“. . . no more than one concept per word.”
This is your end point, your conclusion. It’s propriety depends on how you got there of course. So, assuming life qua whoever one is to be the chosen goal, how does this rule contribute to that?
Your first answer to this question is: “. . . it would prevent word usage from inevitably succumbing to ambiguity.”
My counter point to this is that there are other, more feasible ways to go about doing this. I’ve mentioned this before. If you don’t think this is so and/or cannot fathom any such alternative then please do say so and I’ll give some examples.
Your next justification you give for the rule is this: “. . . it is logical in the most literal sense, it is strict ‘non-contradiction’, i.e., ‘this word will never contradict the concept it refers to.’”
You already know what I’m going to say next based on this statement: “Some may argue that giving a word two concepts is not a contradiction . . .”
Your counter to this is: “. . . it is because once that word, in use, refers to something other than its first concept, that is by nature, a contradictory instance.”
This is an unsupported assertion. It may even be begging the question. It might be circular reasoning too. Circular reasoning is why the statement seems to lack support and just be begging the question actually. Adjusting the grammar of that sentence without altering the meaning, removing some short cuts to spell them out in full basically, “it (<– ‘a word once in use referring to something other than its first concept’) is [a contradiction] because that word, in use, [referring] to something other than its first concept is . . . contradictory . . .” Basically, action A is contradictory because action A is contradictory. A is A is axiomatically true, but A because A is not the same as A is A. If you have any objection to how I reconstructed part of what you were saying, if you think something about it is inaccurate or if you do want to contend that A is A is the same as A because A, go ahead and I’ll continue this part further.
I think a large part of the problem here is context. Objects and actions out there in reality are exactly one thing at a time with only one possible response to anything it interacts with. The human mind is the one thing we know for darned sure is capable of multiple different responses to any given situation. We have free will, meaning the ability to try to recognize our environment clearly for what it is or to attempt to do the opposite. Our mind’s capacity for a variety of responses allows for it to do things which would be impossible to anything else. “Mental entities”, as I believe I’ve seen them called elsewhere before, like concepts and the words we use to label them are created by and exist in our minds. This means they are subject to the unique nature of our minds. Our mind working in accordance with its own nature is not a contradiction, it is completely in line with the law of identity. A unique entity will do unique things.
There’s another question that is left now. Our minds may be capable of reusing symbols to label multiple concepts and acting according to our capacities which stem from our nature is not a contradiction, BUT is doing so optimal by the standard of things which support our life qua ourselves? This leads back to issues of practicality again. You’ve contended that it would not be good because it will inevitably lead to ambiguity and my response to that concern is above already, that I think we can prevent communication break down and thinking problems by other, more attainable means than throwing out multiple word meanings altogether.
Your next objection: “That’s extremely sloppy language . . .” and “Should a language, however, be reduced? Absolutely!”
Sloppy is not necessarily a bad thing. We’re not commanded to seek out attainment of Plato’s forms. Sloppiness may not always impede something being useful for what purpose we have for it. My food may be heaped sloppily onto my plate when I’m on a tight schedule and have to go some place soon. So what of the sloppiness in that case? It doesn’t make it less tasty or nutritious. Taking extra time to arrange my food more neatly on my plate before eating it may make me late for something though. The sloppy dish better serves my needs in this case. Sloppy is only impractical in certain cases and may be a minor aesthetic nuisance that may require more time and effort to fix than it is worth. Is the sloppiness in this case a practical problem? To some extent, but I’ve already said there are other preferable ways to address those problems where they exist.
“. . . the word freedom is said to be defined as ‘self determination’ by capitalists, but is said, by Socialists, socialists such as president Barack Obama, to be defined as ‘absence of need for general sustenance’ (ranging from perhaps a small monthly check -or job for all guaranteed by law, food stamps, government facilitated housing, health care, etc.) Or here is another example: when an atheist socialist goes about referring to himself as rational on the one hand, an objectivist then, on the other hand, is saying ‘no, I’m rational!’. Obviously both are using different definitions and are making communication much more confusing than it could and ought to be.”
Those examples have other problems. The latter definition of freedom is the result of a floating abstraction and thus improperly formed and invalid. The problem there is not that a word can have multiple usages. Even if “freedom” had only one meaning under its entry in the dictionary I’m positive you would still see people in disagreement over what that one definition is/should be/what it applies to/etc. As for the “rational” comment, I don’t think there is even a different definition being used by the two there necessarily. The socialist is just mistaken, he has come to an incorrect conclusion. It’s a lot like two people can mean the same thing by the word “frog” - a little hopping animal that lives by water, eats bugs, and croaks - but one says he or she just saw a frog go by and the other says that that person did not. The first person in this example saw another animal go by quickly and merely mistook it for what both of them meant by the word “frog.” Nice as it would be, one can’t simply define errors out of existence entirely.
Oh, also, there’s more that could be said about if somebody can be rational and still come to wrong conclusions sometimes, if one can be said to be rational in one area though there are other areas where they are not, et cetera. I want to leave that aside right now though because we already have a big enough task at hand.
[/definitionofphilosophysection]
[definitionofsciencesection]
“Science is the study of the aspects of the universe.” <– your definition I referred to earlier
“. . . discovering and organizing facts about the aspects of the universe.” <– one from your last post replying to me
“. . . which term in that definition do you think makes it overly broad?”
Well, all the key terms here are questionable - “study,” “aspects,” and “universe.” “Aspects” is the most problematic though I think. Your definition is vague to the point of useless because it can be applied to almost anything and removes a way to refer to a preexisting, useful concept (at least if you propose this as the ONLY definition for science anyway. I think even if it existed in addition to the other ones though that one would prove troublesome because it would be harder than usual to distinguish in a practical manner when you meant that definition or when you were referring to physics, chemistry, and such) Under your proposed definition, would reading the news paper be part of science? What about seeing how many times you can insult a particular person before they block your account online? Would just looking around in general count?
“Everything in philosophy can be tested and proven via logic.” <– you just said
I said before, “That top, first line in the wiki quote . . . I think one issue . . . is that not everything in philosophy can be tested. There is notably no feasible way to make a test for axioms. Tests depend on axioms.”
“logic is the art of non-contradictory identification” <– this definition for logic comes from Galt’s speech. It is immediately preceded by this, “. . . logic rests on the axiom that existence exists.” http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/logic.html
Logic, just like tests, depends on axioms. One has to accept these axioms before trying to apply logic. Otherwise, one can’t even get past the starting line. The truth of axioms is established in a different manner.
“‘There is no distinction between the ‘logically’ and the ‘empirically’ possible (or impossible). All truths…are the product of a logical identification of the facts of experience. This applies as much to the identification of possibilities as of actualities’.” (You already cited it above.)
I am not contesting that quoted section at all. I don’t see how the equal validity of “empirically” and “logically” discovered information, including when it comes to possibilities, supports your position though. Are you focusing on the second sentence? If so, I would be interested to see the rest of the sentence, but in general if we’re talking about axioms, we do identify these from experience and note that incoherency results from denial of the law of identity and that they are true, but that’s neither testing them nor is it a “proof” really either. The quote doesn’t mention proving anyway. Besides, the definition from the wiki on science that I pasted mentioned testing though, not testing or proving by logic sans test. Though, I also have not claimed that wiki definition is perfect as it is. The “testing” part of the definition though I do find interesting as an attempt to point out some methodology connecting the subjects which are covered by science.
“How does existence, the fundamental state of the universe, apply to ethics?”
In the sentence I quoted and responded to before you referred to existence as specifically “a state of being” and it was this generalized study of “being” as such that I intended to ask about in relation to ethics. Metaphysics will deal with that sort of thing a lot, but ethics has a different focus. Metaphysics must be established before ethics and ethics builds off metaphysics down the line, but ethics is definitely not just about the state of being as such since it deals in what could be, but is not yet. What could be is not independent of what already is, but what is isn’t all that is involved when it comes to the man-made. What already is is not the sole determiner for what actions people will take. I think this application to ethics thing may be getting a bit off track from the main topic now though . . .