What is the nature of the concept "possibility"?

I dug around in Rand’s works for quite a while tonight the answer to this question and couldn’t find the answer anywhere. Stupid or not, it’s going to bug me until I get a concrete answer- or something that resembles one. I thought that it was maybe answered in AshRand’s post on potentiality, but it wasn’t.

My question is this:

When- if they do- do possibilites exist. For example: Does a possibility exist that it’s going to rain tomorrow, or no such thing exits until it actually rains. Is possibility just a word that remains as such until it occurs, or is it a part of reality and existence. I think that they do, but what’s your take on it?

I don’t know why this is bugging me so much. I think that it’s because of the fact that once a possibility has resulted, it’s no longer a possibility.

Thanks in advance for your input.

(Without knowing anything too much)

A possibility is a construct of the mind; it is not any concrete entity. Of course it can pop into and out of … because it is not in existence to begin with. It is a component of knowledge of the conceptual kind. Perhaps it is related to the statement The natures of all entities X are such that they do not preclude event Y_._ (Where Y is the possibility).

Feel free to rip this post apart, or ignore it altogether - but only on the condition that you answer LB’s question.

I do see your point and it does make sense. Thank you.

My question truly baffles me though. It seems to make sense that possibilities exist, but on the other hand, they seem like they don’t until they actually occur.

Your confusion about the concept of possibility seems not to have to do with possibility qua possibility, but with possibility qua future. In other words, your same objection can be and has been applied to the concept of future–and can be derivatively applied to any concept referring to something in the future.

In other words, philosophers have claimed: The future does not now exist. What exists now is the present. Nor will the future exist in the future, because when it becomes what now exists, it is no longer the future but the present. As Aristotle states the puzzle in his Physics, “One part of [time] has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet.”

The solution isn’t very complicated. The future refers to “after now”. Things in the future do not exist, but the future does NOW exist. A part of time consisting in the “after now” does NOW exist.

Applying this to the concept of possibility, one can say: Possibilities occur when we have some evidence that something will occur in the future. That something does not exist (yet?). But the possibility does NOW exist. We do NOW have some evidence that it will occur.

There’s more if you actually want a positive account of what Objectivism says about possibility, but I’ve got to run for now. It is possible someone else will say more.

:slight_smile: Thank you for the forthcoming"possible" assurance Daniel. I understand it a little more now.

I think this would fall under the necessary-conginent truth dichotomy, which is covered (and rejected) by Peikoff in an essay in IOE called “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy”. Although Rand didn’t talk about explicitly (to my knowledge), I assume that this is her position since she included the essay in her book. Peikoff’s stance is essentially that all truths are necessary (other than truths about volitional actions) since reality could not be in any way different from its current state. Under this reading, Objectivism probably wouldnt support talk regarding metaphysical possibilities.

Another way of looking at it might be in a Laplacian Determinism sort of way - ie if we hypothetically knew EVERYTHING about the universe, down to the location/velocity of every single atom, and had the ability/coputational power to process all this information, could we predict whether it could rain tomorrow? If the answer were ‘yes’, then there would be no such thing as the metaphysical possibility of rain, since our inability to predict the rain would just be lack of sufficient knowledge on our part, rather than an inherrant randomness in the universe. However if the answer were no, it would imply that certain parts of the universe are materialistically unpredictable, and perhaps truly random. In this case the talk about metaphysical possibilities would make sense. Modern science in some ways supports the latter view, but this certainly doesnt mean that its automatically true.

On a side note, I think Rand would have said that you can talk about possibilities when it comes to human actions, since they are inherantly undeterministic. A human could have chosen to act in a different way in a sense in which water could not have chosen to stay in the sky, therefore you could say the ‘possibility’ for a different action existed. If I punch someone in the face then there is a ‘possibility’ he might not retaliate, since he has volition and can choose his actions. However if rain occurs, then it couldnt have ‘chosen’ not to occur.

Regarding metaphysical possibilities: I think these, properly understood, are consistent with Objectivism. A metaphysical possibility is something that is necessary given the right conditions–but the right conditions are not tied to the entity. For example, it is (metaphysically) possible that a plane will crash; because the plane will necessarily crash if some screws are loose, but the screws are not loose merely by virtue of the plane’s being a plane. To say that something is possible in this manner, it is important to note, is basically to say that some kind of entity is capable of some kind of action, e.g., planes are capable of crashing.

This is not, however, the primary use of the concept of possibility within Objectivism. Ayn Rand used it as a primarily epistemological concept. For example, one would say that it is possible that one’s plane will crash if one looks outside and notices some missing screws in the wing–there is some evidence in favor of the conclusion, but not a lot.

Dr. Peikoff presents this in some depth in OPAR…and perhaps others in this forum have time to say more.

Lucent,

Try thinking of possibility as an evaluatory concept. Putting humans aside, possibility is a concept that arises because you, the evaluator, aren’t omniscient. If you were, you wouldn’t think in terms of possibilities: everything would be a certainty. It wouldn’t be possible that this coin would land heads or tails; you’d know it would land tails, say, because you’d know every factor involved. But since you don’t, you evaluate it in terms of the factors you do know as best you can, and the result is a possibility. And, of course, the possibility “disappears” when one or another outcome obtains; when you see the coin land tails-up, the unknown factors become irrelevant.

Incidentally, off the top of my head, a few thoughts on how possibility is applied to humans… uh, I was thinking that it applied differently, but I take that back. Humans can make choices, but they’re constrained at a given time by their mental content. So in the case of humans, I think possibility is (along with the other situational factors like those above) an evaluation of what you believe is in a person’s subconscious. For instance, I know it’s possible that my girlfriend will call me within the next few hours; I know it’s impossible that she’ll go on a murderous rampage. No matter how unfocused she were to allow herself to get, she simply doesn’t “have it in her” – there’s nothing in her subconscious that would drive her to do it.

Hmm. I think you can talk about possibilities on the level of a culture, too… I’m not sure what to do with that. I think it’s probably an analysis of what’s possible given the ideas that are accepted and the general direction in which it’s going, but I don’t know if that’s right and I’m not entirely sure how to work it out. I’ll leave it at that.

Sorry for rambling a bit, but I, too, find possibilities to be both interesting and somewhat weird.

Daniel,

I think what you’re getting at is the “possible for” vs. “possible that” distinction. You know it’s possible for this plane to crash because of what it is, metaphysically, but you can’t know that it’s possible that it will crash unless you have some positive evidence about the specific conditions.

Yes, Matt, that’s right.

Thank you, gentlemen for the clarification. I’m beginning to understand the concept of possibility on a more broader plane. I think that the context of a statement in which possibilities are used is what gives me the most problem. It’s like refering to an independent enitity that is at the same time dependent (upon a present situation but only carried out if certain conditions are met. If those conditions are not met, they are no longer true- that is assuming that the possibility is true in the first place.

If I think of it in electrical terms( which is basically my job) it’s like a simple circuit where a lightbulb and a switch are the only load devices. The possibility is like switch which remains open until a situation- influenced by any given outside source with the power to do so- energizes the switch, and closes its contants which then supplies power to the light bulb. However the only problem with that would be the switch is still there. However, is it possible, for clarification purposes, to say that there is a statement such as exhausted possibilities? And do they exist? If we were to go back to my previous example the energized switch is now an exhausted possibility.

I am forgetting one key ingrediant in the circuit- a source of power. The starting point, or in view of an episemological sense- the axiom existence.

I do, however agree with the statement, “the world is full of possibilities.” I don’t even know why I do, which is odd. As I said before, I believe that context plays a major factor here.

Also, there seems to be another problem:

Do conditions exist. It would seem that possibilities have certain conditions that have to be met. Like the wheather example. Is there a possible warm front rolling in? Will it even be cloudy tomorrow?

Or, are conditions nothing more than possibilities? Is It cloudy tomorrow would, but on a higher sense it is also a condition for stormy weather seem like a possibility, but different conditions would need to exist first for these possibilities to be carried out. Conditions seem to be dependent on each other to meet an independent possibility.

Of course this is taking into consideration the fact that possibilities exisiting and conditions existing are axiomatic. Which in fact they are not. I do believe that I should work on this a bit more. I hope I didn’t confuse anyone.

Uh, yeah, you did confuse me. :rolleyes:

Post again when you’ve thought it through more, and I’ll comment then.

Okay, after hours of brainstorming, I’ve arrived at the answers to my own two questions. I did this by arriving at one conclusion, then by finding contridictions in my that primary statement, I revised it. From there I got this:

Does possibility exist? No.

Do conditions exist? No.

Here is the first conclusion that I arrived at:

Do possibilities exist? Yes, for a short time-that is only when they occur. After they occur, they become exhausted. Meaning that they no longer exist.

Do conditions exist? Yes- and indefinately at that.

I’m going to use our previous example with the weather. While I am not a weather man, nor do I know what all is needed to make a storm occur, I’ll state some obvious requirements.

Clouds are a requirement for rain. This = C1 (Condition 1)

Humidity is a requirement for rain. This = C2 (Condition 2)

Rain is the result of these two conditions. This = P (Possibility occuring)

So, C1+C2=P

By stating this, I am stating that clouds and humidity are required for the possibility for rain to occur- or EXIST. Furthermore, I am stating that conditions exist indefinately. Clouds Exist. Humidity exists. These are conditions for the possibility of rain to exist.

After pondering this, I discovered numerous fallacies and contradictions, and arrived at the first conclusion that I wrote.

Neither of them exist.

The true statement would be Clouds + Humidity= Rain.

By assuming that clouds are conditions and conditions are clouds, this violates the law of contridiction. Clouds cannot be conditions and conditions cannot be clouds at the same time. The same goes for Rain occuring being a possibility. It cannot be raining and be a possibility at the same time. Thus, conditions are labels and nothing more than every day references that we use to sybolize something occuring within the future. Furthermore, he future does not exist, to suggest as much would be utilizing primacy of consciousness- not existence. Morever, when rain occurs, it becomes a “condition” for something else. For example: me getting wet for walking outside.

PLEASE let me know if you find something wrong with any of my statements. I do feel as if I am missing something important here.

Was the dichotomy necessary? Certainly not. It’s just the way I chose to express my thoughts on the matter at hand.

So…you have broken down the statements I’ve made and have repeated the outcomes that I have stated. The idea that probability originates from identity, does not mean that probabilities and conditions are existent. I see them as nothing more than references to the future, which has not been proven- or validated that it exists.

I vote to make English the official language of this forum.

I’m that bad, huh? :rolleyes:

Don’t blame everything on yourself. Tom said a couple of bewildering things, too.

One more question to throw out there.

If not existent, what are possibilities or conditions? Are they metaphysical abstractions or something along those lines?

Okay, you’ve given an example of what one thing a possibility could be. My question is:

Does possibility exist?

If not, what exactly is it?

I’m talking about as a whole. Not as an identity or an attribute.

Possibility is an evaluation: it’s an epistemological issue, not a metaphysical one.