Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue

I just finished reading Tara Smith’s books Viable Values and Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics and have begun Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. A practical tour de force of virtue and naturalist ethics. I read After Virtue a few years ago, and upon re-reading its opening paragraphs, I found them to explain exactly the predicament that Objectivism tells us our society is in. Though MacIntyre prescribes the wrong cure, I do think that he has honed in very eloquently on the illness. He writes,

Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all that they possess are fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them significance; parts of theories unrelated either to the other bits and pieces of theory which they possess or to experiment; instruments whose use has been forgotten; half-chapters from books, single pages from articles, not always fully legible because torn and charred…

In such a culture men would use expressions such as ‘neutrino’, ‘mass’, ‘specific gravity’, ‘atomic weight’, in systematic and often interrelated ways which would resemble in lesser or greater degrees the ways in which such expressions had been used in earlier times before scientific knowledge had been so largely lost. But many of the beliefs presupposed by the use of these expressions would have been lost and there would appear to be an element of arbitrariness and even of choice in their application which would appear very surprising to us…

What is the point of constructing this imaginary world inhabited by fictitious pseudo-scientists and real, genuine philosophy? The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have–very largely, if not entirely–lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.

Combined with the realization that morality is a kind of tool, a technology, and a guide that grows out of human nature, this is the correct picture for our moral state today and the way out. What is lacking from MacIntyre’s account, as well as the account given by almost every other moral philosopher, is that human’s nature is to be first an individual. It is only as a result of his nature as a man and as an individual, that he can then find use for society. Still, I found these passages very worth-while and colorful.

Unfortunately MacIntyre is a communitarian, and a conservative one at that. As far as I can tell, his morality basically just comes down to religiously-inspired traditionalism.

I just finished reading Tara Smith’s books Viable Values and Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics and have begun Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. A practical tour de force of virtue and naturalist ethics. I read After Virtue a few years ago, and upon re-reading its opening paragraphs, I found them to explain exactly the predicament that Objectivism tells us our society is in. Though MacIntyre prescribes the wrong cure, I do think that he has honed in very eloquently on the illness. He writes,

Combined with the realization that morality is a kind of tool, a technology, and a guide that grows out of human nature, this is the correct picture for our moral state today and the way out. What is lacking from MacIntyre’s account, as well as the account given by almost every other moral philosopher, is that human’s nature is to be first an individual. It is only as a result of his nature as a man and as an individual, that he can then find use for society. Still, I found these passages very worth-while and colorful.

Like I said, he is missing the distinctively individualist feature of human beings in his account, so he is a communitarian. That doesn’t diminish the more foundational issues that he got right, though. Also, I believe he was an atheist at the time he wrote this text.

Not so sure about that. I’m fairly certain he teaches at Notre Dame.

Like I said, he is missing the distinctively individualist feature of human beings in his account, so he is a communitarian. That doesn’t diminish the more foundational issues that he got right, though. Also, I believe he was an atheist at the time he wrote this text.

I’m not sure how that would cast doubt on either of my claims.

Off the top of my head, that sounds rather much as though he subscribes to the idea that we once had a clear and consistent picture of a complete moral system. If you hadn’t noted that he was an atheist at the time I’d concur with Kat and think this were a prelude to a getting-back-to-the-past origins-in-religion discussion.

But, that analogy does have some merit, insofar as it suggests a superior alternative. Instead of a formerly proud science now in disarray, it is more a case of science being in a primitive state with scientists not recognising the connections between the various parts because they’ve simply not been identified yet. It would be more fruitful to compare the state of ethical theory to the state of philosophy in general prior to Plato or physics prior to Maxwell - for example, the distinction that people make between value in a moral sense and value in an economic sense, which we Objectivists know not to be an unbridgeable gulf but the result of different contexts for the application of the same one standard of value at the heart of both.

JJM

Upon further reading, which I don’t think I fully understood by my first reading of the book years ago, he is not completely arguing what I thought. I was under the impression that he was arguing, like many virtue ethicists, that Greek virtue ethics were the right conception. And in fact, he does think that Greek virtue ethics were on par with early Greek mathematics: objective, sound, and a good start. What I didn’t realize, which undermines him in my opinion, is that he thinks the ethical developments post-Hume are to blame for our regress–not Christianity, as I first interpretted.

So I repudiate the claim. In fact, now I have to wonder how well this book criticizes Tara Smith’s Viable Values.