Human vs animal consciousness

Metaphysics and Epistemology
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I know similar topics have been done on this subject but I have not quite found what I am looking for.

My understanding is that humans and non human animals both have consciousness because they are aware of their surroundings. However, animal consciousness stops as precepts while human consciousness involves the formation of concepts.

But i have difficulty seeing this in a nature. A mind without the ability to form concepts would have to consider each encounter with a physical entity independently. That is, every precept would be its own unit of variable use to the subject rather than being organized under generalizable concepts. If this is the case, I don’t see how an animal would function at all. Wouldn’t every glad of grass be its own precept and therefore present a tremendous level of uncertainty to the animal?

I am assuming that instinct is the solution to this problem. Animals must have inborn reactions to stimuli which enables it to deal with a variety of precepts. This function is clearly evolutionary as animals with weak or inaccurate instincts would die off. If this is the case, does this mean that all animal action is involuntarily driven by instinct? Can an animal purposefully evade instinct?

My secondary issue involves demonstrating the percept/concept divide between animals and humans. How is this empirically demonstrated? I find it difficult to articulate this argument to others. People I have discussed this with (who are equally ignorant of biology as myself) generally believe that animals have the same mental processes as humans, but at a weaker level.

For instance, some days my cat wants to go outside and paws at the door while other days he wants to sit inside and doesn’t paw at the door. How can it be demonstrated that this is a result of instinct (presumably sme sort of environmental factor or diminishing returns on outside adventures for the cat) rather than a conscious decision?

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For instance, some days my cat wants to go outside and paws at the door while other days he wants to sit inside and doesn’t paw at the door. How can it be demonstrated that this is a result of instinct (presumably some sort of environmental factor or diminishing returns on outside adventures for the cat) rather than a conscious decision?

“While there are arguments against animal minds, the cognitive scientists studying animals largely accept that animals are minded, cognitive systems. Animal consciousness, however, it is a topic that some scientists are less willing to engage with.”

http://plato.stanfor…gnition-animal/

I’ve been a dog owner all my life, and based primarily on personal experience I’d have to say that dogs are volitional, and conscious, but perhaps selfless. I can read my dogs emotions as well as those of family members, and reaction for reaction, dogs brood, get excited, show fear, and even smile as their hosts do, and usually for the same reasons; and their memory is as good or better. In terms of planning, I’d say dogs are fully capable of the first few moves, but lack the ability, or interest in forming long range goals.

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I’ve been wondering about this stuff too, and my wonder turned to confusion when I heard Peikoff’s response to one of the questions in the fourth part of the recording of his “live Q&A on July 6, 2012”.

09:20

Questioner: “In the vein of being a dog lover, which I am also, there are at least a couple of podcasts (including one of my favorites: podcast number 16) in which you indicate the possibility that animals might have some kind of primitive form of volition. And I think my own observation of dogs in particular indicates that they indeed make choices. They exert effort. It even looks like to me sometimes a bit of mental effort. You know, not conceptual. It’s kind of a proto form. But what do you think about that? That they have proto volition.”

Peikoff: “Well, no, I would not disagree with you. I just don’t think it’s .. it’s certainly not proven, and I don’t know how it would be provable. But there is a lot of evidence for it. A dog hesitates, can’t decide which stimulus to respond to. Or you call him and at first it’s quick as though we’re gonna go and then he changes his mind and decides not to. There’s a lot of evidence of things like that. But you prove free will by the nature of a conceptual consciousness, so if you’re gonna prove free will for a perceptual consciousness, you have to do it by some other means. I don’t know how.”

I thought Objectivism held that humans are the only beings with free will. Did I misunderstand, or does Peikoff’s response contradict that? And if he’s saying that dogs (and, by implication I think, other non-humans) might have free will, what does that mean for Objectivism’s view of rights?

[Edited to add names to the quotes.]

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My understanding is that humans and non human animals both have consciousness because they are aware of their surroundings. However, animal consciousness stops as precepts while human consciousness involves the formation of concepts.

But i have difficulty seeing this in a nature. A mind without the ability to form concepts would have to consider each encounter with a physical entity independently. That is, every precept would be its own unit of variable use to the subject rather than being organized under generalizable concepts. If this is the case, I don’t see how an animal would function at all. Wouldn’t every glad of grass be its own precept and therefore present a tremendous level of uncertainty to the animal?

All known forms of consciousness are composed of neuronal cells arranged into communicating networks. What these neural networks do by their very nature is to self organize into pattern recognition circuits. Using vision as an example, these pattern recognition circuits are connected to the sensing cells to detect primitives such as motion, color, contrast and edges and then additional layers of the same pattern recognition circuits are overlayed on those primitive outputs to detect shape, distance and movement vectors in 3 dimensions. How exactly this works is almost a completely solved problem with mathematics to describe it (see Jeff Hawkins theory of Hierarchical Temporal Memory presented in his book On Intelligence; thread with videos of lectures here)

More primitive consciousnesses such as fish and reptiles can detect and food and threats and then engage in the appropriate behavior without recognizing and remembering individuals. Although there is a real sense in which concepts are more abstract and percepts more concrete it actually requires a more complex mammalian brain to recognize and remember individuals rather than to deal in patterns. In other words, mammalian brains have the greater capacity to form pattern recognition circuits to recognize individuals but they also retain the ability to recognize simple patterns.

I am assuming that instinct is the solution to this problem. Animals must have inborn reactions to stimuli which enables it to deal with a variety of precepts. This function is clearly evolutionary as animals with weak or inaccurate instincts would die off. If this is the case, does this mean that all animal action is involuntarily driven by instinct? Can an animal purposefully evade instinct?

Applying the word and concept “involuntary” to an animal assumes that an animal has free will can do anything voluntarily, but whether an animal has free will was the question to be asked in the first place. This is called “begging the question”.

My secondary issue involves demonstrating the percept/concept divide between animals and humans. How is this empirically demonstrated?

Um, how about by thinking about types of consciousnesses and corresponding with other minds by writing messages posted on an internet discussion forum? I think that will do the job. Yes. (sorry if this comes across as smart-ass but it is just too easy)

For instance, some days my cat wants to go outside and paws at the door while other days he wants to sit inside and doesn’t paw at the door. How can it be demonstrated that this is a result of instinct (presumably sme sort of environmental factor or diminishing returns on outside adventures for the cat) rather than a conscious decision?

Your cat has consciousness, so of course it is a conscious decision. But your cat does not have words so it cannot be willful in the way humans can when they reason themselves into action. Of course humans also (and usually) are responding to internal and external stimuli as cats do and do not reason out every movement of their little finger, so there is a real similarity justifying your empathy with your cat. However, the difference having a conceptual faculty makes is also real.

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Found this on Facebook and looked for a relevant topic to post as an update.  The “Mirror Test”, used to demonstrate an ability to be self-aware, attempts to bridge the gap between between animal minds (instinctive) and human minds (conceptual).  The recognition of oneself from the herd has little use in terms of planning ones own goals if ones actions instinctively follow the herd.  The following short video demonstrates how the test is used and what conclusions may be drawn from the results…

 

http://blog.petflow.com/this-is-mind-blowing-look-what-happens-when-an-elephant-looks-in-the-mirror/?utm_source=fbsprescuesiteelephant&utm_medium=Facebook&utm_campaign=fbspblogelephant

 

Theory of Mind: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_mind

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My understanding is that humans and non human animals both have consciousness because they are aware of their surroundings. However, animal consciousness stops as precepts while human consciousness involves the formation of concepts.

But i have difficulty seeing this in a nature. A mind without the ability to form concepts would have to consider each encounter with a physical entity independently. That is, every precept would be its own unit of variable use to the subject rather than being organized under generalizable concepts. If this is the case, I don’t see how an animal would function at all. Wouldn’t every glad of grass be its own precept and therefore present a tremendous level of uncertainty to the animal?

The difference you’re looking for is between association and identity.

 

Animals can learn about various percepts by associating it with everything that it does (as in Pavlov’s dogs) and associating similar percepts with each other.  In mammals such as dogs and cats, the sheer quantity of such associations can develop into rudimentary forms of reasoning (which is what Peikoff was struggling to identify).

So a dog could not think to itself, in preverbal terms, that “all men are mortal;” the concepts of men and mortality refer to what things are, instead of what they are similar to.  It could think something along the lines of “this man is like that man, and that man just died” but you can’t generalize that way.

 

However, in perceptual terms (such as “this man” or “that man”) most animals are perfectly capable of grasping identities.  They simply don’t have the capacity to process groups of entities in such terms, while we do.

 

Although it is worth noting that some primates have been taught to communicate with sign language, which means that they must have some rudimentary form of conceptualization (at least for first-order concepts, which refer directly to percepts).

The interesting thing about that is that none of those primates have ever asked the question “why”.

 

I don’t know what that means yet, but whatever allows us to conceive of a “why” must be the thing which none of the higher mammals have in common with us; the thing that is truly human.

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…

Although it is worth noting that some primates have been taught to communicate with sign language, which means that they must have some rudimentary form of conceptualization (at least for first-order concepts, which refer directly to percepts). The interesting thing about that is that none of those primates have ever asked the question “why”.

 

I don’t know what that means yet, but whatever allows us to conceive of a “why” must be the thing which none of the higher mammals have in common with us; the thing that is truly human.

 

I’m not sure that’s a valid distinction, or at least relavent in terms of expressing what’s on ones mind.  There are various studies I’ve seen that demonstrate animal curiosity about how things work, along with being happy to discover a solution or irritated at not finding one.  When animal behavior posits problem solving in action, I think one can assume that the animal is in fact asking, “why”.

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What is it that an animal does that qualifies as behavior positing problem solving activity?

What are you contrasting this behavior with to draw such a conclusion? A child’s development? Would this be an anthropomorphic projection?

 

A puppy or kitten explores a home that it is in. After it familiarizes itself with its environment, does it continue to explore with the same intensity into adulthood, or just investigate changes, such as the appearance of a Christmas tree, or packages brought in, or other new objects introduced into the home?

 

Sure, some birds can drop rocks into a tube of water to raise a morsel of food into eating distance.

A green heron will drop bait into the water to lure a fish. Would you consider this a variation on trolling or fly-fishing?

Aborigines cut a small hole into a gourd that a type of monkey can reach into, but once clutching the prize, won’t let go of it to allude capture.

 

DA, I don’t recall having to reconcile this issue on my journey.

 

I got to try explaining something recently, when a goose was out on the ice on the lake and it set down, like it might on the ground, atop the ice. The comment was made - that doesn’t look very comfortable. It must be freezing its nether-sides off. Why do some human beings think that because they feel, think, and/or do something - that animals must have fully or near parallel experiences?

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What is it that an animal does that qualifies as behavior positing problem solving activity?

What are you contrasting this behavior with to draw such a conclusion? A child’s development? Would this be an anthropomorphic projection?

…

 

What comes readily to mind was seeing some nature show years ago featuring an octopus finding a glass jar with a crab inside, and sealed with a cork that had a small penetration large enough to insert an arm, but not to extract the crab.  In working to extract the crab, the octopus shifted color to red, presumed to denote an aggitated state, and finally works out how to remove the cork top.  In doing a quick Google search I found the following, which is one of numerous similar examples:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ocWF6d0nelY

 

So how does this compare to a human finding something unusual that elicits curiousity, and leads to trying to figure out how to get at the object of that curiousity?  I’d say pretty darn close, but yeah it’s not human problem solving because an octopus obviously isn’t a human.  So I guess the question is, is human intelligence singular by method or by species?

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That was no cork. That octopus unthreaded a plastic lid.

 

A couple of other examples that come to mind -

John Lilly spent 26 years studying if dolphins could learn to communicate with humans. Here’s a link to a rather bizarre take on one aspect of it (4th one down).

Other researchers have spent time teaching sign language to primates with limited success.

 

Meanwhile, missionaries have gone into tribal lands, and in much shorter periods time been able to learn the language of the natives.

 

If the distinction is a-rational intelligence vs. conceptual reasoning - then many animals, including an octopus opening a jar, elephants working conjointly to accomplish a goal, bears taught to ride bicycles, monkeys working with their organ grinders, a dog that can retrieve 1000 toys differentiating the sounds a human makes to distinguish which toy to grab, parrots mimicking a wide selection of sounds it can replicate, etc., I would say that intelligence or capabilities along these various lines can clearly be demonstrated. 

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As indicated in my post, “I found the following, which is one of numerous similar examples”, e.g., transparent container, goodie inside, removable top, etc.  What I find persuasive in this kind of test is that from the POV of the octopi, the only familiar object is the goodie inside, so one can presume that instinct per se, isn’t entirely relied on in arriving at a solution.  The method is primarily one of trial and error, applying/refining what works and retaining that knowledge for future use, i.e., problem solving.

 

Going back to the mirror test, again the test animal is being presented with an unfamiliar experience such that instinct can only play a marginal role.  And not all test animals respond with the same interest/actions, indicating some ability to choose to focus their attention/actions, or not to, i.e., free-will.

 

Do these kind of tests posit human intelligence? No, because the test animals aren’t human.

 

Do these kind of tests posit similar intelligence? Yes, because the methods used are essentially the same, e.g., choice, examination, manipulation, reward, refinement, and in some cases passing on what has been learned to others: http://www.allaboutwildlife.com/2009-10/monkeys-teach-their-young-to-floss-teeth/3148

 

So again I ask, is human intelligence singular by method or by species?  Meaning, are we comparing methods of discovery to evaluate intelligence, or simply declaring that all non-humans are dumberer because they aren’t human??

 

As an aside, I don’t consider attempts to teach animals to act human by learning a foreign/alien language particularly relevant as measure of intelligence, given that if applied to our own educational system, a failing grade would indicate that the student isn’t human.  I recall an interesting story (wish I could remember the title), where a group of scientists working to establish communication with captive dolphins only succeeded in causing the dolphins to become insane.

 

Edited to correct spelling errors

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In seeking to compare methods of discovery to evaluate intelligence, to contrast man, the rational animal, with animal, sans-rational, how does one filter rationality from the mix to ensure an accurate ordinal assessment of dumbness, or more positively, intelligence, and simultaneously apply it across the broad all-inclusive animal kingdom?

 

Peikoff, in one of his lectures, discussed the borderline case. Loosely paraphrasing, it is not accomplished by trying to contrast the dumbest college freshman against the brightest primate. First, the normative standard needs to be isolated, at which point you return to the borderline case and apply the principle abstracted to the specific particulars involved.

 

Edited: Would this be considered a case of playing devil’s advocate with Devil’s Advocate?

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Well, the first thing I notice is some effort to establish a self-fulfilling premise; “to contrast man, the rational animal, with animal, sans-rational”.

 

It seems to me a truly objective test to look for intelligence amongst all animals (Man included) doesn’t begin by comparing non-humans with marginal humans.  For example, if cognition, i.e., thinking, reasoning, or remembering is the normative standard being applied “based on what is considered to be the usual or correct way of doing something” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/normative), such comparisons only add an unnecessary distinction by species.  Again, are we looking for animal intelligence, or only human intelligence.

 

The usual or correct way of doing something is presumed to be different from one species to another, according to what a particular animal needs to accomplish in order to survive.  One doesn’t expect elephants and octopi to behave like humans in order to survive, let alone survive like a marginal human, but one can observe behavioral patterns that posit intelligent survival skills/abilities, e.g., thinking, reasoning, or remembering that are the correct way of doing something an elephant or octopus needs to do to survive, and differentiate instinctive from volitional actions.

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I think the question one starts with is, “What are the similarities and differences between human cognition and the cognition of other animals?”

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I think the question one starts with is, “What are the similarities and differences between human cognition and the cognition of other animals?”

 

This is preferable to dismissing animal cognition a priori, but the metric should be animal qua animal (which includes man), rather than man qua man (which excludes animals).  That may be a small point, but I belive it’s a more honest approach to comparing intelligence amongst all animals, if that is ones goal.

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Perhaps a fertile way of defining the issue would be to say that each species of animal has a ‘cosciousness’ particular to its own genre. In other words, dogs and homo sapiens are each conscious in their own way.

 

To extend this a bit, i might suggest that consciousness is, by definition, those learning traits specific to a particular species. In the very least, this perspective would abolish the ‘next to god’ or ‘spark of godliness’ assumptions that underlie and sabotage much of the inquiry into animal learning.

 

Of course, those of philosophical; bent will recognize this as the Cartesian issue of dualism redux…speaking of which…a good arrticle would be Nagel’s “What’s it like to be a bat?”…

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Well, the first thing I notice is some effort to establish a self-fulfilling premise; “to contrast man, the rational animal, with animal, sans-rational”.

 

Not trying to establish a self-fulfilling premise. The distinction was to try to isolate the fundamental difference from the pack. Man as the rational (differentia) animal (genus) goes back a few years, so in a sense, this is rehashing old territory, or trying to reduce this to elements that it was induced from. 

 

It seems to me a truly objective test to look for intelligence amongst all animals (Man included) doesn’t begin by comparing non-humans with marginal humans.  For example, if cognition, i.e., thinking, reasoning, or remembering is the normative standard being applied “based on what is considered to be the usual or correct way of doing something” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/normative), such comparisons only add an unnecessary distinction by species.  Again, are we looking for animal intelligence, or only human intelligence.

 

 

Separating out what is bolded, you earlier asked if human intelligence is singular.by method or species. To ascertain this, doesn’t intelligence need to be investigated apart from man’s unique capacity for reasoning?

 

The usual or correct way of doing something is presumed to be different from one species to another, according to what a particular animal needs to accomplish in order to survive.  One doesn’t expect elephants and octopi to behave like humans in order to survive, let alone survive like a marginal human, but one can observe behavioral patterns that posit intelligent survival skills/abilities, e.g., thinking, reasoning, or remembering that are the correct way of doing something an elephant or octopus needs to do to survive, and differentiate instinctive from volitional actions.

Here, shouldn’t the question should be if the usual or correct way of doing X or Y is dependent on X or Y, rather than which specie is performing X or Y?

 

Edited: before, after.

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Rational means having reason, which means having the power of the mind to think and understand in a logical way, which refers to the formal processes used in thinking and reasoning.  So rational implies logical, which implies reasoning, which implies problem solving.  Therefore, to the degree that any non-human animal responds with curiosity and works to figure out how to do something, Man’s “rational (differentia)” becomes a shared trait and not a unique one.

 

You’re probably aware by now of my great respect for Locke, but even he didn’t fundamentally challenge whether or not some animals, by sharing an intellectual capacity with Man, ought not to be considered mere property to be claimed.  Of course at the time we were still working out whether or not lesser humans, i.e., slaves ought to be considered claimable property.  Obviously much depends on the scope of the “differentia” Man seeks to establish between himself and those he desires to have dominion over.

 

So observing that human intelligence is singular by species, i.e., Man is just way-way smarter than all other stupid animals, appears to me to simply rationalize Genesis 1:26, whereas observing singular methods humans use to problem solve may be a more intellectually honest test of whatever differentia remains between ourselves and other intelligent creatures.
 

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Referencing the following from ITOE:

(As far as can be ascertained, the perceptual level of a child’s awareness is similar to the awareness of the higher animals: the higher animals are able to perceive entities, motions, attributes, and certain numbers of entities. But what an animal cannot perform is the process of abstraction—of mentally separating attributes, motions or numbers from entities. It has been said that an animal can perceive two oranges or two potatoes, but cannot grasp the concept “two.”)

 

It is this distinction I’m trying to separate out of this intelligence equation. Can rationality exist without conceptualization?

 

Gathering sticks to serve as kindling, learning to strike a match (not to manufacture one), place a marshmallow on stick (again, not to fabricate one) differs in what crucial ways from the physical activity of riding a bike (again, not having developed the capability of producing one, much less mass producing them) or orienting a stick with a marshmallow in a proper proximity to a flame?

 

Edited: Added.

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“Can rationality exist without conceptualization?” ~ dream_weaver

 

Thankee-sai  :thumbsup:   That is a wonderful question…

 

This would be a difficult non-human attribute to posit behaviorally.  Your example of gathering sticks relies heavily on displaying an ability to manufacture:

“(not to manufacture one)”

“(again, not to fabricate one)”

“(again, not having developed the capability of producing one, much less mass producing them)”

 

This at least expands the “tool maker” argument to something with marketing skills, e.g., a trader.  My question here is, are we looking for a human trader, or all creatures that trade?  Is the standard being applied man qua man, or animal qua animal?? 

 

Having the ability to conceptualize, i.e., form mental pictures, is behaviorally expressible by sound and gestures to communicate, and I believe most would concede that intelligent animals communicate with members of their own pack.  I’m inclined to be generous and permit that many animals have any ability to translate into and out of their own means of communication via aggressive, passive, and playful posturing, including some remarkable examples of deception.

 

But where oh where do animals go to shop?