Jacob86

This is true. That is why I do not hold that *everTHING* has a cause. Only every effect.. You are missing a simple but important part of my conclusion (in the argument) and my position in general. The conclusion of the argument is that this volitional being (God) exists. I do not hold that God is the creator of "all existence". He exists- and He did not create Himself. I don't think any thinking Theist has ever suggested that God created "ALL of existence". The position of Theism is that God exists, and He created everything else which exists. This in no way violates the axiom of existence. Neither does it suggest that He is "outside of existence". Regarding your objection about "volition *alone*"- you are again forgetting the argument and reading into the conclusion false notions of God which you have gathered from the culture or elsewhere. The argument proves that there must be a being which has a nature such that it can *act* of its own accord (volitionally). The argument says nothing about this being *only* volitional. And the argument clearly states that the necessity is for a being which *acts* of its own accord in order for *action* to exist at all. So neither of the objections really holds. I didn't say anything about "existence" or "cause". I used this argument to "suggest" that in order for action to exist, there must be a volitional actor. It is true that this implies that other existents are caused by God and it is true that this implies that God does not require a cause.. but this is only a problem if we suppose that everyTHING must have a cause- and I do not hold to this. This would all be relevant if I were suggesting that this volitional actor were outside of existence (i.e. that He doesn't exist). But I have emphatically not said that. To speak of the necessity of God existing in no way questions/challenges/ or attempts to undercut that existence exists. Existence exists. God is an ("The") existent. He exists. I don't see the problem. Nope. I understand that matter and energy exist. I would have to look further into the exact definitions and distinctions regarding matter and energy in order to answer intelligently on this issue. It seems to me that energy is dependent upon entities such that it can't exist apart from an entity.. As far as I currently know regarding physics, the ideas of "anti-matter" and "potential energy which is not possessed by an entity" in a "vacuum" all sound like irrational science fiction. I don't mean this as a "religious" statement or as "ad hominem". I simply mean that it would not be surprising for non-philosophical geniuses in physics to come up with a philosophically ridiculous (i.e. illogical) theory; they have no proper philosophical foundations. BUT, I admit that I do not have a full enough grasp on their definitions in order to say that this is the case. I will attempt to study the issue if you or anyone else thinks that this (the potential of this theory being true) is a major flaw in my argument.

And this unrelenting desire to know what is true regardless of the topic is commendable. I'm not sure if I fully understand you here, but I think I would say that my definition of "Reality" is anything and everything which ever has or ever will be. Are you suggesting something along the lines of Aristotle's potentiality and actuality? To be honest, it's difficult for me to understand exactly what you are trying to communicate here. Perhaps you could elaborate more specifically?

I appreciate that you seem to have your "philosophical head" on straight in that respect. Do you have any response to my above argument?

I'm not familiar with a "recursive fallacy". Could you explain what you mean by it and how you think I have committed it? (Unless the below is your unpacking of this). You have switched types of "causes" and "action" in this objection. The first type is concerning motion, the second type is concerning motivation. Yes, volition is not uncaused- but it is free from physical cause and effect (i.e. free from determinism). It's cause is motivation or value judgement. And while the "act" of consciousness and judging values is an "action", it is not motion which is the type of action being discussed in the argument. "A thing cannot act but in accordance with its nature" -John Galt. If a thing acts it is either because its nature is such that it acts of its own accord OR its nature is such that it only acts in reaction to other action. To hold out possibility that there could be action at all apart from an entity with a nature sufficient to act on its own is to hold out the possibility that a thing (anything) could act against its nature-- that A could be non-A. There is no exception to the LAW of C&E. You simply misunderstand it. It says that "every effect must have a cause" NOT "every THING must have a cause". Additionally, I have quoted Rand's own popular wording of the Law of Causation which is "a thing can only act in accordance to its nature". I am not saying God is an exception to this. I am saying that to suppose that there is action apart from an entity with a nature sufficient to act on its own is to suppose that there is an exception to this. YOU are making the exception. Not me. I'm no physicist, but this is what I mean when I warn about psycho-epistemologically holding perceptual data above logic: If Stephen Hawking thinks he has found a square circle, he is wrong. An entity cannot act but in accordance to its nature. If an entity in the deep vacuums of space acts as a result of the "potential energy", it will either act as a reaction from the action of something else or it will act of its own accord. I will not abandon the Law of Causality in hopes that in the theoretical "deep vacuums of space" there is something going on with "anti-matter" (whatever that is) and "potential energy" resulting in something like a "wound up spring" which did not get wound up or "a rock held above the ground" with nothing holding it up. If you and Hawking want to fantasize about finding perceptual data which you think violates the laws of logic (and the corollary law of causality), go ahead and continue on your safari for square circles. Just know that holding out hope that contradictions exist is tantamount to waging war against reality...and there are always consequences. Whatever Hawking eventually does find (if anything) regarding this theory- unless and until it is shown that it does not violate the law of causality-- unless and until it is integrated without contradiction- there is no reason to count it as worthy evidence of any sort in a philosophical discussion.

Yes, by "act of it's own accord" I mean volitional action as opposed to a reaction. That is because a REaction is an action resulting from a prior action. You understand me correctly. I am not talking about the "metaphysical reactions" since all of these imply prior action. These metaphysical reactions are all "action", but there would be no action at all (and therefore no metaphysical REactions) if there was not an entity which by nature could act "of its own accord"/"volitionally". I THINK I understand what you're saying here, so I'm going to give an answer...but if my answer misunderstands your objection, let me know. In the second premise (If there is not a "volitional entity" there would be no action), what I mean is that such an entity is a necessary sufficient cause for there to be action such that action is only possible if such an entity exists. Does that make sense? So, yes- in a sense I am saying "IF and ONLY IF there is volitional action, there is action". I think you might be focusing on the fact that there are two types of "action" being considered: The volitional and the non-volitional (reactionary). But the second type of action is entirely dependent upon other outside actions, such that NO reactions could be possible apart from non-reactionary action. So if there is the second type, there must be the first type. If the first type did not exist, the second type (REactions) could not exist. Since the second type do exist, the first type must exist.

I have not had sufficient time to read all the posts in order to know if what I have to say is going to be redundant (covered by someone else already). If my points have already been covered, I apologize. I'm working off of your third objection. It seems there are 3 "possibilities" regarding the existence of an infinite set: Past, Present, and Future. Regarding the past, it is usually referred to as an "infinite regress". A regress is a series going back into the past. An infinite regress is supposed to refer to a series going back into the past forever. A series, though, must have a beginning. An "infinite series" would have no beginning. If a series does not begin, then it does not exist. Therefore an "infinite regress" is a "series which does not exist". To say that an infinite regress exists is to say that a non-existent series exists. It is a contradiction. Regarding the present, it is usually referred to as an "infinite set". But any set which exists in its entirety at a definite moment in time (i.e. the present), must be definite (not infinite). An non-finite set would need to stretch on outside of any definite point in time. Therefore a "present infinite set" is a "definite and non-definite set". It is a contradiction. Regarding the future, I think that this is what is referred to by philosophers as a "potential infinity". That is to say that the set has the potential to continue on forever into the future. This is possible. But there could be no definite moment in time at which the set could be said to be "infinite" for the reasons stated above concerning the "present infinite set".

Ok....I think I understand what you guys are saying though it seems entirely irrelevant. If someone makes up a word that has no referents to reality (i.e a "floating abstraction"), then all one needs to do is ask "to what does this word refer?" If the answer is "nothing" or "I don't know", than no further conversation is needed. If you are asking for my "referent" for the term "God", it is the necessary being. Now, you can doubt that such a necessary being exists on the basis of the fact that you cannot see it-- but the inability to see something is not proof of its non-existence. Likewise, unless I demonstrate that there is a reason to believe that this being exists, then I have no reason to believe it exists either. My shortest and most concise argument for the existence of God is as follows: -"An entity cannot act but in accordance to its nature" -John Galt -If there is not an entity whose nature gives it the ability to act of its own accord, then there is no action. -There is action. -Therefore there is an entity whose nature is such that it is able to act of its own accord. -The ability of an entity to act of its own accord implies volition. Volition implies value. Value implies a mind. -Therefore the entity whose nature is such that it is able to act of its own accord is a "person" having a mind, values, and volition. If you demand a "connection to perceptual reality", it is "there is action". The rest follows logically from there. If your reply to this is that "we cannot perceive this being", than my reply to you is "neither can you perceive all entities having identity, and yet you claim to know that it is true". Reality is not reducible to our perception.

Yes, I have stated numerous times that I agree with all of the above. I agree that the perceptual is what you start with before any method, including logic, is applied. IF by "start" and "before" you are referring to the chronology of the subject (the knower) rather than the validation of the object (the thing in question which is to be known as true or rejected as false). Huge difference.

Again: we need to define more clearly what is meant by "base" or "foundation" or "starting point" when we are discussing this. I have made my point on this a million times and no one seems to understand the distinction. I AGREE that the knowledge of the definitions of "square" and "circle" are dependent on perception (And logic). When I say "knowledge based on logic alone" I mean am not talking about the historical discovery of the definition of one's terms. I am talking about an appeal to evidence. So, if we are agreed (through perception and logic) on the definitions of "square" and "circle" than we do not need to appeal to perceptual evidence to prove that there are no square circles. By "appealing to perceptual evidence" I mean breaking out graph paper and trying to draw a square circle. I do not mean "remembering one's definitions" when I say "appeal to perceptual evidence". I AGREE I AGREE I AGREE that perceptual evidence is necessary in the formation of definition. I am saying that, given the definitions, there are certain things which can be known by logical necessity apart from looking for empirical data to back up the proposition in question. HUGE DIFFERENCE. It is the difference between "how do I come to know something?" and "how is something validated as true?" One is Subjective. The other is Objective. If you don't see the difference, I do not know how else to try and show it. But I do know that without this difference, Objectivism will sink into empiricism and skepticism rather quickly.

I agree with all but the last statement. IF it is derived from perceptual knowledge and only perceptual knowledge, than it *is* only perceptual knowledge. If there is nothing but perceptual knowledge, then one cannot know a Universal since one would have to perceive every entity classified under that Universal in the universe at the same time. If there is only perceptual knowledge, than the only knowledge you have is of percepts. If there is more than percepts as knowledge, than there is more than perceptual knowledge, and one can know Universals. As I've said before, I will grant that knowledge is "originated in" or "kick-started by" perception. But if knowledge is more than mere perception, then it must be more than perception alone. If I have indicated that I believe Identity is separate from Existence, than I mis-spoke. "Existence is Identity" is one form of a cornerstone to my Philosophy. I do not mean that Identity is separated. I mean that in the process of identification, one must grasp that the existent in question "has" identity or "is" identity; meaning one must grasp that this existent is itself (Implicit LOI) and it is not any of the other things which are perceive (Implicit LNC). This implicit application of the laws of logic in the act of Identification is necessary to abstract and rise above the perceptual level. I thought it over this morning before I read this post, and realized that my position on it was unnecessary and confusing, so I am content to stick with the traditional understand of the LEM. I apologize for the confusion.

If by "originates" you mean a chronological order of discovery, then absolutely not! (I absolutely would not object). I think I have said as much a few times in trying to point out the distinction between a "foundation of discovery" and a "foundation of evidence"....or a "chronological starting point" and a "systematic starting point". I absolutely reject that any knowledge is "innate".

By the way, does any one know where the premise that "all knowledge is entirely reducible to perception" came from?? I do not recall reading it in any of Rand's writings, but I could have missed it. Is it explicitly discussed or even stated anywhere in Oist literature? Or is it an assumption being made by Oists based on their understanding of her explanations of epistemology?

Another quick question and possible oversight by Objectivism: If "Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification" and if "Identification is implicitly necessary in the process of abstraction required for concept formation", then how is logic not necessary (implicitly) in the process of concept formation? Is the identification taking place "contradictory" or "non-contradictory"? And if it is "non-contradictory identification" then isn't it "Logic" according to Rand's definition? This would mean that Logic and Perception are required in the process of conceptualization which would mean that concepts (and therefore knowledge in general) would be reducible to perception AND logic. Even if we are using Rand's definition of "Logic". Right??

I appreciate your input and what seems to be a bit of a compliment. Haha. However, as a side note, I would like to point out that contrary to what you might believe, I have probably spent no more than total of 30 minutes of my entire life studying formal logic (in the sense of "modus podens", etc..). I have really only studied the three basic laws of logic and their relationship and necessity to Philosophy in general and Epistemology in particular.

PLEASE READ: Given the rather extreme length of this thread and the fact that it has COMPLETELY changed topics from "Argument for the Existence of God" to "Debating Epistemological Bases", it MIGHT be a good idea to just end this and continue the Epistemological discussion in a new thread... especially since I do not think that we will ever get around to the original topic of the thread any time soon. Any opinions on this??

I have NOT ever said that logic is all you need to know anything. I do not hold that. I utterly reject that. I DO hold that logic (meaning the 3 basic laws of logic and their application to any and all things) is sufficient to know some things. And that everything else which is known is known through a combination of logic and perception. I have stated my position on this several times (usually in more detail...if you have questions regarding the details, I will be happy to elaborate). I am currently attempting to find out if Objectivism is implicitly "empiricist" and therefore "skeptic". Yes. It seems that it is, but the point of this discussion is to test that out. I understand all of this. However, it seems that the premise that "all knowledge is reducible to perception" and the idea that the validity of logic (the laws of logic) is entirely dependent upon perception both seem to imply that Objectivism has an explicit "empiricist" base, while inconsistently functioning as a non-empiricist. This is what I am trying to find out / point out. And it seems that you assume that I am coming from this "intrinsicist" or "rationalist" side. I would like to submit that I am not because I do not by any means deny the reliability of perception. I am only questioning the SOLE SUFFICIENCY of perception. That is to say that I wholly agree with Oism that perception is valid and necessary for knowledge. But I disagree with the idea that it alone is sufficient for knowledge. I have read quite a bit of Oist literature and gathered all that I think I will gather. However, I can not ask questions of the literature in order to find out if Oism is being consistent with its premises or not. That is what I am doing here. So, in summary, we seem to agree in our respective rejections of both Rationalism (doubting the perceptual) and Empiricism (doubting the non-perceptual), but it seems that there is disagreement as to what the right answer is. My position is that the analytic (logic- specifically the three laws and their subsequent application to any and all data) AND the synthetic (perceptual data) are both necessary in epistemology but that the analytic is not dependent upon the synthetic for its validity. The Oist position seems to be (correct me if I'm wrong) that what I am referring to as the "analytic" is really just a subset of the synthetic (perceptual data) and that all of epistemology (including the validity of what I call "analytic"/"logic") is entirely dependent upon perceptual data. 1) Is this an accurate description of the Oist position? 2) Does my position make sense? (I don't mean "do you agree with it?". I mean "do you understand what I am saying in describing my position?) 3) Would you like any further details concerning my position? Now, there is obviously a difference in our positions and my desire is the discovery of the right one. IF I am convinced that my position is flawed and wrong, I will alter it. The best way to discover any flaws in one's position is to "put it to the test" against that which one perceives to be the "next best" position. That is what I am doing. That is my "prime" motivation...although my secondary motivation is to convince you and Oists of the flaws in your position in the case that mine is accurate. A note on "Intrinsicism and Universals". I do not (currently) hold that universals are intrinsically in the objects. Moreover, the only real "Universal" I am concerned with in this discussion is "Identity" which Greebo seems to have suggested is a Metaphysical reality (which seems to suggest that Identity is at least an "intrinsic" universal). My desire is not to oppose the Oist position on Universals per se. It is to question and reveal flaws in the Oist epistemological claim that all knowledge is reducible to perception and that the laws of logic are dependent upon perception. If this means that I am implicitly arguing for "intrinsicism" in respect to Identity, then so be it. But that is the only "universal" which seems relevant in this particular discussion.

I don't mean that the entire conversation has been simply semantics. I mean the misunderstanding concerning "logic" and "the laws of logic" has been semantics. I appreciate the links (and many of the quotes on those pages may end up being of value to this discussion), but the point I was trying to make is that when I said "logic" I did not mean what you meant when you said "logic". That's all. I am no more making it separate from the entities to which it applies than anyone makes any attribute separate from an entity to which it applies in the process of abstraction. I am saying that for ANY entity or attribute/etc... "A is A"... I don't think this is an error. do you? Ok. I understand all of this. But the fact that Identity is Metaphysical does not make it therefore non-epistemological in a different sense. Identity is metaphysical in that all entities have identity. Identity is epistemological in that we must grasp the identity of the metaphysical (i.e. Identify) in order to accurately know it. I am not saying that it is Epistemological and not Metaphysical. I am saying that it is both in different ways. The question here is this: In epistemology (i.e. in the acting of "knowing"), must the knower implicitly grasp and apply the law of identity in addition to observing percepts? I say "yes" and that therefore "knowledge" is composed of percepts and the law of identity. Without the implicit application of the law of identity, one would be stuck on the level of percepts and would never be able to isolate (i.e. identify) and abstract perceptual data in order to form concepts. Do you agree? If not, please explain why. I'm not missing that point. I am suggesting that that is the point. Your conclusion that "the latter of which can never be true" is the purpose and function of the LNC. The purpose and function of the LEM is to say in effect that your only two 'options' are the necessary (A is A) or the impossible (A is not A)--which is sort of a round about way to say "you really only have one rational option". Combined, they triumphantly declare "A is A" with inescapable victory. I know that your thinking is "but that 'option' isn't really even an 'option' because it is impossible and absurd". That's the point. The point is to show that your only option if you wish to deny that "A is A" is irrationality. If you don't like that wording of the LEM, then you should have the same problem with the LNC which says "A is not non-A". A similar objection to yours could be stated about the LNC by saying "but this is obvious! A never could be non-A. There is no point in saying it this way". I think the proper response to such an objection is also "no, that is the point". The laws are stating explicitly what is EXTREMELY obvious implicitly to anyone who is thinking. Their explicit formation makes it all the more difficult to evade the implicitly obvious by showing that any attempt to deny that "A is A" automatically and necessarily results in utter irrationality. The combined point of them is essentially that the only option is "A is A". Hahaha. I knew that only because I have run into that problem multiple time in my own posts and had to go back and edit them.

Then the problem here is simply semantics. When I say "logic" I am referring primarily to the three basic laws of logic (Identity, Non-contradiction, and Excluded Middle). What you are referring to as "logic" is what I would consider the broad use and application of the laws of logic to various concepts, etc.. I generally refer to this as "reason". So, to clarify: Where I have said "logic", I mean "the three laws of logic"- but primarily the law of identity since the others are simply corollaries. And where I have said "reason", I mean the application of these laws to all of knowledge. If you prefer that I use "the laws" to refer to the first and "logic" to refer to the second, that's fine with me- but it will take me a little time to automatize it so I may still slip up on it.. Anyways, you agree then, that the implicit use of the law of identity is necessary in the process going from percepts to concepts... is this correct? If so, then isn't it true that knowledge is reducible to perception AND the law of identity, since the law of identity is necessary to rise above the level of percepts? I apologize for the confusion. I didn't realize that you were using lower case to designate a percept and upper case to designate a concept. However, as Rand said, the "concepts" are implicit in the percepts. So if I speak about percepts with conceptual language, I am referring to the implicit concept- not the explicit and full meaning/definition of the concept. See above about the my interchanging Identity with Logic. I agree that Identity is metaphysics in a sense, but I don't know if I would agree that it is therefore NOT epistemology. I think I would suggest that it is epistemological in a different sense than it is metaphysical, but that it is epistemological nonetheless. It is epistemological in the sense that one must "grasp" it in their "knowing"/"knowledge" of the metaphysical. After all, Rand says that identity and identification are necessary for abstraction and conceptualization in the opening pages of her "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". Hmmm. I don't know if this is a very important point of disagreement at this point in the conversation, but I will reply quickly with my view for clarification's sake. I hold (for now...though I may change my position if I look further into it) that the LEM (Law of Excluded Middle) is set up that way purposefully and that this is what enables it (and the other laws) to be applicable to all of the different scenarios. The fact that there is no middles option is the function of the LEM: A or non-A. The fact that A could not ever possible be non-A is the function of the LNC (Law of Non-Contradiction). The infallible conclusion is the Law of Identity: A is A In this way, the laws are wholly complementary and interdependent...and really, the two corollary laws (LNC & LEM) are unpackings/expressions of the law of identity. Identity says "A is A". The LNC says "don't try to deny this because it is impossible; A is not non-A". The LEM says "and don't try to evade it by attempting to pretend that there is some middle ground between 'A is A' and 'A is non-A'. There is no middle ground. Your 'options' are surrender to Identity or admit your rebellion".

Wow. Attention span. I have not reached a contradictory conclusion in my position. I am demonstrating the contradictory conclusion of your position if your position is taken consistently.

WOW. Evade much? I say "Existence is Identity, Consciousness is ____(what?)____". And you say "ability to perceive"!? WOW. I am going to give you the EXTREME benefit of the doubt and assume that it is possible that you have never read or heard this phrase from Rand. Allow me to tell you how she fills in the blank: "Consciousness is Identification". If you take issue with this (i.e. if you disagree with Rand here), then please state it openly rather than beating around the bush and acting like I am the one evading the issue. If you wish to continue to argue that Identification is not necessary for Conceptualization, then put it in those words. I am happy to defend Rand's position here. But I need to know what your position is. If not; if you agree that Identification is necessary for Conceptualization, then say so- and stop demanding that I prove it. One or the other. And, once you have chosen and clearly stated your position on this matter, please address my argument in post 566 regarding what Rand says in ITOE 6-7. All of this assumes your position on the use and applicability of logic. The point of this discussion is that I contend for an expanded (NOT reduced) use and applicability of logic. So, please address my argument in post 566 regarding what Rand says in ITOE 6-7. I understand the difference between percepts and concepts just fine. We are talking about the process of abstraction which is necessary to go from percepts to concepts. "Since it ["existent"] is a concept, man cannot grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. But it is implicit in every percept (to perceive a thing is to perceive that it exists) and man grasps it implicitly on the perceptual level....it is this implicit knowledge that permits his consciousness to develop further....." -ITOE, 5-6. *Underlined and Bold mine* What I mean when I refer to implicit use, applicability, knowledge, etc... is what Rand is saying here. But this is just the beginning of what she said in this section regarding the process of abstraction. I want to discuss the rest of what she said in this section which is quoted in post 566. So, please address my argument in post 566 regarding what Rand says in ITOE 6-7. And what you are calling "conscious" here seems to be the same as what Rand and I are calling "explicit". Likewise what you call "unconscious" here seems to be the same as what Rand and I are calling "implicit". And how can one identify and distinguish characteristics and form classifications (whether consciously or not) without implicitly applying the laws of logic to that characteristic? On the perceptual level it looks like this: "blueredbluepinkyellowredbrown" In order to identify and distinguish one color from the others in order to abstract one must implicitly do this: "blue", "not redpinkyellowredbrown". "blue". "blue is blue, and is not redpinkyellowredbrown". Obviously we do not call it "blue" but the "blue" attribute is isolated and distinguished from the rest which results in identifying it as itself and not as the rest which are not it. Again, please address my argument in post 566 regarding what Rand says in ITOE 6-7. Exactly. And what does it mean to identify something, other than to implicitly apply the law of identity to it? Without implicitly identifying brick as and existent, one cannot know (even implicitly) that "brick is". Apart from this, for all one knows, "brick is not". A child looks at a brick and perceptually what goes on is "brick is". But then he looks away and perceptually what goes on is "brick is not". But then he looks back and sees it again and perceptually what goes on is "brick is". Then he eventually learns that "brick is" and "brick either is or is not". But "brick is not non-brick (i.e. cat or rain or book)". "Brick is brick". At this point he has implicitly used logic to isolate and identify "brick" from among the rest of "the perceptual field" (as Rand would say). I don't think you understand that the three basic laws of logic are simply expressions of isolation and distinction of one thing (whether an attribute, entity, etc..) from everything else. A is either A or non-A A is not non-A A is A A stands for the thing being isolated and distinguished. Non-A stands for everything which is not that thing being isolated and distinguished. The implicit use of these three laws is necessary and inescapable in the act of "Identification" or "Isolation and Distinction"-- which is necessary for Conceptualization. I don't know why this seems to be either 1)So difficult to grasp or 2) So horrible that thinking people want to evade it.

My goodness I am NOT as stupid as to "blank out" the fact that consciousness is implied in perception! But now that you brought up the term "Consciousness", what does Rand say "Consciousness is"!? "Existence is Identity, Consciousness is _________________________"!!! And what IS the meaning of the word in this blank? Yes. See post 566. I put a huge chunk of pp.6-7 from ITOE in that post as reference to what I am getting at. I am no more "adding logic" as if it were some mystical entity, than you add concepts or percepts or abstraction as if they are some mystical entity. As far as the extent to which this "tool" of logic is used, that is what we are endeavoring to find out in this discussion. "There are entities called Bricks". This knowledge does not need logic? Very well, then. "There are not entities called Bricks". And this is where I could pull one of the Objectivist tricks by quickly snapping a quote of Rand with no further explanation: "Consciousness is Identification"! But, I won't do that. I don't think that I would say that it "automatically" uses the tool, but I would hold that the implicit use of this tool is necessary in the formation of concepts. Again, please see post 566. I am familiar with the process of abstraction. I am contending that you are not because you are blanking out the necessity of implicit identification in the process of abstraction. How can we know that "balls bounce, books don't, and tables have four legs" if we are not able to implicitly know that "balls are balls, not books; books are books, not tables; and tables are tables, not balls". In other words, how can we hold onto perceptual data long enough to form a concept without implicitly applying the three basic laws of logic to it. "Ball is ball. Ball is either ball or book. Ball is not book. Ball is ball." Ya and "Percept" is a concept also. I am not talking about our conscious name and definition of it. I am talking about the implicit use of it. Big difference. Again. I know this. I am not suggesting that any amount of logic can alter metaphysical reality. I am saying that logic is implicitly necessary in the accurate correspondence of consciousness to reality (i.e. in "knowledge"). Yes, the brick *IS*- metaphysically. But, epistemologically, without the implicit use of logic; the brick *IS* and *ISN'T*

Haha. I am not playing any "rationalist games". I am trying to make sure I accurately understand you. The first sentence would have been sufficient clarification by itself. And, incidentally, it is included in the way I meant what I said- I just did not word it as carefully to make "room" for concepts which refer to only one single percept. I apologize for my sloppiness. However, I do not think it changes the nature of argument.. No. I am trying to point out that apart from something non-perceptual being added to percepts, one only has percepts and cannot "graduate" to concepts. I am NOT saying "concepts are perceivable". I am saying that IF there is nothing but percepts in knowledge, then there is nothing but percepts in knowledge (meaning one could never reach concepts). *sigh*- Not only do you claim to have access to my thoughts (declaring that all thoughts are fallible), but now you claim to have access to my motives and intelligence? Clarifying questions work wonderfully to understand someone else's position when it seems to be saying something "stupid". I have extended this courtesy to you more times than I can count... and I will continue to do so- not out of some altruistic duty but for the sake of coming to a mutual understanding regarding the issue. Haha. Obviously there is a subject perceiving. I am getting at the process by which the subject goes from perception to conception. Please see my post #566. In that quote from ITOE, Rand seems to be saying what I am saying; that identification is necessary to conceptualization. She just doesn't explicitly explain that Identification is the implicit application of the law of identity (or of logic in general) to one or more details given by perception. This is what I am arguing; that without the implicit application of the law of identity to perceptual data, one cannot focus on and isolate perceptual data in order to abstract and therefore one cannot conceptualize. If you think it is possible to identify something and to implicitly go from "entity" to "identity" (as Rand puts it) in your mind without implicitly using the law of identity, please put forth your case.

Apart from identification, he can sense it, yes. I do not think that he can focus on it, isolate it, and abstract it apart from identifying it though. And Rands does not seem to think so either.

I am concerned with concept-formation; specifically regarding the way Rand describes it and its necessary precursors in the ITOE quote above from pp.6-7.

(*Bolding mine) Here it is "straight from the horses mouth". I completely agree with all of the stated above. And since all of you are Objectivists, I assume you do too. Notice that Rand says that implicit identity precedes the implicit concept of "unit" and that this concept of unit is "key" and "entrance" to the conceptual level. The rest should be pretty obvious. Identity/Identification is necessarily implied in the graduation from percept to concept (at least, according to Rand, it is). And this makes sense. How can a mind hold onto and use a unit of perceptual data without implicitly applying the law of identity to it. In fact, all three basic laws of logic must implicitly be applied in order to hold on to anything particular. If A is the unit being held onto and used, it is implicitly necessary that A is either A or not A; that A is not non-A; and that A is A. If this is not being implicitly applied to the unit, then at any moment the unit could transform into something else and the process leading to conceptualization could never reach its goal. I really don't see why anyone would have any motivation to doubt this. It is painfully obvious. So much so, that it is MORE than overlooked by most people.