In the context of something which has classical potentialities and possibilities, (i.e. putting aside the manmade/free-will, and putting aside quantum mechanical systems) there seems to be a strange dichotomy between an epistemological aspect and a metaphysical which upon reflection disappears entirely.
When speaking of “possibility” one often hears of it in the context of an absence of knowledge. If I and my partner sleep in, upon waking I turn and say “It’s possibly a wonderfully nice day today”. What do I mean by “possible” here? Strictly speaking, it means “I don’t know” what the weather IS. As a rigorous thinker, of course I know that the weather IS something definite, my not knowing it does not confer a state of uncertainty to the weather itself, the only uncertainty is my knowledge. Of course in order for me to be uncertain about the weather, the implication is that metaphysically “the weather” is not static or predetermined. So “possible” here is used to characterize two things, 1. metaphysically weather can change, and 2. in the particular instance I do not know specifically how it has changed.
Another use of possibility in common parlance is an attempt to characterize things in terms of their metaphysical potentialities. If, prior to going to bed, I look at the sky and say to my partner, “it’s possible tomorrow could turn out to be a wonderfully nice day”. What do I imply by “possible” here? That the nature of the weather, the clouds, the atmosphere, the biosphere, the bodies of water and the sun all might interact, such that metaphysically we have a “wonderfully nice day”. I’m really trying to characterize the potentialities of the system, they could produce many things, one of which is a “wonderfully nice day”.
At first blush there seems to be a sort of dichotomy here with the concept or use of language, in the one case, there is metaphysical certainty, the present IS, but complete absence of knowledge. The other case seems to be a recognition that the metaphysical reality of the future, is but a potentiality, and given our knowledge of the system, those potentialities can be identified and talked about.
Observe that the metaphysical potentialities variant (for a classical system) reduces to the “epistemological” variant upon closer consideration, and in a sense the “line” between the two hinges upon the level of knowledge one has. Assuming that there is no metaphysical indeterminism or causal indeterminism in classical systems (which I think is consistent with the Objectivist view of classical systems), a classical system will be and act in accordance with its nature in a one to one fashion. There is no epicurean swerve and no way could the classical system have chosen otherwise… single-outcome causation implies a determinism - the metaphysical potential is not multivariate but singular. In the state of the weather, prior to bed time, the potentiality of the system, inherent in the nature of all of its subportions, their configuration, current states, etc. IS what the weather will be tomorrow. The potentiality is present in the same way the potentially of a ball falling through a pyramid of pegs, has a particular destination due to its starting trajectory/spin etc. and in the same way an apple falling from the tree will hit the ground. No matter how complex, the system is finite, and the ENTIRETY of it IS.
Back to knowledge, the weather system of earth is NOT infinitely complex, and having sufficient knowledge of that finitude of complexity, would allow one to say with certainty “tomorrow will be a wonderfully nice day… see?”
Now if one, for example didn’t have the time to think about that immense complexity, or one only had the ability to gather 99% of the required knowledge, one would then be forced to say again “it’s possible tomorrow could turn out to be a wonderfully nice day”. With the implicit knowledge that the classical system’s potentiality IS SINGULAR, the statement now is simply an admission of incomplete knowledge (along with the knowledge that the nice day is still consistent with the nature of the system).
So when the machine drops the ball into a pyramid of pegs the system does not have the metaphysical potentiality for the ball to land in any slot other than the one which the machine is configured to drop it in. This is trivial, if one considers the state, configuration, motion, temperature, light impinging on it, i.e. the ENTIRETY of the system, IS the system, not some subset which is “known”.
When dealing with a classical system in which there is no metaphysical or causal indeterminacy, all references to “possibility” refer to the lack of knowledge, and the greater the lack of knowledge the greater the number and variety of possibilities.
Any thoughts about the Objectivist perspective on the above?