Jonathan, in #93 you wrote:
I have not been able to find that view in Objectivist writings. Do you have some specific text in mind?
In Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Peikoff writes:
In Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics, Tara Smith writes:
Hello, Stephen.
As against these quotes that you’ve provided, may I introduce some material from Fact and Value, and then ask whether the tenor, or the intention, or the meaning is consonant?
Evaluation, though it is essential in every field of cognition, is especially urgent in regard to the man-made.
[…]
Justice—being an aspect of the principle that every cognition demands an evaluation—requires moral judgment of men and their works across-the-board, with no areas of life excepted or exempted.
Stopping here to emphasize my “take away”:
Justice demands a moral judgement of “men and their works” with no exceptions. So I would take this as meaning that one’s dealings with the grocer does in fact require a “moral judgement” of the grocer.
In Ayn Rand’s words (from “How Does One Lead a Rational Life in an Irrational Society?”): “one must know clearly, in full, verbally identified form, one’s own moral evaluation of every person, issue and event with which one deals, and act accordingly.”
In order to “know clearly…one’s own moral evaluation of every person…with which one deals,” I would suppose that it is necessary for a man to have a moral evaluation of every such person. Does that not follow?
How does one reach a moral evaluation of a person? “A man’s moral character,” Miss Rand writes in “The Psychology of Psychologizing,” “must be judged on the basis of his actions, his statements and his conscious convictions…”
So if this is the formula, and if this kind of evaluation is “especially urgent in regard to the man-made,” with “no areas of life excepted or exempted,” then doesn’t it demand a moral evaluation of the grocer on the basis of “his actions, his statements and his conscious convictions”?
While I recognize that you have Peikoff writing, “If one wants only to buy a quart of milk, therefore, no special assessment of the grocer is indicated; absent information that he is trafficking in illicit or tainted goods, one may legitimately assume that the man is reputable,” I am not of the opinion that Peikoff’s writings must be consistent with each other.
Furthermore, whatever the value of our “legitimate assumption” that the grocer is “reputable” – and whether that fulfills our moral imperative to evaluate “every person…with which one deals” or not – what if an Objectivist were to learn that his grocer was a member of the Libertarian Party (whichever version is held to be morally reprehensible per today’s sanctioned interpretations of the Peikoff/Kelley schism)?
In Fact and Value, Peikoff says:
…in the human realm, one must distinguish the rational from the irrational, the thinkers from the evaders. Such judgment tells one whether a man, in principle, is committed to reality—or to escaping from and fighting it. In the one case, he is an ally and potential benefactor of the living; in the other, an enemy and potential destroyer. Thus the mandate of justice: identify the good (the rational) and the evil (the irrational) in men and their works—then, first, deal with, support and/or reward the good; and, second, boycott, condemn and/or punish the evil.
Well, okay. Since the evil is the irrational, and given that adherence to the Libertarian Party is held as irrational, and that the “mandate of justice” is to “boycott, condemn, and/or punish the evil”… the conclusion I would draw is that, should one learn that one’s grocer is a Libertarian, it is then “mandated” to break off associations such as frequenting his shop.
Taking “On Sanctioning the Sanctioners” for what it seems to mean, shouldn’t one extend one’s moral judgement to anyone who continues to frequent the Libertarian Grocer’s shop (or at least those who also know that the grocer is a Libertarian)?
For there Peter Schwartz writes (and Peikoff avows that he agrees) that “assisting one’s philosophical enemies–i.e., those who hold values fundamentally antithetical to one’s own–is ultimately harmful to one’s own interests.” To purchase from a Libertarian Grocer is “assisting one’s philosophical enemies,” yes? “And the corollary of this principle is: neither should one sanction the sanctioners of one’s philosophical enemies,” which would appear to extend our mandated moral judgement to those who knowingly buy their milk from the Libertarian Grocer.
Taking this together with Peikoff’s idea that these sorts of moral judgements must be made wherever and whenever one has any such information at all – “since every fact bears on the choice to live, every truth necessarily entails a value-judgment […] a process of evaluation is coextensive with and implicit in every act of cognition […] Justice is an aspect of the principle that cognition demands evaluation; it is that principle applied to human choices and their products. Since man is volitional, evaluation of the man-made is of a special kind: it is moral evaluation” – it would appear to me that Peikoff and Schwartz are here arguing that “one is required to judge even those with whom one doesn’t interact directly,” whatever else Peikoff or Tara Smith or Ayn Rand may have written elsewhere.
Am I reading this incorrectly?