if Objectivism holds the universe as the sum of all its parts, what does it mean when it says - “All entities in the universe may be finite, but the set of entities need not be”? Does this mean the universe is or is not infinite?
There are two ways that the universe may be finite or not, to my knowledge, and neither seem particularly problematic to me. The first way is for the universe to be “very big”, which seems to be permitted by the phrase, “but the set of entities [in the universe] need not be [finite.]” Here, as I recall discussing in another thread, one simply claims that for any finite list of spatiotemporal existents that you may conjure, there is always some such existent not on the list. This works in much the same way that the natural numbers work. Create any finite list and you will always miss at least one. While I know of no specific proof that this describes reality, scientists claim to have good evidence for the case. So I take this description as at least more likely than not.
Does this mean that the universe, being infinite, is without definition? I don’t see why it should. A comprehensive listing is not a definition. If it were, then we would have no definition of the natural numbers. However, if you ask me to tell you what are the natural numbers, and you gave me no effective limit on the amount of time I have to tell you which are the natural numbers, I could sit here forever and list off each and every one. Likewise, in reverse, you could think of any thing you want and ask me, “Is this a natural number?” and I would answer “Yes,” or “No,” correspondingly with perfect accuracy. Hence it seems we have an effective definition of an infinite set. That is because the members of the set are perfectly distinguished from every thing that is not in the set, and everything not in the set is perfectly distinguished from things in the set. We could just as well apply this to the universe, assuming it is “very large”. You could ask me to show you every single thing in the universe and, given infinite time and unlimited locomotive power, I could show you everything. Likewise, show me anything you like and I could tell you whether it is in the universe or not. The later is not much of a hurdle to clear when every answer is going to be “Yes,” unless you ask me about a thing that does not exist.
The other way for the universe, or any defined set of stuff, can be infinite is by being “very small”. That is, by being infinitely divisible. Though this concept is not expressly contradicted by the quote, “All entities in the universe may be finite, but the set of entities need not be,” the quote does seem to imply that nothing can be infinitely divisible. Yet I don’t see why this should be. Suppose that you have a rock, which we call X, and you divide it into two and get pieces X_1 and Y_1. You then divide X_1 to get X_2 and Y_2, and so you carry on this pattern. For what reason must you reach some point at which your division must cease? At every stage you must have a piece that, following the pattern of naming used above, is named X_n for some finite n. But why must there be a particular greatest number that n could be? Put another way, it seems perfectly possible that for any given X_n, there will be an X_n+1 and Y_n+1. Each particular part X_n for any finite n will be well-defined. I will be able to show you each X_n, granted unlimited time and divisive power, and for every thing you show me I can tell you whether it’s an X_n or not. How can I ensure the later? Well, give me unlimited time and I will produce every X_n for each finite n. If the thing you show me is an X_n, I will produce it at some finite stage. If it is not, I will never tell you that it is an X_n. The only hitch is that if you show me something that is not an X_n and ask me whether it is and X_n for some finite n, I will not have a test to show that it is not one. That is, I could never tell you, “This is not an X_n.” Is that important for a definition? I don’t think so. It would never lead me into error. That is, I would never say “This is an X_n,” when it’s not. And I would never say, “This is not an X_n,” when it is. And moreover, everything will either be an X_n or not an X_n–it’s just that in some cases, I must always remain agnostic.
Still, what definitely does seem like evasion is this whole, ‘don’t try to imagine the beginning of the universe, because it’s too abstract’. I don’t get that. The first bit of energy, in the very first split-second of time, required no reason to come about? It just seems, that with the Law of Causality, that an eternally recycling universe - in terms of physical matter, not metaphysics - makes more sense overall.
I don’t see why this should be. Let’s say that the universe recycles. Where did this whole process of recycling come from? Why is there something rather than nothing? Why is there any existence at all? Whether you have a universe that recycles or one that has a beginning and an end, it is nonsense to ask, “Why is it here?” You must first start with the fact that it is here. That is automatic and given. To try to go underneath that fact is to try to go underneath an axiom. If you want to question an axiom, well, you’re on your own.
I see no problem with the idea that the universe had a “first moment”. And if you ask me, “What made it exist?” I would say that the question is unintelligible. It was, by definition, the first moment. Nothing preceded it, so nothing could make it exist. It just was. In the same way that the universe “just is” and needs no explanation for being, the first moment “just was”.