Vik
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Posts posted by Vik
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The question before us is what underlies our attainment of the concept, "knowledge." Like all concepts, what underlies "knowledge" is something more primitive than that concept. You appear to be objecting to my searching for the most basic grasp of "knowledge" we can identify.
-- Mindy
What I meant by "prerequisite" was that humans mentally do certain things before they form a concept of "knowledge".
I'm not asking for an evolutionary perspective on the cognitive machinery that gives us knowledge.
Insofar as that is concerned, I submit the possibility that cats can form abstractions about perceptual concretes. But many facts indicate they can't abstract from first-level abstractions.
The fact that cats have more difficulty with televisions than mirrors is one of them.
And you DID bring up a "difficulty" concerning humans:
"Remember the old confusion of Phosphorus and Vesperus? The morning star and the evening star? "
It takes quite a bit to grasp that two bright things in the sky are actually the same object. The ability to do the kind of work that astronomy and mathematics demands involves far more cognitive machinery than it takes to grasp that a reflection in the mirror is oneself.
As for animals opening increasingly complicated latches, it's possible that animals can abstract from perceptual-concretes. I still have yet to see evidence that they can abstract from abstractions. The token-hoarding gorillas come close.
I don't deny that cats and humans share some similarities. But if your goal is to find something more primitive than what we can do, you should distinguish it from what we can do. That was why I kept emphasizing levels of abstraction. That could be part of the continuum you're looking for.
BTW, I didn't mean "truth". I meant something more advanced than "perceptual observation" but less advanced than "proven". I'm still not sure what the right word is. For now, replace with "fact".
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If all you had was perception, if you couldn't integrate any of it, if you had no ability to do logic, then you would have no need to validate anything because you would be a cat.
Perceptual concretes are knowledge, they are the basis of all knowledge. Chapter 6 of Kelley's "The Evidence of the Senses" covers the two contending theories of the justification of knowledge, foundationalism and coherentism.
Perception provides the *material* for knowledge, but you should be very careful what you call "knowledge".
You wouldn't call the verdict of your inner ear knowledge of the direction of gravity.
You have to integrate what you inner ear is telling you with other observations before you can determine your orientation with respect to gravity.
Perception provides nonpropositional, non-inferential basic knowledge. Denying percepts are knowledge cuts off any possibility of justifying knowledge by tying it to reality.
Knowledge as an abstraction refers to units, those units include in their most elementary form the percepts delivered by the senses. Cats do not have the facility of abstraction to possess the concept of knowledge, but they have the referents of that concept.
The fact that knowledge can be reached through perceptual observation does NOT mean that undigested percepts qualify as knowledge.
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Remember the old confusion of Phosphorus and Vesperus? The morning star and the evening star? They "appeared" to be different stars, though they weren't. Penetrating appearances is not a given, it involves a discovery. It is not some level of cognition. Science is full of discoveries of the sort.
Equivocation on "appearance". We were discussing the difference between a projection and reality, NOT whether two observations happen to correspond to the same object.
Those are VERY different acts of cognition.
But moving on.
Discovery of general truths requires a level of cognition capable of identifying general truths.
Discovery of particular truths requires only a level of cognition capable of identifying particular truths.
I do not deny that cats can grasp particular truths about mirrors.
But telling me that humans have difficulty with even higher levels of abstraction doesn't make my point about lower level abstraction irrelevant.
So the fact that cats do not realize TV is TV is irrelevant.
Cats have far more difficulty with televisions than mirrors.
Humans have little difficulty with either.
There's a major, highly relevant difference there.
(As far as I know, cats do know TV is illusion, but, like so many of us, they can interact entertainingly with that illusion.)
If they do, they forget far more often than console gamers do.
And you need to rule out alternate explanations for NOT attacking a television, such as the possibility that cats think there's an inaccessible animal behind an impenetrable shield.
The fact of the matter is that I don't bat at a television screen. That's a *qualitative* behavioral difference, not a quantitative one involving levels of knowledge. There's a *qualitative* difference between cat cognition and human cognition, one that cannot be explained by any amount of gradation of "discovery".
I don't doubt that cats can discover particular facts about particular objects such as mirrors and televisions.
I even grant that they can (eventually) distinguish between mirrors and reality.
But it would take an enormous amount of evidence to convince me that they can go beyond that and grasp the idea of "illusion" as such and apply it to EVERY type that we do.
Now, your claim that to realize something is an appearance requires that "...they are capable of isolating the characteristics of appearance as such," confuses the phenenomen with its conceptualization, and inverts the process of conceptualization. First comes experience, then concepts pertaining to it.
What I claimed was that
- grasping appearance as such requires a HIGHER-LEVEL abstraction
- evidence of grasping LOWER-LEVEL types of appearances, such as mirrors, does not in itself qualify as grasping appearance as such, particularly when we have evidence that ca
Animals, some, at least, and infants operate with a notion of "see," and "hear," etc. if you want to understand how we come to understand knowledge per se, I think you need to embrace that evidence.
Which animals and what evidence?
As for infants, it's debatable.
"[A]cquiring knowledge means learning about the characteristics, properties, potentials, etc. of things." Isn't seeing acquiring knowledge? What are concepts, propositions, and reasoning, independent of their sensory roots?
I do not deny that perception is required before you can have concepts, propositions, and knowledge of anything.
But I deny that perception alone will give you knowledge.
If all you had was perception, if you couldn't integrate any of it, if you had no ability to do logic, if you couldn't validate any of it, you'd have a loosely associated pile of perceptual concretes.
Would you call THAT "knowledge"?
- grasping appearance as such requires a HIGHER-LEVEL abstraction
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I only aimed at giving the "skeleton".
It's an excellent one. Thank you very much.
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I realize that, ideally, one would choose his career based solely on what he wants to do. But suppose you're in a compromised situation, such as miserable long-term economic outlook like the one we are currently facing, and your ideal career choice is a risky or bad bet in terms of the job outlook. Should you go with your first choice, or pick something else which offers a better chance of getting a job?
EDIT: Just to connect this scenario to the actual situation, suppose that your first choice isn't necessarily the love of your life, but is just the best thing you've found so far.
Several considerations are worth mentioning:
It takes time to develop proficiency in any field. If you've already made some steps in that direction, and you still think it's possible, by all means consider trying to take another one.
Be very careful with the criterion of "what you want to do". Anything you might want to do is a concrete action. What is the more abstract purpose? What other roads might head in that direction? Don't settle for just one road. Have a backup road. At the very least, develop the ability to identify multiple, alternative paths towards achieving your values.
If you have to switch tracks, make use of what you already know and build on what you already have.
If you're afraid of risk but can't quantify it, that just means you haven't researched the work sufficiently. Risk can be measured. Learn from others on similar tracks. And learn from errors. Try to figure out what they could have done differently to succeed. Remind yourself that failure presupposes the existence of an alternative course of action, if only you find the right one.
Most importantly, don't let the outcome be your only source of happiness. Then you'll feel like you're working joylessly in the hope of something that always seems just out of reach. And the day you get the specific outcome you desire, you might find that the single, brief moment of happiness you get wasn't worth it.
Draw happiness from the fact that you are choosing to pursue your values, whatever form that pursuit might take.
The goal is happiness. Productive work is the means.
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I didn't say TV programs, I said mirrors. It matters.
An animal will make all kinds of different adjustments to be able to see or hear something they have detected. They make the adjustments the situation requires, and the specific behavior involved varies greatly. The goal of this behavior is seeing or hearing. They act to be able to see, etc. Seeing is the goal of that, instrumental behavior. Isn't it true, then that they have some primitive grasp of what it is to see, versus not being able to see, something they have detected? I think so.
And, as we share that animal level of organization, our well-defined concept of knowledge is likely to have its roots in that very primitive grasp. That's why I mentioned the behavior of infants who would not be considered conceptual.
Are you comfortable dismissing such behavior entirely?
-- Mindy
I know what you said.
My point is that if cats can't generalize about the television, they have NOT learned the difference between an appearance and a physical presence.
The mirror example tells us that they can distinguish an appearance *in a mirror* from physical reality. But it doesn't prove that they are capable of isolating the characteristics of appearance as such. And acquiring knowledge means learning about the characteristics, properties, potentials, etc. of things. So while cats certainly have some sort of "primitive grasp", what they have "learned" doesn't qualify as knowledge. It's something more basic.
The way I see it, primate evolution took a radically different turn with cognition than feline evolution. Gorillas and chimpanzees will happily watch television. Only a cat will bat at it.
The cat cases reinforce the idea that we need to clearly distinguish *our* kind of cognition from the other, dare I say more primitive, types of animal cognition.
The fact that cats can grasp one subcategory of appearance *but not another* is very interesting. It suggests that they can abstract from perceptual concretes under certain circumstances, but they cannot abstract from abstractions. Perhaps they cannot grasp "appearance" as such. Perhaps they can grasp differences *only* when virtually everything else is the same but not when multiple things are different.
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How to reduce the concept of "knowledge"? To know what facts give rise to this concept I must know what knowledge is. Ayn Rand defines knowledge as: "a mental grasp of fact(s) of reality, reached by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation".
So what do we have to know to form the concept of knowledge? We have to know the difference between the two types of awareness of reality, namely perceptual and conceptual. We have to know of the process of reasoning. We have to know the concept of consciousness and reality.
Are we at the perceptual level? Yes, more or less: all these concepts are either axiomatic, and thus perceptual, or very close.
The distinction between perceptual and conceptual is not axiomatic, but once you have formed some concepts then you can introspectively observe the differences between your abstract ideas and your concrete percepts. (Plato discovered many such differences through introspective observations, e.g., concepts are general but percepts are particular, concepts are eternal but perceptual concretes can go out of existence, etc.) We can also form the concept of reasoning or thinking introspectively by observing what we are doing when we form concepts, generalize, make judgments, integrate, etc and contrast that to other mental actions, such as when we experience emotions or when we are trying to remember something.
Reality or existence is an axiomatic concept. So is consciousness. It is therefore not necessary to reduce them. To _validate_ them only requires direct observation; that you open your eyes and look at reality. So this is were we begin.
That forms the basic skeleton of the reduction of the concept of "knowledge" to the perceptual level, yes.
It should be fleshed out with instances of each concept. Definitions should be adjusted when necessary.
My fear is that if a careless reader focuses on definitions and ignores the necessity of examining instances, they'll end up as another victim of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy.
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Your instances of fragile and those of not-fragile each include mugs, glass, and concrete. Those groupings do not pick out fragility, but "having broken," and "not having broken." But the concept, "fragility" is not a synonym for "broken." Not everything that breaks is therefore fragile!
Your instances should have reflected breaking under given circumstances, versus not breaking under the SAME circumstances. That is the difference "fragility" picks out.
-- Mindy
They weren't supposed to.
Fragility is a potential for action, namely the action of fracture.
My point is that you need to differentiate before you can integrate.
The step you mention was implied, but I should have been explicit. You are correct in bringing it up.
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Again, I don't think the deductive mode is going to pay off.
Consider the behavior of a kitten who encounters a mirror for the first time. He bats and paws at his image, treating it as he would another kitten. But he just touches a flat glass. After a while, he quits reacting to his own image at all, and (usually) never does again. It seems as if he has learned that certain appearances of cats are not knowledge of the presence of a cat.
I'm not proposing that the kitten does arrive at such knowledge. My point is that experiences that simple provide data to support a first notion of knowing. I would also claim that actions of animals and infants in trying to see or otherwise perceive something amounts to a primitive notion of knowledge.
BTW - I'm talking about *reducing* a concept to less abstract concepts and perceptual concrete referents. I'm not suggesting you deduce "knowledge" from first principles. That's rationalism, not Objectivism.
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Again, I don't think the deductive mode is going to pay off.
Consider the behavior of a kitten who encounters a mirror for the first time. He bats and paws at his image, treating it as he would another kitten. But he just touches a flat glass. After a while, he quits reacting to his own image at all, and (usually) never does again. It seems as if he has learned that certain appearances of cats are not knowledge of the presence of a cat.
I'm not proposing that the kitten does arrive at such knowledge. My point is that experiences that simple provide data to support a first notion of knowing. I would also claim that actions of animals and infants in trying to see or otherwise perceive something amounts to a primitive notion of knowledge.
I've seen adult cats continually leap at the television screen, figure it out, and then leap at it again when a different program is on. They do NOT generalize. At best, the mighty television-hunters have knowledge of *particular facts*.
If there are cats that are able to omit the particular program AND the particular television screen, that would prove they can abstract from particulars but that does NOT prove they can abstract from abstractions. Saying that cats learn is a far cry from saying they have a "notion" of knowledge.
Most importantly, humans grasp the difference between reality and projection around the same time: 2 years.
Cats, if they ever grasp the difference, figure it out in adulthood across a wide variety of ages.
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Yes, I think that is correct, though I would say "from which.... can be deduced", because that avoids the (incorrect) implication of "used to deduce". That is not why we have explanations. They are used to predict other instances, and amount to systematizing the measurements omitted.
Three aspects need to be differentiated:
An explanatory law is the product of a process of generalization. Its open-ended character anticipates certain kinds of events yet to be observed.
Explanatory laws can be used as source material for providing particular explanations of particular effects.
An explanatory theory is a well-substantiated, well-supported, well-documented explanation for an open-ended set of phenomena. A theory predicts phenomena yet to be observed as well as explains familiar phenomena.. It has wider generality than explanatory laws or particular explanations about particular effects. A theory explains certain descriptive generalizations as well as specific observations.
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What is an explanation--in general? Not merely a scientific one. Any of them.
Here is one attempt:
An explanation is a logical arrangement of propositions used to deduce a set of facts concerning an effect.
(A full treatment of propositions is needed, but that is outside the scope of this thread, namely describing explanation)
What is an effect?
It's the action, event, phenomenon, etc. associated with a set of entities operating under certain conditions in accordance with their respective identities.
So explanation involves showing how a physical interaction, under a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, produces an effect.
Why do we try to deduce facts?
So we can succeed at achieving some purpose. Our success depends on a *correct* explanation.
A correct explanation shows how an effect necessarily follows from the constitutive properties of the entities involved.
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I think this means explanation is essentially a matter of analysis. In explaining the magic trick, you are taking individual motions of the hands, etc., and identifying a second aspect of that motion, how when the magician seemed to flourish the deck, he was tossing it away and getting the hidden deck from his sleeve... (not an actual explanation...) The analysis (in this case) cross-classifies elements or aspects of the thing to be explained.
To explain osmosis, you refer to the operation of diffusion in the presence of a semi-permeable membrane. Diffusion is a known phenomenon of materials, and semi-permeable membranes are known structures of the body. Osmosis, then, explains the toxicity of certain extreme levels of normal substances--salt, for example. Diffusion isn't toxic, and our membranes aren't, and salt is necessary to life. But too little salt and too much salt are both toxic, and both act via osmosis, causing cell death. Diffusion drives both toxic effects. This requires an explanation, the same thing having different effects.
The new classifications are explanatory iff they assimilate the thing to be explained to pre-established rules, laws, or categories.
-- Mindy
Quantitative differences are often used to "explain" qualitative ones. But these merely describe what happens to certain entities at such and such quantities.
The law concerning osmotic pressure *describes* the pressure associated with the number of ions present but it does not tell us *why* the ions "exert" the pressure.
An explanation succeeds in explaining some effect (action, event, phenomenon, etc.) when it shows how the effect necessarily follows from facts concerning how certain entities operate under certain conditions.
For a proper explanation, you need to talk about physical interaction. What we call an "effect" IS entity-action. But also consider the constitutive properties (such as structure) of the entities and the potentials made possible by those properties. After all, your grasp of nature is much more than a loose network of associated quantities.
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No, I'm saying that an explanation that succeeds in explaining anything, or in other words a sufficient explanation, must show how the effect necessarily follows from the cause, or in other words how the cause is sufficient to produce the effect. Neither the mere possession of an idea or being aware of an alternative is sufficient to compel acting on the idea or choosing that alternative. However it is true that one cannot willfully and volitionally act or choose that which is wholly unknown. Thus, being aware of an alternative has the effect of making possible the choice of it while that awareness is not sufficient to compel a choice.
Oh, well it's implied by the nature of sufficiency. If the determinist can't explain free will, he can't objectively say that what we call "choice" is determined. All he can do is say that some causal process is responsible for "compelling choice".
But if *that* process is what we call the act of choosing, it would still remain true that it isn't awareness or external circumstance that "compels" choice.
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The assertion that there is no explanation means that the choice was not necessitated by antecedent ideas,
I think this needs to be clarified.
You aren't saying that lack of evidence for determinism *proves* that we aren't determined.
You're just saying that we have *no objective basis* for believing in determinism due to the way we experience consciousness.
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Out of instances of knowledge, of course. You must mean something I didn't get.
-- Mindy
When I tried that back in 2008, I managed to isolate the following characteristics:
- grounded in observed fact
- arrived at objectively
- discovered through a process of applying logic to facts
- integrated with the rest of one's knowledge without contradiction
- correctly placed within the hierarchy of knowledge
- grounded in observed fact
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As a starting point, I would distinguish knowledge from whatever opposes it, which would be "error" and "ignorance".
Also "justified true belief". There are JTB that aren't knowledge.
"Ignorance", at least in the ordinary sense, describes a consciousness whose nature (at least with respect to the particular matter) has no causal relationship to reality. If in the context of your consciousness a proposition is arbitrary (lacks logical basis for affirmation or denial), then you are ignorant of the proposition's truth or falsity.
This also covers "underdetermined theories", where two theories explain a set of facts equally well and we lack sufficient information for going further. I think Peikoff's concept of "possible" is appropriate here.
"Error" on the other hand describes a consciousness which accepts as true claims which are false (which could be because of an error in logic, or an error at the perceptual level).
Or accepts as false claims which are true.
Do you regard conceptual errors, such as package deal, reification, stolen concept, equivocation, etc., as errors in logic?
So as a first step, "knowledge" describes a proper causal relationship between a proposition and reality -- that is, the consciousness has integrated awareness of facts, and has validated a conclusion by the use of logic, applied to that awareness.
The believers in "justified true belief" call this "justification", but "integration" seems to mean that knowledge isn't a species of belief.
It seems to me that when I integrate, I don't "believe" that something has those aspects. I *know* that it does.
Somewhere we also need to cover the concept of "description" or "describe", in the sense that a proposition is true when it describes reality -- I think that "describe" (or, similarly, "grasp") is the fundamental concept in the transduction from metaphysics to epistemology. At any rate, this is certainly something that needs more careful development.
As in the truth or falsehood of a proposition is determined by consulting the body of knowledge available and performing the necessary mental actions?
Also, what do you mean by "transduction"?
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Are you supposing that the concept of knowledge is not introspective?
--Mindy
Out of what material provided by introspection can you form the concept of knowledge?
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Are you asking what other concepts the concept "knowledge" logically depends on, or are you asking as a matter of individual developmental psychology how a person might come to grasp the concept "knowledge"?
Other concepts that require fewer steps away from the perceptual level and which the concept "knowledge" depend on.
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Two people have suggested that "fragility" refers exclusively to fracture toughness.
What is the word for the concept that is more abstract than fracture toughness and includes special conditions like heat-treatment and embrittlement in its estimate of what the thing can do?
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Grames,
Good catch.
I meant "proposition".
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David,
I am attempting to reduce the concept of knowledge to the perceptual level.
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Mindy,
First, strength has a very specific meaning in materials science and mechanical engineering. Calling hardness, ductility, and so on forms of strength confuses everything.
Second, different materials have different values for fracture toughness. If two parts are made exactly the same way, but out of different materials, one will be more resistant to fracture than another.
Third, two samples of the same material will show a difference in fracture point if one is subjected to special conditions. Embrittlement comes to mind.
Fourth, you've misunderstood me. I'm well aware of the necessity of commensurable characteristics.
I'm not suggesting you compare a mug to a piece of steel. I'm just suggesting you consider a wide variety of materials.
Nor am I suggesting you compare a mug now against the same mug later. That ignores things like material fatigue and crack propagation.
I'm suggesting that you study the constitutive properties behind the phenomenon of fracture, such as chemical structure, properties of grains (if there are any crystals), part design, the presence of initial cracks after creation of the material, etc.
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OK, I get you now. I would suggest, though, that it wasn't "a long chain of reasoning," but, rather, a long process of conceptual development.
We need facts as well as concepts, but you are right to emphasize concepts. Not everyone attaches conceptual thought to "reasoning".
The earliest, most rudimentary form of this is probably the voluntary orientation of sense-organs, which goes very far down the evolutionary scale. Organisms that have the capacity to orient their sense organs put a premium upon doing so. They will interrupt most activities to try to see/hear/smell, etc. something already intimated by sense-perception. The point is that they utilize a form of criterion for "knowing well enough." Such a functional equivalent of a concept of knowledge isn't what you are interested in, I realize. But it is interesting, no?
It suggests how organisms evolved the levels of awareness leading up to concept-formation.
The concept of knowledge is a product of introspection. Obviously one must have a good deal of knowledge before the opportunity to conceptualize it as such arises. So the question becomes, what variety of instances of knowing must be manifest to introspection, in order to support the abstraction of the differentiating characteristics of the concept, "knowledge?" And this leads to the question of where introspection starts, and how it occurs. Which I bring up to impress you with the complicated nature of your question.
When a baby makes efforts to see something, is he introspecting? His behavior is deliberate, and aims at his becoming situated so as to "see," and in that way to know about something. Does not that qualify as a rudimentary concept of knowledge? A full-fledged concept of knowledge is probably not possessed by any but some life-long epistemologists. I do realize you mean the well-read Objectivist's grasp of "knowledge," but I'm pushing for a broad perspective on the issue.
The child has knowledge but not a concept of knowledge as such. That's formed much later.
Both an epistemologist and a layperson understand how knowledge differs from such things as fantasy, error, arbitrary speculation and so on.
The concepts are the same.
What's different is the level of knowledge about the nature of the units.
There are logical restraints on the answer to your question, but they play a minor part in answering it. The development of knowledge is a question of cognitive development, not specifically of logical connections. I think, therefore, that while we could create scenarios for acquiring the concept, "knowledge," they would have to be regarded, at best, as conjectural. I'll take a stab at creating such a scenario, if you're interested.
--Mindy
It isn't conjecture to grasp that a concept of knowledge isn't possible without a concept of entities. Some things are necessarily implied and don't require specialized scientific knowledge to grasp.
However, I would be happy to hear a cognitive science perspective.
Prerequisites for the Concept of Knowledge
in Metaphysics and Epistemology
Posted
The equivalence principle represents higher-level knowledge. If you use it to interpret perceptual information, you're demonstrating that some perceptual observations require higher-level knowledge before they can be used to tell you what you want to know.
I don't deny that you have knowledge of "local down". I'm just hesitant to apply certain words to certain things.
Explanation below.
I would say they qualify as knowledge only when you use them properly. Like you said, the inner ear merely reports on "local down", not the direction of gravity. It would be a mistake to regard the former as knowledge of the latter.
We reach knowledge of certain particular, concrete facts through perceptual observation. That secures all higher-level knowledge to a perceptual base. You don't need to invoke "percept".
More on the distinction below.
Rand's definition of "knowledge" involves "perceptual observation", not "percept".
And
"A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality."
~IOE, 1, pg5
I think it's only fair to her views that we don't treat her words as synonyms unless she explicitly said we could treat certain words as synonyms.
If you want to talk about interpretations, I'd say the use of "perceptual observation" rather than "percept" or "perception" suggests that she believed we did something with percepts before we have "perceptual observation".
I'm not saying my interpretation is correct, but I haven't seen anything to contradict it. Although honestly it's a minor point.
What's important is that we reach knowledge of certain particular, concrete facts through perceptual observation. That secures all higher-level knowledge to a perceptual base, thereby avoiding the Kantian attack.