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Correct me if I’m wrong, but according to Objectivist philosophy THE defining characteristic of a person who is in possession of rights is the ability to think rationally.
You are wrong. Rights are a fact of man.
You are wrong. Rights are a fact of man.
What is the defining characteristic of man?
Correct me if I’m wrong, but according to Objectivist philosophy THE defining characteristic of a person who is in possession of rights is the ability to think rationally. This implies that you give up your personhood, and therefore your rights, when you are unable to think rationally. Again, please correct me if I am wrong.
I don’t know what you mean by “unable to think rationally”. Do you mean lunatics and tiny-tots? If so, then this is real inability, and the details of the law have to be tailored for such exceptions. However, for the purposes of this thread, it would be better to avoid those types of cases, and focus on regular non-lunatic adults. So, for instance, though we have people in government who believe that an implanted micro-chip could be the sign of the beast, and though you and I can agree that such people are being irrational, it does not follow that they are unable to be rational. Since they are able to be rational, I do not have the right to force my conception of rationality upon them, nor do 100 million of me, acting in concert.
I don’t know what you mean by “unable to think rationally”. Do you mean lunatics and tiny-tots? If so, then this is real inability, and the details of the law have to be tailored for such exceptions. However, for the purposes of this thread, it would be better to avoid those types of cases, and focus on regular non-lunatic adults. So, for instance, though we have people in government who believe that an implanted micro-chip could be the sign of the beast, and though you and I can agree that such people are being irrational, it does not follow that they are unable to be rational. Since they are able to be rational, I do not have the right to force my conception of rationality upon them, nor do 100 million of me, acting in concert.
This is a direct contradiction of man as a rational animal. What you are saying here is “man is rational, except when he isn’t.”
This is a direct contradiction of man as a rational animal. What you are saying here is “man is rational, except when he isn’t.”
No, I’m not. If you like, let’s just forget about the label. Let’s drop “rational” and look at reality…
Most adults have the ability to be observe the world, to read about it, and to make judgments about it. From all this, they arrive at conclusions. These conclusions may be true or false.
That’s all I said. Where is the contradiction in this?
No, I’m not. If you like, let’s just forget about the label. Let’s drop “rational” and look at reality…
Most adults have the ability to be observe the world, to read about it, and to make judgments about it. From all this, they arrive at conclusions. These conclusions may be true or false.
That’s all I said. Where is the contradiction in this?
The definition of man in Objectivism is literally “rational animal.” Pulled straight from line 1 of her Ethical Egoism proof:
(1) |- man(x) <==> animal(x) & rational(x).
In other words, “a being is a man if and only if they are an animal and rational.” The moment a being ceases to think rationally, it ceases to be a man. Therefore, when a being requests that I repect its rights while it is not thinking rationally (in this case, the purchase of a drug that will harm it), I am not obligated to respect its rights, precicely because it is not a man and therefore has no rights.
The definition of man in Objectivism is literally “rational animal.” Pulled straight from line 1 of her Ethical Egoism proof:
(1) |- man(x) <==> animal(x) & rational(x).
In other words, “a being is a man if and only if they are an animal and rational.” The moment a being ceases to think rationally, it ceases to be a man. Therefore, when a being requests that I repect its rights while it is not thinking rationally (in this case, the purchase of a drug that will harm it), I am not obligated to respect its rights, precicely because it is not a man and therefore has no rights.
Rawls, the issue of the non rational human comes up from time to time, there is a section of Oism that tries to cover that gap, make of it what you will http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.php?showtopic=1099
Rawls, the issue of the non rational human comes up from time to time, there is a section of Oism that tries to cover that gap, make of it what you will http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.php?showtopic=1099
Thanks for the read Greyhawk.
From what I can tell, this is the crux of her argument:
A broken unit, then, is a unit that lacks a characteristic shared by other units of the concept of which it is a member. A broken unit is to be regarded as a unit of the concept from which it is derived is because it should have the characteristic it lacks, as determined by its goals or purpose. Broken units are essential tools for conceptualization, because they allow us to omit contextually non-essential units which would otherwise wipe out the possibility of defining and conceptualizing facts about living organisms and man’s purposive creations.
From what I can tell, Rand is saying that just because something lacks a characteristic of of the group of which it is a member does not exclude it from that group (concept). I have to ask then, is this a deontological argument? Persons, by objectivism’s own standards, are beings that are animals and can think rationally. This is not only a characteristic, such as being with eyes, or being that can smell, but a fundamental characteristic in objectivism’s definition of a man, and therefore a being with rights.
So would this make, say, a refusal to let your child stay up as late as it wants a violation of its rights? Does the degree to which one is able to rationalize dictate the degree to which their rights should be respected? Who determines a person’s ability to rationalize? Who determines what rights should and should not be respected?
Note: edited for a better child analogy. It would have every right to that cookie if it earned it!
The definition of man in Objectivism is literally “rational animal.” Pulled straight from line 1 of her Ethical Egoism proof:
(1) |- man(x) <==> animal(x) & rational(x).
In other words, “a being is a man if and only if they are an animal and rational.” The moment a being ceases to think rationally, it ceases to be a man. Therefore, when a being requests that I repect its rights while it is not thinking rationally (in this case, the purchase of a drug that will harm it), I am not obligated to respect its rights, precicely because it is not a man and therefore has no rights.
You need to study and understand Objectivist epistemology. The referent and meaning of a concept is not just its definition, it is all of the characteristics of the entity.
You need to study and understand Objectivist epistemology. The referent and meaning of a concept is not just its definition, it is all of the characteristics of the entity.
Agreed.
For starters, see Leonard Peikoff’s “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy”
… just because something lacks a characteristic of of the group of which it is a member does not exclude it from that group (concept). I have to ask then, is this a deontological argument? Persons, by objectivism’s own standards, are beings that are animals and can think rationally. This is not only a characteristic, such as being with eyes, or being that can smell, but a fundamental characteristic in objectivism’s definition of a man, and therefore a being with rights.
It is only possible for someone to be irrational, to hold irrational ideas or to behave in irrational ways, because they do in fact have a rational faculty. Other animals are not irrational; they are non-rational.
In other words, “a being is a man if and only if they are an animal and rational.” The moment a being ceases to think rationally, it ceases to be a man.
You’re misunderstanding Objectivism’s notion of man. In it’s fundamentals, Objectivism has no different conception of man than a good biologist would have. Indeed it has no radical view about who is a man and who is not. However, one does not judge this closeness of conception by an analysis of definitions. Rather, one considers all the actual existing entities (particular animals, in this case) that one would term “man”. Objectivism offers no radical new sub-set; it does not say: all these animals that you referred to as men: like Jesus and Marx, guess what … …they aren’t men.
Now, I understand why you may be confused, because you are taking the definition to be the starting point. It is not. The definition is a neat little summarization that describes the millions of entities being subsumed by a concept. Suppose a scientist comes up with a coding scheme for DNA and we get a definition like “Man is a DNA-X456Z-12 animal”. Such a definition is not the starting point for the scientist. Rather he looked at all sorts of men, sought their defining characteristic, and came up with one. While doing this, he might have encountered a few men who have some abnormalities. However, whatever scheme he tried, there were always a few men out of a million that had abnormalities. Is he left in a position where he cannot define man? Some might say yes, he’s stuck. However, Objectivism does not. Definitions serve a specific purpose: they help us tie a concept back to a single (though important) aspect of the existents subsumed by a concept. Definitions act like a reminder about the reality of the existents. With this intent, the scientist would be perfectly correct to use his definition, despite the few exceptions.
Consider this: from a certain perspective, the scientist’s definition is better than the “rational animal” one: i.e. from the perspective of the percentage of abnormal existents included in the concept, but not covered by the definition. Yet, a definition like that is not better from most perspectives: from ones that are not interested in thinking about detailed biology. From a broader and more lay-person perspective, man is an animal (still a biological perspective, but very simple); and he has a brain that has qualities that even a layman understands is significantly different from other animals. Also, like the scientist’s definition, this particular distinguishing characteristics is an important one when one considers all the other characteristics of men. For instance, we could define man as a plane-flying animal, or as a theorem-forming animal, or as a forward-thinking animal, but defining him as a rational animal evokes plane-flying and theorem-forming and forward-thinking. So, we settle on “rational animal”, not as a way to start to exclude things that were in our set of things we call men, but as the best way to succinctly describe that set.
When Objectivism says “man is a rational animal”, what is meant is that man has a certain biological mechanism that allows him to be rational. People who have such a mechanism and do not use it well are also included. This is why Objectivism says Rationality is a virtue: because while all men have the means to be rational (lunatics excluded), they do have a choice as to whether they use their rationality.
Now, if you want argue that Objectivism has worded its definition poorly, and that it ought to say “Man is an animal with the potential to be rational”, you can do so. Someone here might like to argue the other side; but, it’s a side argument that does not change what Objectivism is saying. The whole focus on telling men they ought to be rational implies the potential not to be so. In fact, Rand makes so many arguments about various other theories of philosophy, psychology and economics being irrational. There is no implication that she thought that Kant or Keynes or James Taggart were not men.
I have not addressed the link from rationality to rights, but it was important to get this out of the way first. Check out Trebor’s link, and get “Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology” for more info.
It is only possible for someone to be irrational, to hold irrational ideas or to behave in irrational ways, because they do in fact have a rational faculty. Other animals are not irrational; they are non-rational.
That’s a subjectivist argument. If P = person and R = rational, then modus tollens says this is wrong. To say otherwise is to admit that rationality is a spectrum, which poses all sorts of problems for the epistemology.
I promise I’ll try to get a copy of Rand’s epistemology book, but if anyone has a good resource regarding how rationality translates to rights that would be great.
Man’s capacity as a man to be rational gives him rights. Laws exist to specify what to do with a man who is not acting rationally. Until a man acts irrationally, he is accorded all the privileges associated with his rights, regardless of his specific capacity for rationality.
A thief’s freedom in the context of his right to it disappears once he steals. The rights never go away, because rights exist in the context man’s nature as a rational animal.
The error with the question “Do irrational humans have rights?” lies in that there is no ‘irrational human’. That is a contradiction in the context of a discussion about rights. Humans can act, for various reasons, irrationally, but as humans they are considered rational being - for reason is their means of survival.
Humans have rights. Period.
“Rational/irrational” in the sense you use is only coherent in reference to actions. A person acts rationally, or irrationally - and determining whether someone acted rationally or irrationally can only be done after-the-fact. Nobody is inherently irrational - every moment of the day provides them the choice among different actions, and those actions can later be judged to have been rational or irrational.
In the broader sense of the word “rational” - ie, “man is a rational being” - the term is used to refer to the capacity to act rationally.
So you are basically using the same word to refer to two different concepts, and then assuming that those concepts are the same.
What is the defining characteristic of man?
The question is irrelevant, since definitions serve the function of summarizing, not gate-keeping. “Man” refers to all of the instances of man. Many things are true of man, i.e. they are bipedal, hirsute, warm-blooded air-breathers who are unique in having a rational faculty. The most economical explanation of what “man” refers to is thus “the rational animal”. A person who is or behaves irrationally does not lack a rational faculty, they simply chose not to use that ability consistently.
Also, note that Rand never argues using formalism like “|- man(x) <==> animal(x) & rational(x)”. You’ve mistranslated what Rand argued.
I promise I’ll try to get a copy of Rand’s epistemology book, but if anyone has a good resource regarding how rationality translates to rights that would be great.
Rationality does not “translate” into rights in any way or sense. Irrational people have all the rights of rational ones. Rights allow men to use their own rational faculty and still live in society. If someone lives in a society as a slave, they are not free to use their rational faculty in all sorts of areas where the plantation-owner simply decides for them. Perhaps that is the tie you’re asking about.
if anyone has a good resource regarding how rationality translates to rights that would be great.
You should start with “The Objectivist Ethics” and “Man’s Rights” in Virtue of Selfishness, and ch. 10 “Government” in OPAR. Though to really understand the connection, you need to read all of OPAR.
Rawls, did you happen to get that “Ethical Egoism Proof” from here: http://andrej.com/objectivism/ ?
You know that is a parody of Objectivism, right? Rand never wrote any of that stuff.
Man’s capacity as a man to be rational gives him rights. Laws exist to specify what to do with a man who is not acting rationally. Until a man acts irrationally, he is accorded all the privileges associated with his rights, regardless of his specific capacity for rationality.
A thief’s freedom in the context of his right to it disappears once he steals. The rights never go away, because rights exist in the context man’s nature as a rational animal.
The error with the question “Do irrational humans have rights?” lies in that there is no ‘irrational human’. That is a contradiction in the context of a discussion about rights. Humans can act, for various reasons, irrationally, but as humans they are considered rational being - for reason is their means of survival.
Humans have rights. Period.
Putting aside the fact that in real life there absolutely are humans that lack the capacity to be rational, I have no logical reason to believe that a human acting irrationally has the capacity to act rationally, therefore no reason to accord them the rights of a rational being. An appeal that humans have some kind of intrinsic capacity for rationality and therefore rights is an appeal to deontology.
“Rational/irrational” in the sense you use is only coherent in reference to actions. A person acts rationally, or irrationally - and determining whether someone acted rationally or irrationally can only be done after-the-fact. Nobody is inherently irrational - every moment of the day provides them the choice among different actions, and those actions can later be judged to have been rational or irrational.
In the broader sense of the word “rational” - ie, “man is a rational being” - the term is used to refer to the capacity to act rationally.
So you are basically using the same word to refer to two different concepts, and then assuming that those concepts are the same.
Once again, the assertion that a human that is acting irrationally posseses the capacity for rationality is impossible without a deontological appeal to the intrinsic rationality of humans.
The question is irrelevant, since definitions serve the function of summarizing, not gate-keeping. “Man” refers to all of the instances of man. Many things are true of man, i.e. they are bipedal, hirsute, warm-blooded air-breathers who are unique in having a rational faculty. The most economical explanation of what “man” refers to is thus “the rational animal”. A person who is or behaves irrationally does not lack a rational faculty, they simply chose not to use that ability consistently.
Also, note that Rand never argues using formalism like “|- man(x) <==> animal(x) & rational(x)”. You’ve mistranslated what Rand argued.
Again, deontology.
And yeah, I did a google search for “objectivism man definition” and that was cached. My bad for not verifying its authenticity, it didn’t jump out as a parody site.