Can definitions be regarded as tautologies?
Definitions are what fill a dictionary. You can own a dictionary and still be dumb as dirt. When thinking, we form propositions (sentences) which are composed of words which can in turn be individually defined. Being able to define the words that you are using in constructing thoughts is not a tautological exercise.
Can definitions be regarded as tautologies?
No.
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It may depend on what you mean by âdefinitionâ.
Strictly speaking a âdictionary definitionâ is a string of words, but the words in the definition represent concepts rather than simply other words in the dictionary. (If such were the case the totality of words would be a floating abstraction referring only to other words, none having any real meaning or referent in reality)
Clearly concepts are not formed only from strings of words, some content of concepts must be âdefinedâ (ultimately) ostensively.
If you mean by âdefinitionâ -> âall of that which defines a conceptâ then your concept âdefinitionâ is, ultimately, not a tautology.
If you mean by âdefinitionâ -> âmerely a string of wordsâ, with no intention to refer to concepts represented by the words, then the string of words themselves function as a tautology.
It should be remembered that although dictionaries define words with a string of words, all the entries of a dictionary do not collectively amount to a meaningless circular self-referencing collection of âlookup tablesâ. The meaning of the concepts referred to by the words in each definition are partly defined outside of the dictionary.
Can definitions be regarded as tautologies?
Yes. âA is Aâ and âa man is a manâ are tautologies. So is âman is a rational animalâ. A tautology is not necessarily exhaustive (as SL observed). The fact that âa man is a rational animalâ does not mean that âmanâ need not breathe Oxygen as well. However, any true definition is essentially the statement of the relation of identity; that every thing is itself.
This is a result of the fact that all true statements of any sort are tautologies (including this one).
The Objectivist answer would be Nickyâs in #3 because, as #4 and #5 observe, you have to go out and observe particulars in order to form a fundamental, cognitively useful, explanatorily powerful concept. The tautologies #5 acknowledges are true given the facts currently available (âcontextâ being the Objectivist way of putting it). If new information can overturn a statement, the statement isnât a tautology.
The Objectivist answer would be Nickyâs in #3 because, as #4 and #5 observe, you have to go out and observe particulars in order to form a fundamental, cognitively useful, explanatorily powerful concept. The tautologies #5 acknowledges are true given the facts currently available (âcontextâ being the Objectivist way of putting it). If new information can overturn a statement, the statement isnât a tautology.
How come no one ever looks things up in the lexicon, which is available for free online?
âEvery truth about a given existent(s) reduces, in basic pattern, to: âX is: one or more of the things which it is.â The predicate in such a case states some characteristic(s) of the subject; but since it is a characteristic of the subject, the concept(s) designating the subject in fact includes the predicate from the outset. If one wishes to use the term âtautologyâ in this context, then all truths are âtautological.â (And, by the same reasoning, all falsehoods are self-contradictions.)â
Randâs point is that all propositions contain a subject and predicate and are of the form: S is P. Since a concept refers to units, and the predicate is a description of the units to which the subject refers, the concept used as the subject already contains the information in the predicate. If thatâs what you mean by tautological than as Harrison said, every proposition is a tautology. But that doesnât mean that the implicit information is explicit knowledge.
As a matter of fact I didnât consult the Lexicon. You seem to say that I contradicted it or that if I had checked it I would have learned something important to what I said. What did I miss?
If new information can overturn a statement, the statement isnât a tautology.
Which knowledge cannot be revised at some point in the future and how do you know it? The implication that some knowledge can be known to be beyond all hypothetical doubt, regardless of what may ever be discovered about anything (which would be implied by the reference to knowledge which âcan be overturned by new informationâ) would seem to require prescience- unless youâre referring to the axioms.
Was that what you meant?
How come no one ever looks things up in the lexicon, which is available for free online?
B) Bookmarked.
Many of the answers here are very good.
Many of the answers here are very good.
Thanks.
Which knowledge cannot be revised at some point in the future and how do you know it?
Tautologies arenât knowledge, theyâre a type of statement thatâs not contingent on any knowledge, like:
Birds can either fly or not. If I like apples, then I donât not like them. If you have a house and a cat, then itâs not true that you donât have a house or cat. Etc., etc.
If statements are either tautologies, contradictions or contingent, I would have to come down on the side that definitions under objectivist philosophy are contingent.
Tautologies arenât knowledge, theyâre a type of statement thatâs not contingent on any knowledge, like:
Birds can either fly or not. If I like apples, then I donât not like them. If you have a house and a cat, then itâs not true that you donât have a house or cat. Etc., etc.
The three statements given here are all direct applications of the principle of non-contradiction, which is itself the negative of the Law of Identity (âA is not non-Aâ)
The Law of Identity âA is Aâ is a tautology. It counts as knowledge because it is the fundamental principle of logic, and logic is a method of thinking that is first learned and then known. Skills count as knowledge.
As a matter of fact I didnât consult the Lexicon. You seem to say that I contradicted it or that if I had checked it I would have learned something important to what I said. What did I miss?
I think I was going to respond to something you wrote but changed my mind and never deleted the quote box. Sorry about that.
Hmmm, after some thoughts, here is my view:
Definitions can be tautological, contingent, or contradictory (as mentioned by aleph_1).
The purpose of definition is to cite explicitly the boundary for a concept so people can determine which existent qualifies and which donât.
I would argue all good definitions are always tautological (but not all tautological definitions are good).
Contingent definitions are only good temporarily.
And definitions that are contradictory are just crap, not useful at all.
As an example, for the concept âBachelorâ:
âBachelors are unmarried menâ would be a good tautological definition. âBachelors are menâ would be a bad tautological definition.
âBachelors are men who have no wifeâ would be a contingent definition.
âBachelors are marriedâ would be a contradictory definition.
The tautological definitions are good for all time. The good tautological definitions state all the critical characteristics of a concept. The bad tautological definitions only state some critical characteristics of a concept. Concepts like âBachelorâ are born from characteristics that is either observed or imagined and deemed important enough to warrant the establishment of a concept. Since these critical characteristics is what gave birth to the concept in the first place, when a definition explicitly refers directly back to these characteristics, that definition is thought to be tautological and is useful in reaffirming the reason why people bothered to establish the concept in the first place.
And of course, any definitions that state characteristics which contradict those critical characteristics that gave birth to the concept is just plainly bad. These contradictory definitions if accepted negate the purpose of the concept completely making it useless.
Contingent definitions are only good temporarily. These definitions state characteristics that existent of the concept just so happens to have, but are not critical. In the case of âBachelorâ, the contingent definition I stated is only good so long as marriages only can happen between a man and a woman. When gay couple can marry, that contingent definition falls apart.
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Vect, I agree with a lot of what you said but I have a few issues.
With respect to the idea of a contingent definition, this is a very dangerous (false) idea. Read Peikoffâs Analytic Synthetic Dichotomy or do a search for âcontingentâ: http://www.proctors.com.au/mrhomepage.nsf/985f14ab922be306482577d5003a2040/4864f5fe3809763a4825789c000dc50a/$FILE/The%20Analytic%20Synthetic%20Dichotomy.pdf
Thereâs a lot about definitions in ITOE but the lexicon really is a great resource if you donât have a copy⌠http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/definitions.html
The good tautological definitions state all the critical characteristics of a concept. The bad tautological definitions only state some critical characteristics of a concept.
The good definition states the essential characteristic. The essential characteristic is determined according to the rule of fundamentality: http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/fundamentality,_rule_of.html
And of course, any definitions that state characteristics which contradict those critical characteristics that gave birth to the concept is just plainly bad. These contradictory definitions if accepted negate the purpose of the concept completely making it useless.
Right, but so does a definition with a non-essential differentia. If you defined bachelor as âa manâ, even though being a man is a true characteristic of a bachelor, you would still destroy the cognitive value of the concept because the concept would then include married men. The whole purpose of the concept is to refer to specific units in reality (unmarried men). By defining the concept by a nonessential characteristic you wipe out the ability to properly distinguish which units the concept refers to.
Contingent definitions are only good temporarily. These definitions state characteristics that existent of the concept just so happens to have, but are not critical. In the case of âBachelorâ, the contingent definition I stated is only good so long as marriages only can happen between a man and a woman. When gay couple can marry, that contingent definition falls apart.
I see what youâre saying here but I think itâs wrong to use the word âcontingentâ just because of the connotations of that term with respect to the analytic synthetic dichotomy. I think the better word is âcontextualâ. Definitions are contextual in that changes in knowledge can necessitate new differentia. A very young child might have the following as an implicit definition of mom: âentity which makes noise and has long hairâ. That definition would serve to differentiate the childâs mom in a very limited context, but when the child encounters other women, the differentia is no longer valid.
Thanks for the links Critical, Iâve read that article by Peikoff more than a month back when I made another thread asking for some pointers concerning the Analytic Synthetic Dichotomy.
I understand that the modern AS Dichotomy and its Platonic ancestor regards all characteristics not essential as been contingent.
And I agree with what Peikoff said, that only man-made characteristics are contingent. All other non-artificial metaphysical characteristics even if not essential is not somehow contingent; things are what they are.
The characteristic âmarriedâ is artificial. The qualifications needed to engage in marriage and whether or not people will marry are all contingent on exercises of free-will. I understand your concern in my using the word âcontingentâ because of itâs close connotations to the AS Dichotomy. But, I donât know if âcontextualâ is suitable in this specific marriage example either. Letâs say that marriage is only allowed between a man and a woman. Now for whatever reason this regulation changed. However, it just so happens for whatever reason that no man is ever gay and no gay marriage will occur. Can the definition âBachelors are men who have no wifeâ be invalidated contingent merely upon the volitional change of the artificial qualification of marriage? Or do actual cases of gay marriage have to happen and be observed to invalidate this definition contextually?
As for essential characteristics, I understand the different standards from that article:
Platonic --------------------------- supernatural essence, people know what characteristic is essential by intuition
Modern AS Dichotomy -------- majority ruled subjective opinion, people know it from the most popular norm, trend, and/or dictionary
Objectivism ----------------------- the characteristic which all (or most) other characteristics of the existent depend on, people know it from reasoning
For the Objectivism standard on essential characteristics from that page of lexicon you linked, I agree. However, after some thought, I have to point out that the Rule of Fundamentality (RoF) only apply to those concept constructed for the purpose of attempting to provide the clearest explicit contrast between existent (such as the example used in that excerpt, human beings vs other animals). This rule singles out the most sharply contrasting characteristics(s) to achieve this.
But, not all concepts are created for the purpose of providing better contrast between existent so that more efficient and effective cognitive differentiation can be attained.
Some concepts are constructed for the purpose of artificial classification based on certain characteristic people deem to be important due to subjective personal values.
âBachelorâ is an example of such a concept.
Because people regard unmarried as an characteristic of personal interest, they created this concept to classify man who are unmarried. The essential characteristic of been unmarried here is essential/critical not because of the Rule of Fundamentality; they are essential because of intent.
As for âBachelors are menâ, I did say it was a BAD tautological definition :worry: . But at least it reaffirms that bachelors are male. Itâs the lesser of two evils compared to the contridactory definition; if a person asks âWhat is a Bachelor?â and you answer âBachelor is a manâ, that person can easily go âA man who isâŚ?â
Now if you flat out tell that person âBachelor is a man who is marriedâ, chances are that person wonât discover the truth until he makes a fool of himself somewhere else later.
I see what youâre saying here but I think itâs wrong to use the word âcontingentâ
If itâs wrong to use the word contingent then itâs also wrong to use the word tautology, which leads me back to my original answer.
If you want to talk about tautologies, you have to accept the definition. You canât refuse to use the word contingent.
Thanks for the links Critical, Iâve read that article by Peikoff more than a month back when I made another thread asking for some pointers concerning the Analytic Synthetic Dichotomy.
I understand that the modern AS Dichotomy and its Platonic ancestor regards all characteristics not essential as been contingent.
And I agree with what Peikoff said, that only man-made characteristics are contingent. All other non-artificial metaphysical characteristics even if not essential is not somehow contingent; things are what they are.
OK awesome. B)
The characteristic âmarriedâ is artificial. The qualifications needed to engage in marriage and whether or not people will marry are all contingent on exercises of free-will. I understand your concern in my using the word âcontingentâ because of itâs close connotations to the AS Dichotomy. But, I donât know if âcontextualâ is suitable in this specific marriage example either. Letâs say that marriage is only allowed between a man and a woman. Now for whatever reason this regulation changed. However, it just so happens for whatever reason that no man is ever gay and no gay marriage will occur. Can the definition âBachelors are men who have no wifeâ be invalidated contingent merely upon the volitional change of the artificial qualification of marriage? Or do actual cases of gay marriage have to happen and be observed to invalidate this definition contextually?
Well, I think itâs merely a question of what we need to differentiate the units against. A man made fact is still a fact so if gay marriage becomes legal then it becomes necessary to adjust our differentia to properly differentiate the units. Itâs all a question of what the context demands we do to keep the units clearly differentiated.
For the Objectivism standard on essential characteristics from that page of lexicon you linked, I agree. However, after some thought, I have to point out that the Rule of Fundamentality (RoF) only apply to those concept constructed for the purpose of attempting to provide the clearest explicit contrast between existent (such as the example used in that excerpt, human beings vs other animals). This rule singles out the most sharply contrasting characteristics(s) to achieve this.
But, not all concepts are created for the purpose of providing better contrast between existent so that more efficient and effective cognitive differentiation can be attained.
But I wouldnât say concepts are formed for the purpose of attempting to provide the clearest contrast between existents. The purpose of forming a concept is to achieve a unit (universal) perspective on a set of existents. Itâs the purpose of a definition to keep the concepts clearly organized in your head- the genus tells you the wider concept to which the defined concept belongs and differentia distinguishes precisely which units of the genus the defined concept is referring to.
Some concepts are constructed for the purpose of artificial classification based on certain characteristic people deem to be important due to subjective personal values.
âBachelorâ is an example of such a concept.
Because people regard unmarried as an characteristic of personal interest, they created this concept to classify man who are unmarried. The essential characteristic of been unmarried here is essential/critical not because of the Rule of Fundamentality; they are essential because of intent.
The concept âbachelorâ isnât merely subjectively important. There are real, objective reasons for having such a concept. Bachelors tend to party it up, have awesome pads, are available for marriage, etc. It is incredibly useful to have the concept regardless of peopleâs opinions on marriage. With respect to the fundamentality of the essential characteristic (unmarried) vs. intent, I think you have cause and effect reversed. The reason people intend to differentiate between married and unmarried men is because being unmarried is an essential characteristic- it gives rise to other characteristics and actions which make the concept useful in the first place.
Hereâs a better explanation of what Iâm trying to say, from ITOE (http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/rands_razor.html):
âThe requirements of cognition forbid the arbitrary grouping of existents, both in regard to isolation and to integration. They forbid the random coining of special concepts to designate any and every group of existents with any possible combination of characteristics. For example, there is no concept to designate âBeautiful blondes with blue eyes, 5â5â tall and 24 years old.â Such entities or groupings are identified descriptively. If such a special concept existed, it would lead to senseless duplication of cognitive effort (and to conceptual chaos): everything of significance discovered about that group would apply to all other young women as well. There would be no cognitive justification for such a conceptâunless some essential characteristic were discovered, distinguishing such blondes from all other women and requiring special study, in which case a special concept would become necessaryâ
As for âBachelors are menâ, I did say it was a BAD tautological definition :worry: . But at least it reaffirms that bachelors are male. Itâs the lesser of two evils compared to the contridactory definition; if a person asks âWhat is a Bachelor?â and you answer âBachelor is a manâ, that person can easily go âA man who isâŚ?â
If we evaluate both kinds of definitions by the standard of what a definition is supposed to do theyâre equally bad. But point taken with respect to a definition that doesnât even have anything to do with the concept lol. In another way though, the definitions by non-essentials are even more insidious than definitions which are just plain false because definitions by non-essentials give rise to anti-concepts.
Also, the person in your example who is asking âA man who isâŚ?â is only asking that question because he/she realizes that the definition is not properly distinguishing the existents involved.
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