agrippa1

Well, no, it's actually not out of line with science at all. In fact (and I use that word looooosely), according to the Copenhagen interpretation, and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, particles do indeed go the opposite way for no reason, all the time. Electrical synapses transmit electrical signals between neurons using electrical coupling across a very small (3.5nm) gap, as compared to chemical neurotransmitter synapses, which operate through the chemical diffusion of neurotransmitters across a relatively large (20-30nm) gap. The reason this is important is that, according to science, quantum mechanical effects can influence the movement of electrons across gaps of this width (they're what make semiconductors work), because the statistical uncertainty of the electrons' positions can put them, randomly, on either side of the gap. Therefore, you could say, with complete agreement with widely accepted science, that electrons in the synapses of your brain can be either here or there, and for no particular reason (pardon the pun). If nothing in science can explain why an electron jumped the gap in my brain and "caused" me to post this, than can you really say that something I like to call "free will" had nothing to do with it? Oh, and just to make the argument a little more interesting, it turns out that electrical synapses are especially abundant only in certain areas of your brain, most notably, your cerebral cortex. I don't know if I will ever buy in fully to the QM interpretation of reality, but they certainly seem to have closed the door on determinism.

How do you know this guy: is "yellow" if you can't tell if he's truly yellow, or a combination of red and green. Is the color "yellow," defined as light with a wavelength of between 570 and 580 nm, identical to a mixture of red (625-740nm) and green (520-570nm)? Or is it just perceived as identical? The answer to that question, it would seem, determines whether you believe that existence or consciousness has primacy, but only in terms of universals. It seems a cop-out to claim that "yellow," in reality, encompasses both true yellow and the red/green mixture, since that would imply that "yellowness" is not identical in all yellow things, unless we are willing to loosen our definition of "identical" to mean "perceptually undifferentiable," (as opposed to metaphysically undifferentiable) which brings us back to a perceptual basis of universals. Does this lead us from a primacy of existence to a primacy of consciousness? I don't believe so. It seems from previous discussions that we agree (now) that entities of reality are perceived by our consciousness, and only secondarily do we examine our perceptual knowledge to glean properties from the entities, and so to differentiate and integrate entities into conceptual abstractions. The question of whether the universal, or property, is an abstraction, is an interesting one. My example from earlier in this thread, of the red and burgundy books which I recognize both as "red" leads me to believe that a conceptual abstraction has taken place in order for me to determine the redness of the books. Just as we differentiate entities in order to integrate classes of entities, so, it seems, we must differentiate hues and shades in order to integrate groups of colors into the concept "red," for instance. Similarly, we differentiate the borders of entities in terms of "straightness" in order to conceptualize a "straight line." Once we have conceptualized what a straight line is, through a series of evolutions that remove contradictions (for instance a wire pulled taut seems at first "straight" until we understand the concepts "gravity" and "catenary") we then apply a conceptual standard of "straightness" against entities in reality so to group them into classes or measurements of "straightness." Have we violated the primacy of reality to knowledge, in creating the concept of "perfectly straight," first perceived roughly in reality, by refining it conceptually in our consciousness by geometrical definition? I don't believe so. In the question of how we construct the class "existents," I believe we decouple attributes from entities through the conscious process of attribute recognition, then combine attributes into impossible constructions of non-real conceptual entities, which we hold only in our minds. The origins of these non-existents is existence, but a rational process has created them from the perceived building blocks of reality. Our ability to omit measurements implies the ability to attribute arbitrary measures to the attributes of imagined entities (thus the conceptual "perfectly straight line"). By differentiating the imaginary entities from entities which are consistent with our perception of reality, we are able to form the concept "existent." A problem arises from constructing an imaginary entity which, by its imagined nature, is not perceivable. In that case, we construct an entity which we may believe actually exists in reality. Thus God, etc. So the question of universals must need to be more basic than "redness" or "straightness" and must instead relate to broader attributes such as "color," "shape," "position," "motion," "size," "sound," etc. Anything more defined that these would seem to be a conceptual abstraction of these primitive, perceptual universals.

Funny, you started this thread with an example of something that you claim does not exist in reality, in order to show that concepts are not based on reality, and now are claiming that there is nothing that does not exist in reality, in order to show that reality is not based on concepts. But the example of that which you claim does not exist in reality, actually does exist (is discoverable) in reality; and the conclusion you draw from your current claim of the non-existence of non-existents is that that which you seek (a solution to the problem of universals) does not exist. If you want to differentiate an existent from a non-existent in order to reach an ostensive concept of "existence," it's as plain as the nose on your face and the face on your nose.

If two entities have the property of existence, then existence is a property, and therefore a concept. To say that "existence" is not a concept, is to say that no two entities have the property of existence, and therefore, that nothing exists, or at most one thing. Since your own consciousness is the thing that you can say with greatest certainty exists, then, at most your consciousness, but no more, "exists."

No. The most direct path exists in reality. Reality exists regardless of consciousness.

True, the principle of rejection of force should be inviolable. But there are always disputes as to whether a violation has occurred, and the only way to address these disputes is through an a priori consent to the government's judicial process. In other cases, the application of justice may be against a person's will and against his beliefs as to what is and isn't his rightful property. In addition, the adjudication of a particular situation may be seen as out of proportion to the violation, in the perp's view, but he would still be bound, by a priori consent, to abide by the judgment of the court. In the same way, the value of a properly run government could be agreed and consented to by all citizens, with the establishment of a rational and fair tax on market exchanges across the society.

I'm not convinced this is completely true. The principle governing application of laws is not one of voluntarism, which would imply that we could choose whether or not we wanted to have laws enforced against us. The principle governing application of laws is a priori consent, based on agreement of principles of justice. I believe the same principle may apply to government financing, that is, that a priori consent, as opposed to voluntarism, could be the basis of proper financing. I don't know what mechanisms could be used to implement safeguards against improper gov't functions, but I believe we could reach a fundamental agreement as to the objective value of government that would make a taxation feasible, within Objectivist philosophical standards.

Any definition of straightness must be measured against the standard of "the most direct path between two points." Assuming that two points exist in reality, there also exists in reality the most direct path between them.

In case you missed it, Britain has been forced to nationalize Northern Rock, after the first run on a bank there in 140 years. Story here. Is this a pebble in the British pond, or the first breaking swell of an advancing storm?

We're not "stuck" with wrong definitions. Defining a color in terms of wavelengths specializes the context of the definition to pure light sources. Orange can be made up of pure orange light, or of pure red light and pure green light (as in your television) or of a random sample of wavelengths centered around the wavelengths you mention (as in the case of sunlight reflected from an orange book). Your mistake (in my opinion) is in making (presumably infinite) "precision" an attribute of "true" definitions. By that standard there are no "true" definitions, including, foremost, the definition of "true." In which case we'd be having a hard time communicating right now. (Hmmm... perhaps you have a point) You realize you are asserting here that nothing exists. (or at least not more than one thing - your consciousness perhaps?)

Must a person have infinite height in order to be "tall?" Does a 6'8" man only "tend towards tallness?" The point is that all measurements are relative to standard of measurement. Your assumption that the standard of straightness is an infinitely straight line is as invalid as an assertion that the standard of "longness" is an infinitely long distance.

You do understand why those are incomplete, and thus false definitions of the concepts "red" and "orange," right?

Could you define "knowledge?"

The concept of a perpetual motion machine refers to nothing in reality. It is the construct of three concepts which do exist in reality: Perpetual (in context of a time frame), motion, and machine. The fact that a perpetual motion machine does not exist, does not invalidate the concepts which were combined in order to create the new concept of such a non-existent machine. Similarly, the concept of a "straight line" is the construct of the the attribute "straight" and the concept "line." I can define straightness comparatively, by demonstration, and I can find examples of straightness (a piece of twine suspending a weight) that idealize the concept of "straight." The concept "line" is based on the perception of demarcation between two entities or two regions of an entity, or the border of a single entity. It was probably concretized as a result of drawing figures, and refers to the representation in graphic terms of either a concrete or an abstract concept. The fact that a perfectly straight line may not "exist" in nature does not invalidate the concepts from which the concept "straight line" was constructed.

Yes. And this speaks to the problem of universals, as you state it above. The property of "redness" depends on how precisely you define (ostensively) "red," as well as the context of identification. For instance, if you pointed to a bookshelf and said, "see those two red books over there?" I look, and based upon my personal conceptualization of the "ideal" red, look for two books that match that ideal closer than the other books. If I see a red book and a burgundy book on a shelf of blues and greens, I identify those as the "red books" you are referring to. There is no conceptual confusion there. Moving the fringe, if I look and see one red book and one orange book, I may have to come back with "You mean the red and the orange one?" which is a process of communication in which we synchronize our definitions of concepts. If you were to reply "no those are both red" then I might calibrate my communications with you, in a sort of unique dialect, in which the term "red" as used by and to you, subsumes my concepts "red" and "orange." (Preferably, I would point out the difference between the colors of the two books, and try to come to an agreement on the meaning of "red" and "orange" but if you were color-blind, my redefinition of the term would be the only way to synchronize our concepts) In regards to the straight line, the same process of definition holds true. If I drew three lines on a piece of paper, one curved and two generally "straight" (I will assume that your confusion is theoretical, and not conceptual), and asked you to measure the two straight lines, you would look at the three lines, identify the two which hold more closely to your concept of "straight" and measure them. If two of the lines were straight, accurate to the picometer, and one was straight, accurate only to the nanometer, you would have no confusion as to which lines I meant, assuming those accuracies were apparent to you. If they weren't, or if the difference did not meet your conceptual threshold for differentiation (in terms of "straightness"), you might ask me what I mean by "straight." A particular "universal" is a property that is conceptualized by your rational mind, not necessarily by all rational minds. If you're looking for a "universal" that is universal to all men, in absolutely, precisely defined terms, you are not going to find it. We all conceptualize properties based on our perceptions and rational processes, so there is naturally some level of disparity between any two men's concepts, as held in their minds, and as synchronized by their terms. (In a manner similar to the observation that two clocks never agree with absolute precision, but both say sufficiently the same thing in terms of "what time it is.") Edit: typos and more words

You lost me. Are you asserting that properties are not derived from specific instances of entities? If so, where do properties come from? You measure the distance between the two with a string, and you notice after a couple of attempts that the shortest measurement corresponds to the string having a characteristic that you conceptualize as "straight."

The straight line concept is derived from the positional relation of entities. Positional relation is defined in terms of direction and distance. Distance is defined in terms of standard unit and is measured in a straight line. Straight line, conceptually, is defined as the shortest distance between two points, and has the characteristic of being "straight." So the example of straight line that you find in infinite examples in reality is in the distance and shortest path between any two points you can indicate.

Different subject, but do you think there's a possibility that Pasternak stole from Rand? Dr. Zhivago was published long after "We The Living" Lara is close to Kira, and the Victor characters are uncannily close.

Yeah, I was going to hypothesize about the possible meaning of "Greenspan," but then I remembered that he's not fictional. Galt/Gault is a proper noun for an archaeological clay layer in England, derived from Norw. "gald" meaning "hard ground." But this is much better. And thanks for "The Driver." I got an email from Mises.org a few months ago asking "Who is Garet Garrett?" I had no idea, and I never had a chance to read the piece. BTW, the novel is available on mises.org in pdf format here.

Just as Ambassador Wilson's revelation that Iraq had tried to purchase Uranium from Niger as late as 1999 adds weight to the notion that Saddam was seeking WMD in violation of the UN sanctions. I'm interested in whether those who use the "he had not WMD" argument thought Saddam would do with his freedom once the sanctions were lifted. Saddam had used Oil for Food mechanisms to bribe high-ranking UN members, including politicians from Britain, Russia, France and China (four of the five permanent members of UNSC). Also, I never heard any proof that Saddam and Osama "hated each other" except the weak argument that Saddam was a secular leader with Christians in high posts. If you read Osama's 1998 fatwa against the US, you see three prominent mentions of Iraq, one "listed" mention of Saudi, and not a word about his poor Palestinian brothers. How do you explain that?

I've always been interested in how people come up with names for characters in their novels. Rand seems to take this art to a new level with some of her names. On a personal level, it seems that "Francisco D'Anconia" is probably derived from "Frank O'Connor" and her Grandfather's name, Nate, a nod to Branden. On a colloquial level are the names like "Mouch," "Boyle," and "Scudder" that pepper her writing. Then on a higher plain, "Dagny" meaning "new day" in Norwegian, and "Ragnar" in old Norse meaning "judgment warrior," capture eloquently the characters those two. A more complex construction is John Galt. "John" a Hebrew name derived from "Gift from God," and "galt," a variation of "gault," the Norwegian word, roughly, for "clay." So John Galt literally means "clay, given from God." Now it gets interesting, because the word "galt" is so close to another word, so powerfully evoked in AS, "gold," or to use the closer derivative, "gilt." Maybe it's just a coincidence, but in order to transition the word meaning "clay from God" into the word meaning "gold," one must replace the the letter "A," which just happens to be the general indefinite article as well as Aristotle's shorthand for any possible entity, with the letter "I." It seems that a great deal of Rand's philosophy is captured in the deceptively simple name "John Galt." I was just wondering if anyone has found other examples of Rand's imaginative use of names to evoke character in her writings.

You're talking about communication of a threat, which is a crime, regardless of the mental capacity of the perp. The more general, and difficult question is the non-communicated threat, that is, the potential threat that we correlate to the clinical diagnosis of an individual. This raises the question of whether we should restrain people who have not committed a violent act in the past, based on a similarity they have with people who have committed violence. Recognizing that clinically defined conditions are only a subset of the possible correlative traits of violent persons reveals a danger in the diagnosis (i.e., preventive) approach to threats, v. the criminal justice (i.e., reactive) approach. Should the definition of "dangerous" be extended beyond the clinical insanity definitions to include behavioral indicators of potential violence? For instance, if it was shown than membership in a street gang had a stronger correlation to violence than clinical schizophrenia had, would we be justified in chemically or physically restraining gang members? Are we more comfortable with restraining people who are dangerous and irrational, than we are with people who are just dangerous? (dangerous, in the statistical sense) In other words, is irrationality a crime?

I think I meandered my way over to agreeing with you on this. And you clearly show that inflation biases us towards purchasing, while deflation biases us towards investment, which agrees with my final paragraph. Whether a shift from purchasing to investing affects the velocity of money is still an open question, though it seems that the banking process would tend to slow it down, and that the interest skim by the bank would tend to deter borrowers somewhat. But I'm not 100% sure of the answer. I think, though, that if you apply a similar analysis to borrowers, rather than investors, you will see a clear difference between inflation and deflation. Assume a constant rate of change for capital, raw materials, labor, and prices, and see if you don't see a problem for borrowers in times of deflation.

I disagree. Real rate of interest, I'll agree with, but not "nominal." Investment decisions are based on relative real rates of return. Clearly in an inflationary period, people will spend more and invest less (assuming similar nominal rate) because real rate of return is lowered by price inflation. In an inflationary environment, holding on to cash is not an option, because you are incurring a cost due to inflation. During deflation, your cash is gaining in value, so you are realizing a benefit while holding on to it. I would assert that the motivation for decisions is stronger towards avoidance of costs, than it is towards increasing benefit, for most people. If my assertion is true, then inflation increases velocity and deflation decreases velocity. I don't have anything to back that up, except the binary evaluation most people use, of "losing money" v. "making money," as the first measure of success. But assuming that the "held cash" effect is negligible, due to the relatively small amount of cash held statically in an economy, it would seem that the rate of price inflation/deflation affects the mixture of purchases v. investments, with inflation pushing folks towards purchases, and deflation pushing them towards investments. The question then becomes: Does the velocity of money stay the same, whether it is put into purchases or investments? I don't know how to approach this one, except very simply: investment is essentially the transfer of purchasing decisions to another. It seems that the financial process of pushing money around from investor to ultimate borrower amounts to a delay in the (proxy) purchase of real goods by the investor, and thus a decrease in velocity v. direct purchase.

That's a secondary problem. The fundamental problem is that Americans have lost touch with the meaning of "individual rights." While the original indies probably meet SN's definition in terms of their middle-of-the-road politics, I believe that a great deal of the current expansion of indy numbers is made up of people like me who finally understand that Dems and Reps, while they preach social and economic freedom (respectively), actually stand for economic and social servitude (respectively). I base this on a sample of two (me and my wife) who have both switched from Rep to Ind in the last few years. I also base it on general surveys which find that Americans in general are "socially liberal" and "fiscally conservative," as if the two are ideologically opposite stands that represent a middle ground between Liberalism and Conservatism, rather than a rejection of the anti-individual bases of both of those ideologies. Of course, your point is well taken, that people who recognize individual rights often go overboard to the Libertarian/Anarchist fringe, and fail to consider that an institution they recognize as evil, actually has a proper and significant role to play in individual freedom. It is this proper role that Objectivists should prepare to expound upon, to break the notion that we stand simply for "laissez faire" and "selfishness" in all their extreme literal implications.