Danneskjöld

Same pattern, same answer. If I were a few hundred miles away in a spaceship, then Pluto could be seen with the naked eye. If and to the extent this is the case, then you could call it a primary entity. [edited for spelling]

b11 and b12 are combined in one line: b1) entities in an extended sense.... Crux is to specify these entities further, so what distinction do you propose? By the way, check Ayn Rands defintion of metaphysical (Ayn Rand lexicon): It pertains to reality, that atoms are part of primary entites and that primary entities are part of other entities. That IS metaphysical.

I assume you do not object to the categories as such, but just to my defintion of the specific name of the categories? How would you define then the two different categories of entities in an extendet sense? I did call them "lower" and "higher" level entities in comparison with the direct human perception level. So solarsystem is an entity more complex than a chair (as chair is only part of solarsystem). Analog is a atom less complex than a chair (as a chair is composed of atoms). Edit: So the metaphysical hierarchy is there anyway, why not introduce it in the categorical system?

It does not matter what to fill a IF-THEN sentence with, be it an impossible or a possible hypothetical. Point is, it IS hypothetical. So right now human beings cannot perceive molecules directly. So molecules are not classified as primary entities, but as entities in an extended sense. That does not imply, that it is not possible, that in future human beings will be able to perceive them directly. If and to the extend this will be the case, then molecules will be classified as primary entities.

Where to find?

By definition any primary entity is directly perceivable by human beings. According to the Law of Identity a human being cannot perceive molecules directly. Check what Leonard Peikoff wrote about this topic: If you had genetically modified microscope eyes, you could perceive molecules directly without the help of a machine. So what? If god existed, I would burn in hell forever. So what? I repeat: By definition any primary entity is directly perceivable by human beings. According to the Law of Identity a human being cannot perceive molecules directly.

a) primary existents a1) living entities a11) human beings a12) non-human beings a2) non-living entities a22) metaphysically given entities a23) non-metaphysically given entities non-primary existents b1) entities in a “extended sense” b11) lower-level entities b12) higher-level entities b2) non-entity existents b21) metaphysically given non-entities b22) non-metaphysically given non-entities Any objections to or further thoughts on that? [edit: insert of b21) and b22)]

"They differ in the attribute of being directly perceivable by humans or not, i.e. primary or not. All primary existents are entities “in a primary sense”, i.e. they are things perceivable by humans." So you want to take out the second sentence out of its context and analyze it without context? Isn't that something, Objectivists condemn? In the first sentence I make clear that it is all about direct perception. If you need to have it statet in the very next sentence again, I will do so the next time. Who said, that an input of all senses is required? It is not even statet implicitly anywhere. The definition says only, that primary existents can only be directly perceived by sight and/or touch. The other senses can perceive only non-primary existents. Nothing more, nothing less. And why do you think Peikoff used the word point to instead of waving to? You cannot point to something by waving. If I am mistaken, please show me a dictionary which does say so. I fully agree. Finally your "microscope theory": To be a primary existent (i.e. a primary entity) it must be directly perceivable by human beings. According to the Law of Identity human beings cannot perceive molecules directly. As all of you stated they do need a microscope (or whatever) to perceive them by sight. Perceiving an existent by seeing does not make it automatically a primary existent. You can see the smoke of your cigarette, but as it is not self-sufficient it is not a primary existent. According to Peikoff it is not even an entity at all.

Very well said. By which categories would you start instead of the ones I proposed, to extinct the possible confusion? I had in mind to start with a) primary entities non-primary existents instead of defining primary existents as primary entities which must be defined. But in this case you need to define primary entities and postualte, that a primary entity is a primary existent. Or else these two categories do not imply that all existents are included. You cannot leave room for uncertainty, everything must be covered. Or else you cannot rely on your conclusions completely, as there is a doubt you cannot prove nor disprove. Another solution would be to start with: a) primary entities entities in an extended sense c) non-entites But I like to keep it as simple as possible, so I preferred to use alwas the same 2-category-pattern a) A non-A and using always a (implicit) definition of A. So I would in a next step categorize primary existents (i.e. primary entities) into a) living and non-living entities, even though I could as well choose to distinct three categories from each other (e.g. human beings, non-human living entities, non-living entities). I would like to clarify a question, which is related to another post. Exactly. And they are extended in both directions, i.e. too big or too small for direct perception. Why not calling these different non-primary entities higher-level or lower-level entities? At least that would be my choice of the next two categories in the entities in a extended sense-category. Which distinction would you choose next?

Please do read carefully before answering. Molecules and Universe are not directly perceivable by humans. Where the hell can you see and touch molecules directly? How can you possibly point to universe (i.e. point to everything with only 10 fingers...) All the existents you are asking about in the second paragraph are not entities, therefore they belong to the category non-entity existents (in case you are referring by "Santa Clause" to the concept itself, as "Santa Clause" is no existent aside from the concept) Yes, in case you want to categorize non-entity existents further. [edited for spelling]

Stupid questions. Yes, I am correct and no, there are no other existents.

In a different post I realized, that I did not really understand the distincion between entity and existent. I have made some thoughts and would like to have my conclusions checked before applying them to further thoughts. The qoutes are from the Ayn Rand Lexicon: An existent is something. That implies, that it exists. It can be anything, but must be something. Existents can be divided in two main categories a) primary existents non-primary existents They differ in the attribute of being directly perceivable by humans or not, i.e. primary or not. All primary existents are entities “in a primary sense”, i.e. they are things perceivable by humans. Non-primary existents again can be divided in two main categories a) entities in a “extended sense” non-entity existents They differ in the attribute of being self-sufficient or not. So entities in a “extended sense” include molecules and universe, non-entity existents include actions and attributes. Am I correct so far in my definitions? Are there existents and/or entities, which are not covered? Thx

Actually, I have not read ITOE yet, but as "investigating" in this subject, I have ordered it yesterday. I realized, that I really do have problems with the definitions and have to do some more of defining the words (especially english being a foreign language). Nevertheless, you are right, I should take the question as it is and not thinking of possible ways of different answering than the obvious. To finish off this part of the conversation: do you really put metaphysically existing entities all on the same level? Don't you see, that there is a different level considering "concepts" AND "matter"? ARL:"An entity is perceptual in scale, in size. In other words it is a “this” which you can point to and grasp by human perception. In an extended sense you can call molecules—or the universe as a whole—“entities,” because they are self-sufficient things. But in the primary sense when we say that entities are what is given in sense perception, we mean solid things which we can directly perceive." As I see it, you regard an entity only in the primary sense. But that does not change the fact, that the entity in the primary sense does consist of entities in a "secondary sense" (lower-level entities) and is part of an entity in a "secondary sense" (higher-level entity). Anyway, in the next days I will concentrate on the initial thoughts of this post, as there still is a lot to clarify.

First, getting to the question about existents. As I said in the post, where I tried to defend my position: So I have. I would not anymore answer to the question, if there exists only one really complex existent, with a general "yes". I would want you to clarify your question first. And this on the grounds of my thoughts on levels: By saying of levels, "[they are] a concept of consciousness", you agree, that there are different-leveled concepts. So is the concept of marriage a higher-level concept than the requiring concepts of man and woman, i.e. marriage consits of man and woman, but man and woman do not consit of marriage. (I do omit here homosexual marriages, as it would not change the argument, but make more complex). Regarding the context, by saying of levels, "[they are] not a concept of existence", I assume you meant, that they are not applicable to existents. But by definition, any existent is a concept, therefore there exist different levels of existents. ARL: "The building-block of man’s knowledge is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action. Since it is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage." Applying the levels to existents: So solarsystems consist of planets, while planets do not consist of solarsystems. Therefore solarsystem is a higher-level existent than planets. Galaxies consist of solarsystems, but solarsystems do not consist of galaxies. Therefore galaxy is a higher-level existent than solarsystem. The highest-level existent possible is universe. There neither exists an existent besides it nor above it. It is the only existent on its level. Therefore I would want you to clarify your question. If you are asking, whether there exists only one existent or more in gerenal, the answer obviously would be more. But if you are asking, if there exists an existent, which allows no other existents except the ones, which are part of itself, i.e. which is the only one on its level, than the answer is yes, that is universe. [Edited for spelling]

I never said A is not A. That is a contradicion in terms and I try to think and write accordingly. In fact my argumentation says basically: An object, that is, is different to what it was. The statement does not seem to be obvious though. And regarding my initial post, the statement is not hidden under other random points. It is statet clearly and simply.

No, you misunderstand me. I do not believe "that the properties of other entities is a part of the identity of the instant entity" generally. Only if (as in this case) the "other entity" is itself a part of "the instant entity" an therefore by changing "the other entity", "the instant entity" is changing with it. So your analogy of chair/electron interaction and you/me interaction is simply arbitrary. How can it not be reconciled with Objectivist metaphysics or epistemology, when it is derived from definitions, which are based on reality? By definition universe is an existent. (Ayn Rand Lexicon: "The building-block of man’s knowledge is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action. Since it is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. " By definition, the concept universe includes all other existents and entities. (Ayn Rand Lexicon: "The universe is the total of that which exists") So how many existents exist apart from "universe" which are not already included? None. Therefore if you are asking me, if there exists only one really complex existent, my answer is yes, the only one really complex existent is universe. You can brake this existent apart to its components (i.e. entities and existents) but that does not change the fact, that nothing else exists on the same level. This last part is not thought completely through yet. I will have to think about this one some more. Nevertheless, you do not see where to start contradicting me with reasonable logic? Just start anywhere, and I will adapt my thinking, if you are right. No, as said, this existent can be broken down into other existents and entities, but no "same-level existent" can exist, and is therefore the only one. It can be broken down to one entity A and the rest being non-A.

I have to split this post, because I will have to make further thoughts. But for the time being: David Odden is right insofar, that I mixed the concepts of entity and existent, i.e. I set them as equals in the quotation of myself above. According to the Ayn Rand Lexicon: Existent: [...] is the concept of an “existent”—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action. Since it is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. Entity: To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of non-existence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. So I agree and correct myself, that universe is not an entity. Nevertheless, Marc K. is claiming, that universe is not an existent, even though it fullfills the requirements by definition. [Edit: I am not sure, whether universe cannot be counted as an entity considering this definition. I will have to think it through]

I do not (never have) disagreed with the Law of Identity. But I am getting too specific? How do you want to analyze anything, if not getting specific and check it in any way possible to you? How should I check a fundamental universal such as A is A, if not by getting very specific and apply it to one object? But considering your post, I conclude that you agree with my initial conclusions then?

You are claiming: "No the unit nature of "universe" [...] is breakable into its individual components. Metaphysically there are only a multiplicity of individual entities." You seperate the individual components from universe and reach the conclusion, that universe is not an existent, but its components are. The same argumentation works for a chair. Seperate the individual components from the chair, so you reach with this argumentation the conclusion, that the chair is not an existent, but its atoms are. That is my question: why do you handle the concepts universe and chair differently?

Then tell me one existent, that is not the sum of its parts and therefore an existent according to your definition. A chair is the sum of all the atoms it is composed of, an atom is the sum of all particles it is composed of, the particles are the sum of whatever they exist of. So is univeres the sum of all it exists of. How can you draw the conclusion, that universe cannot be regarded as an entity, i.e. as an existent? And anyway, this is driving away from the originally intended subject of the post. If you want to use this argument, show me how it is related to my thinking, that A is now and only now A.

So where do you draw the line between "being breakable into its components" and therefore metaphysically inexistent and the metaphysically existent? Are you claiming, a chair is not an enxisting entity, because you can brake it into its components (i.e. atoms)?

What exactly is the problem? Is universe not defined as "everything that exists"? If so, than metaphysically universe is "only one really complex existent" (as worded by DavidOdden), existing of "individual existents" (as worded by Plamatic). I do not see any contradiction. A chair is "one really complex existent", even though it is built of "individual existents" (i.e. atoms).

Of course an object's identity never changes. A is always A at a specific time. What I am saying is that the object itself changes and is therefore not the same A in the same respect as before. In terms of variables: A(1): chair with the one electron on the north side of atom x A: same chair with the one electron on the west side of atom x, after a time t According to The Law of Identity: A(1) was A(1) and A is A. But A was not and is not A(1).

What are you talking about and how is this related to my posts?

First of all, the fact that you are wearing tan shorts is never part of my identity. You mixed subjects in your statement. Where is my misunderstanding of Identity? Why is the differernt position of an electron irrelevant to an object's Identity? How can something with a certain arrangement be the same as something with a different arrangement? Yes, I do start by the metaphysical premise, that there is only one really complex existent: it is what we sum up under the concept of universe. What is wrong with that? I am not talking about higher-level concepts with integrated concretes such as chairs in general. So a discussion about losing the property of "chairness" is irrelevant. I am talking about a concrete entity. As the universal "A is A" is based on the integration of concretes and must be by definition applicable to all concretes, it is legitimate to apply it to the proposed chair. I am not arguing, that after the changing position of the electron it is not a chair anymore. And electrons moving around atoms according to their identity does not change the fact, that the arrangement of particles in the entity itself is not the same anymore and therefore the entity cannot be called to be exactly the same.