Do animals have volition II?

For those who have a searchable CD, the term “volitional” brought to light the following passage from Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology in the Appendix—Abstraction as Measurement-Omission:

[A]lthough I hesitate to talk about volition on the preconceptual level—because the subject isn’t aware of it in those terms—even a preconceptual infant has the power to look around or not look, to listen or not listen. He has a certain minimal, primitive form of volition over the function of his senses. But volition in the full sense of a conscious choice, and a choice which he can observe by introspection, begins when he forms concepts—at the stage where he has a sufficient conceptual vocabulary to begin to form sentences and draw conclusions, when he can say consciously, in effect, “This table is larger than that one”—that he has to do volitionally. If he doesn’t want to, he can skip that necessity, and you can observe empirically that too many people do, on too wide a scale.

 

I would contend, per the Salmieri lecture referenced earlier, that certain “low hanging fruit” of causal connections are likely provided for by instinctive means.

 

You might find an interesting introduction into a genetic approach to the domestication of animals in this link.