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Bold Standard

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  1. Britain made a formal request to Moscow for help in the murder investigation. But Mr Putin left diplomats open-mouthed with claims that the former spy did not die ‘a violent death’.

    At a dramatic press conference in London the Health Protection Agency (HPA) revealed that he had been killed by a ‘large dose’ of radioactive polonium 210, and not thallium as previously thought.

    Only a speck of it would have been enough to prove fatal once it got into his system, probably by being slipped into his drink or on to food.

    Whoever did this must have been expert in the dosage because giving him too much would have caused almost instant death while it took weeks for him to become gravely ill, giving the killer ample chance to escape.

    Could this be viewed as an act of war, from England's perspective, assuming it's proven that Putin's regime is responsible?

  2. In the contexts I've encountered this statement, I believe that the speaker has meant merely--if the person had chosen differently, which would be metaphysically possible *under the proper conditions*, then he would have acted differently.

    Oh, also, he's meant that the choice was intitiated according to final causation, which is a unique phenomenon of living organisms, as opposed to mere efficient causation, like billiard balls bumping each other around.

  3. Remember that accepting an idea of scientific predetermination doesn't negate human conciousness. It doesn't mean humans are just mindless drones following the rote orders they are "predetermined" to execute. What predetermination does mean in the context of logic and observation is that for any given human decision there could not have been any other outcome.

    This is interesting in the human context because we often think that there could have been other outcomes. For instance, we find questions such as "What if Napoleon hadn't invaded Russia?" interesting because we can posit alternative decisions having been made in the past. Yet it seems odd to think of Napoleon's decision as anything but following inevitably from the preconditions before it. We think of our current and future decisions as being open to free will, but once we look at them in hindsight it is unclear whether they could have been otherwise.

    And as strange as the deterministic position is, the free will position seems just as odd. Is the human brain a sort of "quantum computer" as some have alleged such that it can operate in violation of the normal macro laws governing outcomes? This seems even more improbable than a deterministic universe.

    It seems to me that it is the determinists who set up the straw man against free will. Objectivism has never claimed that choices exist in a vacuum or are uncaused, or that the brain is a quantum computer(? ..is that a reference to Heisenberg's quantum theory?).

    I also think there is a confusion about what an Objectivist would mean when he says a choice "could have been otherwise." He doesn't mean (as I understand it) that under the exact same conditions, in the exact same state of mind, by completely random chance or by some mystical power a particular person might have made a different choice than he made. I've only seen Objectivists make the claim that people might have chosen otherwise in the context of demonstrating that actions follow from choices. In the contexts I've encountered this statement, I believe that the speaker has meant merely--if the person had chosen differently, which would be metaphysically possible *under the proper conditions*, then he would have acted differently.

    If someone has an example where an Objectivist has claimed more than that--specifically, has claimed that, under the exact same conditions--with all the person's premises and psychology and everything being equal, the choice to think or not is completely random, arbitrary, or uncaused, which seems to be what the determinists are accusing Oists of saying, then I'd like to see an exact quote and reference for that.

  4. (2) can a sufficiently good computer simulation of the brain be conscious? And if so, does it posess free will even if it is fully built from deterministic components?

    I'm currently reading The Biological Basis for Teleological Concepts by Dr. Harry Binswanger. So far, he's made some interesting arguments for why machines don't engage in goal oriented behavior, but I don't know if he'll adress the issue of "artificial intellegence" in computers. I think his arguments so far are at least applicable to the extent of substantially clarifying the issues involved.

    I disagree that Objectivism hasn't addressed this topic directly. It's just that, the common arguments in favor of determinism and against free will (as well as traditional but incorrect arguments in favor of "free will" that Objectivism rejects) are from diverse philosophical premises, so that the specific premise or premises which lead to that specific argument have to be identified and refuted before the argument can be refuted. So refuting specific arguments, and identifying each of the Objectivist principles which are necessary to validate free will in the context of an argument can get pretty complicated.

    There are several lecture courses available from the Ayn Rand Bookstore which are devoted to free will, though I haven't heard them. Dr. Peikoff gave some interesting arguments for it (and against several different variations on determinism, and against arguments that volition is or would be causeless) in his History of Western Philosophy courses. And Dr. Binswanger is adressing it in the book I'm reading now. Most of the more advanced Objectivist materials (especially on epistemology and sometimes metaphysics) at least adress the issue, and I almost always get a better understanding of it when they do. (As opposed to trying to discuss it out of context on message boards, which has usually temporarily confused me, until I can separate out the diversity of positions being stated and their significance, which is often more work than its worth, for me on this particular issue).

  5. Hah, me too! I used to pronounce it wrong specifically to make it rhyme more nicely.

    Which one did you pronounce wrong? The first would be funny, "God is goo'd."

    But, looking back on it, I remember what attracted me to Christianity most strongly was the concept of Jesus as a perfect man, and the idea that perfection was attainable--even if only by mimicking God.
    (Sorry, couldn't resist.) I liked Jesus at first for that, and also because I thought he was an individualist and a rebel. I didn't realize what he was rebelling against included justice and self esteem, though. (For the record, Christianity doesn't actually hold that it's possible to attain perfection even by mimicking God; only Jesus could do it, because he didn't have original sin because of his alleged virgin birth. Also, he wasn't really much of an individualist. But it's easy to understand how people could be mislead about these points who haven't studied the scriptures in detail).

    Sheesh, glad I straightened that mess out!

    Yeah, thank God! : P

  6. I went to a Christian pre-school, too. But I don't remember much Christian stuff besides the prayers they made us say before we ate our snack, "God is great God is good let us thank him for this food." I just remember not thinking that good and food was a very good rhyme. And also, me being very much an ADHD kid and not knowing it (I wasn't diagnosed with it until 7th grade), i was the only one who was 100% unable to take a nap during nap time. When all the other kids went to take their nap, I got to stay up and play, because otherwise I'd just squirm around and make noise and keep all the other kids awake.

  7. Only I didn't like the way the Jesus fish looks and wanted to make mine with an eye and with fins, which the teacher grudgingly allowed.

    Lol, that's awesome. Trying to improve the picture to make it look more like a fish, and not understanding why the teachers didn't like it better that way. I can totally picture it. :dough:

  8. 3. Forcing myself to perform certain actions in order to automate them

    A book with helpful suggestions about how to automate your subconscious actions is Ayn Rand's The Art of Fiction. Even though it's not obvious from the title, there are many philosophically/ethically interesting sections in that. I think what you're trying to describe is forming good habits. I think there are some principles necessary to form good habits besides merely forcing yourself to perform the action (for example, people force themselves to perform actions out of duty, and they never become habits, because there is a [possibly subconscious] contradiction between their values and the action). Other than that, your plan seems quite rational. You might consider adding a category of deducing from the principles you've induced, to make sure none of your conclusions contradict your firmly grounded premises. (On induction and deduction, I'll again recommend Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology as a great resource).

  9. Bold Standard: I'm not sure I understand your claim about the meaning of "accurate knowledge".

    I'm not using these terms in a nonstandard way. Here's the definition of "accurate" given by dictionary.com:

    ac·cu·rate

    adj.

    1. Conforming exactly to fact; errorless.

    2. Deviating only slightly or within acceptable limits from a standard.

    3. Capable of providing a correct reading or measurement: an accurate scale.

    4. Acting or performing with care and precision; meticulous: an accurate proofreader.

    3 is the closest meaning to the way I meant it, but 1 and 2 could work.

    Our senses are a device. Now suppose some device measures temperature, and it has an error range of 1 degree (+/-).

    Is that device "accurate"? I would say no, it has it's limits.

    I can't imagine how "accurate" could be a valid concept the way you're using it. In order to be accurate something must have no limits? Isn't that the same as saying it must have no identity? But then nothing would be accurate and the concept would refer to nothing, so why would we even need it? Accuracy in no way implies omniscience.. Why should it?

    And our senses are just the same. We are still, however, able to trace down the inaccuracies because we can gain knowledge of something in different ways.

    For example: the blind spot: If you look at an object from a certain distance, your brain will give you a WRONG image of that object (it will attempt to "complete the image", by making you perceive something that is not actually there), but when you change the distance or change the location of your focus, then you can see another image. When you integrate your knowledge you realize that one of the images must be WRONG, and you run more tests to see which one is wrong, and why.

    It would be helpful to clearly distinguish between sensation, perception, and conceptualization. There definitely seems to be some equivocation between the three here.

    which would be like learning to use a device in it's range of accuracy, learning when a device is reliable.
    So now the senses are capable of accuracy and reliability? Which position are you taking?

    Our eyes are not a photon-meter, and thus they do not give accurate knowledge about the wavelength reflected by the object.

    hmm, I'm sorry, but this strikes me as a complete non-sequitur. Do you propose that if our eyes were a photon-meter, then they would give accurate knowledge about wavelengths? Do photon-meters not have ranges of error or limits? And who ever said that sense-perception gives accurate knowledge? I only ever said that it gives accurate information (data), but knowledge necessarily involves conceptualization, and that is where error can certainly occur.

  10. We have more than one way and more than one sense to examine an object, and therefor, even though our senses do give false information about the world sometimes, we still have a way to know that it is wrong, IF we keep in mind this fact, that our senses do not provide 100% accurate, reliable information at all times.

    But Objectivism never claimed that sensory perception gives you direct information about the object; it gives you direct (infallible) information about the object's relationship to your sense organs.

    Take the example of the color blind man vs the man with normal vision. They might both look at the same object, and the color blind man will see it as grey, whereas the man with normal vision sees it as green. The intrinsicists or "naive realists" who thought perception gives direct knowledge of objects would have a difficult time explaining how this would be possible. But the Objectivist solution (as I understand it--Leonard Peikoff discusses this problem in his History of Western Philosophy lecture course) is that perception doesn't give you knowledge about whether the object is "green" or "grey" in itself, but rather, "the nature of the object is such that when light reflected from the object in certain conditions reaches my eyes, I experience green," or for the color blind person, the same but with grey. And both people will be correct in this assessment.

    For example: the color of an object and the amount of illumination you perceive it as having are not it's actual wavelength that reach your eye. What you perceive is a result of the actual color/brightness compared against the environment.

    I'm not sure what you mean when you say "[its] actual wavelength," because "wavelength" is not something that exists intrinsically in an object, but is the result of an interaction between the object and a light source, under certain conditions. If the conditions change, then the wavelength will change. I'm far from an expert on physics, but I'm pretty sure that the wavelength that reaches your eye when you perceive an object is the actual wavelength reflected from the object in the environment. Do you mean that the wavelength you actually perceive is not the same as the wavelength that reaches your eye? But people don't perceive wavelengths.. They perceive the effects of wavelengths on their sensory apparatuses.

  11. There is a different problem in that context, and that is that some Objectivists treat Ayn rand as prophet - they quote her words without really understanding them , and live by them exactly as Jewish orthodox man would live by the word of Moses. [...] treating every sentence she ever uttered as God-given.

    I disagree with your claim that there are Objectivists who do this. What you're describing is philosophical "rationalism," and since Objectivism explicitly rejects rationalism, someone who does this would not be an Objectivist, strictly speaking.

  12. Not exactly, because Objectivism is not technically a description of man's relationship to the universe.

    Although that's not the totality of what Objectivism is, I would say it's fair to claim that Objectivism contains a description of man's relationship to the universe.. The "relationship" being found in epistemology (study of knowledge, which is gained from perceiving the universe) and ethics (codes of behavior, which is, in a certain sense, man's effects on the universe), and "the universe" and "man" being found in metaphysics (the study of the fundamental nature of the universe, "man" being part of the universe under consideration).

  13. I had always used "faith" as a synonym for "trust." That, I think is the root of my problem.

    I think this is largely an issue of context. There are some contexts in which it would be entirely appropriate to use "faith" as pretty much synonymous with "trust." For example, people often say, "I've got faith in you," to someone, when what they really mean is, "You've earned my trust," or something to that effect.

    But faith in the religious context usually means trusting someone else's judgment above your own. The classic example is the story of Abraham choosing to sacrifice his son Isaac on the alter (Genesis 22). In this myth, all of Abraham's reason and desires tell him not to sacrifice his son, but he chooses to do so anyway, (as it is normally interpreted) because of his faith in the superiority of God's commands over his own mind. This is the sort of context in which religious people will often say, "I don't know it, but I have faith." Which is different from trust, because if you trust someone, it should be because you know that they are trustworthy, not because you simply choose to believe it.

    Also, I can't think of where I saw it, but I seem to remember a definition of religion that read something like this: "Religion is how a man describes his relationship to the universe." If that definition were the accepted one, then could Objectivism be considered a religion?

    Again, there could be contexts in which it would be appropriate to use the term "religion" in this sense. For example, someone might say of a great professional athlete, "Sports are his religion." This simply means that his fundamental orientation to life and the universe is centered around his passion for sports.

    But in most contexts, "religion" is meant to be a particular type philosophical approach, which relies on mysticism, dogma, and faith. Defining it as "how a man describes his relationship to the universe" would be too broad, because then how would one distinguish religion from philosophy, or from "central purpose," (as in career) etc.

    Not to mention, most religions denounce "This World," or "the material realm," so depending on how you define "the universe," (i.e., if you mean the physical universe) many religions might be seen to denounce any proper relationship between it and men altogether.

  14. So would a true Objectivist not have any religion?

    Strictly speaking, that's right. But, Ayn Rand did sometimes use religious terminology figuratively to stand for things she believed in.

    One example is from a very interesting and inspiring letter that she wrote to an actor named Colin Clive, in 1934. If you ever get a chance to look at Letters of Ayn Rand, I suggest you read the whole thing sometime, because it's one of my favorites and it seems like you'd be interested. But here's an excerpt:

    You see, I am an atheist and I have only one religion: the sublime in human nature. There is nothing to approach the sanctity of the highest type of man possible and there is nothing that gives me the same reverent feeling, the feeling when one's spirit wants to kneel, bareheaded. Do not call it hero-worship, because it is more than that. It is a kind of strange and improbable white heat where admiration becomes religion, and religion becomes philosophy, and philosophy—the whole of one's life.

    She uses similar language in certain places in The Fountainhead. Here is an interesting excerpt from the introduction that Ayn Rand wrote to the 25th Anniversary Edition of The Fountainhead in 1968 in which she elaborates on her approach:

    [A] possibly misleading sentence is in Roark's speech: "From this simplest necessity to the highest religious abstraction, from the wheel to the skyscraper, everything we are and everything we have comes from a single attribute of man—the function of his reasoning mind."

    This could be misinterpreted to mean an endorsement of religion or religious ideas. I remember hesitating over that sentence, when I wrote it, and deciding that Roark's and my atheism, as well as the overall spirit of the book, were so clearly established that no one would misunderstand it, particularly since I said that religious abstractions are the product of man's mind, not of supernatural revelation.

    But an issue of this sort should not be left to implications. What I was referring to was not religion as such, but a special category of abstractions, the most exalted one, which, for centuries, had been the near-monopoly of religion: ethics—not the particular content of religious ethics, but the abstraction "ethics," the realm of values, man's code of good and evil, with the emotional connotations of height, uplift, nobility, reverence, grandeur, which pertain to the realm of man's values, but which religion has arrogated to itself.

    The same meaning and considerations were intended and are applicable to another passage of the book, a brief dialogue between Roark and Hopton Stoddard, which may be misunderstood if taken out of context:

    " 'You're a profoundly religious man, Mr. Roark—in your own way. I can see that in your buildings.'

    " 'That's true,' said Roark."

    In the context of that scene, however, the meaning is clear: it is Roark's profound dedication to values, to the highest and best, to the ideal, that Stoddard is referring to (see his explanation of the nature of the proposed temple). The erection of the Stoddard Temple and the subsequent trial state the issue explicitly.

    She goes on to discuss religion, ethics, language, and her reasons for using words like "exaltation," "worship," "reverence," and "sacred" in a non-religious sense. It's a very interesting introduction that makes some important philosophical points, so I'd recommend that, too, for anyone interested in this topic.

    [edited to change "metaphorically" to "figuratively" in the second sentence.]

  15. Issue could be made with your definition of "religion", but even running with it, Objectivism is a belief system and not a system of social coherence. While people may identify with it and so identify with others who share the beliefs, people may also cohere over a belief that marshmallow fluff is the tastiest confection man has ever produced and yet fluffionites who identify with each other's beliefs do not constitute a religion.

    Mmmm, tasty communion. :worry:

    So my question is, could Objectivism be used as a Religion, teaching faith in oneself?

    The exact definition of faith is "belief in the absence of, or in contradiction to the evidence of the senses." So what Objectivism advocates is not faith in oneself, taken literally, but rather genuine self-esteem, which depends on reason and the evidence of a good reputation one has developed with oneself.

    Ayn Rand uses the term "religion" to mean "the primitive form of philosophy" (she discusses this in the first chapter of The Romantic Manifesto, and in other places). That means an early attempt for man to explain existence, but always with elements of mysticism, faith, and arbitrary dogmas.

    Any benefits that could be had from religion can be found in a more consistent and potent form in a rational philosophy. There are a few benefits to traditional religion.. Such as social interaction with like minded individuals. But there's no reason that can't be found in Objectivist clubs and organizations, and in fact, in my experience the quality of such groups is far superior to any church gatherings I've ever encountered.

    [Edit: and even that is not an essential element of "religion" as such, but merely a cultural consequence of the longstanding dominance and popularity of religious beliefs.]

  16. It sounds like you're saying, in essence, "This is what happens to people with such a philosophy." As if Atlas Shrugged proves a point.

    But Atlas Shrugged does prove points. To the extent that a story identifies true principles, it demonstrates valid points. If someone said to a person who was being wasteful with his finances and not saving any money for potential emergencies, "Aesop's grasshopper thought he could be extravagant all summer and not put anything away like the ants, and look where it got him," would you give him the same criticism? Sure, it's just an analogy. But do examples of moral principles have to abide in real life situations? Are fables and fiction invalid means of presenting principles, in general, or are you suggesting that Atlas Shrugged is specifically deficient in this respect?

    Sorry if that's off topic.

    Welcome to the forum, deviahah.

  17. But what was Ayn Rands ultimate goal in her life?

    I don't know that..

    The motive of my writing is the portrayal of an ideal man. The portrayal of a moral ideal, as my ultimate literary goal, as an end in itself -- ...

    Since my purpose is the presentation of an ideal man, I had to define and present the conditions which make him possible and which his existence requires.

    She says in this article what her ultimate literary goal is, but I'm not sure what her "ultimate goal in life" was.

    Atlas Shrugged was a remarkable achievement, but I don't think it would have had nearly the same impact as it has and will have, if not for the indispensable non-fiction works she produced afterwards. Also, I think she could have produced something even greater than Atlas with To Lorne Dieterling, but unfortunately she never wrote it.

    Still, I think I understand your sentiment.. After someone produces something like Atlas Shrugged, how do they ever top that? Well.. I would think the same thing about someone who had written The Fountainhead, which she did top. And, philosophically (though not literarily), I think she topped AS with ITOE, which was not a minor embellishment for her philosophy, but the rational foundation necessary to make her philosophy possible, in opposition to the philosophical trends of centuries. It seems to me (based on the biographical material I've seen) that Ayn Rand was an individual who fought to improve herself and achieve new remarkable things to the very end.. Although she was perhaps a little depressed after Frank O'Connor passed away.

  18. I think AS was her most productive achievement- it took her 10 long, grueling years to complete. But with ITOE, I think she could write this book with a lot less effort because she had her philosophy so well defined in her head already, it was just a matter of putting the words down on paper. Even though ITOE may be a more significant accomplishment, I think AS required the most thought and effort.

    That might be true.. But could either Atlas Shrugged or ITOE or anything that Ayn Rand wrote have been produced without the lifetime of productive achievement she had achieved prior to writing them? (In which case, you might judge each consecutive project she undertook as the more "difficult" accomplishment).

  19. Perhaps running would help you? At least that may have some unrelated positives.

    My first thought was that some type of exercise would probably help you (although I'm not the most athletic person around, so I don't know too much about what types, etc). My hypothesis is that maybe your problem isn't just a low threshold for pain, but a lack of endurance in general.

    (Which can be improved through exercise, but you'd probably want to meet with a personal trainer, or maybe a coach at your school about what type would be good for you).

  20. How is it that some people, e.g. Kendall, manage to "see the light" so to speak of Objectivism while most seem completely unable, even when presented with a logical argument that they admit they cannot refute?

    I think it might be an issue of honesty, in a lot of cases. When I was a Christian, one thing that really bothered me was that, even though most people around me claimed also to be Christians, and really believed in a lot of the Christian philosophy, very few of them really seemed to take it seriously and try to apply it consistently to their lives. I tried very hard to apply it consistently, and the result was, of course, disaster for my life. I expect anyone who is consistent on a religious philosophy will have a similar experience, and anyone who is honest will notice a causal relationship between the two. After that point, the ones who choose to damn reality and keep their religion are the ones who hate life, and the ones who choose to reject the religion and keep reality are the ones who want to live. But most people are perfectly content to hold religious convictions (or other mistaken premises) as an abstract concept detached from most of their day to day lives and decisions.

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