Non-moral Norms

Ethics
1

I’ve always been of the opinion that there is no such thing as a non-moral norm. The very concept just doesn’t make sense to me: That you should be able to say, rationally, that “You ought to do x, and yet if you do x I cannot morally praise you; and if you don’t do x, I cannot morally blame you,” seems entirely wrong to me. But most philosophers take it for granted that norms of rationality are non-moral: You ought to do them, but only in the sense that it will make you a better rational agent which is a desirable thing. You cannot be morally blamed for being irrational.

I suspect Objectivists, especially given this example, will side with me that this is just false–and I think this is supported by the details of Objectivist ethics. Rationality is a tool for man’s survival and happiness, and so norms of rationality are norms about the only method of achieving happiness, which is a man’s ethical end. I can’t think of other norms which I would expect the average philosopher to regard as non-moral. Perhaps norms about feeling pleasure, like “You ought to go to the movies if it makes you laugh,” or something, since philosophers are probably going to view pleasure as itself non-moral. But every one of them seems to have an essentially ethical character, and this intuition always seems justified by my analysis of ethics.

But rather than proceeding by hearing some example, having an intuition about what is right, and then engaging in analysis, is there a more methodical, principled way of arguing that there are no non-moral norms?

2

I’ve always been of the opinion that there is no such thing as a non-moral norm…

Why is it so hard to think of non-moral normative principles or norms?

Morality is a code of values and principles to guide your life in general, so what, then, about normative principles within a specialized field of action? They could be considered non-moral, at least in the sense that a moral man does not have to think about them, if he is not into that field.

For instance, take normative principles of how to make a speech or build a house. If you are not into speeches, or building houses, then _morally_ speaking, there is no reason for you to care about these normative principles.

_Moral_ principles apply to all men (virtually) all the time, while non-moral normative principles are only applicable to some men, some of the time, namely if and when they are engaged in a specific type of action that is not, morally, obligatory for all. Such as holding a speech or building a house.

Of course, a rational morality suggests that if you are engaged in a specific type of action then you should consider and apply the proper normative principles or standards, to successfully achieve your (moral) goals.

As to your question about method, I suggest you simply look at reality and see if you can find any facts giving rise to the notion of non-moral norms. In other words, engage in a process of reduction and/or induction.

Remember that the standard of truth and objectivity is _never_ the “intuitions,” i.e., feelings, of most average philosophers. The standard is _reality_.

3

_Moral_ principles apply to all men (virtually) all the time, while non-moral normative principles are only applicable to some men, some of the time, namely if and when they are engaged in a specific type of action that is not, morally, obligatory for all.

This is probably the point on which we disagree. You’re apparently claiming that a fact which is not a fact about “the nature of man, in general” has no relevance to morality and does not enter into a norm. I claim, in contrast, that any fact about the nature of an individual is relevant to forming moral principles applicable in the context of that individual (or any individual where the fact exists), and that the ultimate moral standard “my life” makes sense only when facts of the individual are considered.

4

May I offer an example? Suppose in a chess game, it turns out the sacrifice of a rook leads to mate in three moves. Does the advice: you ought to sacrifice your rook to get a checkmate, have moral import or not? This is clearly an ought (but is based on an is, namely the rules of chess and the situation on the board). My view is that this “ought” has no moral import one for either good or ill. The question of happiness might be involved. Suppose this were the deciding game for the World Chess Championship. Then the choice is important to the player, but is not a matter of life or death.

Bob Kolker

5

Suppose in a chess game, it turns out the sacrifice of a rook leads to mate in three moves. Does the advice: you ought to sacrifice your rook to get a checkmate, have moral import or not?

Why are you playing chess in the first place? If your goal is to win the game, then allowing your rook to be taken is not a sacrifice (despite the idiotic terminology), it is an investment in support of your goal. It would be irrational and thus immoral to subjugate the true goal “win the game” to a lesser value “keep your rook”.

My view is that this “ought” has no moral import one for either good or ill. The question of happiness might be involved. Suppose this were the deciding game for the World Chess Championship. Then the choice is important to the player, but is not a matter of life or death.

You have the wrong view of morality (although, to your credit, one with some resemblance to Objectivist morality). Morality is not defined in terms of mere morgue-avoidance, to paraphrase Smith’s term, since there is no such thing as “pure existence” without identity. Existence entails identity, therefore a moral code is no designed to elongate abstract “existence with no nature”. It follows then that a choice to exist requires a discovery of one’s nature, so that you can discover the principles that lead to your existence qua being that you are. If this means that you should play and win at chess (for whatever reason), then that tells you what actions you should undertake; if being an novelist is the proper means of realizing your nature, then do that and do not become an electrical engineer because it will earn you more money.

6

This is probably the point on which we disagree. You’re apparently claiming that a fact which is not a fact about “the nature of man, in general” has no relevance to morality and does not enter into a norm. I claim, in contrast, that any fact about the nature of an individual is relevant to forming moral principles applicable in the context of that individual (or any individual where the fact exists), and that the ultimate moral standard “my life” makes sense only when facts of the individual are considered.

I am sorry David, but I do not know whether I agree or disagree, simply because I do not understand what you are saying or how it is related to what I said. Please elaborate or clarify yourself.

7

Please elaborate or clarify yourself.

I am asserting that the concept “norm” implies “moral”, thus there are indeed no non-moral norms. A “norm” is a principle about “what one should do”, and all notion of “should” are moral in nature. They are specifically “is-ought” rules that relate an end to a choice. This is what morality is.

8

Good example. I believe I agree with you, Odden, in the big picture. Do you believe that the choice to play chess is a(n im)moral one? What life-supporting purpose does it serve? It doesn’t seem like the kind of thing to be an end in itself.

9

Do you believe that the choice to play chess is a(n im)moral one?

I’m not a chess person, but for many, it would be an intellectual pleasure whose denial would be a real sacrifice. Let’s look at an analogous choice (real, not hypothetical). My research is at the center of my life – it is an essential part of my nature, and for me to dump my research would be spiritual suicide. As it happens, it would have no effect on my economic well-being if I were to stop doing research. So I have many choices open to me which lead to maintaining my “mechanical” existence. But my proper, integrated existence is not just “my failing to die”, it also includes the continued active use of my mind. It would be nothing short of insane for me to put an end to what my mind does best. The concept of one’s life must include both the physical and the spiritual aspects of existence.

Chess may not be so dramatic, but given a choice between playing chess and watching “Survivor” reruns, the only moral choice that I can see is playing chess. What does it mean to “survive qua man”? Man’s quintessential tool for survival is his power to reason – man is a reasoning animal, not a running or clawing animal. And wtf is chess but a game of reasoning? So yeah, chess is or could be part of the end in itself.

10

I think there is a difference between moral principles and their application in your own life and, on the other hand, non-moral normative principles.

Consider the virtue of productivity. It entails that you should pursue some career, some productive work. But it does not say what type of career you should pursue, that is entirely up to you to decide.

As long as it is consonant with the requirements of your survival as a rational being, “it’s all good”. There are thus many legitimate optional values.

(One can say that some optional values are better than others, but only in regard to your own very personal context and the only one who can truly judge would be you. For instance, while there is no reason to say that architecture is objectively better or worse than medicine, the fact that the latter bores you to death, is a good reason for you not to pursue a career in medicine.)

How do non-moral normative principles differ from moral principles? I can see at least two differences. 1. Moral principles are fundamental, while non-moral normative principles are non-fundamental. 2. Moral principles are not optional, if you want to live. Non-moral normative principles, on the other hand, are optional.

Compare the normative principles within architecture with the principle of productivity. The latter applies to all men (virtually) all the time, while the former only applies to those who are concerned with building houses. It seems to me that when you say that every “norm” per se is a moral one, then you are saying that this is a concern every moral person should care about, while in fact it is optional.

Non-moral normative principles are thus not only non-fundamental, they are also optional.

Now, while moral principles are not “optional”, when you apply them that usually means that you apply them on optional values. Morality does not have a say on _exactly_ what you should pursue here, not as long as the options are legitimate from a moral point of view. And once you adopt a certain optional value, such as your specific career, then that implies a certain set of non-moral normative principles, such as the principles of architecture or medicine.

Of course, once you have chosen a career and recognized the principles it entails, then it would be immoral to evade that knowledge. But what determines this? The moral principle of honesty. But notice that this principle applies to _all_ knowledge, not just knowledge of how to build a house or treat a patient, because it is _fundamental_.

Therefore I see a basis for a distinction between moral principles and non-moral normative principles.

11

Non-moral normative principles are thus not only non-fundamental, they are also optional.

The operative word is convention. Conventions are rules adopted for convenience or are ad hoc rules. For example driving on the right. (Or driving on the left). Some rule must be adopted to keep traffic from being chaotic. There is no apriori reason for choosing one over the other.

Bob Kolker

12

Consider the virtue of productivity. It entails that you should pursue some career, some productive work. But it does not say what type of career you should pursue, that is entirely up to you to decide.

Agreed, which only means that you cannot say that “there is a moral principle whereby all men, by their nature, must engage in a career of researching the grammatical structure of human language”, or anything like that. The principle is applicable in a particular context, which has something to do with the nature of those individuals who are good at doing that kind of work. And in the context of a person who does have this “engage in research” nature, it would be immoral to abandon that career for a career as a truck driver (assuming there was not some contrived-scenario reason why he had to be a truck driver).

As long as it is consonant with the requirements of your survival as a rational being, “it’s all good”.

Depending on what exactly you mean by this, I disagree. I would say that rejecting the objectively ideal career in favor of a lesser existence (for a researcher to trade in a productive life of creating knowledge for a life driving the big rigs) would in fact be a destruction of value, and therefore immoral. Even though, of course, the choice of research versus truck-driving is an optional value. An optional value is “something that is a proper value for some men, but not all men”. Morality is not just “that which is proper for all men”.

How do non-moral normative principles differ from moral principles? I can see at least two differences. 1. Moral principles are fundamental, while non-moral normative principles are non-fundamental. 2. Moral principles are not optional, if you want to live. Non-moral normative principles, on the other hand, are optional.

As I suspected. This is where we disagree. I would say that morality is broader than just “principles of universal mechanical existence for man”. It includes the relationship between facts particular to the individual and how those facts guide the choices that he must make in seeking his ultimate goal.

Morality does not have a say on _exactly_ what you should pursue here, not as long as the options are legitimate from a moral point of view. And once you adopt a certain optional value, such as your specific career, then that implies a certain set of non-moral normative principles, such as the principles of architecture or medicine.

On what basis does one properly adopt an optional value? My position is that this is just another instance of moral evaluation – that you judge how that value integrates with your ultimate goal. If it supports that goal it is good, if it opposes that goal it is bad. How do you evaluate optional goals amorally?

13

The operative word is convention. Conventions are rules adopted for convenience or are ad hoc rules. For example driving on the right. (Or driving on the left). Some rule must be adopted to keep traffic from being chaotic. There is no apriori reason for choosing one over the other.

Bob Kolker

Oh no, that is not at all what I was talking about!

The types of principles I am talking about have an objective basis in reality, they are not just a convention based on convenience. (Though I do not deny that some of the principles I am refering to _might_ be regarded as conventions.)

Take certain rules of architecture, they are about how you build a house that will actually stand and not fall apart. It is, actually, an application of laws of physics. The COMPLETE OPPOSITE of the type of “conventions” you are talking about.

14

Depending on what exactly you mean by this, I disagree. I would say that rejecting the objectively ideal career in favor of a lesser existence (for a researcher to trade in a productive life of creating knowledge for a life driving the big rigs) would in fact be a destruction of value, and therefore immoral. Even though, of course, the choice of research versus truck-driving is an optional value. An optional value is “something that is a proper value for some men, but not all men”. Morality is not just “that which is proper for all men”.

I actually think we agree on this point. As you might remember, I also wrote: “One can say that some optional values are better than others, but only in regard to your own very personal context and the only one who can truly judge would be you. For instance, while there is no reason to say that architecture is objectively better or worse than medicine, the fact that the latter bores you to death, is a good reason for you not to pursue a career in medicine.”

As I suspected. This is where we disagree. I would say that morality is broader than just “principles of universal mechanical existence for man”. It includes the relationship between facts particular to the individual and how those facts guide the choices that he must make in seeking his ultimate goal.

True, one have to integrate the concretes of your own life with that ultimate value which is your life, which mean that you have to consider your personal context. But I do not see why what means that there are not optional, non-fundamental normative principles of the type that I mentioned.

On what basis does one properly adopt an optional value? My position is that this is just another instance of moral evaluation – that you judge how that value integrates with your ultimate goal. If it supports that goal it is good, if it opposes that goal it is bad. How do you evaluate optional goals amorally?

I have no idea how you got the impression that I would be of another opinion. Of course optional values have to be integrated with your ultimate value, i.e., your life. All I am saying is that many things are all pro-life, but since your life is not mine and since we have different interests and personalities, what kind of job will be of interest and value to you may not be of any interest and value to me. To say that both are legitimate, morally speaking, only means that you have no objective reason to say that truck driving is a bad job. Maybe it is not your thing, but that does not follow that truck-drivers are bad people.

In other words, I think we have agreed all the time. Maybe I was unclear? Although I did my utmost to be clear on this point. Let me paraphrase my point: the principles apply to all, but the application demand that you think about your own personal context, with everything that entails. To disregard your own personal context when you apply a principle, would be an expression of intrinsicism and would have disastrous results. But having said that, I cannot see how it follows from this that there cannot be any non-moral, normative principles. I.e., non-fundamental, optional normative principles of the type I have described in my posts.

15

I’ve always been of the opinion that there is no such thing as a non-moral norm. The very concept just doesn’t make sense to me: That you should be able to say, rationally, that “You ought to do x, and yet if you do x I cannot morally praise you; and if you don’t do x, I cannot morally blame you,” seems entirely wrong to me. But most philosophers take it for granted that norms of rationality are non-moral: You ought to do them, but only in the sense that it will make you a better rational agent which is a desirable thing. You cannot be morally blamed for being irrational.

I suspect Objectivists, especially given this example, will side with me that this is just false–and I think this is supported by the details of Objectivist ethics. Rationality is a tool for man’s survival and happiness, and so norms of rationality are norms about the only method of achieving happiness, which is a man’s ethical end. I can’t think of other norms which I would expect the average philosopher to regard as non-moral. Perhaps norms about feeling pleasure, like “You ought to go to the movies if it makes you laugh,” or something, since philosophers are probably going to view pleasure as itself non-moral. But every one of them seems to have an essentially ethical character, and this intuition always seems justified by my analysis of ethics.

But rather than proceeding by hearing some example, having an intuition about what is right, and then engaging in analysis, is there a more methodical, principled way of arguing that there are no non-moral norms?

I have a hard time with the way you are using the concept of norm. I’ve only known it to be a measure of group behavior, etc; therefore, I can’t think of it as being anything other than amoral.

16

But having said that, I cannot see how it follows from this that there cannot be any non-moral, normative principles. I.e., non-fundamental, optional normative principles of the type I have described in my posts.

A non-fundamental, optional normative principles regarding the choices of an individual is a moral principle. Is this where we disagree? Namely, on the scope of “morality”?

17

Take certain rules of architecture, they are about how you build a house that will actually stand and not fall apart. It is, actually, an application of laws of physics. The COMPLETE OPPOSITE of the type of “conventions” you are talking about.

Yes. To be sure, there are basic principles of how to build sound buildings that will stand in wind and rain, retain heat and stay dry in a storm. However, are umpteen styles and bauplans of buildings that will stand securely. How does one choose one plan/style over another? Especially when more than one plan will meet a given set of needs by the person wanting a home. Styles and fashions within the space of sound plans are very often a matter of convention or habit or taste.

Bob Kolker

18

I have a hard time with the way you are using the concept of norm. I’ve only known it to be a measure of group behavior, etc; therefore, I can’t think of it as being anything other than amoral.

Definition of Norms

The sense you’re familiar with is a more colloquial sense. The sense used in philosophical conversations refers to concepts that are characterized by “ought statements”. So my question is, is there ever a true, minimal sentence expressed as “You ought to do x,” which is not a statement of moral requirements?

19

Why are you playing chess in the first place? If your goal is to win the game, then allowing your rook to be taken is not a sacrifice (despite the idiotic terminology), it is an investment in support of your goal. It would be irrational and thus immoral to subjugate the true goal “win the game” to a lesser value “keep your rook”.

What about the argument that anything can be seen as an “investment in support of a goal,” even criminal activity?

So as a human my ultimate goal is furthering my own life, correct? And if so, furthering my own needs selfishly is my moral imperative. I could justify just about anything on these grounds, could I not? Would it be irrational and immoral for me to subjugate my true goal, my “good” life, to a lesser value which would be other people’s rights, for instance?

I know I probably didn’t say it right, but it’s just an observation I had.

20

What about the argument that anything can be seen as an “investment in support of a goal,” even criminal activity?

To be a bit more literal about that, though, that’s the possibility of arbitrarily claiming that anything is an investment in a goal". I could claim that eating arsenic is an investment in some long-term goal, but that doesn’t make it so.

I could justify just about anything on these grounds, could I not? Would it be irrational and immoral for me to subjugate my true goal, my “good” life, to a lesser value which would be other people’s rights, for instance?

Only in the sense “could attempt to evade the proper conclusion”. Moral evaluation is about what is, not “how persuasive a particular line might seem to someone”.