PBK, my question was much simpler. I understand why Diane’s statement isn’t correct; what I wanted to know – if you have an answer to the question – is, what is “volition”? I know it is not focus, reason, rationality: I don’t want to know what it isn’t. Can you define it, in the sense “make clear what the concept refers to”? If not, fine.
I do understand your point about the potential trouble of stating what is not subsumed under a given concept, i.e., the potential problems with negative definitions.
But, focus in this case is an instance of volition i.e., focus according to O’ism is subsumed under the concept volition. So, “focus” is not an example of stating what volition is not, but it is an example of what volition is. My point being that we cannot exclude focus as an instance of volition, which needs to be consider as part of the entire context of what volition is.
I will work on “defining” volition. Given volition is an axiomatic concept it will be difficult. Likely we are going to be left with a sort of ostensive definition. Off the cuff I’d say,
The ability of animals to choose how to direct their actions
However, I am concerned over this statement:I cannot imagine what a ‘primitive form of volition’ could be.
I meant “primitive” in the sense of a form of volition that does not involve the sort of complex mental regulation that humans do on the conceptual level. We bring our minds into focus, then we choose to think, then the process of thinking is essentially a process of asking and answering questions. This process of asking and answering questions is volitionally regulated. We can choose how to manage our minds, (except for the psycho-epistemological aspects of thinking.)
Now, to my knowledge there are no conceptual animals except human beings. So, obviously no animal is going to be engaged in the complexity of asking and answering questions, because they can’t form questions without concepts. (Also, given that values are certain kinds of concepts, animals will have no meta-ethical behavioral regulation guiding their actions, in the sense of not having conceptual goal-direction guiding their actions.)
Here is what Ayn Rand has “hesitantly” to say about a primitive form of volition with regard to preconceptual infants.
Prof. A: Abstraction is a volitional act. Is that right?
AR: Oh yes.
Prof. D: Then how do I go about abstracting the very first time? How do I know what to do,
volitionally? Unless I first had the idea of abstraction, how could I proceed to will to
abstract?
AR: No, you do something else volitionally. That is, you abstract volitionally, but you don’t
will it directly the first time. Do you know what you will? You will to observe. You use your
senses, you look around, and your will is to grasp, to understand. And you observe similarities.
Now, you don’t know yet that this is the process of abstraction, and a great many people never
grasp consciously that that’s what the process is. But you are engaged in it once you begin to
observe similarities.
And although I hesitate to talk about volition on the preconceptual level—because the subject
isn’t aware of it in those terms—even a preconceptual infant has the power to look around or not
look, to listen or not listen. He has a certain minimal, primitive form of volition over the
function of his senses.
But volition in the full sense of a conscious choice, and a choice which
he can observe by introspection, begins when he forms concepts— at the stage where he has a
sufficient conceptual vocabulary to begin to form sentences and draw conclusions, when he can
say consciously, in effect, “This table is larger than that one”—that he has to do volitionally.
If he doesn’t want to, he can skip that necessity, and you can observe empirically that too many
people do, on too wide a scale" (ITOE, 150).
You stated,
Man has free will; animals do not. What possible middle ground is there?
I could understand being so adamant to claim animals don’t have concepts. But there is plenty of first hand, observable information to support the existence of some form of volition in some animals.
Man is a certain kind of animal, and I know of no evidence that precludes other animals from having the ability to choose their actions, on a non-conceptual level.
Children from conception to birth, from infancy to adolescence; developmentally progress basically through all the stages that most non-human animals take. That is their development takes them from being a piece of protoplasm to embryo etc, etc. etc. For a brief period after they are born, like any higher animal, they experience only the perceptual level of consciousness. Behaviorally, they act and engage their environment like any chimp or intelligent dog would.
I’ve observed this first hand with both my infant son and my dog.
If you observe closely you can watch an infant progress from a writhing, non-volitional animal (degree by degree) to something obviously volitionally directing its perceptual senses; then later to something of a hybrid state of consciousness, flirting with conception. The child remains for months like this, before it ever shows any sign of even implicitly knowing its first word, and then its first concept.
In this sense we observe the child behaving exactly as Ayn Rand describes here:
And although I hesitate to talk about volition on the preconceptual level—because the subject isn’t aware of it in those terms— even a preconceptual infant has the power to look around or not look, to listen or not listen. He has a certain minimal, primitive form of volition over the function of his senses" (ITEO, 150).
It is in this sense that an animal could have volition. And in my opinion, it is in this sense that some animals such as “intelligent” dogs do have volition.
In the case of my dog, and the dozens I’ve observed, the dog not only “has the power to look around or not look, to listen or not listen,” there are definite indications of other “selections”. (Note: I use scare quotes here because I am aware of the danger of anthropomorphizing, and I am aware of the dangers of trying to apply concepts meant to describe human behavior such as “choice,” or “selection” to describe animals.)
Obviously, as we know dogs are non-conceptual so the dog is not conceptualizing its environment, it is not engaged in measurement-omission, and thus does not discover “similarities” and differences as described in ITOE.
As one example of what can be observed in the case of my dog. My dog has a “vocabulary” of probably a dozen words such as sit, stay, roll over etc. Also, I have words and phrases for 1) “do you want to go outside” and “do you want food.” I have tested and the dog keys in on the phrase “do you want…”, she will sit and intently focus until I give her the 2 alternatives, either “go outside,” or “food.”
When she hears “food” and she has to urinate, she will get quiet settle down, and wait, until I give her the next alternative. When she hears “go outside,” she gets very excited, and barks and jumps.
But, if I don’t move, and ignore her response, then ask again, “do you want…” and pause; she will settle down, and her gaze intensifies as she waits for the alternative again. Then when I say, “food” she can be observed to quiet down even more, and wait, for the next alternative.
Her behavior varies dependent on if she is hungry or if she needs to urinate. As she is conditioned to come to me for either option, she does every time and waits to be given the alternatives. And as I like to test her abilities, I often ignore her response, and feed her the alternatives until she provides unambiguous responses to my questions.
I submit this and other examples like it from other pet owners demonstrate a form of volition on the perceptual level.
I do not think these behaviors can be explained via operant conditioning, but I will expect to hear some people try.