.
“The invention of the laws of numbers was made on the basis of the error, dominant even from the earliest times, that there are identical things (but in fact nothing is identical with anything else) . . . . The assumption of plurality always presupposes the existence of something that occurs more than once: but precisely here error already holds sway, here already we are fabricating beings, unities which do not exist. . . . To a world which is not our idea the laws of numbers are wholly inapplicable: these are valid only in the human world.” (HH I:19) (1878)
Wrong (and boringly unoriginal).
“Logic too depends on presuppositions with which nothing in the real world corresponds, for example on the presupposition that there are identical things, that the same thing is identical at different points of time: but this science came into existence through the opposite belief (that such conditions do obtain in the real world). It is the same with mathematics, which would certainly not have come into existence if one had known from the beginning that there was in nature no exactly straight line, no real circle, no absolute magnitude.” (HH I:11)
Wrong (. . .). There is a certain number of letters in this sentence. Whether we express that number in base 10 (from normal number of fingers) or in base 8 (from normal number of spaces between fingers—practice and origin for a tribe in South America), the number of letters in the sentence is what it is regardless of the base we select for expression of that number. The number of items is there, and in this case, a child beyond age 6, including the reader, can know that number present, obfuscations of philosophers notwithstanding. / On exactly straight lines (and so forth), whether in a flat Euclidean plane or on the surfaces of elliptical or hyperbolic geometry, the number of exactly straight lines is infinite (as recognized by both Descartes and Newton for the geometry they knew, the Euclidean). The fact that we arrive at idealizations of the physical world by abstractions does not mean that those idealizations are not also concretely instantiated. Electrons are concretely real even though we have to have a lot of abstraction to get to them.
In _Gay Science_ III, §111 (1882), Nietzsche repeats the old baloney I quoted from _Human, All Too Human._ But he begins to get more vicious and _ad hominem_ about it, and this is some originality. The Introduction to GS in the Cambridge edition is written by Josefine Nauckhoff, who is also the translator. She includes the following comment in that Introduction.
“In his earliest writings about truth and error, Nietzsche sometimes spoke as though he could compare the entire structure of our thought to the ‘real’ nature of things and find our thought defective. . . . Later he rightly rejected this picture . . . . There are passages in _The Gay Science_ where it is unclear whether he is still attached to this picture. He discusses fictions, the practice of regarding things as equal or identical or mathematically structured when they are not so or only approximately so . . . . He is making the point, certainly, that mathematical representations which are offered by the sciences [think Maxwell, who died in ’79] are in various ways idealizations, and this is entirely intelligible. There is greater ambiguity when he suggests that nothing is really ‘identical’ or ‘the same’. To take an example: the concept ‘snake’ allows us to classify various individual things as ‘the same snake’. It is trivially true that ‘snake’ is a human concept, a cultural product. But it is a much murkier proposition that its use somehow falsifies reality—that ‘in itself’ the world does not contain snakes, or indeed anything else you might mention. Nietzsche came to see that this idea of the world ‘in itself’ was precisely a relic of the kind of metaphysics that he wanted to overcome. As a remark in the _Nachlass_ puts it (_The Will to Power_ 567): ‘The antithesis of the apparent world and the true world is reduced to the antithesis “world” or “nothing”’.”
So far as I recall, Nietzsche made no progress in setting forth a plausible metaphysics or anti-metaphysics in which that old divide, prominent in Plato and Kant, could be laid to rest. Certainly, Rand was in no debt to Nietzsche in her own efforts on this divide.
Against Kant and in step with Aristotle, Rand writes: “‘Things as they are’ are things as perceived by your mind” (_AS_ 1036). Rand spoke in that passage against Kant of “things as they are” and not of “things in themselves.” She was right to avoid the latter phrase because of the well-known shading of it. That latter phrase, down from Kant, intimates a severance of existence with its character from our grasp of it. In the same vein, rightly she would reject talk of the _transcendental object_ or talk of _noumena_ and its sundering distinction with _phenomena,_ the latter a foul concept when transplanted from its use in Newton to fundamental ontology. Joseph Owens: “Aristotle’s procedure is to let _things_ speak for themselves. They show themselves to be the same in some ways, to be different in others. Concepts and words simply follow and reflect as best they can the nature of things themselves” (1978 [1951], 138).
Nietzsche in his mature thought would replace metaphysics with psychology (armchair) as “queen of the sciences” (BGE 23). Kant had used that phrase in noting the disrepute to which metaphysics had fallen by his time (1781). Kant was himself, in his mature, critical thought, not proposing yet another metaphysics. He was proposing a method and critical awareness of the bounds of cognition under which a future metaphysics might merit respectability. Nietzsche’s sayings against logic, truth, mathematics, and metaphysics are not focused on Kant. They are wide-armed against the entire Socratic-Platonic and Aristotelian traditions and against the no-stopping tidal wave of the modern hard sciences.