@Eiuol
I agree with a lot of what you said. I also think qualitative distinctions are more fundamental than quantitative ones.
@Grames
@Easy Truth
I will write out some rough thoughts I’ve been having and some research I’ve been doing on this subject. Hopefully it will make things clearer.
Imagine that you have two entities where the measurements of the first entity with respect to some characteristics (that we care about) are (1.0,1.0,1.0) and the measurements of the second entity are (2.0,1.0,1.0). Now, at the end of the day, Objectivism allows you to form exactly one “big” concept from this data set:
A = (x,1.0,1.0)
where the use of the variable “x” means that the entities belonging to this concept must have some measurement value for the first characteristic, but may have any measurement value. But also, we can use differentia to get many more “small” concepts by specifying ranges that the variable is allowed to take. For example:
B = ([1.0, 12.0], 1.0, 1.0)
means that the value of the first characteristic can be anything between 1.0 and 12.0, but the values of the other two characteristics must be exactly 1.0 and 1.0, respectively. So B is a sub-concept of A. You can take concepts like these and make further restrictions to get sub-concepts of sub-concepts, for instance
C = ([2.3, 4.6], 1.0, 1.0).
And, I don’t think it would be too much of a stretch to say that you can do disjunctive sums of intervals to get even more complex concepts such as:
D = ([1.0, 12.0] + [26.5, 123.4], 1.0, 1.0)
where the notation “+” means that the entity is allowed to have values either in the interval [1.0, 12.0] or in the interval [26.5, 123,4]. Furthermore, by using these two entities in combination with others, again, I don’t think it would be an unreasonable interpretation of Objectivism to say that you can have concepts that look like this:
E = ([1.0, 12.0] + [26.5, 123.4], y, [0.1, 2.6])
or even ones that allow for infinite collections of allowed intervals like this:
F = ( [1,0, 2.0] + [4.0, 5.0] + [7.0, 8.0] + …, y, z).
If you spend some time graphing these examples, you will notice that all of the concepts formed by these methods look like rectangular prisms arranged in rectangular prisms arranged in rectangular prisms, etc., all of which have edges that are parallel to at least one of the axes. Furthermore, these are the only kinds of shapes that concepts in Objectivism are allowed to have. I hope that this will make clear what I meant when I said that Rand’s theory of concepts is “merely classifying things”.
The problem with her theory is that there will always be real-world collections of entities that completely confound this sort of scheme. That is, when you plot the measurements of all the entities in the collection, they might form a shape which is very simple but which cannot be a combination of rectangular prisms.
For instance, consider the collection of entities:
{(0,2),(1,1),(2,0),(3,1.1)(4,2.1),(3.1,3),(2.1,4),(1.1,3)}
Any combination of measurement omissions and restrictions to intervals will result in just two kinds of interpretations of the data. On the one hand, you will have very simple interpretations which underfit the data. And on the other hand, you will have very complicated and counter-intuitive interpretations which overfit the data. And in no case whatsoever will you obtain a system of concepts which notices the super-simple underlying pattern you would have gotten had you simply plotted some points and used your spatial intuition to play connect-the-dots.
Even though none of the entities in the above example have any measurements in common, by using your spatial intuition, you can form a simple network of similarities:
(0,2) ~ (1,1) ~ (2,0) ~ (3,1.1) ~ … ~ (1.1,3) ~ (0,2)
which your brain would immediately recognize as a one-dimensional loop. A one-dimensional loop is a notion that:
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Is highly abstract, and can be applied to just about any data whatsoever to yield tons of non-trivial information about that data.
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Is super easy to understand. It’s almost concrete in how easy it is to understand.
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Captures the essence of how the entities in the example are related in a very simple and accurate way, even though they are all different from each other.
I say “accurate” in the above because saying that the data is described by a one-dimensional loop also implies a network of dissimilarities among the given entities. For instance, we can say that (0,2) is dissimilar to (2,0), because, on the one-dimensional loop, there is no shortcut from (0,2) to (2,0) which allows you to skip the entity (1,1).
The process of fitting a manifold to a set of data-points is studied in the field of Persistent Homology:
In my opinion, I think that Rand was trying to do something like this when she formulated her theory of concept formation.
Rand’s theory also suffers from another problem which I’ve been trying to address. Basically, it smuggles huge portions of mathematics (at the very least the non-zero rational numbers), which themselves have highly non-trivial spatial structure, into the notion of measurement. This, in addition to the above, is why I don’t find Grames’ account of how concepts of space can be derived from measurement omission at all convincing.
I believe that this problem can be remedied by claiming that the human brain comes equipped with a very small number of simple spatial ideas and operations which can be used to form any mathematical concept including the concepts of logic.
All this has lead me to investigating the theory of simplicial sets. These are very simple and very interesting mathematical gizmos that can encode combinatorial and topological information simultaneously. Furthermore, they constitute what is called a “topos” in category theory, which means that they are capable of serving as a foundation for all of mathematics. Additionally, every topos has its own internal logic, (and these logics are, in general, higher-order intuitionistic type theories). So there is a conception of logic out there somewhere which can be derived entirely from spatial concepts.
The main problem is that the standard theory of simplicial sets allows for simplices of arbitrarily high finite dimension, and the human brain can handle only 3. However, as it turns out, it’s very easy to prove that simplicial sets restricted to at most 3 dimensions also constitute a topos.
I am currently trying to figure out the ins-and-outs of all of this stuff, but I think that Rand’s dream of a mathematical epistemology is on the horizon.