I’ve been thinking a lot about the Mind/Body problem recently. I know Ayn Rand wrote a lot about how there was no dichotomy, but I think she was talking more about the whole Theory/Practice, Fact/Value, Rationalism/Empiricism gap, and all the many, many, many different variations on this theme (i.e. the Mystics of Mind and of Muscle).
I’m talking more about the Cartesian dualism, this whole issue of having Mind and Body being distinct entities which act upon one another. To the best of my memory, she said it was a scientific issue, but I believe there is still a significant philosophical question or two to be solved here. Namely, if Mind and Body are distinct entities, with one being Incorporeal and the other Corporeal, how does this Incorporeal entity act upon the Corporal one? It’s not a highly original question I’m asking here, but it’s one I have not found any answers to in the Objectivist literature.
I think Descartes solved it quite nicely, even if he turned it into some kind of epistemological solution. Basically, he starts by pointing out that when we think of something as being ‘heavy’, we imagine there is some real substance of ‘heaviness’ which is joining two objects together. So, when a dumbell sits in the gym, the reason it is difficult to pick up is because of the connection between the dumbell, some literal, corporeal force of ‘heaviness’ (not to be confused with the force of gravity) and the floor of the gym. It is like a kind of glue, sticking the two together. However, this is an incorrect conception: there is no actual heaviness there - rather, the object, the dumbell or what-have-you, possesses certain properties, as does the floor (well, the Earth beneath the floor), which draw them towards one another. Although we can describe this as gravity, we don’t say that there’s a certain amount of ‘gravity’ existing between the two objects, binding them - rather, we describe their relationship as being a gravitational one.
An easier example, although one he does not use, is the fire/heat one. Fire exists, heat does not. Obviously we feel heat, but there is nothing literally ‘hot’ about the fire. The fire, or any object ‘heated’ by the fire, has an effect on our nervous system in such a way, that it sends a certain signal, indicating heat. But there is no actual ‘heat’ without a person to feel it. We would be mistaken in describing a literal ‘heat’ particle, floating around amongst the fire.
Now, Descartes’ solution consists of the following (it’s pure Rationalism, by the way): we have certain innate ways of understanding the world. One of them is the proper, bodily, spatial way, where we understand the theory of gravity, or the way nervous system is effected by movements in particles, creating the feeling of ‘heat’. The other is this notion of ‘heaviness’ literally existing, along with ‘heat’ as real things, not as properties/descriptions-of-relationships-between-property-bearing-entities or experiences, respectively, but as entities.
Now, Descartes points out the reason we make this confusion, is that this is the proper method granted to us, of understanding the mind/body relationship. The Union of Mind and Body is a literal thing, like this imagined heaviness or heat (let me reiterate that he is not stating these things actually are imagined, but that the conception of them as physical entities is imagined) we had earlier. The reason we think these relationships between physical entities are in fact physical entities themselves, is because we are given this method of viewing the world, as a way of understanding the Mind/Body Union as being a literal thing. There really is a Union between the two of them, such that Mind and Body are bound together.
Now, there is a distinct error in all this. It assumes the existence pre-concieved methods of thinking, or psycho-epistemologies, as I think they should be properly termed. There is absolutely no reason to believe that Descartes is right, that the method of understanding the Mind/Body Union is a result of some primitive notion, and the reason we know that notion exists, is because we make the mistake of applying it to the Bodily world by accident. It can only exist, because it makes sense for it exist - i.e. it’s convenient.
I think it makes far more sense that we just make a mistake of assuming that, since we see physical entities all the time, that all there must be are physical entities. Throughout the History of Philosophy, until this idea was proven wrong, we have not allowed for the existence of these relationships as anything other than strictly material things. I think it is more an inherited philosophical error of Materialism, than any ‘primitive’ instincts instilled for us to understand the world.
But I’m wondering if there isn’t something to this. Not any of this mumbo-jumbo about preconcieved ways of viewing the world, but what he points out about this whole matter of relationships. What if it were possible that a relationship between two corporeal entities could produce a third, incorporeal entity, as a relationship between the two of them. In other words, what if Consciousness is a relationship between neurons, and a literal one at that. It is like that primitive notion of ‘heat’ as actually existing. May I mark, however, that what I regard is something slightly different to Descartes. He holds that the Union of Mind/Body exist as this physical (incorporeal) thing, whereas I regard just the Mind existing as this physical (incorporeal) relationship between Body and Body.
What this would result in, would be an explanation for the fact that Mind/Body both change, and both rely upon one another for change, such as we observe in Neuroscience when changes in the brain accompany changes in the mind (and for thousands of years in the fact that the actions of the body reflect the will of the mind). This explanation of Supervenience would be very useful.
However, what this still leaves open is the issue of free-will. If both rely upon one another for change, and if Consciousness merely arises from the Brain, how on earth does this emergent property feedback onto the brain? How does it effect a change? This theory is perfectly sensible for non-volitional creatures, but it still leaves open the problem of humans. Is this then still a scientific question, as Ayn Rand posits?
Questions, Criticisms, Comments, etc are most welcome. I believe Binswanger has written/said something similar to what I’m thinking here, but I don’t know exactly what he said. Also, I would deeply appreciate anyone who knows a little Descartes here to tell me if I have got him right, or have gone totally off-base.