I don’t know if this is the appropriate forum for this, but it seems as good as any.
What are the possibilities of psychological immortality, via futuristic scientific processes such as mind-uploading? In other words, do you believe it is possible to create a brain-computer interface so advanced as to actually upload all of someone’s memories, emotions, tendencies, etc. into a computer? The obvious benefit of this would be to, upon the death of that person, upload it into a new body.
I know this sounds like total science fiction but, hey, so did flight, at one point.
The obvious dilemma here is that you could never say for sure that the newly uploaded mind actually is the same consciousness, rather than a duplicate of it.
I haven’t seen any evidence to support the conclusion that this is possible. Do you have some to offer? There was evidence that man could fly even before the first manned flight, but where is the analogous evidence that all of someone’s memories, emotions, tendencies, etc. could be loaded into a computer and a new body?
I don’t know that there is any. But if the history of technology has taught us anything, it’s that what is considered impossible usually winds up being, not only possible, but commonplace.
I know that there has been some very preliminary work done on neural-computer interfaces. I don’t have a link, but I remember reading about some scientists that had somehow fused neurons with a computer chip, increasing it’s processing speed.
Here’s the Wikipedia entry for brain-machine interface.
From what I have read about “mind uploading”, to actually accomplish this one would have to replicate a physical human brain with identical neurons, but there is no suggestion that this is actually possible, and I’m afraid that the history of technology doesn’t by itself constitute such evidence … so in my judgment, the possibilities of psychological immortality are nil.
The obvious dilemma here is that you could never say for sure that the newly uploaded mind actually is the same consciousness, rather than a duplicate of it.
On the contrary, it is very simple: the upload is a duplicate.
Suppose it were possible to duplicate a person down to the smallest physical and mental detail. Suppose the duplicate were 100% identical to the original down to the last atom and brain impulse. It might be impossible to tell the two apart, but there would be two.
Likewise, the upload would be a second, distinct entity. It might live forever (or at least as long as the Universe), but it would be a duplicate. The original would still be dead.
I find it much more likely (and verging on the realm of the possible), that they could do a gradual neurological transfer. My scenario is this:
An artificial brain (or pieces thereof) are hooked into your regular brain, probably through a number of implants that can create feedback in your existing cortex. Through repetition, you can learn how to access parts of this new brain and use it to do stuff.
Then, they gradually “copy” data from your biological brain into the artificial one. Probably there’d be a lengthy, obnoxious process where you’d have to learn to access that data again, probably a lot of trial-and-error that would have to be overseen by a complete medical/neurological team. Then, after the bugs were worked out, they’d destroy and remove biological brain tissue that was no longer necessary until you were operating 100% out of the artificial brain.
It’d probably take years. I hypothesize that this might actually work and allow you to keep the “you” intact, because of what happens with severe stroke victims or, say, people that have been blind since birth and had their sight restored. There isn’t a hard and fast “this part of the brain does this function”, and with significant effort it is possible to “rewire” the brain and get a great deal of function back.
My grandfather is a case in point. He had a stroke about 10 years ago, a very severe one, and his prognosis was awful. Basically, they said that even if he lived he’d pretty much be a vegetable. He just got his driver’s license back.
I find it much more likely (and verging on the realm of the possible), that they could do a gradual neurological transfer. My scenario is this:
This reminds me of the star trek teleporter dilemna. Is it the same me on the other side? The answer seems to be obviously, no. But what if they took out a single cell in your brain and replaced it with an artificial one which functioned normally, but would not die? Would you still be you? What about two cells…or three? At which point do you become not-you. I believe that your suggestion is correct, JMegan. That is, that gradually if the continuity were preserved by giving the existing brain time to integrate the added parts, you would not notice a change and would be, in fact, the same person. Not a nuerologist, but that’s my laymen’s guess.