must admitt that I feel little urge to prove this to you. However, the idea that every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics has proven to be of significant instrumental value, and I do think that counts for something.

So, a physicist doesn't need to know whether or not A can equal non-A at the same time and in the same respect? He doesn't need to know whether physical objects obey natural laws, or whether all events are entirely random and unknowable? The conclusions he draws from observable phenomena (assuming that there is such a thing as observable phenomena--a metaphysical assumption!) would not vary greatly depending on his answers to these metaphysical questions? He doesn't need epistemology either? Proper methods of induction (i.e., "the scientific method") and deductive reasoning are not vital for his craft?

You're right; the physicist doesn't need to know. That (knowing stuff) isn't what science is all about; it's about being able to do things. If the supposition that the Earth is flat figures in your account of astronomy, yet this proves to be no problem to you (because all you need astronomy for is knowing when to sow and when to harvest), does it really matter that in fact the Earth is sphere-like? Well perhaps to some (perhaps even a lot of) people this would matter, but science is primarily instrumental, not some perfectionistic quest for Truth. Science justifies its right to exist pragmatically, just like everything else. You may think it a sad thing, but in the world as it is, Truth has no value in itself; it only has value in an economic kind of way.

This depends entirely on which metaphysician you ask. The majority of metaphysicians in history (especially prior to The Enlightenment) were not empiricists. If you asked a metaphysician in the middle ages how he could explain something unknowable, he would have a whole arsenal of answers ready for you--mystical revelation, innate knowledge, intuition, reading the stars, casting lots, came to him in a dream, etc, etc.

But that doesn't only apply to pre-enlightenment philosophers. Try asking a Kantian sometime how he can explain the unknowable. He will undoubtedly have given the issue a lot of thought, and will have a very complicated, highly technical, completely unintelligible answer for you.

I agree with you that one shouldn't try to explain the unknowable--but that's assuming certain principles in epistemology that not every metaphysician subscribes to.

Well if he (the medieval philosopher) could explain it, he couldn't claim the explanandum to be unknowable, could he? If it was, he wouldn't be able to explain it. Of course there're those really mystical thinkers like Eckhardt, but I don't think he (or any other distinguished metaphysician, for that matter) ever made the mistake of claiming to be able to know the unknowable. Either they said that their metaphysical ideas were perfectly knowable (the medieval rationalists), or they said that of course the unknowable can't be known or understood, but that it could be 'experienced' or something (the medieval mystics).

I distinguish between Kant and Kantians.

I'm no expert, but I don't think the former really claims to be able to explain the unknowable. Or is that not what you where getting at?

The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory are about can be known or not; the question is whether they actually can be or can't be known.

That's an epistemelogical question.

Too easily interpreted as such, I'm sorry. Allow me to rephrase: "The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory is about can be known or not; the question is whether we have observations of the explanandum so we can actually talk about it, or whether we don't have observations of the explanandum, so we can only speculate about it - to begin with its existence or non-existence for example."

You consider it to be a possibility that there is a fat man who lives in the north pole, employing elves to make toys for all of the children of the world, which he will deliver all in one evening, by riding a sleigh drawn by flying reindeer, and squeezing up and down chimneys, with all the toys in a bag? (Just to be sure you know who Santa Clause is--I'm not sure if they have that fairy tale in the Netherlands or not!)

Technically speaking, yes, I would consider that a possibility, since there is no evidence that there is no Santa Claus. However, at the same time there is no evidence that there is a Santa Claus, and one might say that if there had been one, there should have been clues implying his existence. Thus, if I have a belief about the existence of Santa Claus, it's probably that I think it highly unlikely that he exists.

(Wow, did you just trick me into a formal statement about Santa Claus's existence? )

Jan.

[WHAT ARE METAPHYSICS?]

I'm not sure I follow this analogy. In what respect would these sets be similar? The Big Bang theory and Creationism are both specific attempts to explain the origin of the universe. There are striking similarities between the two--for example, they both hold that the universe appeared ex nihilo. But, as far as I know, Creationism has always been a theological position, in which a Supreme Consciousness "creates" the universe; whereas the Big Bang theory is a supposedly secular explanation of how the universe exploded into existence, using the laws of mechanics on a cosmological scale.

The relationship between metaphysics and physics is different. Metaphysics has traditionally been merely a theory of the nature of the universe--supernatural or not. Originally, in fact, it was not supernatural (with Aristotle). But then people applied the term to religious views as well, so that we had Plato's metaphysics, and Pythagoras' metaphysics, and later Augustine's metaphysics, and so on.

Are you saying that Aristotle's metaphysics wasn't theological?

Physics, however, does not mean metaphysics minus the supernatural. Physics is not a theory of the nature of the universe. It is a scientific attempt to explain one delimited portion of the universe--but not the universe as a whole. It only explains the dynamics between physical objects. It says nothing on, for instance, ideas, or the mind (as apart from the physical mechanisms of the brain) and so on. And besides that, the study of physics (as the word is normally used--dictionary.com says "the science that deals with matter, energy, motion, and force" which seems okay to me) is a science which relies on the answers to questions about the nature of the universe that are more fundamental. For example, physics deals with questions like: "how fast will a weight or a feather fall when dropped?" But it doesn't deal directly with questions like: "Are weights and feathers real? Are laws of nature immutable, or can they be molded by human consciousness? Are there any necessary connections between events?"

It is my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. Do not that I'm not saying that we can do so now, or that it will ever be worthwhile to do so. In the end, I would say, everything we can sensibly talk about is physics. And personally, I don't think it very sensible to talk about whether feathers are real, whether the laws of nature are immutable, or whether necessary connections between events exist. There're facts, and there's speculation, and when we want to objective, I think we shouldn't make claims within the domain of the latter.

Okay--religion is a type of philosophy. Christianity is a type of religion, which holds positions in metaphysics (different positions depending on which Christian philosopher you mean). Physics and Wicca have no explicit relationship that I'm aware of.

Right--religion is the genus, and Wiccans and Christians are both species.

That was really the point: Philosophy as the genus for metaphysics and physics; religion as the genus for christianity and wicca. The different species would concede that they are the same sort of thing (that is, a philosophy or a religion), but not that they are exactly the same sort of thing (so wiccans don't consider themselves christians, and people claiming to objective should want to call their thing 'metaphysics').

Personally, I think that would be acceptable in a certain sense (if you wanted to consider physics to be a species of metaphysics)--but I have seen people present arguments that an applied science such as physics or paleontology or whatever should not be referred to as "philosophy," on the grounds that philosophy should deal with general principles and should not require specialized knowledge that is not available to everyone (any adult human with a working consciousness, I mean). So it might be more clear to distinguish between what is "science" and what is "philosophy," even though science is necessarily dependent on philosophy. In that case, a physicist (qua physicist) would be a scientist, and a metaphysician (qua metaphysician) would be a philosopher. Inasmuch as physics as a science is dependent on and presupposes philosophical positions, I would argue that it is most dependent on metaphysics and epistemology.

There is of course the problem with the things we call sciences nowadays, using to be called philosophies until at least well into modernity. Let's not embark upon that subject.

And whereas physicists may adhere to, or presuppose philosophical positions, I don't think physics does. Any metaphysical views a physicist may have determine his physics only in a negative way: His views on physics depend on his views on metaphysics and epistemology only insofar as he will allow them to - but there is no need to do so.

No, because Wiccans and Christians are different species of religion.

I don't think that they necessarily should, qua scientists. But a specific scientist, if he is also interested in philosophy, could be a metaphysician qua philosopher.

That is true. A person may do research in evolutionary biology yet attend church every sunday; there's no possibility therein. The point is rather, that evolutionary biology is not a religion.

So you dispute the claim that it was called this because it was the section that came "after the physics" when Aristotle's works were compiled? It might be ambiguous if you attempt to derive meaning from the root words without that historical insight in mind, but with it it seems to make sense to me (assuming that it is an accurate historical fact).

For as far as I know, the story about Andronicus editing Aristotle's work is not an accepted historical fact.

No, but that's an epistemological issue. Metaphysics doesn't (necessarily) attempt to explain things that are unknowable. Aristotle was an empiricist--he didn't believe in innate ideas. He thought that all knowledge was derived from experience, including knowledge of metaphysical principles.

If you ask the metaphysician, he will tell you that of course he is not explaining something unknowable, because if it was unknowable, how could he ever explain anything about it? My guess is that if we'd ask Aristotle whether his philosophy should be considered a physics or a metaphysics, he would choose the former. The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory are about can be known or not; the question is whether they actually can be or can't be known.

For one thing, physics is a science which requires specialized knowledge of the physical world, whereas metaphysics should be derivable from the knowledge possessed by every adult human. Also, if you are okay with the definition of physics as "the science that deals with matter, energy, motion, and force," that is insufficient for a complete theory of being qua being, since knowledge of more than matter, energy, motion, and force is possible (for instance, knowledge of psychology; or of law as it pertains to government, is also possible, and those are not exclusively dependent on nor are they derivable from knowledge of matter, energy, motion, and force).

I don't understand the point you're trying to make with the first line of this section. As for the rest, I already expressed that my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. It may be useful to utilise a set of abstractions and pseudo-laws governing these, but that does not take away this belief of mine.

A person who accepts the onus of proof principle ("the burden of proof is on he who asserts the positive") would reject any proposition which lacks sufficient evidence (although he would likely employ a gradation from impossible, to possible, to probable, to true, etc). A person who accepts some form of faith would have no problem accepting a proposition without any evidence at all (although he would likely require an appeal to emotion or authority before accepting it, etc).

To accept that a proposition is at least possible, without sufficient evidence, would, I think, require a certain amount of faith. To reject a proposition in spite of sufficient evidence is skepticism. The approach I advocate is to reject a proposition until there is sufficient evidence (I don't think there might be a Santa Claus, only it's impossible to say for sure--I say there is no Santa Claus).

But a person can suspend judgment on a proposition, and at the same time employ any of these principles--faith, skepticism, or onus of proof.

It all depends on when you consider evidence 'sufficient'. I will not claim there is no Santa Claus, but I will let the facts speak for themselves.

Jan.

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

(Why won't the quote tag work..?)

Yes I have actually read beyond the title. Have you actually thought about the implications of what you're proposing?

You didn't display having read beyond the title, though. And yes, I have thought about the implications of the idea.

Please note that I'm not actually proposing to introduce this idea. I was just after weighing the pros and cons; as in, a discussion wherein people try to be objective, and consider every point of view. (Didn't Aristotle say that is the mark of a great mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it? Think first, judge later.) If it seems all I do is propose pros, that should probably be attributed to the fact that all you other people do is propose cons.

Following your logic, why should the government stop with healthcare? After all, food is a far more fundamental and immediate human need than healthcare. Why not simply collect taxes at the point of a gun so we can guarantee that everyone eats three good meals per day?

Yes, why not? (Perhaps because breaking a leg is a much more serious problem than not eating for a few days; or perhaps because food is much easier to obtain than medical treatment; or because you can see it coming that you're going to want to eat tomorrow, but not that you're going to break your leg tripping over the doorstep of the restaurant; or because everybody needs (and probably is going) to eat every day anyway, so taxing, then redistribution wouldn't make a lot of sense...)

I'm glad to hear you say that.

As a general rule, I try to not believe in things whose existence I can't prove.

Like most things the government does, government-provided healthcare is often crap.

Yes yes, but a decent government-provided healthcare system isn't unthinkable.

You don't seem to understand that another person's need does not create a demand on my life, or yours for that matter.

You don't seem to understand that a universal healthcare system would not just be a demand of others on your life, but also a demand of you on other people's lives - but more importantly; that it may also be a demand of you, on your own life. It may be in your own interest.

People take calculated risks all of the time. It is not irrational to take a calculated risk like going without health insurance. In any event, those who take such risks do it voluntarily and then have to live with the consequences of their decisions.

It may not be irrational to take a risk (I don't see what difference it makes if a risk is calculated or not; a risk is a risk), but can't see how it would be rational to take a risk. If you know your chance of breaking a leg is 49%, and your chance of not breaking it 51%, it would be rational (in an economic kind of way) not to insure yourself for breaking that leg, but I think that actually a lot of people would still get that insurance with this kind of numbers. What on earth is a calculated risk, and what on earth is rational in this case?

No, what I am saying is that the only proper function of gov't is protection against one man's abridging another's freedom, through initiation of force. It should not protect you from the law of causality, that is, natural impediments to your freedom.

What's the difference between aliens come to destroy our homes, and a meteor come to destroy our homes? The distinction between natural impediments and agrressive barbarians seems like a rather arbitrary one.

It's still makes a world of difference. Involuntary taxation is still involuntary and enforced at the point of a gun. There still remains the issue forcing productive people to provide for unproductive people who do not or will not provide for themselves.

As has been said, one person's need is not a license to take by force from another person.

Let 'involutary taxation for the common good' be A; 'unproductive people who do not or will not provide for themselves (but are still provided for) B. You say "if A, then B; but B is absurd; so -A". You do not seem to give thought to the possibility that -A may be absurd as well: If a country in need of a defensive military has no involuntary taxation, the defense of the country would depend on people voluntarily providing the means for a military. If everyone would provide, there would be no problem, but there are still the B-people; those who will not provide for themselves, that is, who will not tribute means for a military, but who would still enjoy the protection thereof. Now consider the situation where the entire population of a country consists of B. There will be no military this way. Then some people will get together and decide that if no-one else does, they will provide the means for a military. Their ten-men-army is doomed to lose, of course, so they gather up enough providers-of-means untill they stand a good defense. The same problem thus arises for -A as for A: The B-people are still provided for.

That's right; I say it isn't. It is of primary importance that a man be "safe" from one thing: the initiation of force. No service, health care or otherwise, is worth this.

Being safe from initiation of force requires just that; initiation of force. Unless of course there would be no man who would not adhere to this principle, but that is just not realistic. A service that keeps people safe from initiation of force requires certain means to operate, and where do these means come from? They are provided voluntarily by moral peope? Voluntarily you say? Not exactly, because if these moral people wouldn't provide, there wouldn't be this safe-keeping service. Seem more like involuntarily. Of course, they have the choice of providing or not providing, but if they want to be safe from initiation of force, they are forced to provide.

Those weren't just points; they were my argument. They should be enough to convince you that universal healthcare is immoral.

If there are arguments that may be thought of as countering your points; your points will not suffice to convince a lot of people.

I would rather die than demand another man sacrifice his life, his productivity, for me to live. But realistically, I would (and do) have a private insurance plan, which I pay for myself.

That first part sounds very altruistic. If you were to choose between your own death and somebody else's, you'd choose your own? Or if you were to choose between your own death and an hour of the surgeon's time, you would still want to die? That seems noble beyond anything I've ever heard of. Congrats on the insurance plan, btw.

Exactly. It's only in my self-interest to pay for my own medical care, and nobody else's. But you seem to be suggesting that I should demand that you pay for it!

That wasn't the suggestion. The idea was presented in the first post of this topic; an obligatory health insurance plan. Note that this would not necessarily mean you paying for other, and vice versa. It may also be thought of as each taking care of his own. However, it may not be equally easy to provide for oneself at every stage of one's life. Therefore, it may be rational to agree to receiving more care than you can pay for during this part of your life, and providing more than you consume, during that part of your life.

1. I wasn't trying to leave you in the dark, I thought what I said would be self-evident once it came up.

2. "Better safe than sorry" is an argument for private health insurance. Better safe, with insurance I earned and I know will keep me healthy, than sorry, with shitty medical care and taxes out my ass. Of course, you can put your perspective in there and use it to try to justify that if you want. The point is, it's a useless generalization.

3. Anyway, I'm be happy to discuss things with you if you have legitimate questions, but it looks to me like you may be better off reading some of Rand's work if you're really interested.

1. It wasn't self-evident at all.

2. Allow me to point out that this topic was never meant to be applied to the actual situation of your country. It was meant as a theoretical discussion.

3. In reply to you speaking of 'legitimate questions': Why is anything that appears to be in conflict with Rand's writings unconditionally wrong? That is not a very philosophic kind of view. Isn't it good to test your foundations times and times again?

Needed according to whom?! Who gets to decide this? Say I have ovarian cysts. I could just take tylenol or tylenol with codeine every period to get over the excruciating pain and hope they never develop into cancer. That's one option. Or, I could have expensive surgery to remove the cysts so that I don't have pain but I can still have kids. OR, I could just get a hysterectomy (which, IIRC, is actually easier and cheaper). Then, do I get hormone replacement therapy or just tough out the sweats and the bone loss? What do I do? How do you decide which treatment I "need"?

Practical issues can be dealt with, I'm sure. In any case, they're not within the scope of the discussion I had in mind when starting this thread. Besides, I don't think implementational problems that aren't insurmountable (or would you claim that they are?) a good argument in a theoretical discussion in the first place.

Whereas, if I pay for this myself, I can decide which option I want given my situation and the amount of money I have to pay for this crap.

Why is that impossible with a government-provided healthcare?

Every service the government provides is shitty. Can there possibly be a reason for this? Is that within the realm of speculation? I think it is. The reason is that it's a violation of rights. Once you take that step, everything that follows after is a hideous downward spiral of destruction.

"Every service the government provides is shitty, because it's a violation of rights"? That my lady, is one crappy piece of argumentation. Either that, or very inaccurately formulated.

What is so special about health. Cannot we use the same argument, to say the following:

[...]

I'm glad you're consequently thinking this through.

It's obvious that it would be great if each had what he needed in order to live a fine life.

But it's also obvious there're these unproductive people who do nothing but enjoy being provided for, and that this would be unfair for the productive people, and that in the end it would probably wreck the system.

So the one extreme, the government taking care of everyone's basic needs, is not acceptable; but does that necessarily mean we have to adhere to the other extreme?

Jan.

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

What you don't seem to know, Shading, is that Objectivism calls for a voluntarily supported government, not a tax-based one. So no, we do not advocate a tax-based government at all: not for its proper functions (military) and certainly not for improper ones (healthcare).

Voluntarily or obligatory, it doesn't really matter if it would be rational to rather be safe than sorry - but you say it isn't?

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

Well, there's your answer. If you want it more succinctly:

"Free" government healthcare is wrong because it relies on taxation, which is initiation of force against taxpayers.

Initiation of force is wrong because it contradicts a principle that every rational man should hold - it subverts rational thinking, and it subverts freedom.

What else is there to say? That should be enough. Can you really support something like universal health care, knowing the above?

I obviously wasn't through talking at this point. I brought up arguments that are generally thought of as justifying demanding people to pay taxes. These might be false, but you still have to show that they are, before you can expect anyone to be convinced of the wrongness of taxes.

But chances are, most rational people would end up paying in far more than they're getting out. I'm not going to be extremely overweight, have 11 children, or need to go in for alcohol poisioning. If I do need serious medical care, I'll pay to have it done right, rather than getting crappy public service. And yes, I have a close relative who was mistreated in the emergency room due to sheer stupidity and incompetence, so I mean that. So my point is, it's in my rational self-interest to save my money and pay for my own healthcare, than pay taxes and hope for the best.

An obligatory health insurance is a violation of freedom, not a protection of it. As you said, healthcare is incredibly expensive; it's not a right, but something that must be earned, whether we're talking about the jungle or the product of rational men living in the jungle, i.e. industrial society.

I'm not saying that healthcare is a right.

Healthcare being government-provided doesn't necessarily mean it's crap.

And what if you desperately and acutely need medical care in order to be able to live the life you want to live, but you have not yet been able to save enough money for it? Government-provided healthcare would have been a life-saver, but when there was a vote for it, it didn't pass, because of people like you. Would you feel regret?

So the conclusion to draw is that initiating force against people to pay for the military is also wrong. I'm not happy that my tax dollars are being wasted in Iraq. Even if we were fighting in California against a land invasion from China, I don't want my money stolen to pay for it; I'd be happy to donate, and so would a whole lot of very wealthy individuals and corporations.

I have to agree with you here.

However, this kind of reasoning wouldn't apply to health insurance. When there's China threatening to invade, every citizen is in danger, and so everyone is willing to contribute to the costs for defense (let's assume there're no people who would abuse all the others paying; choosing not to contribute themselves). But when you have an accident, it's only you in whose self-interest it is to raise money to pay for medical care - and what if you can't raise it?

What we see is that with a defensive military, it's only necessary to contribute as soon as a threat arises; but with medical care it might just be a good plan to insure your well-being beforehand.

Reason does operate the same way in all rational beings, but it doesn't say that "it's better to be safe than sorry," which is a generalization that's only useful in certain situations. Sometimes it's best to take risks. Anyway, this generalization certainly can't be applied to the universal healthcare quesion.

If you claim that the generalization can't be applied to the universal healthcare question, at least bother to tell me why. You're not providing any argumentation at all. Why is it rational to take the risk and don't go into insurances?

Jan.

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

So the only choice available is the false alternative of tax supported health care and no health care? Why is this?

Can you point me to where I state that it is either this or that, and no other?

And have you ever heard about relevant argumentation, instead of just claiming something is false?

1. What gags is saying is that you're still paying for it by paying taxes - 2. and also at the expense of your freedom from initiation of force (which is the only "right").

He said 1, yes, but I said that as well, so he should have replied to what I said after I said 1, not repeating what I said and thinking it an argument.

He didn't say 2 at all.

[What's wrong with free healthcare?]

One problem is that when people feel 'protected' from something, such as when wearing seat belts or helmets, crumple zones, airbags, supposedly-safe soccer-mom minivans, they tend to take more risks and actually suffer the same number of, if not more, accidents. It's scientifically proven, and the term for it is Risk Homeostasis.

If people have no incentive to stay healthy, imagine what will happen to that tax-paid healthcare when they start eating McCholesterol every day, not exercising, and doing generally stupid things because "Hey, they'll fix me for free!"

Every ache, pain, cold and minor fever that normal rational people might take aspirin for, will then become something people go to the hospital for (because hey, it's "free!"), and then we'll be waiting for months for a scheduled operation (ala Canada) that could normally be done within 24 hours in a free-market system.

I don't think the analogy is correct. People with airbags etc. think they're safe, as in, that nothing is going to happen to them; whereas people who eat extra burgers, or jump from roofs know they're not safe, and that something is going to happen to them. Thinking nothing's going to happen to you is not the same as knowing you'll be fixed if something happens.

Also, I haven't specified anything about what would, and what would not be included in the health insurance I talked about, but if you really want to go into those details; it's probably a logical rule that medical care is only provided if it is actually needed.

Healthcare as you propose it would not be "free" in any rational sense of the word. Perhaps you should change the title of this thread to "What's wrong with stolen healthcare?"

Have you actually even read beyond the title and the first line of this topic?