Is my table a table?

Metaphysics and Epistemology
21

Castor said:

Yes, AKA the metaphysical concept of objectivity. That definition struck me as a bit peculiar since a regular definition of realism entails: “Philosophers who profess realism state that truth consists in the mind’s correspondence to reality.” By that account reality is not seen as being objective; only a belief or statement concerning reality can be objective (to some extent) if it accurately describes reality. In this more general view reality cannot be objective, only propositions can be.

Correspondence to what Castor? One can be a realist about anything. If you believe in gremlins you think they are real. External realist believe that there is a mind independent world really out there that must be corresponded to…

Castor said:

In what regard is “description” different from “concept” one might ask, especially as Rand defines the concept of table in a descriptive manner.

Also: this idea of “concept” doesn’t seem to promote well-being. Isn’t hair colour correlated to risk of sun induced skin cancer? I’ve discovered I find blonde x beautiful but, sadly, that does not apply to all other young woman. I’ve discovered she is 24 years old, in contrast to another woman who is 84. I might consider Blonde x as a candidate for marriage, reproduction or recreation while the 84-old woman is not in that conceptual domain. It’s seems essential for me to make this meaningful distinction/categorization.

One uses concepts to describe anything. But if one describes non-essentials in a definition the definition ceases to serve its cognitive purpose of referential economy. Without such economy one would not be able to survive as man.

22

Euiol said:

There is no metaphysically primary concept, which concept you use is a matter of what you’re focusing on. Tables aren’t usually synonymous with firewood since tables are made out of many different materials.

This is unfortunately false. The Primacy of existence is an ontological priority.

23

Castor said:

Man has not just only learned to use objective criteria in tool-making, he also has learned he has needs and desires and that those can be satisfied by tool-use. This is in part a subjective act, a valuation.

A consciousness man is always creator and authority of identity. This is in part a subjective act, a valuation. A proposition containing this identity is only true when an objective part of the identity is indeed found in reality.

e.g. The identity of Santa Claus is not: has wings, steals stuff from children and is dressed like Darth Vader.

The ‘proper’ identity of Santa Claus is: dressed in red, quite chubby and old, gives stuff to children, ect.

The ‘proper’ identity of Santa Claus has no factual reference in reality => Santa Clause does not exist.

Even non-existing things have identities.

Mans needs are objective facts based on metaphysically given identity. Ms Rand uses the bread vs poison example to illustrate this. Man does not create the conditions that satisfy his needs, they are objective facts. That a subject must identify those conditions means that there is one making the identification but that changes nothing about the fact that the conditions are metaphysically given- outside the ability of consciousness to change.

Santa Clause is a mental existent. As such he has he identity given to him by the ones who created this abstract object. In this context one who described Santa Clause as a muslim skateboarder would be failing to identity the facts that relate to his creation by another. I chose plasmatic as a user name and it was a choice to do so but it is a fact that that is my user name.

24

I have to reiterate my first post in this thread. Why are you looking to gain an understanding of Rand’s theory of concepts from an online message board and not from the actual text where she lays out her theory of concepts? ITOE is NOT a long book. Am I wrong to assume that you have not read it? If my assumption is correct, I think it’s silly to look for answers from secondary sources who almost always have an incomplete understanding of the issues.

 

My questions here concern the way people conceptualize and to what extend that can be regarded as objective. Every concept that is objective must refer to a measurable aspect of reality. As indicated there are a lot of possible conceptualizations of any one physical object, ever so empirical, verifiable, practical and ever so objective.

What is it that makes an Objectivist to accept any one conceptualization and reject other, empirical, verifiable and objective concepts? When I point at my wooden table and state: “this is a Flammable Object”, is a Objectivist forced to deny this statement? And if so, on which objective grounds? Is he/she forced to deny the concept of flammability or the concept of object or the integration of those identifications? What empirical fact makes a concept of a “flammable object” a non-concept for a physical object when it is in fact flammable?

 

Why would an objectivist be forced to deny that proposition? Wood is flammable. The concepts ‘table’ and ‘flammable’ are valid concepts, I don’t understand the problem? Concepts are a tool of cognition, meaning that so long as the concept is valid, your purpose defines which tool you should use.

 

 

Euiol said:

This is unfortunately false. The Primacy of existence is an ontological priority.

 

Read Eiuol’s post again because I think you’re misinterpreting his point.

1 Like
25

Critical said:

Read Eiuol’s post again because I think you’re misinterpreting his point.

I’m responding to something louie has claimed more than once elsewhere that is being reiterated here.

26

A statement can be true on a desert island. As truth depends on the coherence with reality. When a second person would arrive he could verify the statement. The verifiably of a statement is a precondition for it to be objective, the actual verification is the explicit claim of a second person that this statement indeed is true. Without an actual verification a statement can be true and (maybe) objective but an observer stranded on an island has no absolute mean to be sure of that.

 

I think I could sympathize with a good portion in these lines and with the way you formulated it. But in some way is doesn’t sound like the message or method Rand seems to promote. I wouldn’t be surprised to find a very similar phrasing as yours in a recommendation of a Nietzschean philosophy or of Existentialism (Sartre, de Beauvoir) The freedom’s you emphasize are very prominent in those philosophies, where, in my understanding of, Rand’s epistemology seems to advocate a kind of absolutistic reasoning.

You are under the impression that Objectivism leads one to an “absolute” understanding of anything.  This is not what Objectivism claims.  Objectivism argues for the objectivity of knowledge.  Look at it this way.  Newton’s knowledge of gravity/mechanics was objective based on the totality of knowledge available to him.  Einstein’s knowledge of gravity is objective based on the totality of knowledge available to him - but is not itself complete, as he fully realized.  And sometime in the future, someone will probably come along and do to Einstein (and Quantum Mechanics) what Einstein did to Newton.  This does not mean that we cannot use their mathematics to solve problems.  We don’t have to wait and wait and wait until we have Absolute Knowledge and Truth of Everything.  We can still send a rocket to Mars using Newton’s math.

 

And no, this is not a form of Pragmatism or Utilitarianism.

 

Other philosophies, such as Pragmatism, Nietzsche and Existentialism, Idealism, Skepticism, Rationalism, etc.   undermine knowledge at it’s very root - i.e. the validity of (an individual’s) senses as the basis of objective knowledge.  Objectivistism either stands or falls on it’s position regarding the  “validity of the senses”.

27

New Buddha said:

You are under the impression that Objectivism leads one to an “absolute” understanding of anything. This is not what Objectivism claims.

Hmm, I’m not sure what your trying to say here but Oism does advocate absolutes.

28

I’m responding to something louie has claimed more than once elsewhere that is being reiterated here.

“Table” is not more or less primary than “firewood”. No concept is more primary than the other. Existence itself, not the concept “existence”, is still fundamental to everything at all. Don’t reify ontology. There is no unqualified absolute fundamentality, only contextually absolute fundamentality. Existence is assumed throughout and required. I don’t know exact quotes, but it’s pretty basic to Objectivist epistemology that no concept is inherently “more important” than another.

29

I take objective to mean something like independent of an observer, his subjective viewpoints or his interests.

 

If “objective knowledge” is knowledge which is known apart from an observer, then wouldn’t all knowledge be subjective by virtue of being known by someone?

 

That’s not what Rand means by “Objectivity”.

30

In response to Plas #27

 

Hmm, no it doesn’t.  Let me illustrate by example.

 

Suppose a six year old child and an architect are looking at the same building.  Certainly the architect would have a greater breadth of knowledge and see more and understand more than the child, right?  However, this does not invalidate what the child knows, nor does it automatically mean that the architect is the arbiter of “absolute” knowledge and therefore what he says goes.  Each and every person can only know what he knows, and no one is omniscient.  Do you think you can find two architects that will agree on all things?  Or should we ask the ghost of Frank Lloyd Wright to settle matters?  Or Inigo Jones?

 

The child’s knowledge (and the architect’s for that matter) can be said to be objective to the extent that he has integrated his knowledge (to the best of his ability) into the totality of what he knows, and that he has (to the best of his ability) eliminated known contradictions and is not evading anything he knows to not be true.

 

We never stop learning or expanding our knowledge or seeing things in a new perspective.  Except for fairly mundane statements which can only be proven by ostensive definitions (the building exists) we never reach a point where we have “absolute” knowledge of anything.  Propositions are limited, finite and contextual and, most importantly, made by individuals.

QM - Fact or Fantasy
31

 

 

Hmm, I’m not sure what your trying to say here but Oism does advocate absolutes.

 

Absolute understanding?

 

Reality, and everything in it, is always absolute.  But (correct me if I’m wrong) wouldn’t absolute understanding amount to intrinsicism?

32

Absolute understanding?

 

Reality, and everything in it, is always absolute.  But (correct me if I’m wrong) wouldn’t absolute understanding amount to intrinsicism?

It would absolutely amount to intrinisicism (my spell checker doesn’t like that word, lol).  Essence is contextual and epistemological.

 

Edit.  Or knowledge could be social, and determined by a vote?  51% agree?  It must true!  Or it could be habit per Hume.

 

The essential demarcation between Objectivism and other philosophies is not A is A, or the Law or Non-Contradiction.  It’s the Validity of the Senses as the basis for individual objective knowledge.  This is why Rand made such a point of Kant’s ludicrous premises that “because I have eyes, I’m blind”.

1 Like
33

Harrison said:

 

 

Absolute understanding?

 

Reality, and everything in it, is always absolute.  But (correct me if I’m wrong) wouldn’t absolute understanding amount to intrinsicism?

 

Yeah I wasn’t sure what he was wanting to say about “absolute understanding” so I stated as much with my own qualification that Oist advocates absolutes.

1 Like
34

Buddha said:

 

Hmm, no it doesn’t.  Let me illustrate by example.

 

Suppose a six year old child and an architect are looking at the same building.  Certainly the architect would have a greater breadth of knowledge and see more and understand more than the child, right?  However, this does not invalidate what the child knows, nor does it automatically mean that the architect is the arbiter of “absolute” knowledge and therefore what he says goes.  Each and every person can only know what he knows, and no one is omniscient.  Do you think you can find two architects that will agree on all things?  Or should we ask the ghost of Frank Lloyd Wright to settle matters?  Or Inigo Jones?

 

The child’s knowledge (and the architect’s for that matter) can be said to be objective to the extent that he has integrated his knowledge (to the best of his ability) into the totality of what he knows, and that he has (to the best of his ability) eliminated known contradictions and is not evading anything he knows to not be true.

 

We never stop learning or expanding our knowledge or seeing things in a new perspective.  Except for fairly mundane statements which can only be proven by ostensive definitions (the building exists) we never reach a point where we have “absolute” knowledge of anything.  Propositions are limited, finite and contextual and, most importantly, made by individuals.

 

I am not challenging the contextual nature of knowledge or the objectivity of knowledge at all. Its clear now you were trying to say that man is not omniscient. I agree, but all knowledge is absolute contextually. And in the exhaustive sense of absolute, one who conceptualizes the axioms knows that existence, identity and consciousness are absolute and cannot add one bit to that knowledge. Nothing else you will learn will add anything to existence exists, what exists has identity, and it takes a consciousness to know it.

 

edit:

 

Buddha said:

 

 

Essence is contextual and epistemological.

 

Notice I said nothing about essence. You should ask yourself why you crossed these things with absolute…

 

 

 

Proposition:

 

All existents have identity…Name a context where this doesn’t apply.

35

This is why Rand made such a point of Kant’s ludicrous premises that “because I have eyes, I’m blind”.

 I think that’s the source of the OP’s confusion, as well.

More specifically, it seems like he’s equating “observer-dependent” with “subjective,” which means that awareness (of anything) as such is subjective, which would mean that conscious processes can happen spontaneously (that consciousness as such is arbitrary), which sounds an awful lot like “blind because I have eyes”.

 

I don’t intend to actually participate much in this thread, but that’s what I’d focus on.  :thumbsup:

36

Louie said:
 

“Table” is not more or less primary than “firewood”.

 
You continue to amaze me with your completely wrong ideas about fundamental tenets of Objectivism. Table and firewood are more or less primary in a given context! What do you think epistemological hierarchy is about?
 
 
Louie said:
 

No concept is more primary than the other. Existence itself, not the concept “existence”, is still fundamental to everything at all. Don’t reify ontology. There is no unqualified absolute fundamentality, only contextually absolute fundamentality. Existence is assumed throughout and required. I don’t know exact quotes, but it’s pretty basic to Objectivist epistemology that no concept is inherently “more important” than another.

 
This is so wrong… Nothing I have said could possibly be construed as saying that one concept is “more important” than another or that I am “reifying ontology”… (the study of what exits) Where did I claim that the study of fundamental facts (the science of ontology) is a concrete entity?(“look, there’s a study of ontology going down the street!”) Where did I claim that “existence itself” was not universally fundamental?
 
The Primacy of existence is the ontological principle that is the representation of the universally absolute fact that is _ existence itself _ !
 

The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness—the <arl_178> notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it receives from another, superior consciousness).
The source of this reversal is the inability or unwillingness fully to grasp the difference between one’s inner state and the outer world, i.e., between the perceiver and the perceived (thus blending consciousness and existence into one indeterminate package-deal). This crucial distinction is not given to man automatically; it has to be learned. It is implicit in any awareness, but it has to be grasped conceptually and held as an absolute.

37

 Nothing I have said could possibly be construed as saying that one concept is “more important” than another or that I am “reifying ontology”…

 

How do you know?

38

How do you know?

 

Do you have a argument to make to that effect?

39

Plasmatic, please read carefully. The context about my post is metaphysics. There is no “metaphysical” context. Context is epistemological - what something is primarily depends on what you choose to focus on. I only said you were reifying because what you said suggests that there is an absolute fundamentality, implicitly advocating natural kinds - a great example of making ontology into a metaphysical fact. A metaphysical hierarchy of concepts. I’d argue that ontology is often invalid actually, since ontology is more or less deciding metaphysical hierarchy. Doing that is reification, making real what is not actually real. Ontology only makes sense in epistemological terms, i.e. purposeful knowledge.

40

Plasmatic, please read carefully. The context about my post is metaphysics. There is no “metaphysical” context.

 

 

Where did you carefully read me say that there is a metaphysical context as though context was a metaphysical concrete? Quote it…

 

Louie said:

what something is primarily depends on what you choose to focus on.

 

What something is, is a metaphysically given fact, not a man made fact.

 

 

Louie said:

 

. I only said you were reifying because what you said suggests that there is an absolute fundamentality, implicitly advocating natural kinds - a great example of making ontology into a metaphysical fact. A metaphysical hierarchy of concepts. I’d argue that ontology is often invalid actually, since ontology is more or less deciding metaphysical hierarchy. Doing that is reification, making real what is not actually real. Ontology only makes sense in epistemological terms, i.e. purposeful knowledge.

 

Oh boy, I’m not going to waste my time arguing with you. I’ll just quote Ms. Rand so that others reading a moderator claiming this don’t think it reflects Oist tenets.

 

ITOE said:

 

[…]if by “simple” you mean metaphysically primary, then only entities are metaphysical primaries[…]

Prof. B: Does that mean that some entities are prior to other entities, or have priority in being called entities? In other words, you can’t identify a society as an entity until you have identified the individuals as entities, and the same with parts of the body.

AR: That’s right. But the priority here, metaphysically, would be determined according to which is essential. In other words, you would apply the law of fundamentality. Now, epistemologically, the priority is: which do you have to know before you go to the next one? It’s the hierarchical <ioe2_273> structure of concepts. You can’t talk about “society” before grasping what man is. And you can’t separate an inch of ground without grasping that there’s a wider stretch from which you isolate a certain area. Therefore here the priority is both cognitive and metaphysical.

Prof. B: On the metaphysical priority, isn’t there a basic classification of things as entities which comes before all these special cases, rather than seeing them all as equal?

AR: Right, they’re not all equal metaphysically. A valley, for instance, or society—those epistemologically can be regarded as entities. But a mountain is a primary entity; the valley is not, it’s a dependent—it’s actually an indentation between two mountains if you regard them together. But then what is the primary entity? Recall what we said about the pile of dirt vs. the mountain: it has to be a unit of some kind, tied or welded or integrated together, which has certain properties, and with actions being possible to it as a whole. Such as, you can climb a mountain, but you can’t do anything with the pile of dirt, unless you glue it together.