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Eiuol

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About Eiuol

  • Birthday 05/01/1989

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  • Experience with Objectivism
    Rand related: All major works. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Virtue of Selfishness, Atlas Shrugged, etc)

    Peikoff related: OPAR and three lecture series (Objectivism Through Induction, Understanding Objectivism, Unity in Ethics and Epistemology)

    Tara Smith related: Most things, including Viable Values and Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics.

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  1. There have been 2,929,862 infections and 89,574 coronavirus-related deaths reported in the country since the pandemic began. There have been 16,800 infections and 34 coronavirus-related deaths reported in the country since the pandemic began. That is from your links. The percentage of the peak is higher in Iceland because the peak itself is significantly lower than it is in South Africa. All you did is show that you don't know how to interpret data.
  2. 4 – The nutritive soul is concerned with food and offspring. Having another like itself is the closest to the eternal. I'm not sure if this means that having offspring is required for the good life, or that having offspring is the end for the nutritive aspects of the soul, but not necessarily what the intellectual soul must seek. 5 - The work of perceiving is produced by external things. There of course has to be something to be perceived in the first place. 6 - Motion, rest, number, shape, and size are common to all of the senses. 7 - Something must be between the sense organ and the thing perceived because it is not the quality itself that moves the organ. This sounds like the quality of something must produce effects on something else external to the perceiver. 9 - Uncovered organs seem less accurate. Eyes are not covered in an ant, but they are in birds. 11 - The organ of touch is not itself skin. We know this because when we use a tool or cover our skin, the outside thing seems to work like touch. But Aristotle doesn't really say what the organ is. In modern terms, I would say that the organ is all the neurons under the skin. Sense is in a way the mean of contrary attributes of perceived things. Anything too loud or too quiet cannot be sensed. 12 - Sense is receptive of the form of perceived things, like wax being receptive of shapes. The senses are acted on by things, not because of what the things are, but the attributes the things have. Book III 1 - There is no particular sense organ for common attributes because we just associate particular senses to the common attributes. 2 – Since we can distinguish different types of attributes, we must be able to distinguish the difference by something else. 3 – Opinion is affected by persuasion and speech, while imagination is not. Some animals have imagination but none have speech, so imagination is not opinion. 4 - Intellect is not mixed with the body and has no organ and is potency of the soul. Intellect in this sense could be something immaterial and something externally independent like a cosmic entity, of which various things with souls make use of. But other times it sounds like it might be the power of anything that exists to be intelligible by virtue of its form, yet requires a particular entity with a soul to be actualized (while not being a consequence of a sensory or physiological process). The intellect is receptive of intelligible things. 5 - Intellect is caused by becoming all things, and it is productive by forming things like the way light produces color. It becomes all things in terms of their intelligible aspects, in just the same way that the senses become what they sense in terms of the sensory aspects of the things sensed. The intellect brings about forms. I wonder if this is evidence that Aristotle thought that forms are just epistemological artifacts while the intellect is the intelligibility of things that makes an epistemological artifact possible in the first place. 8 - Intellect is the form of forms, the overarching form. The potency of knowing or perceiving are the same things that are known or perceived. Intelligible things are present in perceptible forms. 10 - Intellect that reasons for the sake of something and is concerned with actions causes motions; desire is the starting point. 11 - There is sensory imagination when trying to visualize something and deliberative imagination when making calculations.
  3. Not the electrons, no. Not any more than I see your skin cells by looking at you.
  4. It's not just a description, true, but form is abstract and many times he says it is what makes a thing what it is in the way that a knife is a knife by having such a pattern of action or identity as to go towards cutting, an identity which the entity acts out. But the form is nothing metaphysically real except in the sense that having an identity is real. Form is actualization, not itself actual. Matter is potential because the things that a knife is made out of, the steel, the atoms, the handle, none of these things actually have a nature unless and until it has a pattern of action or an identity, so conceptually speaking, you can distinguish form from matter. But they are absolutely inseparable. It's more about his belief in the shape of the universe and how things move, he just applied his theory about form and matter to it as well. But I didn't get to reading Metaphysics yet. But we can section this off to another thread to talk about another time.
  5. The Soul translated by Joe Sachs Book I 1 - Perhaps the first thing to ask is if something is a thing, a quality, or quantity; potential or being-at-work; divisible or not. Even when nothing is happening, feelings still arise. So the soul can't simply be a response to the external world. 2 - Many thinkers thought that like is known by like, so by this reasoning, if the soul knows everything, it is like everything. 3 – Plato thought that soul had intellect and moved in a circle. But this means the intellect thanks the same thing many times in a row. But all thinking is bounded, so this can't be. Many people make the mistake of not asking how the body is affected by the soul, or which kind of bodies. 4 - The human acts by means of the soul in the sense that perception goes to the soul, while memory comes from the soul to motions. This is like the modern distinction of bottom-up processing from top-down processing. This is reason to think that Aristotle sees the human soul as all the psychological capacities of people. 5 – Is living in all the parts or some of them? It seems rather that the soul holds the body together. Book II 1 – Material is a potency while form makes the look of that material as a result of why it is called what it is. Soul is the form of a body with life as potency. If the eye were an animal, the soul of it would be sight. 2 – Where there is perception there is pain and pleasure, and where there is pain and pleasure, there is desire.
  6. 5 – Anything that moves itself cannot move itself as a whole. To cause motion in itself requires that it is caused by something motionless. Otherwise parts would move the whole and parts at the same time. 6 – There can only be one eternal first mover, which must be continuous. 7 – Change of place is the primary motion. What moves itself most authentically brings about this motion. Change of place belongs more to things that take up their nature more. This sounds like actualizing nature means to be active in a primary way especially, or at least that it is bounded together with something that is active in a primary way. 8 – Motion in a circle is from something itself to itself. 10 – Even if a thing could move continuously without something pushing it again and again, the motion will be consecutive rather than one.
  7. I don't know what you're talking about. Form is not a boundary, unless you mean the shape of something. The boundary he explicitly says is place. Yes he begins with what you're saying, but that's not what he ends up with. But perhaps that's the way I'm reading it. There is some ambiguity. He does say it is like a container that can't move. But it doesn't have independent existence, it isn't a special category, it isn't the attribute of something singular, it is just the innermost motionless boundary of what contains. But this kind of boundary is always within something else, it doesn't just spread out. So it is a boundary of something, even if it is not literally equal to that boundary and it is mostly relational. There is nothing wrong about the form and matter distinction, although Rand got wrong what Aristotle meant. Form is the abstract description of what makes a thing what it is, quite similar to the essential of a concept, but it also describes for the sake of which something acts and its pattern of action. Matter is what something is in physical terms but of course something can't exist without having some pattern of action and sake for which it acts. That's why matter according to Aristotle is only a potential. Importantly, neither form nor matter is even close to platonic because he never tries to make form into something concrete or something that can exist independently and act. He usually spends the most time checking premises. Anyway, I should have said the most important parts for this conversation are those about the void, chapters 6 and 7 and 8 that I mentioned.
  8. Meteorology translated by E. W. Webster Book I Natural phenomena in outer space are treated as if they are things occurring on earth in terms of the way things move and interact. Comets, shooting stars, and the Milky Way are treated as if wind and fire operate the same way in outer space, like circular motion stirring things in such a way that they catch fire. When the natural phenomena are things that already happen on earth, like snow and rain, descriptions and causes make more sense. In chapter 14, Aristotle discusses the way that the earth has not always been the same, that rivers can come into existence while others might dry out. He directly recognizes that this process is sometimes man-made, but also sometimes natural. Because there is no end to time, Aristotle says that everything about the parts of the earth will change in time. Book II 3 - Throughout the book Aristotle describes the water cycle, which makes everything else grounded despite the use of elements in his theories. He uses the fact that water loses the salt when it evaporates as evidence that another substance is added, rather than something that is part of water already, that makes the sea salty. 5 - Aristotle recognizes that the earth is symmetrical north and south, so it has north and south poles, and this is what makes places habitable. 8 - Earthquakes are thought to be caused by dry wind inside the earth. The main evidence for this seems to be the noise that earthquakes make, as if it was a release of wind that makes the noise. A lot of the stuff about wind and earthquakes are spurious correlations. But it is interesting that he describes tsunamis correctly in a way that makes sense that wind might be involved. He thought that a strong wind pushed the water back, and caused the earthquake, then the wave rushed in. Book III Aristotle has much to say about rainbows. Since these come about from water or rain, they come about through something like a mirror, but since the particles are so small, the mirror only reflects the color. It's interesting that he understands that it has to do with optics and not simply emitted from the sky. Book IV This entire book is basically antiquated chemistry. It is based on the 4 elements, and describes things like boiling or thickening.
  9. Book II 1 – Matter is always bound up with a contrary. Hot and cold share the same matter. 4 – The coming-to-be of the elements is cyclical. For example, Fire + water results in earth + air. 5 - Matter is not perceivable and it is the intermediate between extremes, or contraries in this case. 6 – Aristotle says that the excellence and good of each thing that comes about by nature (as compared to fortune) is its nature. The cause of these things is their determinate condition. If something is compounded out of elements, such as fire, what does the soul consist of? If the soul was made out of fire, then it would change only in a physical way. But that doesn't explain memory or gaining skills. 7 – It seems that Aristotle says that through the mean, contraries turn into each other. 9 – It is art, not wood, that makes a bed. The form is the essential nature, and it is an end - as a figure or form that expresses a formula of essential nature. Matter is moved, form moves. 10 – Coming-to-be and passing-away can both happen cyclically and forever because movement on a circle will approach and then retreat. All things in nature strive for the best, and since not all things exist eternally, the next best thing is perpetual coming-to-be. This sense of striving for the best sounds to me like Aristotle is saying that the nature of anything is to exist in its fullest extent and its fullest work. 11 – If something will come-to-be absolutely and necessarily, then it is always coming-to-be, in the sense that it can't possibly not-be. So if the existence of something is necessary, then it is eternal. This must be cyclical because this process be unlimited, and the relationship of necessity goes both directions. In a way, this is eternal recurrence from Nietzsche, if it were interpreted as a real metaphysical theory. Aristotle however explains why individual animals don't recur, by distinguishing species from number, where species recur but not individuals.
  10. 4 – Alteration is when the underlying thing remains but a property changes. 5 – Matter cannot be separate from magnitude. If it was, it would lack either place, or concrete existence. And it cannot exist within a body as its own separate form of existence, because then there would be infinite matters within the body. 7 – If A and B are like each other in all respects without difference, then there is no reason to think that one should act on the other any more than the other. If A and B are different from each other in every respect and not identical in any way, then there is no reason to think that one could be affected by the other. It would be as if saying white could affect line. The proper relationship should involve contraries. The 2 things must be similar in genus but different in species. Active power is that from which a process originates. The end for the sake of which the process takes place is not active. A state is when apparently the active power brings about an end. In a sense then, a state is a form. 10 - We don't say wood combines with fire, food with body, shape with wax, or properties with things. Combination should involve things that have separate existence. Compounds might be different than the constituents, but the constituents may remain potentially. Their power of action is preserved. Combination should not depend on every part being side-by-side because this makes perceptual acuity the standard of something being a combination.
  11. Generation and Corruption translated by H. H. Joachim Book I 1 - Those who think that there is an underlying One must maintain that all coming-to-be is alteration, because everything is singular anyway. The singular thing is what changes. Those who say that there is more than one ultimate kind, alteration is distinct from coming-to-be. This would be because some things come together or go apart. 2 - Those who dwell in close association with nature and its phenomena are better able to formulate the foundations of their theories, and their principles admit of wide development. Suppose that you divide something until I can no longer be divided, so that the underlying thing is all that remains. This would mean that this thing has no magnitude, and would be a point. Or this would mean that the thing is no body, and would be a nothing. In both cases they can't be put together and make something come-to-be. 3 - Unqualified coming-to-be applies to substances. Qualified coming-to-be applies to qualities.
  12. It's not that the place does it, he just means that these things end up in a place that is proper to their nature. He says "certain influence" which sounds like a translator's effort to suggest "something like influence but not quite actually influence". We might say that place is a final cause of the movement of fire according to Aristotle, and final cause is never a thing in his eyes. It's abstract. It's not really relevant to this discussion, things still need to move in the same way, places still need to exist. He eventually defines place as simply the boundaries of any particular entity.
  13. That is what he thought. Really only the earth remains still in the sense he didn't think that the earth could go any more towards the center of the universe. I don't think it's consequential to what he thinks place is. Somewhat, but Galileo made things mechanistic and reified math. What do you mean? He didn't think that place influenced motions. It is not that place influenced the motions, but that he thought the elements moved in a particular way just as we think of how oil always float on water. But, the first chapters are different than the later ones, he is exploring the topic. I'm mostly presenting it for the questions, not his answers.
  14. Since in this case space and stuff always exist simultaneously, this is more reason to think that space is a characteristic. Because if you actually were only left with "space" there couldn't be anything actually there that exists, by your own admission. And you could not be left without space either, because then things would not have location. If entities are metaphysical primaries, then space must be derivative of those primaries. I don't see how space could have any independent existence, or at least why you suppose there are 2 metaphysical "types".
  15. Suppose you removed the particles, or whatever is there that is material. How would you differentiate what is left with absolute nothingness? Presumably what is left after you remove the material things is space, and if you remove space, absolutely nothing would exist.
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