See also for why any legal system must necessarily contain libertarian aspects, the American abolistionist Lysander Spooner, in “The Unconstitutionality of Slavery” explains that any positive law, by its nature, implies the existence of a objective legal standard, and positive law, again by its nature, implies that this objective legal standard must have libertarian content. Any positive law that deviates from moral law, should be disregarded for the simple fact that unjust laws are illegal, and obedience to them is not required.
How can an unjust law be illegal? There is nothing to enforce a “naturally legal” law let alone stop an “illegal law”. It makes no sense to call that law at all, unless we suppose a law exists in the fabric of reality itself, i.e. intrinsic law. A law is enforced by someone, always, and we can call it law because someone is saying they’ll be justified to implement force against a lawbreaker. Without an enforcer, a “law” amounts to merely a kind request, and bad laws are mean. Sure, we can call a law unjust, but to declare that a law is illegal because it is forbidden by natural law makes me wonder: Why should I care if I violate natural law if nothing is going to enforce it? If you only mean “there are always consequences” then you’ve literally equivocated law and morality. Call a bad law immoral, not illegal. You’re making the same error as the comrade, that “lawfulness is [always] just” by making law a sanctified thing above, beyond, and separate from the state or any enforcer.
A law is a judgment of the state, and I see no issue with that. The issue with Socrates is that his comrade is wrong to call lawfulness just. Lawfulness is not always just, so the comrade’s issue is easily fixed. It also means we actually -must- pick the laws we like. Whether or not we make a moral choice is a separate question. But just as law is not equal to morality, whether something is a law has no bearing on moral action except as a pragmatic consideration. Hopefully, a law is proper, though, and only represents a subset of morality, non-initiation of force. Sort of like how Rand said “individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law.”
I find it interesting that you, an anarchist, mentioned a non-anarchist to add some support to your position, while I, a non-anarchist, mentioned a guy who was basically an anarchist.
My ultimate point is that obeying and enforcing must be decided by an individual for himself. The question is not “is it wrong to break the law, because the law in itself should be respected?” The better question is “does the law serve my self-interest?” Laws that are just serve our self-interest.
Regarding Socrates deciding to stay in Athens instead of escaping, Stirner had another point that applies to what you said. From the same book:
Had he known, and been able to know, what he was, he would have conceded to such judges no claim, no
right. That he did not escape was just his weakness, his delusion of still having something in common with the
Athenians, or the opinion that he was a member, a mere member of this people.
But he was rather this people itself
in person, and could only be his own judge. There was no judge over him, as he himself had really pronounced a
public sentence on himself and rated himself worthy of the Prytaneum. He should have stuck to that, and, as he had
uttered no sentence of death against himself, should have despised that of the Athenians too and escaped. But he
subordinated himself and recognized in the people his judge; he seemed little to himself before the majesty of the
people. That he subjected himself to might (to which alone he could succumb) as to a “right” was treason against
himself: it was virtue.
To Christ, who, it is alleged, refrained from using the power over his heavenly legions, the
same scrupulousness is thereby ascribed by the narrators. Luther did very well and wisely to have the safety of his
journey to Worms warranted to him in black and white, and Socrates should have known that the Athenians were
his enemies, he alone his judge. The self-deception of a “reign of law,” etc., should have given way to the perception
that the relation was a relation of might.
