Seeker

The scholastic environment is the classroom. A principally social organization like a sorority is, well, principally a social organization, and it's not unreasonable to use sociability as an evaluative criteria for the members. To quibble with the fact that beauty is an element of sociability is to take exception, not with the Delta Zeta sorority, but with human nature itself. Rand herself was a Romantic, not a Naturalist, and would abhor the selection of an ugly individual to fill the role of say, Dagny Taggart in a film production of Atlas Shrugged. That beauty is largely not a matter of choice is beside the point; the volitional act in question is that of the selector - the casting director in a movie, or the members of the selecting committee of a social organization seeking to achieve a beautiful and more sociable membership. The virtue for them is to accurately select on the basis of beauty as one particular discriminating factor. Whether social organizations are valuable as such is a fair point for debate, but once that question is answered affirmatively, the use of beauty as a selection criterion is validated accordingly.

Obviously if you can't pay, you can't pay and that's just water under the bridge. Reality is what it is, so to that extent a court that cancels particular repayment terms in favor of others, is merely recognizing reality and cannot be faulted for that as such. But where I and perhaps others see trouble is in going further than that in releasing the debtor from his obligations as well as their equivalent, which should perhaps include money damages if the adjustment of repayment terms so warrant. If anything, a debtor should end up owing more after bankruptcy, not less, to make up for having failed in his initial obligations. The distribution among creditors in any repayment scheme is a minor issue, I think, compared to the moral importance of being committed to honoring one's promises to the extent that one is able over the course of one's life. If some creditors can objectively claim priority over others then so be it, otherwise I don't see why a simple percentage breakdown that includes repayment to everyone in part and on the same schedule wouldn't be sufficient. Again, I ask: how can a court know today what an individual's ability to repay will be tomorrow? At best they can make an educated guess. I do not think that they can know that one could only repay 10% of his obligation over the course of his life, certainly not to an extent sufficient to release a person from his obligations. Admittedly, this is a complex issue overall, but the moral principle seems rather simple. Forgiving debt may be well-advised sometimes, but I see no reason why doing so should not be at the exclusive discretion of the individual creditors, and the basic moral obligation of the debtor to repay as much as possible over the course of his lifetime seems just. The idea of society granting a "fresh start" at the expense of a few is simply not consistent with the principle of individual rights.

I addressed the lifetime debt question as a matter of personal honor, pride and self-esteem. Somehow the plain logic of that - which all should agree to - got lost on the way to bankruptcy court, apparently. But how can anyone know ahead of time how soon, and the extent to which, a person in his lifetime will be able to repay his outstanding debts? Answer: it's impossible, which is why the only moral outcome is to enforce the contract, not forgive any debts, and insist that the debtor pay his debts to the extent that he is able as soon as he can. The difference between actually cancelling the debts, and not cancelling them, is that in the latter case the individual does everything he can to eventually repay the debt! That is simply not the same as cancelling the debt. Liquidiation of assets? Yes. Fresh start in life? No way!

The way forward for Giuliani is to promise to appoint "strict constructionists" to the Supreme Court (the actual term preferred by Scalia, I believe, is "textualist"). That might placate the conservative base which views court appointments, not the presidency, as the key to social issues, and which might give a pro-choice candidate a pass on that basis. I don't know much about Giuliani but so far he seems infinitely preferable to Hillary Clinton who is simply a great big bundle of lies piled atop lies. Uggggh. All this could change as more details about Giuliani are revealed, of course, but up front I'd say he could be a winner.

In my view, a debt cannot ever morally be forgiven (except by the voluntary consent of the lender). Ask yourself, if you have pride, whether you would allow yourself to go through life without paying a debt that you owed someone. The answer should be that your pride and self-esteem would never let you get away with it. You would do everything possible to honor your debts, period -- no rationalizing it away with "it was just my sore luck, why can't I ever catch a break?" or "the bank is big and rich anyway" or "life is just too hard", etc. If you are a moral person you would work towards eventually repaying your debts simply as a matter of personal honor. I have a hard time seeing how a just law could "forgive" a debt without the lender's consent. At most it could permit you to prepare an orderly plan for how you will repay the debts in due course and as soon as possible, as opposed to having your affairs fall into complete and perpetual disarray. A lifetime of trying to honor debt with all its attendant difficulties might will be the practical result in some cases, but that is a far cry better than a lifetime of petty rationalizations and personal dishonor, even if under cover of law.

As I see it, at the heart of this case is a fact asserted by the airline in explaining how the situation arose, namely that the pilots were repeatedly told that takeoff conditions were imminent, only to have it turn out that this was repeatedly not the case. I confront this fact because, in the absence of explicit contract terms to the contrary, I think that the passengers should indeed have a right to disembark and not be held by force (even if that force is implemented simply by means of moving the aircraft away from the jetbridge or stairs). But, as long as the airplane is actually engaged in the process of taking off (having left the gate), it would be impractical and irrational to extend the right to that context as it directly pertains to the purpose for which the passengers boarded the aircraft. What I'm searching for then is a line that signifies unreasonable delay, particularly since a considerable unreasonable delay could result in significant hardship to the passengers (lack of food, fresh air, water, toilet facilities, or even just time wasted). To be clear, I don't think this should extend to emergency situations such as natural disasters. Yet repeatedly waiting for imminent takeoff conditions is a contradiction in terms, and regardless of the unjust FAA regulations, this was the airline's decision, i.e. it was with their ambit of free choice to act as they did. As the airline could have taken steps to allow the passengers to disembark earlier and chose not to, they were the proximate cause of the passenger's hardship even though the storm caused the delay. At some point the chain of causes and effects involves the airline's choice in extending the delay beyond what could be reasonably expected, at which point they should be obliged to permit passengers to leave. A law to secure the passengers right to depart a plane that is being held on the ground by the airline and is not actually in the process of taking off (having gone beyond a reasonable time to do so), would be a just law in my view. One way to judge the amount of time that is reasonable might be to examine the standard by which the pilots are basing their decision to see if it makes any sense. The rationale used (that takeoff conditions were considered immiment over a ten hour span) doesn't seem to cut it. A nexus between the actual amount of time passed beyond a certain minimum baseline and a cascading standard of evidence (possible takeoff at time t, probable takeoff at time t+1, certain takeoff at time t+2, or abort) may be worth considering. With the passage of each unit of time the airline should confront a higher burden of proof in establishing their expectation of immiment takeoff to keep the passengers on board against their will. I appreciate the difficulties that confront an airline in allowing passengers to disembark as Kendall explained, so I wouldn't extend the right beyond what the airline is actually capable of providing under the circumstances, and a wide berth favoring the airlines might be prudent. Only to the extent that they actually are able to allow passengers to safely leave the aircraft should the right exist. But to that extent, and in relation to a rational prediction about takeoff conditions vis-a-vis the amount of time passed, I would support such a right.

In referring to the "animal kingdom" I of course meant to exclude people. Jeez ...

Shooting also involves skill. Maybe having and practicing that skill is a rational value to you. Animal rights activists would argue that your squirrel has a right to its life in forest, so let's be clear: animals have no rights. Only humans can have rights. It's not that your right trumps its right. There are no rights in the animal kingdom.

Offhand I'd say there are no legal rights, and ought not be, unless there's a book or recording. I agree with JMeganSnow's answer.

To play devil's advocate for a moment, might the conditions to which passengers are subjected ever give rise to a violation of their rights in extreme circumstances? I'm thinking here of passengers being denied food, water, fresh air, toilet facilities, and so forth for hours upon hours, without being allowed to leave.

Interesting story arising out of the recent JetBlue debacle: "The stranding of hundreds of passengers aboard JetBlue Airways Corp. planes for up to 10 hours on Wednesday has revived calls to enact an airline customer rights law." a passenger bill of rights to - cap the time any delayed flight can languish on the tarmac without letting passengers get off - specify compensation when airlines fail to deliver services as promised

Check with your local Womyn's Stoodies Departmynt.

Necrovore, Copyright protects a creator's expression of a particular intellectual work, and reproduction is expression. By reproducing the creator's work, you have expressed those particulars that belong to him alone, that only he, as the creator of the work, may rightly express. You have denied to him the right to be the only person who expresses himself by doing so yourself. The artist, in conceiving a work of art, necessarily draws upon his own unique identity and intellectual effort. His conception becomes a concretized value when it is outwardly expressed, as in a written composition, a painting, an audio recording etc. Creation of a fixed, material object containing the artist's work is expression of that work. The particular aspects generated by the creator within that concretization is a value. As its creator he is exclusively entitled to that value. Your assertion that the right is one of access is incorrect. Access is not the issue; expression of something particular is. No one can rightly express the creator but the creator, and no one may rightly derive value from the essential particulars of his expression except him. Your argument that the device creates the value is also incorrect. The value you gained was in your unauthorized expression of his intellectual work. By using your computer to reproduce the particulars of his work, you violated his right to be the sole person to express them. Rights do exist in a social context, and that context is everyone in the society. That includes you even in the privacy of your own home. The exclusive right to expression does not vanish when you are by yourself. You are still violating the creator's right. You are still not entitled to express that which is rightfully his, and no one else's, to express.

Perhaps "terms of trade" was a misstatement of what the copyright symbol means; more like, the right, which exists anyways, is being explicitly emphasized at the point of trade. It is emphatically not true, however, that you gain no further value from your additional copy. If that were true, then why bother making the copy? Because of course it is a value to you. To reiterate you are not buying the music over and over, because you are not buying the music, but only one copy of the music. Your rejection of that distinction is leading you into a greater thicket of misunderstanding.

But necrovore, the important principle is that the creator of the music has the right to control its spread through copying, and thereby control the product of his mind. This hasn't changed at all since 1964. In offering his mind and music to the world, the creator spreads value, but only to the extent that he chooses in voluntary trade. In making an additional copy for yourself, you are spreading the product of his mind further (only a bit further perhaps, but still further) than he chose to allow. Now, maybe you could convince him, with your argument, that doing so would be in his rational self-interest. He might even agree. But it is still his right to decide the extent of his music's spread via copying, not yours. The way he chose to implement that control (in the case of a typical music CD) is by reference to the federal copyright laws. As to new technology, the current law reserves to the author the right to make copies (with some exceptions). If a particular act of copying is illegal (and by extension, immoral under the terms of trade by which you acquired your copy) yet for some reason necessary, then the law can be changed. The creator might not like the change, but he didn't specify his own terms when he sold you the copy, he referenced copyright law, whatever it happens to be. That law might be friendly to his IP, but it might also be hostile to it. That's the risk he took in choosing to invoke copyright law as the terms of his deal with you. So what we need is evidence to support the idea that the creators are okay with spreading their mind-product a bit further, to the iPod, either by reference to their own statements or actions or to federal law. I think the RIAA's FAQ statement lends some support to that conclusion, there is some potentially supportive (though not controlling) ideas in case law and legislative history, and Kendall's de facto circumstances idea, which acknowledges the realities of the digital media revolution, shows how acceptance of this extension is in the interests of the creators. But violating the rights of the creators to their mind-product to facilitate technological progress for ourselves would simply be immoral.

Okay, this I understand. Before I thought that a CD player's buffer created a copy, but since it is not "fixed", the correct conclusion is that the buffer contents is not a copy. That's the distinction I needed, and I accept it.

In the case of the CD player you seem to be relying on Title 17, Section 101, U.S. Code, since you say (using other words) that the copy cannot be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." The problem I see is that there exists a very easy way to perceive, reproduce, or otherwise communicate the copy in the buffer that does not involve an advanced degree in computer science or electrical engineering, namely the player's audio jack. Every time I listen to a CD I'm perceiving the copy in the buffer, not the original. So it evidently is a copy within the meaning of Section 101, which puts it on an equal footing with the copy in iTunes. Is there another section of law that creates a distinction? Again, I see the difference between players as arbitrary. You seem to be applying a "least copying necessary" standard to favor one configuration of hardware over another, the CD player over the iPod. The nature of a CD only requires that the hardware configuration be able to read the CD. Both a standalone player and my computer's iPod/iTunes set-up do that equally. Beyond that, you have to introduce something else not involving the nature of the CD, to favor one configuration over the other. If there is a basis for "least copying necessary", I have yet to see what it is, or how the amount of copying would be measured. Am I in too deep when it comes to copyright law? Yes, I am. Since the rights holders have granted permission according to copyright law, I have no choice but to inquire into what that law is. I should probably consult an IP attorney for a dispositive answer instead of groping around on my own. Interestingly though, I have read that many IP attorneys believe that CD ripping for personal, noncommercial use is legal, relying on such cases as Sony v. Universal City Studios and RIAA vs. Diamond Multimedia.

Perhaps the reason that I can't distinguish between my making a copy when I press "play" on the Discman versus "import" in iTunes is that there isn't one - both being essential to each method of playback, no other factor bearing on the question. From where does this alleged distinction arise? I might not reject it, if I knew the basis for the contention. To your other question, I can at least point to this FAQ on the Recording Industry Association of America's web site: "If you choose to take your own CDs and make copies for yourself on your computer or portable music player, that's great. It's your music and we want you to enjoy it at home, at work, in the car and on the jogging trail." Notwithstanding their inaccurate portrayal of who owns the music, we can at least conclude that the organization that represents most of the rights holders sees no problem.

I don't know what you mean by "uncontrollable copying". Any copying that occurs, is controlled by the device that copies, which is in turn controlled by the humans who designed and use it. But more significantly, nothing in the above justifies favoring CD players over iPods. The method of copying I have outlined most certainly is necessary to play the CD's contents on an iPod. I could just as easily say that the CD player's buffering is unnecessary because iPods exist, so there's no permission to use CD players any more. In other words, the preference for one over the other seems arbitrary and thus unconvincing. Similarly, the "qua CD" idea fails to persuade me because it speaks only to the nature of CDs, not the means by which they are played. I don't see why a Sony Discman is any more "qua CD" than my iPod set-up except in superficial terms - in essence, they're both doing the same thing.

I discarded their cases and stacked them in a box as a final backup in the very unlikely event that both my primary hard drive and external backup hard drive fail simultaneously. Otherwise, I don't use them. When I spoke of "implied" permission, I simply meant the permission that was actually granted to play the one copy I was sold. You seem to reject out of hand the idea that my technique employed to play the CD copies is permitted as incidental to the player's operation. Now, you might say, "but your playing technique incidentally involves making copies, so a right to it could not have been implied", to which I would draw a distinction between effective copies versus data transferred as part of the player's operation (akin to a data buffer). On this I remain unpersuaded so far. There are of course differences between data buffered in an integrated circuit, let's say, and stored in a hard disk (such as persistence when the power is turned off, etc.) but those seem irrelevant here. I could exploit both as separately usable copies with the right techniques. Here, I have chosen not to. What I have then is a very sophisticated CD player that plays the original copies I was sold, when and where I want, having stored them all in its playing buffer (which took a lot of reading ahead, to be sure). Under the system I have designed, at no point do I isolate the stages of the data transfer in such a way as to effectively create multiple copies. I bought one, and that's the one I am using, albeit with a very sophisticated technique.

To use the product as the instructions say, for the vast majority of people entails copyright violation unless the use in question is allowed by something akin to "fair use" (I'll try to think up a better label). You seem to suggest that we shouldn't be at all surprised that Apple would encourage copyright violations, but this is an era of lawsuits and court injunctions; surely the lack thereof (that Apple continues doing what it does) serves as some evidence that Apple isn't actively encouraging copyright violation? Apple is sensitive to its stock price. It should avoid getting in that kind of trouble. I acknowledge that they covered their asses with their EULA, but I hold firm that they are, in fact, actively encouraging ripping copyrighted CDs. So the only remaining option is that encouraging ripping copyrighted CDs is okay thanks to a concept of "permitted usage" (how's that?), i.e. an objectively correct understanding of what the granting of a limited license to one CD copy entails with respect to its use. So this is definitely not the "fair use" doctrine as defined by the government. But where I think the moral issue may be more complex is in trying to define what permitted usage actually entails and whether it requires an exception to the principle of not making any sorts of copies without express permission because a limited type of permission was implied. Let's accept that the copyright owner could say, "by this license I do not allow you to import your CD into iTunes". A clear statement such as that would be incontestible. On the other hand, permission to import the CD might be implied because in the iPod context I am not making a copy to functionally increase my number of copies, but acting so as to use the material singly on a player of my choice. That the player happens to require an intermediate copy step in order to function is incidental to its operation; effectively, there is still only one copy, if all I have done functionally is to transfer the song to play on my iPod. Could I use the steps involved to improperly make functional copies, playing the song on my iPod and computer and CD player all simultaneously? Sure. But I need not - I can merely play the one that's on my iPod only, treating the intermediate steps as incidental to the player's functioning. This is, in fact, exactly what I do. It is not so much making copies as changing the manner in which I play the copy I already have. Now, to get back to the copyright holders. If this type of usage is invalid, then that requires that they did not give me permission to play the copy they sold to me in such a manner, that incidental duplicates which will never be played but which exist solely to enable my player to function, are contrary to their will. This seems a bit of a stretch. It is hard to see what rational purpose they could have in demanding that I use a portable CD player but not a digital media player such as an iPod (particularly since they never made such a desire clear). There is no evidence of player preference on their part. I can reasonably assume that they want me to use the best player available to enjoy their material. As of now, that happens to be an iPod, which incidentally involves a couple of copy steps for its operation. So on these grounds it seems to me that their permission was implied, and I am in the clear so long as I never make use of the intermediate copies for anything else. That is the territory I am seeking here to defend - a way of looking at those copies as subsumed within implied permission. I suspect that there will be disagreement here - have at it!

Oh, for sure. The question wasn't whether I was bound by it, but whether it really gets Apple off the hook for plainly encouraging copyright violation. I hold that it does not. Also, whether (according to the EULA) I am "authorized or legally permitted to reproduce" the materials begs the question of whether "fair use" grants such authorization. Your explanation suggests that it is not, but my questions concerning "fair use" as a moral concept were not limited to what the Federal Government says (other than as a potential starting point for grasping the concepts involved), but seek a moral understanding of the issue.

And of course in the context of today's climate, that first and most likely explanation is that that refers to online piracy. iTunes is, after all, a program that replaces Napster or other such programs as the way to get music online. The idea that by stealing they might be referring to following their instructions to import CDs that one has already paid for simply does not leap to mind. That's lovely. Where is that EULA buried? In tiny print? The README.TXT file in the bin directory? It's certainly NOT in the prominent printed user's manual that TELLS you to import CDs from your collection. And who honestly expects the average users' CD collection to contain non-copyrighted CDs? That's just CYA for Apple. It doesn't change at all their encouragement of precisely the conduct at issue here.

I think the idea is that permission for fair use was granted when I bought the CD from the store, and the question then was what constituted "fair use"? The evidence of that general principle could be garnered not only from the property holder but by such things as Apple's documentation and the fact that they've not been slapped with a court injunction forcing them to cease and desist encouraging outright theft. Why accept the idea of "fair use"? I would take it that "fair use" is a correct legal principle because there is underlying it a corresponding moral principle, something along the lines of, "I can take reasonable measures to make use of the copy for which I paid, including making a subsidiary copy for my iPod, because permission to do that was implicitly granted when I made the purchase". Now we can argue over that reasoning, but my point is that did notrequire knowledge of the specific IP holder's permission, but only the general concept of "fair use". The questions I see are: 1. Is "fair use" a valid concept? If so, what does it mean? 2. Does "fair use" entail importing the CDs into iTunes and my iPod? 3. Can individual copyright owners deny "fair use" to those to whom they sell copies?

Apple's iPod documentation explicitly instructs users to import their CDs into their iTunes library. You may say it is sloppy thinking to believe that Apple wouldn't do that if it weren't proper, and it probably is, but I can totally understand why people wouldn't see it as a problem when Apple is not only telling them it's okay, but instructing them to do it when setting up their iPod. The following is from page 6 of the iPod user's manual: There is not a word about contacting the copyright holders to get their permission. No disagreement. I didn't see it as impermissible.