Jonathan, in #93 you wrote:
The official Objectivist position is that it is evil to sanction the sanctioners of evil, so one is required to judge even those with whom one doesn’t interact directly because others, with whom one does interact, may be interacting with them.
I have not been able to find that view in Objectivist writings. Do you have some specific text in mind?
In Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Peikoff writes:
If man’s life is one’s standard, one must identify the moral status of every person, issue, and event within the field of his concerns . . . .
. . .
The time one should devote to inquiry of this kind depends on the context. In general, in life as in law, a person is to be regarded as innocent of wrongdoing until proven guilty. If one wants only to buy a quart of milk, therefore, no special assessment of the grocer is indicated; absent information that he is trafficking in illicit or tainted goods, one may legitimately assume that the man is reputable. As the relationship involved becomes more significant, however—if one is a juror in court, say, or wants to invite a person to become one’s business partner or the companion of one’s child—then, obviously, special study and assessment do become necessary. (278–80)
In Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics, Tara Smith writes:
In condemning the sanction of evil, Rand is not proposing that a person must take up arms in order to battle every evil on earth. She disavows the notion that one should “give unsolicited moral appraisals to all those one meets” or “regard oneself as a missionary charged with the responsibility of ‘saving everyone’s soul’” [quoting Rand].
. . .
The ethics of sanction, with a careful consideration of all its nuances in different situations, is easily the subject of a lengthy study in its own right. Because part of what is involved are messages that a person’s inaction tacitly conveys and because that will depend largely on the exact context . . . it is impossible for an abstract formula to specify particular actions that, in all circumstances, constitute sanction of others’ evil. In general, the more close and sustained one person’s relationship with another, the more his association lends support to that person. . . . (162–63)