“Wooden table” is two concepts: wooden and table. There is nothing wrong with multiple concepts applying to one entity. Perhaps you can make it into one, but then it’s still a type of table. That is its genus is “table” and the concept table also applies to it. If it is used as firewood, then you’d probably say “this table is primarily treated as firewood”. It always was firewood to the extent it meets the essential character
How is a proposition “this table is primarily treated as firewood” to be formalized in Objectivists’ terms? Is it something like: “the concrete object x as conceptualized as an integrated identity A is employed in reality to the extent that its expressing his integrated identity B and thus negating the A-identity”?
At this point I think a more realistic account is this one:
1] The needs and wants of people are met when an object x is created with the capacity to perform a desired function F.
(e.g. to place stuff on, preferable foods or decorative materials).
2] The capacity of a concrete object x to perform function F is equivalent to having an identity A1.
(e.g. all table-like objects have the capacity to perform table-functions.)
3] In order for objects to exist they must be made of matter. The chosen materials for object x have identity M.
(e.g. this table is made of wood.)
4] A concrete object x can be utilized for any desired function F2, F3, F4,….Fn, as long as it doesn’t contradict the physical properties of x, i.e. the only constrain is its identity M.
(e.g. this table can be used as a raft, firewood, shelter, .)
5] Reiterating 2]: having the capacity to perform functions F2, F3, F4,….Fn is equivalent to having identities A2, A3,A4, An.
6] Thus object x can be identified as: (A1,A2,A3, and/or An) and M.
7] As 1] and 4] are predicated on the needs and wants of people, the identification is subjective in functional terms and only objective in reference to in its physical properties.
(Although this specific object is meant as a table, commonly used as table, his material M fully enabling the usage as a table, we have to conclude that x is not uniquely a table to all people at all times).
8] Conclusion: identification cannot be a purely objective act.
At this moment I personally think this last ‘deconstruction’ of identity is plausible and it seems to have some parallels with the accounts some Objectivists has given thus far. At the same time this conception of identification seems to differ substantial from what Ms Rand wants her readers to accept.
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/objectivity.html
Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given context, only one answer is true , the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process, no escape from the responsibility for it, no shortcuts, no special revelations to privileged observers—and that there can be no such thing as a final “authority” in matters pertaining to human knowledge. Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one’s own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second.
Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly; that there is no escape from the law of identity, neither in the universe with which he deals nor in the working of his own consciousness , and if he is to acquire knowledge of the first, he must discover the proper method of using the second; that there is no room for the _ arbitrary _ in any activity of man, least of all in his method of cognition —and just as he has learned to be guided by objective criteria in making his physical tools, so he must be guided by objective criteria in forming his tools of cognition: his concepts.
(my marking)
Man has not just only learned to use objective criteria in tool-making, he also has learned he has needs and desires and that those can be satisfied by tool-use. This is in part a subjective act, a valuation.
A consciousness man is always creator and authority of identity. This is in part a subjective act, a valuation. A proposition containing this identity is only true when an objective part of the identity is indeed found in reality.
e.g. The identity of Santa Claus is not: has wings, steals stuff from children and is dressed like Darth Vader.
The ‘proper’ identity of Santa Claus is: dressed in red, quite chubby and old, gives stuff to children, ect.
The ‘proper’ identity of Santa Claus has no factual reference in reality => Santa Clause does not exist.
Even non-existing things have identities.
These things considered I think Ms Rand suggests more rigorousness, more objectivity and more consistency than she actually delivers The ‘world’ of concepts seems to be much more muddy, more subject to agency and much less clear-cut as Rand portraits it to be. If something basic like the construction of concepts is partial but essential predicated on subjectivity it’s a misrepresentation to state:
The senses, concepts, logic: these are the elements of man’s rational faculty—its start, its form, its method. In essence, “follow reason” means: base knowledge on observation; form concepts according to the actual (measurable) relationships among concretes; use concepts according to the rules of logic (ultimately, the Law of Identity). Since each of these elements is based on the facts of reality, the conclusions reached by a process of reason are objective.
The stereotypical example is how the Inuit have 50 different words for different types of snow; Southern Canadians probably have 5 or 10; and Nicaraguans really don’t have any, though they’d recognize some from books and movies. Slightly apocryphal, but this much is true: one person might group things as a single concept while another person may break them down further and group them into two or more concepts. If they’ve both done it right, they can both see and validate that the other has created a meaningful category, even though they each might find their own categorization useful to their own purposes.
I think I can agree to your example but I question if Rand would with the bold part.
Castor, its important to point out here that there are two different senses of objectivity for Oism.
- The ontological distinction of objective which is referring to external realism. That is, mind independent facts. This is the factual basis of the primacy of existence over consciousness. Consciousness exists bit it is ontologically dependent on metaphysical primaries.
Yes, AKA the metaphysical concept of objectivity. That definition struck me as a bit peculiar since a regular definition of realism entails: “Philosophers who profess realism state that truth consists in the mind’s correspondence to reality.” By that account reality is not seen as being objective; only a belief or statement concerning reality can be objective (to some extent) if it accurately describes reality. In this more general view reality cannot be objective, only propositions can be.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
- The epistemological distinction that refers to the volitional method of identifying and integrating those ontological facts in order to correspond to them in thought and action.
The primary question you seem to be asking is concerning the epistemological requirements of objective correspondence. Objectivity in this context is a relation between the subject and object of cognition. The identity the things being identified as against their background context both externally and internally constrains the process of identification in such a way that arbitrary whim and bad methods can produce failure to correspond to the facts. This process is neither automatic nor unconstrained. It is a volitional process that requires one to discover the conditions that are not up to the observers/subjects caprice.
The Oist principle of Rand’s Razor (concepts ought not be multiplied beyond necessity) is an epistemological guide to remind one of the cognitive requirements of economy that is the reason for concepts in the first place.
Rands Razor in the explanation here:
The requirements of cognition forbid the arbitrary grouping of existents, both in regard to isolation and to integration. They forbid the random coining of special concepts to designate any and every group of existents with any possible combination of characteristics. For example, there is no concept to designate “Beautiful blondes with blue eyes, 5’5” tall and 24 years old.” Such entities or groupings are identified descriptively. If such a special concept existed, it would lead to senseless duplication of cognitive effort (and to conceptual chaos): everything of significance discovered about that group would apply to all other young women as well. There would be no cognitive justification for such a concept—unless some essential characteristic were discovered, distinguishing such blondes from all other women and requiring special study, in which case a special concept would become necessary. . . .
In what regard is “description” different from “concept” one might ask, especially as Rand defines the concept of table in a descriptive manner.
Also: this idea of “concept” doesn’t seem to promote well-being. Isn’t hair colour correlated to risk of sun induced skin cancer? I’ve discovered I find blonde x beautiful but, sadly, that does not apply to all other young woman. I’ve discovered she is 24 years old, in contrast to another woman who is 84. I might consider Blonde x as a candidate for marriage, reproduction or recreation while the 84-old woman is not in that conceptual domain. It’s seems essential for me to make this meaningful distinction/categorization.
“Hi! I’m Mary”
“No you are not, you are a woman.”
“O Castor, you romantic fool….”
@Castor #13
“Any statement about my table is only objective when it concerns true facts that can be verified empirically by all reasonable and competed men.”
What if you are stranded on a desert island? Is objective knowledge impossible because there are no other reasonable and competent men around to verify what you believe to be true? Is learning to survive impossible then?
A statement can be true on a desert island. As truth depends on the coherence with reality. When a second person would arrive he could verify the statement. The verifiably of a statement is a precondition for it to be objective, the actual verification is the explicit claim of a second person that this statement indeed is true. Without an actual verification a statement can be true and (maybe) objective but an observer stranded on an island has no absolute mean to be sure of that.
You need to appreciate how radially individualistic Objectivism is. While it is nice to exchange information and learn from others, it is not absolutely necessary in order to obtain objective knowledge. We are all epistemic islands. We are all individuals. Information received through communication with others is no different, metaphysically, than information gained from your senses when you plant a seed and watch it grow or learn to drive a car. Words spoken or typed by others are just sensory input to you. YOU must determine if what they say is true or not. What they believe to be true has no bearing on whether it is true – and their belief should never serve as a substitution for your own judgment.
This fact that it is existentially impossible for one person to think for another is the basis for Objectivist Ethics. No one can force you to believe something to be true and you cannot force someone else to believe something to be true. We each must think for ourselves and draw our own conclusions. Will we be wrong on occasion? Absolutely. We’re probably wrong more often then we are right. But we can learn from our actions including communicating with others.
I think I could sympathize with a good portion in these lines and with the way you formulated it. But in some way is doesn’t sound like the message or method Rand seems to promote. I wouldn’t be surprised to find a very similar phrasing as yours in a recommendation of a Nietzschean philosophy or of Existentialism (Sartre, de Beauvoir) The freedom’s you emphasize are very prominent in those philosophies, where, in my understanding of, Rand’s epistemology seems to advocate a kind of absolutistic reasoning.