SL, I quoted what you actually said and the missing premises you mention are contained in knowledge of the Oist philosophy which your post demonstrate ignorance of.
I explained that " You will not be able to transfer meaning this way without denying the context the concepts used from “common sense” (which aint psychology!) originated". You want a process of conceptualization/abstraction that skirts reduction. You want abstraction disconnected from hierarchy, without a foundation on first level concepts. You want to turn the special sciences into a floating abstraction free from the criticism of the foundational science of Philosophy.
In forming concepts of hypothetical entities the concepts you use to define them,if valid, will ALL be integrations of sense data. Otherwise, “You are applying a concept from our present level of knowledge to a level on which you deny it suddenly.” The entire way you describe and even named your thread shows lack of understanding of Oist epistemology.
For now Ill post some quotes from ITOE for you to ponder:
“And you know what else is crucially important? When you talk about discovering the ultimate constituents of the universe, remember that in order to discover them, no matter by what calculations or by what machinery, you had to bring them to your perceptual level. You would have to say “this particle” is that which acts in such and such a way on subatomic particles, which act in such and such a way on atoms, which act in such and such a way on molecules, and all of that results in a material object such as this glass as distinguished from other material objects such as this ashtray. Unless you bring it back to the perceptual level, it’s not knowledge. That is what has to be kept in mind always in speculating about ultimate causes, which have to be discovered by some, at present, unknown means. You still always have to bring it back to your sensory-perceptual level, otherwise it’s not knowledge”
“Measurement is the identification of a relationship in numerical terms—and the complexity of the science of measurement indicates the complexity of the relationships which exist in the universe and which man has barely begun to investigate. They exist, even if the appropriate standards and methods of measurement are not always as easily apparent nor the degree of achievable precision as great as in the case of measuring the basic, perceptually given attributes of matter. If anything were actually “immeasurable,” it would bear no relationship of any kind to the rest of the universe, it would not affect nor be affected by anything else in any manner whatever, it would enact no causes and bear no consequences—in short, it would not exist.
The motive of the anti-measurement attitude is obvious: it is the desire to preserve a sanctuary of the indeterminate for the benefit of the irrational—the desire, epistemologically, to escape from the responsibility of cognitive precision and wide-scale integration; and, metaphysically, the desire to escape from the absolutism of existence, of facts, of reality and, above all, of identity.”…
" The process of measurement is a process of integrating an unlimited scale of knowledge to man’s limited perceptual experience—a process of making the universe knowable by bringing it within the range of man’s consciousness, by establishing its relationship to man. It is not an accident that man’s earliest attempts at measurement (the evidence of which survives to this day) consisted of relating things to _himself—_as, for instance, taking the length of his foot as a standard of length, or adopting the decimal system, which is supposed to have its origin in man’s ten fingers as units of counting.
It is here that Protagoras’ old dictum may be given a new meaning, the opposite of the one he intended: “Man is the measure of all things.” Man is the measure, epistemologically—not metaphysically. In regard to human knowledge, man has to be the measure, since he has to bring all things into the realm of the humanly knowable. But, far from leading to subjectivism, the methods which he has to employ require the most rigorous mathematical precision, the most rigorous compliance with objective rules and facts—if the end product is to be knowledge.
This is true of mathematical principles and of the principles by which man forms his concepts. Man’s mathematical and conceptual abilities develop simultaneously. A child learns to count when he is learning his first words. And in order to proceed beyond the stage of counting his ten fingers, it is the conceptual level of his consciousness that man has to expand."…
“ Everything that we discuss, everything, is <ioe2_194> done from the human viewpoint and has to be, because there is no such thing as “reality in itself.” That is one of the concepts of Kant’s that we have to be very careful of. If we were omniscient like God, we would still have to perceive reality by our God-like means of perception, and we would have to speak of exactitude from that viewpoint. But “things in themselves”—as separated from consciousness and yet discussed in terms of a consciousness—is an invalid equivocation. .”..
“when we speak of measurement, we begin with a perceptually given unit, and that unit is absolute and exact [within the context of our means of perception]. Then conceptually we may refine our methods and we may measure such things as milliseconds and a part of a subatomic particle, which we can’t do perceptually. But the standard of these measurements, the base from which conceptual complications may later be derived, is that which we perceive directly on the perceptual level; that is what measurement means, that is its base. Therefore, when I say that for measurement there has to be a unit of measurement, I mean that even when you take a submicroscopic, conceptual type of measurement, that type ultimately has to be reduced back to our standard of measurement, which is the perceptually given, and nothing more or less.
With scientific development you might discover that, microscopically, the edge of this piece of paper is ragged and has tiny mountain peaks and valleys. That is not relevant to your [macroscopic] process of measurement, because you had to use the perceptual method as a start in order to get to your microscopic instruments of measurement” "