So where's the solution to the 'Problem of Universals'?

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Anyhow, we're getting into that time of week, so if Mr. Ogg would care to distill out the essence of his points regarding percepts and concepts, especially w.r.t. the Objectivist epistemology, that might allow me to respond to his claims. As I understand it, he wishes to eliminate "percept", which means "the product of perceiving", from chain between the external object and concept. At some point, he seemed to be claiming that a percept is an implicit concept

I explicitly denied making this connection after you claimed I made it before.

or else that the act of perceiving automatically results in an implicit, but that's clearly false.

I have made no substantive statements about the implicit concept, if that's what you mean. Somebody else wanted to discuss the topics on ITOE p. 6, not me. In this context, I have asked exactly two questions with related questions:

1. What does Rand mean by a "percept"?

a. What do others mean by a 'percept' and how does this differ from Rand's meaning?

2. What valid role does the 'percept' have to play in Rand's theory of concept-formation, if any?

That's all there is to that aspect of the thread.

The sensory organs present something to the brain, which receives that neural input in its perceptual centers and holds it in a tenable form, namely a percept. Certain percepts can, at least in man, be organised into abstractions via conceptualization, and this is really the level how man's knowledge is dealt with. It's unsurprising that Rand mentions the foundation, percept, only minimally and just at the beginning (this is a characteristic of her writing).

It is clear that "universals" and "classes" play no role in Objectivist epistemology, and that relating sense organs to knowledge via percepts and concepts does. So it is good to be focusing on the right stuff. If there is a story whereby concepts can be created directly without any perception, I'd be amused to learn about it. I haven't had the time to research the day's ever-changing output, and I now need to decide about whether certain people live or die, which sux for them.

If universals have no role to play, then Rand shouldn't have mentioned them up front. If class theory has a role to play, then that is my own theory which obviously I would never attribute to Objectivism.

Deciding whether certain people live or die is irrelevant to logic and objective reality. Furthermore, bans are utterly useless on the internet, if that's what you mean by 'die.' If I couldn't punch my way through a soap bubble, I wouldn't be here to try.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Actually, I changed my mind about that given the way Miss Rand uses the term "percept." But regardless, I don't know that we need a concept for those entities or existents that we cannot perceive, such as atoms, magnetic fields, and such. Besides, the term noumena has already been taken by Kant, and he gave no evidence whatsoever, let alone proof of any kind, that the noumenal world exists.

Speaking of which, what David Odden was getting at regarding proof is that one has to have evidence and consider it logically (in a non-contradictory identification manner) before one can talk about proof. And if the skeptics are not going to take as evidence what is right before their eyes, then what is going to convince them? They are in denial for the most part. They sometimes bring up issues that need to be considered, such as your skepticism about "percepts" (without calling you a skeptic), but one must be careful in understanding if they are raising a good issue or merely putting a question mark at the end of a series of words.

Everybody talks about skeptics without mentioning any evidence that these skeptics exist.

All I am saying is that if such a skeptic truly exists, all he has to do is ask for the proof. He doesn't have to disprove anything using stolen concepts or petitio principii.

To validate the evidence of the sense, one has to take their nature into account, but it would be a validation and not a proof, since proof requires evidence and without the senses what evidence can one possibly have?

Easy: take out the one stumbling-block to your standard of what constitutes proof, and which reduces your standard to a petitio principii: the senses themselves. If you can't remove that liability, then you are stuck with the logical consequences: Objectivist reason is based on a petitio, every skeptic who comes along can play hob with Objectivism at will, and there is no principle in the entire realm of logic to help your philosophy.

In Objectivism, the senses are considered valid because it comes about due to an automatic process that is not learned. As far as we know, we don't have to learn to perceive entities; it is just something that we do automatically. It is a strictly causal interaction between the world and ourselves; and since volition or choice is not involved, it is valid.

I don't know if that's why they are considered valid, and you're the first person I've ever seen with that particular take on the subject. Perception is valid - for perception, I can grant you that much.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I said: Proof requires evidence considered in a non-contradictory identification manner.

Easy: take out the one stumbling-block to your standard of what constitutes proof, and which reduces your standard to a petitio principii: the senses themselves. If you can't remove that liability, then you are stuck with the logical consequences: Objectivist reason is based on a petitio, every skeptic who comes along can play hob with Objectivism at will, and there is no principle in the entire realm of logic to help your philosophy.

I think you misunderstand something here. There is no such thing as logic without evidence, and the beginning point of evidence is perception (or the perceptually self-evident). There is no logic apart from the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality; and perception gives us the facts of reality.

When it comes to similarities, on the perceptual level one simply observes that they are similar. On the conceptual level, one may have to go through a logical process of showing that two or more concepts are similar (such as showing that Augustine's Catholicism is very similar to Communism), but on the perceptual level it is either obvious that they are similar or it is not considered to be similar. And similarity is contextual, both on the perceptual level and on the conceptual level.

In other words, two yellow things are similar in the context of a background in which the two items stand out with respect to the background. If two yellow things are hung on a black wall, it becomes rather obvious that they are similar; on a yellow wall, one of the items may look closer to the color of the wall whereas one will stand out more readily, say if it is yellow-orange. In which case the yellow item and the yellow orange item would not be considered to be similar. On a black wall, they would be considered to be similar; on a yellow wall they would be considered to be dis-similar. It is not something you prove, it is something you perceive.

I think this thread is winding down, so what I would suggest, if you want to understand Objectivism, is to read OPAR, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Dr. Leonard Peikoff. He goes into a lot of details in one book that makes it more easy to grasp qua one philosophy than if you read all of the works by Ayn Rand. Of course, you should read those as well, since it was Ayn Rand who wrote them, but she never did write her one book on Objectivism qua philosophy.

There is a lot more philosophy to do out there, even in epistemology. Miss Rand covered concept formation, but she didn't go into how we form sentences or rather how measurement omission is involved in sentence formation, aside from the concepts themselves. And I think there is a lot more work that can be done in other branches of philosophy. Miss Rand laid down the ground work, but there is a lot more that can be done.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

I said: Proof requires evidence considered in a non-contradictory identification manner.

Easy: take out the one stumbling-block to your standard of what constitutes proof, and which reduces your standard to a petitio principii: the senses themselves. If you can't remove that liability, then you are stuck with the logical consequences: Objectivist reason is based on a petitio, every skeptic who comes along can play hob with Objectivism at will, and there is no principle in the entire realm of logic to help your philosophy.

I think you misunderstand something here. There is no such thing as logic without evidence, and the beginning point of evidence is perception (or the perceptually self-evident). There is no logic apart from the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality; and perception gives us the facts of reality.

Your logic needs something, called evidence, in order for it to churn something out called a conclusion. But I think you're misunderstanding me. Whatever it is your logic needs in order to be logic, call it the evidence of the senses -- its logical validity is still based on a petitio, no matter how badly logic and reason need it in order to be called logic and reason, in order to say: there is now such a thing as logic and reason. And the petitio remains.

When it comes to similarities, on the perceptual level one simply observes that they are similar. On the conceptual level, one may have to go through a logical process of showing that two or more concepts are similar (such as showing that Augustine's Catholicism is very similar to Communism), but on the perceptual level it is either obvious that they are similar or it is not considered to be similar. And similarity is contextual, both on the perceptual level and on the conceptual level.

In other words, two yellow things are similar in the context of a background in which the two items stand out with respect to the background. If two yellow things are hung on a black wall, it becomes rather obvious that they are similar; on a yellow wall, one of the items may look closer to the color of the wall whereas one will stand out more readily, say if it is yellow-orange. In which case the yellow item and the yellow orange item would not be considered to be similar. On a black wall, they would be considered to be similar; on a yellow wall they would be considered to be dis-similar. It is not something you prove, it is something you perceive.

No, it's not something you prove, at least, not by other means than itself. This is called a petitio.

I think this thread is winding down, so what I would suggest, if you want to understand Objectivism, is to read OPAR, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Dr. Leonard Peikoff. He goes into a lot of details in one book that makes it more easy to grasp qua one philosophy than if you read all of the works by Ayn Rand. Of course, you should read those as well, since it was Ayn Rand who wrote them, but she never did write her one book on Objectivism qua philosophy.

I can quote you things from OPAR that'll make you wish you'd never taken up Objectivism, out of sheer intellectual embarrassment. If you like, I can pull out some of these quotes for you to take a gander at.

There is a lot more philosophy to do out there, even in epistemology. Miss Rand covered concept formation, but she didn't go into how we form sentences or rather how measurement omission is involved in sentence formation, aside from the concepts themselves. And I think there is a lot more work that can be done in other branches of philosophy. Miss Rand laid down the ground work, but there is a lot more that can be done.

Nor did she go into how similarities are known, or how implicit measurement occurs.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Your logic needs something, called evidence, in order for it to churn something out called a conclusion. But I think you're misunderstanding me. Whatever it is your logic needs in order to be logic, call it the evidence of the senses -- its logical validity is still based on a petitio, no matter how badly logic and reason need it in order to be called logic and reason, in order to say: there is now such a thing as logic and reason. And the petitio remains.

If what you are calling "logic" does not require evidence, then it is not logic. Objectivism considers "logic" without the reference to evidence to be rationalistic -- i.e. thinking divorced from reality.

No, it's not something you prove, at least, not by other means than itself. This is called a petitio.

Give us some examples of what you are calling petitio, besides your claim about perception.

I can quote you things from OPAR that'll make you wish you'd never taken up Objectivism, out of sheer intellectual embarrassment. If you like, I can pull out some of these quotes for you to take a gander at.

If you are going to do that, then I suggest you start another thread.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Your logic needs something, called evidence, in order for it to churn something out called a conclusion. But I think you're misunderstanding me. Whatever it is your logic needs in order to be logic, call it the evidence of the senses -- its logical validity is still based on a petitio, no matter how badly logic and reason need it in order to be called logic and reason, in order to say: there is now such a thing as logic and reason. And the petitio remains.

If what you are calling "logic" does not require evidence, then it is not logic. Objectivism considers "logic" without the reference to evidence to be rationalistic -- i.e. thinking divorced from reality.

That is the whole question of truth: empiricism, or rationalism? There's no such thing as a pure rationalism out there anyway. And your own empirical intellectual certitude cannot have been gained from the senses, not if it is based in more than mere psychological confidence in the rational mind. I hope you don't mind my calling Objectivism empiricism, based as it is in the senses. The extreme forms of empiricism are simply into data gathering and number crunching, and I'm not saying that's Objectivism. Your logic is grounded in the senses, but your logical certainty about their validity cannot be grounded in them without committing petitio. So that foundation has to be somewhere else, it simply hasn't been discovered yet, it is implicit knowledge. As you say, there is a lot of work to do yet. Too bad I don't see anybody doing any work, just a few changes Peikoff made to the epistemology and a theory of induction.

No, it's not something you prove, at least, not by other means than itself. This is called a petitio.

Give us some examples of what you are calling petitio, besides your claim about perception.

I can quote you things from OPAR that'll make you wish you'd never taken up Objectivism, out of sheer intellectual embarrassment. If you like, I can pull out some of these quotes for you to take a gander at.

Your reply got deleted, but my response was simply "ok."

[Ogg_Vorbis]

If what you are calling "logic" does not require evidence, then it is not logic. Objectivism considers "logic" without the reference to evidence to be rationalistic -- i.e. thinking divorced from reality.

Give us some examples of what you are calling petitio, besides your claim about perception.

I wasn't able to finish my reply last time, this edit window stopped allowing me to add further comments. It wouldn't even let me copy and paste after a certain point.

So I never got a chance to give you an example of a petitio, when anyway the Objectivism claim about the senses is such an obvious example that it doesn't require a Ph.d. to figure it out.

I think you should know first off that the idea was invented or discovered by Aristotle, who did everything right with logic but pretty much flubbed the rest of his philosophy and science.

Here's a simple example for you from Wikipedia:

• Suppose Paul is not lying when he speaks.
  
• Paul is speaking.
  
• Therefore, Paul is telling the truth.
  

In Objectivist logic, you are asking me to affirm the validity of the senses as an assumption, that is the supposition in the first premise of the wiki argument.

I am not therefore asking Objectivism to divorce logic from reality, I am asking Objectivism to change its supposition, the assumption underlying its logic theory, into something that is not an assumption, thus eliminating the petitio.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

If what you are calling "logic" does not require evidence, then it is not logic. Objectivism considers "logic" without the reference to evidence to be rationalistic -- i.e. thinking divorced from reality.

Give us some examples of what you are calling petitio, besides your claim about perception.

Here are two examples, embedded in a single statement, of what I am calling a petitio principii: "For the purposes of this series, the validity of the senses must be taken for granted—and one must remember the axiom: Existence exists." (ITOE, p. 3)

[Ogg_Vorbis]

I wasn't able to finish my reply last time, this edit window stopped allowing me to add further comments. It wouldn't even let me copy and paste after a certain point.

So I never got a chance to give you an example of a petitio, when anyway the Objectivism claim about the senses is such an obvious example that it doesn't require a Ph.d. to figure it out.

I think you should know first off that the idea was invented or discovered by Aristotle, who did everything right with logic but pretty much flubbed the rest of his philosophy and science.

Here's a simple example for you from Wikipedia:

• Suppose Paul is not lying when he speaks.
  
• Paul is speaking.
  
• Therefore, Paul is telling the truth.
  

In Objectivist logic, you are asking me to affirm the validity of the senses as an assumption, that is the supposition in the first premise of the wiki argument.

I am not therefore asking Objectivism to divorce logic from reality, I am asking Objectivism to change its supposition, the assumption underlying its logic theory, into something that is not an assumption, thus eliminating the petitio.

Here's another interesting fact about the petitio. Even if Paul is telling the truth -- which would have to be validated using the senses -- the conclusion is true, yet the argument still commits a petitio.

So mutatis mutandis, Objectivism's conclusion about the validity of the senses may be true, yet the argument toward the conclusion commits a petitio, that is, a logical fallacy -- even if there is no argument. A complete lack of argument, a base assertion, counts as a petitio too, even if the assertion is true.

[Acount Overdrawn]

Here are two examples, embedded in a single statement, of what I am calling a petitio principii: "For the purposes of this series, the validity of the senses must be taken for granted—and one must remember the axiom: Existence exists." (ITOE, p. 3)

These aren't examples of petitio principii: The purpose of ItOE was not to prove the validity of the senses or the existence axiom--it was to prove the validity of Rand's theory of concept formation; and also to offer her solution to the "problem of universals."

What I mean is: after reading ItOE, the conclusion the reader would draw is that Rand, at the very least, has provided her theory of concepts; with other conclusions being that she has given a persuasive proof of her theory or that she hasn't.

I think you're committing the fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi, specifically the irrelevant thesis fallacy. Yes, the argument you gave above is valid: Rand did not prove the validity of the senses or the existence axiom in ItOE. But that wasn't her intent in the first place.

[Acount Overdrawn]

So mutatis mutandis, Objectivism's conclusion about the validity of the senses may be true, yet the argument toward the conclusion commits a petitio, that is, a logical fallacy -- even if there is no argument. A complete lack of argument, a base assertion, counts as a petitio too, even if the assertion is true.

Could you show me some type of textbook or website discussing logic where it is concluded that you can commit the fallacy without making any argument? The petitio is usually committed when a proposition in one of the premises is the one being proven in the conclusion--it revolves around arguments, not simply statements.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Here are two examples, embedded in a single statement, of what I am calling a petitio principii: "For the purposes of this series, the validity of the senses must be taken for granted—and one must remember the axiom: Existence exists." (ITOE, p. 3)

These aren't examples of petitio principii: The purpose of ItOE was not to prove the validity of the senses or the existence axiom--it was to prove the validity of Rand's theory of concept formation; and also to offer her solution to the "problem of universals."

Some in this thread say the problem of universals isn't even in the book, some say it is. Some even contradict their previous statements, first saying the problem is answered by the whole book, and then denying that it's even in the book. Interesting.

Here's another interesting point. Some say that Rand's statement regarding the stolen concept fallacy used in disproving the validity of the senses is Rand's argument for their validity, the discussion of their validity not being necessary 'since the arguments of those who attack the senses are merely variants of the fallacy of the "stolen concept".' (3) But that may or may not be her argument, and in either case, it is a petitio or circular to say, "You can't disprove their validity without relying on their validity, therefore we assume (even if only for purposes of that discussion) they are valid." And that is the implication of the statement on page 3. That is a petitio even on the face of it.

In all the Rand literature I've read, which is the vast majority, I've never seen a single discussion about the validity of the senses that doesn't rely on this argument. Let's see what Peikoff has to say about this issue in OPAR:

'The validity of the senses is an axiom. Like the fact of consciousness, the axiom is outside the province of proof because it is a precondition of any proof.' (39)

Circular.

And I don't even want to delve into the fact that he then states that the axiom is a corollary -- axiom, corollary, which is it? Is "axiom" now identical with "corollary"? That is why I suggested to Moivas that I provide some quotes from that work, although, really, I want to save you all the intellectual embarrassment by not starting a new thread about it. I am not cruel.

So moving on to the next relevant quote: 'The purpose is not to argue for the testimony of our eyes and ears, but to remove the groundless doubts about these organs that have accumulated through the centuries.' (39) Remove them? How? Blank-out. Unless Peikoff considers a petitio to be a valid argument form.

The skeptic doesn't have to ground his doubts, all he has to do is ask for the proof, and then declare it a petitio. It doesn't even take a skeptic to do that, any empirically-grounded Aristotelian logician could do it, because Aristotle invented the idea of a petitio in the first place.

What I mean is: after reading ItOE, the conclusion the reader would draw is that Rand, at the very least, has provided her theory of concepts; with other conclusions being that she has given a persuasive proof of her theory or that she hasn't.

I think you're committing the fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi, specifically the irrelevant thesis fallacy. Yes, the argument you gave above is valid: Rand did not prove the validity of the senses or the existence axiom in ItOE. But that wasn't her intent in the first place.

No, she declared the discussion irrelevant to that context, because their validity, along with the axiom "existence exists," only needs to be assumed. And by definition of petitio, any such assumption is unwarranted, groundless, even if the conclusion from the assumed premise is true. It doesn't matter if ITOE was about the discussion, what matters is that ITOE assumes the premise.

And so, I realize you asked me for a textbook description of a petitio. After all, perhaps I edited Wikipedia's petitio article to say what I wanted it to say, and then cited it here. Who knows? Or perhaps an Objectivist wrote the article. At any rate, what do you think of the book "The Philosopher's Toolkit"? It has a couple pages devoted to a discussion of "begging the question." And it pretty much reflects the wikipedia article, but using a different example. Here it is:

1. Violence against children is wrong.

2. Spanking is violence against children. (Assumption)

3. Therefore, spanking is wrong.

As the Toolkit says, "It is the sort of argument that preaches only to those already converted," in this case, to the premise that spanking is violence against children. And in the case of ITOE, it is an obvious instance of preaching to the converted. Here's why.

For Rand to state that the axiom "existence exists" must be remembered -- when it has never been discussed before in the book or the series -- is an obvious case of preaching to those who already know it and believe it, because anyone naive to Objectivism, in reading that Foreword, would be totally confused by the statement that he should remember something he's never heard of before ('and one must remember the axiom: Existence exists'). This is such an obvious petitio that I don't really need to consult a textbook -- Rand's ITOE is the textbook example of the fallacy of the petitio principii. And two examples in one sentence, that is not only textbook, that is a homerun -- no, it is a grandslam.

Edited February 25, 2008 by Ogg_Vorbis

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Could you show me some type of textbook or website discussing logic where it is concluded that you can commit the fallacy without making any argument? The petitio is usually committed when a proposition in one of the premises is the one being proven in the conclusion--it revolves around arguments, not simply statements.

The Philosopher's Toolkit gives an example of a petitio that's not an argument, Descartes' "I think, therefore I am." It contains the word "therefore," but is it an argument? Upon closer examination, you will not find a single property to the statement by which one can attribute to it the form of an argument. It is simply asserted, and a petitio.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

The Philosopher's Toolkit gives an example of a petitio that's not an argument, Descartes' "I think, therefore I am." It contains the word "therefore," but is it an argument? Upon closer examination, you will not find a single property to the statement by which one can attribute to it the form of an argument. It is simply asserted, and a petitio.

Wikipedia has this to say on the subject of Descartes' cogito: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum

'Descartes felt that this phrase, which he had used in his earlier Discourse, had been misleading in its implication that he was appealing to an inference, so he changed it to "I am, I exist" (also often called "the first certainty") in order to avoid the term "cogito".'

In other words, according to this article, not even Descartes wanted his Cogito to be confused with an inference, that is, an argument. And I've read that somewhere before too, which is where I got the idea before finding it on Wikipedia.

The Cogito implies that, even if you doubt that you're thinking, the doubt itself is still a thought; therefore, you are thinking even in the act of doubting it. Does that remind you of a more modern version of the Cogito found in ITOE? Even if you intend to disprove the validity of the senses in doubting them, their validity must be taken for granted in the very effort of disproof, as their validity must be taken for granted in all instances of logical proof.

That is just Descartes' Cogito petitio applied to the problem of the senses.

[agrippa1]

A percept is an entity that is perceivable; other entities, I don't know what they would be called: noumena?

I would correct this to say that a percept is an entity that is perceived, which provides a distinguishing characteristic between percept and entity, and thus a repudiation of your equivalence theory. I would also refine this definition to say a percept is sum of the attributes of an entity which are perceived. If none of the attributes are perceived, then it is a null percept, that is, it is not a percept. A percept of a perceived entity is not identical to the entity because not all attributes of an entity can be perceived by man.

However, a percept does provide evidence of an entity.

On edit:

If your theory is that maybe nothing exists, can I ask if there's any practical application you had in mind?

Edited February 26, 2008 by agrippa1

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I would correct this to say that a percept is an entity that is perceived, which provides a distinguishing characteristic between percept and entity, and thus a repudiation of your equivalence theory.

No, a percept is the awayness of entities -- it is given in perception. One does not perceive the qualities or attributes of an entity and somehow must put these together explicitly to be aware of entities. One merely looks. It is the nervous system as a causal agent that "keeps it all together" and one does not have to do this using cognitive volitional effort. This is part of the validity of the senses, that they are automatic and not requiring volitional effort to be able to perceive.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

A percept is an entity that is perceivable; other entities, I don't know what they would be called: noumena?

I would correct this to say that a percept is an entity that is perceived, which provides a distinguishing characteristic between percept and entity, and thus a repudiation of your equivalence theory. I would also refine this definition to say a percept is sum of the attributes of an entity which are perceived. If none of the attributes are perceived, then it is a null percept, that is, it is not a percept. A percept of a perceived entity is not identical to the entity because not all attributes of an entity can be perceived by man.

However, a percept does provide evidence of an entity.

I want to state first off that the basic percept idea was Moivas's, not mine. I merely agreed with it, and tried to interpret it a bit. If you disagree with my interpretation I'm ok with that. I disagree if he still thinks it has anything to do with Rand's idea of a percept. And I see you have dispensed with Rand's 'chaos of sensations' talk and moved on to talk about what we can know through our senses: percepts and attributes.

I never thought that there was an identity between percept and entity, I thought your idea of a percept was not distinguishable from 'entity,' and cited Moivas as having the better definition of 'percept.' When you say that a percept provides evidence of an entity, that is Indirect Realism on the face of it. In that case they are not equivalent; if it were Direct Realism, then 'percept' and 'entity' would be equivalent terms. Not that I agree with that either, I sided with Moivas on this issue. Entity is the genera from which

is distinguished 'percept', and for lack of a better term, 'non-percept'. You say 'percept' is the entity perceived, and 'non-percept' is any entity not in perceptual range, regarding a single moment or act of awareness. Moivas's idea has more to do with the range of human perception itself. Individual atoms constituting tables are not percepts, tables are. Maybe you're right about your definition of 'percept'; I could go either way, as long as it disputes Rand on this, but I can't go along with any form of Indirect Realism.

[agrippa1]

No, a percept is the awayness of entities -- it is given in perception. One does not perceive the qualities or attributes of an entity and somehow must put these together explicitly to be aware of entities. One merely looks. It is the nervous system as a causal agent that "keeps it all together" and one does not have to do this using cognitive volitional effort. This is part of the validity of the senses, that they are automatic and not requiring volitional effort to be able to perceive.

Is it (a percept) the awareness of entities, or the awareness of an entity? Maybe I'm confused on this point in what you're saying. The point I'm trying to make is that the percept integrates only those attributes of an entity which are sensed. The percept is the entity as given to our perception. In my way of analyzing your words, "awareness" is a noun, and is the "thing" we perceive when we receive [and automatically integrate] the sensory evidence of an entity. Another point of confusion for me is whether the percept integrates the sum of perceptions, or if it is a piecemeal designation. For instance, if we see the football, is that given to us as a percept, and then when we pick it up, are the tactile attributes integrated into the same percept, or is there another percept that we mentally integrate with the first? Or is it a combination of the two, with growing automation in the integration as our sensory/perceptual skills develop?

I think there is a trap in equating percept to entity, as it folds both things: the awareness, and the source of the awareness; into a single thing.

Edited February 26, 2008 by agrippa1

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Here are two examples, embedded in a single statement, of what I am calling a petitio principii: "For the purposes of this series, the validity of the senses must be taken for granted—and one must remember the axiom: Existence exists." (ITOE, p. 3)

You don't understand the nature of axioms. One does not arrive at them via an argument, they are self-evident; which means no argument is needed.

For example, the three basic axioms of Objectivism are existence, identity, and consciousness -- there is (existence) something there (identity) that I am aware of (consciousness).

There is no way one could make a valid argument for anything whatsoever without using these axioms at least implicitly in one's statement. They are the starting point of all knowledge, and it is not a logical fallacy to assert them.

If someone says: prove to me that existence exists, then merely by uttering that he is using the axioms existence, identity, and consciousness.

And the validity of the senses are the same way: What evidence could you possibly point to that would show that the senses are not giving you information about reality? In that sense, the senses are axiomatic, because before one could prove anything, one has to have evidence. And this requirement of logic as non-contradictory identification of the facts of existence is not a logical fallacy.

In other words, to deny the senses, one would have to show -- with evidence -- that your awareness of entities is not valid because there is really something else, and that the senses are giving you false information; where the whole idea of false information would have to be countered with evidence gathered somehow, not using anything one could point to and say, "Here is the proof!" In other words, if there is some other real reality out there, that we cannot perceive in any way -- not even using detectors that have dials on them that we can see -- then how could one present that sort of evidence? In short, there wouldn't be any evidence. And no evidence has ever been given for some other real reality -- not Plato's Forms nor Kant's Noumenal world.

And I think it was Aristotle who made the observation that even those in his day who denied the senses took effort to avoid falling down wells by steering clear of them when they came upon them. Similarly, if someone were to reply to this thread claiming that the senses are not valid, well he must have been using his eyes or braille to read this message and then using some sort of replying device, and he would have to be aware of the buttons to push so that he could reply. It is not a sustainable position.

If someone were to declare and to follow through with a declaration that existence didn't exist, then why would he participate in it in any way, including getting into arguments? It is not a sustainable position.

I'm not here giving you an argument for the axioms or for the evidence of the senses, I'm merely pointing out that he who denies them is caught up in a direct contradiction.

The axioms and the senses cannot be denied without using them; that is the nature of the axiomatic.

[agrippa1]

When you say that a percept provides evidence of an entity, that is Indirect Realism on the face of it.

I don't agree with the characterization of this as Indirect Realism (cap'd), since the entity directly provides the sensory inputs integrated into the percept. I was thinking of percept today in terms of a filter through which reality is passed, which implies a direct, but incomplete, awareness of an entity of reality. The real-time characteristic of perception makes me think that it may be valid, and I think some confusion arises when we consider the memory of a percept and equate that memory with the real time percept. This is a natural consequence of thinking about percepts (like when we say that a table is a percept, and an image of a table magically floats into your mind's eye), but I think a percept is the instantaneous awareness of an entity. This is problematic, too, however, because the percept of a ball, for instance, seems to include the spherical shape of the ball, and not just the convex part facing us, which would tend to imply a memory component of percepts.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Is it (a percept) the awareness of entities, or the awareness of an entity? Maybe I'm confused on this point in what you're saying. The point I'm trying to make is that the percept integrates only those attributes of an entity which are sensed. The percept is the entity as given to our perception. In my way of analyzing your words, "awareness" is a noun, and is the "thing" we perceive when we receive [and automatically integrate] the sensory evidence of an entity.

There are entities out there and we perceive them with our senses (primarily sight and touch give us entities directly). But the reason the percept is not the entity is that we don't do anything mentally with the actual entity. What we do mentally, in remembering and conceptualizing, is taking our awareness of that entity (the percept) and either remember it or conceptualize it. We are aware of entities, that is what the perceptual level means. It is not as if we see a percept; we see the entity, and that is what it means to have a percept -- to be aware of the entity.

[agrippa1]

There are entities out there and we perceive them with our senses (primarily sight and touch give us entities directly). But the reason the percept is not the entity is that we don't do anything mentally with the actual entity. What we do mentally, in remembering and conceptualizing, is taking our awareness of that entity (the percept) and either remember it or conceptualize it. We are aware of entities, that is what the perceptual level means. It is not as if we see a percept; we see the entity, and that is what it means to have a percept -- to be aware of the entity.

Okay. Would you say that a percept is a filtered (by our senses) direct perception of the entity?

Also, is the percept persistent? Is the memory included as awareness of the entity or is it a mental visualization of the entity?

Edited February 26, 2008 by agrippa1

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Okay. Would you say that a percept is a filtered (by our senses) direct perception of the entity?

Also, is the percept persistent? Is the memory included as awareness of the entity or is it a mental visualization of the entity?

Well, I would not refer to it as filtering. Our senses have an identity and we can only perceive that which they are capable of detecting -- i.e. you can perceive this reply, but you cannot perceive the electromagnetic aura of the computer screen. The point that Miss Rand was making is that insofar as our senses have an identity, those inputs are automatically retained as one thing -- i.e. our awareness of entities -- rather than something like a pixelated image that we then must determine where the pixels must be placed in order to get to awareness of the entity. The senses are "limited" by their identity, but the claim that they are not accurate because of this "limitation" denies identity. In other words, saying that we don't perceive real reality because we don't perceive magnetic fields or electromagnetic fields is an implicit denial of the law of identity.

As for memory, introspectively it does include images figuratively speaking, that is we can recall what something looked like, but we don't know how this is done on the neurological level. It is stored somehow and we can recall it. But we can distinguish perception and memory; that is we know when we are seeing something and when we are remembering it; and certainly the recall of memory does not use our eyes or other sensory equipment. Memory is internal, after perception, and does not use the senses to recall them -- i.e. we do not turn our eyes to the back of our heads in order to see an image. So, memory is the storage of the awareness of what we perceive, and we recall it internally; which is why I say "images figuratively speaking." But memory is not awareness of an entity directly via the senses; it is the recall of the awareness.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Here are two examples, embedded in a single statement, of what I am calling a petitio principii: "For the purposes of this series, the validity of the senses must be taken for granted—and one must remember the axiom: Existence exists." (ITOE, p. 3)

You don't understand the nature of axioms. One does not arrive at them via an argument, they are self-evident; which means no argument is needed.

I know all that. You don't understand the nature of the petitio principii. One does not necessarily arrive at a petitio via an argument. It can be arrived at via the claim to self-evidence, as in Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," in which he wanted to make sure nobody thought the "ergo" implied an inference.

So what are you telling me? It's an axiom! I have to stand up and salute!

Peikoff tosses out that word "axiom" like he was tossing a salad full of them.

For example, the three basic axioms of Objectivism are existence, identity, and consciousness -- there is (existence) something there (identity) that I am aware of (consciousness).

There is no way one could make a valid argument for anything whatsoever without using these axioms at least implicitly in one's statement. They are the starting point of all knowledge, and it is not a logical fallacy to assert them.

Everybody will grant "A is A," or as Leibniz put it, "A is not non-A." I think you should know by now that I have ITOE fairly well memorized. And I have read Leibniz, who believed there wasn't a single question askable by reason that couldn't be answered by reason: that is the principle of sufficient reason, which, of course, is a petitio, and which took reasoning far beyond any subject involving Rand and her axiom of perception. So I have to ask: who had more respect for the vast power of reason, Rand or Leibniz? Who limited reason to the perceivable, and why? Rand, because she was Aristotelian. But I'm telling you that none of the scientific advances of the past 200 years would have been possible using Aristotelian empiricism or Objectivism. Because none of them, insofar as they involved paradigm shifts, were based in the senses, but were, indeed, paradigm shifts away from dependence upon the senses. It could even be argued that Euclidean geometry wasn't based on the senses, since the eyes give us two lines, like railroad tracks, meeting at a vanishing point in the distance and not remaining parallel according to the senses, so much for their validity. Reason must lift the mind beyond this faulty sensory evidence, which we know to be false not on the basis of the sensory evidence, but on the basis of reason, of rules of inference and the like. Copernicus could never have raised the human mind beyond the geocentricism implied when merely perceiving the cosmos around us, if his theory was based on what his senses told him about it. You will say that his sun-centered theory is based on his perception that the earth has a sun. Yes, but not the centeredness of it, and that's the theory that bypasses the senses entirely and in which reason goes on its own powers. And through the passage of centuries, even all evidence of the senses is forgotten, and the very idea of a cosmic center is abandoned by reason, perception being abandoned along with it. Perception brings evidence about which reason raises questions to be answered by reason, but not through the use of the evidence of the senses, not any more.

If someone says: prove to me that existence exists, then merely by uttering that he is using the axioms existence, identity, and consciousness.

However, I never said that 'existence exists' is false, or that the senses aren't valid, a petitio is not necessarily false, it is only "self-proving."

And the validity of the senses are the same way: What evidence could you possibly point to that would show that the senses are not giving you information about reality? In that sense, the senses are axiomatic, because before one could prove anything, one has to have evidence. And this requirement of logic as non-contradictory identification of the facts of existence is not a logical fallacy.

The requirement is not a logical fallacy, I said that before to you regarding the need for logic to have something to churn out conclusions with. Remember? But the petitio involved in it is a logical fallacy, and this cannot be denied without denying the logic behind it. Furthermore, a petitio is a formal fallacy, not based in the senses but in the mere form of the inference or assertion itself. So you see, logic does not always rely on the evidence of the senses, that right there should clue you in to the very need for Objectivism to find an alternative to the axiom. Like I said before, get rid of the assumption at the basis of your logic, and you have eradicated the petitio which itself is not based on empirical facts but only logical form. The answer thus lies in reason, in its formal pursuits, not in the validity of the senses even granting their validity.

In other words, to deny the senses, one would have to show -- with evidence -- that your awareness of entities is not valid because there is really something else, and that the senses are giving you false information; where the whole idea of false information would have to be countered with evidence gathered somehow, not using anything one could point to and say, "Here is the proof!" In other words, if there is some other real reality out there, that we cannot perceive in any way -- not even using detectors that have dials on them that we can see -- then how could one present that sort of evidence? In short, there wouldn't be any evidence. And no evidence has ever been given for some other real reality -- not Plato's Forms nor Kant's Noumenal world.

What the senses give you is two railroad tracks meeting at a vanishing-point. Now drive your train down a length of the track, and you will find that the vanishing-point never changes, it always remains the same distance away. This is the world of perception that your senses give you. If reason was dependent upon this evidence, it would conclude - and rightly so - that this vanishing-point where the two tracks meet must be at a point an infinite distance away. The fact that the tracks aren't an infinite distance in length matters not to the senses, because the senses don't think, they only obey automatically, as you said, their physical form.

Thank God or whoever that the validity of the senses is not axiomatic, not to be taken for granted, or else science would not have advanced one iota, even Euclidean geometry would have been impossible except as a fantasy and not the seemingly unquestionable theory that ruled science for over 2000 years.

In the history of geometry, it was not the evidence of the senses that ruled out Euclideanism, but the mere logical form of its axioms which became questionable, their dependence versus independence, and this is a relationship existing, not between these axioms and reality, but between these axioms and themselves. The fifth postulate, being found independent, utterly vanquished Euclid's long reign, it was no longer axiomatic for reality only for itself, and it had absolutely nothing to do with their relationship with sensory reality or even non-sensory reality. Google the search string 'euclid fifth postulate independent.'

As far as the senses are concerned, they are good for what they do within their realm, just as Newtonian mechanics is good enough in its own delimited realm, except when dealing with questions such as the retrograde motion of Mercury. And that question was not given by the senses, it was raised by reason based on gathering some sensory evidence, the answer given by reason and having nothing to do with any theory based in the senses. But here's the point: the evidence-gathering would not take place at all unless reason determined that it should take place, and then, in the long run, the answer was not "rational" at all, not in your Objectivist terms, because the answer was not based out of sensory evidence, but simply reason.

And I think it was Aristotle who made the observation that even those in his day who denied the senses took effort to avoid falling down wells by steering clear of them when they came upon them. Similarly, if someone were to reply to this thread claiming that the senses are not valid, well he must have been using his eyes or braille to read this message and then using some sort of replying device, and he would have to be aware of the buttons to push so that he could reply. It is not a sustainable position.

If someone were to declare and to follow through with a declaration that existence didn't exist, then why would he participate in it in any way, including getting into arguments? It is not a sustainable position.

I'm not here giving you an argument for the axioms or for the evidence of the senses, I'm merely pointing out that he who denies them is caught up in a direct contradiction.

The axioms and the senses cannot be denied without using them; that is the nature of the axiomatic.

We all know that the geometricians had to look at the Euclidean postulate in dispute, the fifth postulate. That is not the point. I am not asking that reason be blind to the senses, only that it question them. The senses are valid in terms of being able to see the fifth posulate in writing -- but that is as far as it goes, and that is far, far from enabling reason to solve the problem of its independence, and in this, reason had to go on its own powers.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

When you say that a percept provides evidence of an entity, that is Indirect Realism on the face of it.

I don't agree with the characterization of this as Indirect Realism (cap'd), since the entity directly provides the sensory inputs integrated into the percept. I was thinking of percept today in terms of a filter through which reality is passed, which implies a direct, but incomplete, awareness of an entity of reality. The real-time characteristic of perception makes me think that it may be valid, and I think some confusion arises when we consider the memory of a percept and equate that memory with the real time percept. This is a natural consequence of thinking about percepts (like when we say that a table is a percept, and an image of a table magically floats into your mind's eye), but I think a percept is the instantaneous awareness of an entity. This is problematic, too, however, because the percept of a ball, for instance, seems to include the spherical shape of the ball, and not just the convex part facing us, which would tend to imply a memory component of percepts.

You might not agree, based on something Rand wrote, but then you have to agree based on something Rand wrote. And here's the problem: Rand tried to have it both ways, and in the same paragraph, so naturally everybody wants to say one thing and think another.

Observe: 'A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality. When we speak of "direct perception" or "direct awareness," we mean the perceptual level. Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident. The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery.' (ITOE, p. 5)

Here you have it, and yes, Moivas, I believe the senses are valid for giving this as evidence. You have Rand stating that a percept is a group of sensations -- retained, yes -- but more importantly, integrated by the brain, the percept resulting which then gives "direct perception" of reality.

This is impossible, simply impossible. Rand is trying to provide for or characterize it as Direct Realism on the basis of a theory (scientific or otherwise) that looks exactly like Indirect Realism.

So you see, anybody can argue any which way they want here. I believe Rand wanted to provide for Direct Realism. But on the grounds she provided, it is simply not going to happen. And no, I haven't confused it with the memory of a percept, if that's what you're saying. What you said about the spherical shape of the ball was delved into on a webpage that I seem to have misplaced at the moment. I agree completely with your concerns, but they have been answered in some literature or other, and yes the perception has to go beyond what the eyes give which is only a convex shape. There is much, much more to perception than -- meets the eye. Your concern is well-placed.

Edited February 26, 2008 by Ogg_Vorbis