This is from ITOE
“sensations, as such, are not retained in man’s memory, nor is man able to experience a pure isolated sensation”. I remember also something from OPAR about how you can’t do anything with a group of isolated percepts which have not been integrated into a concept.
So while I see I have to feel something also. I can’t just receive light only.
But I don’t get why sensations are not retained in memory - I know what it feels (in my body) like when I’m sad, or when I get burnt.
In ITOE, Miss. Rand identifies: “A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality.”
You know what it feels like when you are sad or get burnt. This are aspects of percepts integrated into concepts.
The brain integrates the sight of an apple with its feel in the hand along with the sound of the crunch as you bite into it, the sweet taste and crunchy texture along with the smell, and automatically retains it.
The sight of the fires flickering flame, the logs red glow, the crackling sounds associated with it, the burnt smell the warmth as you approach nearer, the burning sensation received by the touch, are integrated and automatically retained
The recollections of the various aspects have to be isolated and integrated into the various terms we use of sweet, burnt, etc. Percepts assist us in this process. You perceive something. You recall it from a previous perception of it. You recall and consider something else that is similar or different. You decide to investigate by adding some more observations you think might be relevant. From the relevant percpets you can begin to abstract what you are trying to isolate for a further integration.
Even “sad” need be isolated from other emotions and integrated. You were not born with knowing what sadness was. At some point along the line, it too had to be identified and integrated into a concept.
The end of the earlier cited paragraph states: “The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery.”
“What are sensations?” is a question taken up in chapter 2 of Kelley’s book “The Evidence of the Senses”
I. Description of Perception and Sensation
A. Perception is of entities, entities in an extended sense. We perceive objects, but also shadows and smoke, sounds and smells. The percept stands out as a unit apart from its background. “Figure-ground” effect in vision, a similar effect applies recognizing sounds.
{Lexicon entry on entity} {This thread contains a discussion about why anyone would ever complicate the simple idea of an entity with primary and extended senses.}
B. Perception is also simultaneously of an attribute in a particular degree. Entities are grasped by means of their identities.
C. Discriminating objects requires a great deal of integration.
visual discrimination - integration of all the contours of the shape.
tactile discrimination - integration of all the positions, pressures and textures of the fingers
integration over time - perceiving a melody or a motion, discriminating a weight by lifting it, shifting it from hand to hand
integration between modalities - a phone rings: hear a noise, turn to see the source, reach out to grasp it.
D. Sensation is unintegrated awareness of an attribute apart from and without awareness of an entity.
E. True sensations are rare - examples hard to find
sensory damage or atrophy ex: the chaotic field presented to the blind when sight is surgically restored
severely impoverished stimuli ex: flashes or points of light, points of pressure on the skin, tones of single frequency
F. Sensations are more primitive forms of awareness than perceptions
G. Merely isolating an attribute of a perceived object by selective attention does not produce a sensation.
H. Sensations are momentary experiences.
J. Sensations-Perceptions describe a continuum, a color patch has a border, a smell is comparatively more like a sensation than is a visual object.
II. The Theory of Direct Perception (“the theses to be defended”)
A. Perception is the normal mode of experience
B. Sensations are unusual , almost never experienced
C. Common cause : Both result from same sensory system
D. Relativity : A stimulus can result in a percept in one person and a sensation in another
E. Unitary product , a percept is not composed of sensations as real constituents
F. Direct : Perceptual awareness gives entities directly because perceptual integration is physiological, not conscious association, inference, hypotheses, calculation or computation
I am interested in this topic. I have one thing that I would like bring up and perhaps Grames or dream_weaver already addressed it and I missed it when I read their comments.
At any rate, Rand seems to contradict herself with regard to sensations, percepts, and the ability of the brain to “retain.”
This is from ITOE
“sensations, as such, are not retained in man’s memory, nor is man able to experience a pure isolated sensation.”
In ITOE, Miss. Rand identifies: “A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism.”
For me, this is a contradiction:
Just wondering what you all thought.
I am interested in this topic. I have one thing that I would like bring up and perhaps Grames or dream_weaver already addressed it and I missed it when I read their comments.
At any rate, Rand seems to contradict herself with regard to sensations, percepts, and the ability of the brain to “retain.”
- Sensations, as such, are not retained in a person’s memory
- Groups of sensations are automatically retained by the brain
For me, this is a contradiction:
- How is it possible to retain (in the brain) a group of sensations when it is NOT possible to retain (in the brain) a single sensation in the first place?
Just wondering what you all thought.
The brain automatically integrates the sensations into percepts, so all we deal with are percepts. So, everything we retain, all of the knowledge/content of our memory, is derived from percepts. We don’t deal with single, isolated sensations, so it is not retained in our memory.
I am interested in this topic. I have one thing that I would like bring up and perhaps Grames or dream_weaver already addressed it and I missed it when I read their comments.
At any rate, Rand seems to contradict herself with regard to sensations, percepts, and the ability of the brain to “retain.”
- Sensations, as such, are not retained in a person’s memory
- Groups of sensations are automatically retained by the brain
For me, this is a contradiction:
- How is it possible to retain (in the brain) a group of sensations when it is NOT possible to retain (in the brain) a single sensation in the first place?
Just wondering what you all thought.
Pick an object within your awareness, somewhere in your room. When you look at it, you perceive the object, you do not see the individual colors separate from the object. That is has color is later learned by abstraction from your perception of the object. Your brain automatically integrates what is striking your senses into the percept - the object in front of you. The same for touch. When you touch something, you feel the object - not the sensations on your fingertips, which are later learned about through scientific methods.
I am not sure, but I don’t see how the contradiction has been resolved.
A. First, let’s look at her assertions:
B. Second, based on her assertions here and elsewhere (e.g. - see aynrandlexicon.com with regard to sensation, integration, and perception), let’s look at the process of integration and do a quick step by step break down:
C. Third, let’s look at some permutations of the inherent contradiction:
D. Fourth, let me be clear:
- How is it possible or even reasonable to assert that the brain can integrate two things which it can neither retain nor experience?
- If I cannot retain or experience a single sensation, then I cannot integrate two of them, as I have no experience of either sensation and my brain has also not retained, in any way, either sensation.
- If man can have no experience of a pure isolated sensation whatsoever, as she asserts, that entails that man’s brain can likewise have no experience whatsoever of a pure isolated sensation. If man’s brain can have no experience whatsoever of a pure isolated sensation, this entails that man’s brain also cannot integrate a pure isolated sensation with another pure isolated sensation in order to form a percept. This is because no pure isolated sensations whatsoever can be experienced by man.
- If you say that man’s brain can integrate two pure isolated sensations, then you must concede that man CAN experience a single, if not two or more, pure isolated sensations. In order for the brain to integrate two pure isolated sensations, it must also have an experience of those pure isolated sensations. Otherwise, its just a bunch of nonsense.
- Rand is saying something like, “You can retain and experience things which are 100%, absolutely impossible to retain and experience.” It just doesn’t make any sense.
I don’t think that is Rand’s position. I believe she said that infants, for the first few months of their lives, only experience sensations. And you can observe this when you try talking to a new born. You can talk, snap your fingers, clap, yell, etc. but it is almost impossible to get them to look at you because they are experiencing many isolated sensations so the world is confusing. Overtime, the mind automatically integrates the sensations into percepts and that is when we begin to see entities (and their qualities).
And then I will quote Dream_weaver, because he summed it up nicely:
“The recollections of the various aspects have to be isolated and integrated into the various terms we use of sweet, burnt, etc. Percepts assist us in this process. You perceive something. You recall it from a previous perception of it. You recall and consider something else that is similar or different. You decide to investigate by adding some more observations you think might be relevant. From the relevant percepts you can begin to abstract what you are trying to isolate for a further integration.”
thenelli01, I think that what Rand says leads to an unwanted logical consequence and she probably would not like it. Nonetheless, if we are to accept any of her philosophically oriented writings, then we must assume that, in that context, she says what she means and means what she says and that that is her position.
I see no way around her logical contradiction, but I would be happy to see if you or someone else could prove otherwise.
There is no contradiction. A group of sensations when integrated into a percept are not a sensation any longer. A percept is a new thing which did not exist before the perceptual faculty created it. The conceptual faculty relies on the perceptual faculty for all of its content, not the sensations directly.
A percept is not composed of sensations as if they were parts or elements of a set.
No one has mentioned it, so I want to add looks like Questioner is committing the fallacy of composition. Another way to think of this is that percepts are an integration of sensations, sensations which are not experienced individually and separately, nor can they ever be. You wouldn’t be able to split apart everything that makes up hearing a sound, for instance. The human brain automatically puts that together. You could argue that sensations are stored, but are not consciously accessible. But the relevant philosophical point is that a perception is at least a collection of integrated sensations that are used to make sense of the world.
(It’s not true that infants can only access sensations, I think any science would show that infants really do have percepts. But it’s not such a claim I think that has implications for Rand’s point, it’s more like infants just have a lot less learned processes.)
When you recall a perception of a computer monitor, are you able to recall individual sensations?
When you recall a perception of a computer monitor, what is the image *composed* of?
If you want to resolve an apparent contradiction, consider the facts on which claims depend.
I am interested in this topic. I have one thing that I would like bring up and perhaps Grames or dream_weaver already addressed it and I missed it when I read their comments.
At any rate, Rand seems to contradict herself with regard to sensations, percepts, and the ability of the brain to “retain.”
- Sensations, as such, are not retained in a person’s memory
- Groups of sensations are automatically retained by the brain
For me, this is a contradiction:
- How is it possible to retain (in the brain) a group of sensations when it is NOT possible to retain (in the brain) a single sensation in the first place?
Just wondering what you all thought.
(It’s not true that infants can only access sensations, I think any science would show that infants really do have percepts. But it’s not such a claim I think that has implications for Rand’s point, it’s more like infants just have a lot less learned processes.)
This really isn’t a philosophical issue anyways, but are you saying infants have percepts from the moment of their birth? Can you direct me to some scientific data on this?
I am not sure, but I don’t see how the contradiction has been resolved.
A. First, let’s look at her assertions:
- Rand asserts that, “sensations, as such, are not retained in man’s memory, nor is man able to experience a pure isolated sensation.”
- Rand then asserts that, "A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism.”
There is no contradiction here. You do not retain the sensations in memory. The sensations are automatically integrated into percepts which are retained in memory. It is your brain which does the integration from sensations to perceptions. Your consciousness is not aware of the neurological processes going on in the brain.
B. Second, based on her assertions here and elsewhere (e.g. - see aynrandlexicon.com with regard to sensation, integration, and perception), let’s look at the process of integration and do a quick step by step break down:
- two or more sensations of a single entity are stimuli which are present to a person’s consciousness
- this person can neither retain nor experience any pure isolated sensations stimulated by this single entity
- then, this person’s brain automatically takes two or more pure isolated sensations stimulated by this single entity and integrates them.
- when the brain automatically integrates two or more pure isolated sensations stimulated by this single entity - thus forming a percept of that single entity, then that person’s brain is able to retain and experience the sensations.
Yes. But you are not aware that the brain has done this process. When you look at reality, you see percepts, not sensations.
- Tell me if I’m wrong here, but I am pretty confidant that that is exactly what Rand is communicating.
C. Third, let’s look at some permutations of the inherent contradiction:
From Rand’s quotes above (section A), her second statement logically contradicts her first statement.
How is it possible or even reasonable to assert that the brain can integrate two things which it can neither retain nor experience?
As I stated above, you don’t experience the operations of the brain and the sensations it is integrating into a percept.
- If I cannot retain or experience a single sensation, then I cannot integrate two of them, as I have no experience of either sensation and my brain has also not retained, in any way, either sensation.
Not true. When you respirate, you do not experience absorbing oxygen and expelling carbon dioxide, but you do experience breathing. You are mixing up the operations of the brain, a physical organ, with the operations of consciousness, a process of awareness that depends upon the operations of the brain as well as other sensory organs.
If man can have no experience of a pure isolated sensation whatsoever, as she asserts, that entails that man’s brain can likewise have no experience whatsoever of a pure isolated sensation. If man’s brain can have no experience whatsoever of a pure isolated sensation, this entails that man’s brain also cannot integrate a pure isolated sensation with another pure isolated sensation in order to form a percept. This is because no pure isolated sensations whatsoever can be experienced by man.
If you say that man’s brain can integrate two pure isolated sensations, then you must concede that man CAN experience a single, if not two or more, pure isolated sensations. In order for the brain to integrate two pure isolated sensations, it must also have an experience of those pure isolated sensations. Otherwise, its just a bunch of nonsense.
As I indicated above, this is not correct. Integrating sensations into percepts is a neurological process. Experience is an awareness process, a process of consciousness.
- Rand is saying something like, “You can retain and experience things which are 100%, absolutely impossible to retain and experience.” It just doesn’t make any sense.
D. Fourth, let me be clear:
- I am not suggesting that we don’t experience the world in a way that “feels” similar to Rand’s description. I am just saying that her presentation is logically incoherent.
This is great. I love all of these responses.
I will have to consider your individual responses more in depth, but, in the short term, I am still not convinced that the contradiction has been addressed.
__________
Let’s start fresh and analyze these remarks that she makes:
A. Sensations
“Sensations, as such, are not retained in man’s memory, nor is man able to experience a pure isolated sensation” (IOE, pg. 5).
“Sensations are merely an awareness of the present and cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment” (IOE, pg. 57).
“On the lower levels of awareness, a complex neurological process is required to enable man to experience a sensation and to integrate sensations into percepts” (IOE, pg. 29).
“Music is the only phenomenon that permits an adult to experience the process of dealing with pure sense data. Single musical tones are not percepts, but pure sensations; they become percepts only when integrated. Sensations are man’s first contact with reality; when integrated into percepts, they are the given, the self-evident, the not-to-be-doubted. Music offers man the singular opportunity to reenact, on the adult level, the primary process of this method of cognition: the automatic integration of sense data into an intelligible, meaningful entity. To a conceptual consciousness, it is a unique form of rest and reward.” (The Romantic Manifesto_,_ pg. 59)
B. Percepts
“A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism” (IOE, pg. 5).
“Percepts are retained and, through automatic memory, provide a certain rudimentary link to the past, but cannot project the future” (IOE, pg. 57).
“On the lower levels of awareness, a complex neurological process is required to enable man to experience a sensation and to integrate sensations into percepts” (IOE, pg. 29).
C. Contradictions
a. First, these Six remarks (note — #3 is the same in sections A & B) by Rand will be used to illustrate her contradictions with regard to [sensations] and [Retain-ment], [Experience] and [Memory].
b. Second, I would like to point out that - to my knowledge, she never really explains what either [sensation Integration] or [sensation Retain-ment] actually are, how they actually work, or how they actually function together, other than saying that they are "complex neurological [processes]” (IOE pg. 29). I am also unaware of any place where she says that one causes the other or vice versa. Thus, I will rely on what she does say and presume that, in the case of percepts, [sensation Integration] and [sensation Retain-ment] happen exactly simultaneously and that neither is the cause of the other as she gives no indication that this is the case.
c. Third, I am utilizing the position that a definiendum and its definition are mutually inclusive, and thus, mutually interchangeable. If we take [Percept] as an example and propose that its definition is [a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism], then we can say that:
Whatever is a [Percept] is necessarily [a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism] and whatever is [a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism] is necessarily a [Percept].
Likewise:
Whatever is not a [Percept] is necessarily not [a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism] and whatever is not [a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism] is necessarily a not [Percept].
* If you do not agree with these statements of pervasion, then the onus is upon you to provide an adequate, cited definition that will satisfy such statements of pervasion. It is also important to remember that the nature of the relationship between a definiendum and its definition is always one of mutual inclusion; if it is otherwise, then the relationship becomes a fallacious one.
2. [sensation] - Rand Contradicts Herself with Her Own Words:
a. Orientation - A Loose Definition of [sensations]
i. [sensations] are merely an awareness of the present and cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment
b. Contradiction with Regard to [Retain-ment of Sensations]
i.CLAIM: [sensations] cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment
ii. CONTRADICTION: a group of [sensations] can be automatically retained by the brain of a living organism
c. Contradiction with Regard to [Experience of Sensations]
i. CLAIM: a person is not able to experience a pure isolated [sensation]
ii. CONTRADICTION: a person is able to experience a pure isolated [sensation]
a complex neurological process is required to enable a person to experience a [sensation]
an adult can experience a pure [sensation] when they hear a single musical tone because a single musical tone is a pure [sensation]
d. Contradiction with Regard to [Memory of Sensations]
i. CLAIM: [sensations] are not retained in a person’s memory
ii. CONTRADICTION: a group of [sensations] that is automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism can be retained and provide a certain rudimentary link to the past through automatic memory.
Questioner, try going into a darkened, soundproof room devoid of any aromas, and summoning the experience of blue or seeing blue, not just recollecting what it looked like last time you saw it.
Or experiencing the aroma of fresh baked apple pie, or hearing a clap of thunder.
It is the percept, not the sensation or group of sensations, only the group of sensations after the brain automatically integrates them into a percept, does the brain retain the percept for later retreival.
FACT: Atoms are not alive
FACT: Human beings are a group of atoms
CLAIM: Human beings are alive
CONTRADICTION: A group of non-living things cannot be alive
Do you see a problem with this logic?
Contradiction with Regard to [Retain-ment of Sensations]
The quote you gave up top, Rand is clear in stating that her position is that sensations are not stored in memory. You could say they are “retained” for a split second, but that’s the strongest she is claiming that there is retention. That says nothing about a “group” of sensations because percepts aren’t even merely sensations glued together. Sensations are only one stage of a process. For instance, it would be rather strange to say that after you bake bread, the dough is still there. The dough is actually in a completely different form. Perceptions aren’t in the same form as sensations, even if you need sensations to make a percept.
Contradiction with Regard to [Experience of Sensations]
I see this erroneous and rather strange of Rand to say music is experienced as a pure sensation. It’s more like an erroneous scientific claim I think. Really it only applies to music nor is Rand claiming even these sensations are retained in memory for developing concepts later. It’s an issue for aesthetics to be sure, but you are not focused on aesthetics.
Contradiction with Regard to [Memory of Sensations]
Key word, integrated. See what I said above regarding bread and dough.
“Questioner, try going into a darkened, soundproof room devoid of any aromas, and summoning the experience of blue or seeing blue, not just recollecting what it looked like last time you saw it.”
I’m not sure what you’re pointing out here, DreamWeaver. I cannot summon the experience at all, not the same way. I’m not sure if that’s what you meant?
It is the percept, not the sensation or group of sensations, only the group of sensations after the brain automatically integrates them into a percept, does the brain retain the percept for later retreival.
dream_weaver - I am not sure where you are getting your information. Can you cite and quote a source for your contention that retention occurs post-integration?
Rand clearly says that, “A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism” (IOE, pg. 5).
That statement gives absolutely no indication that integration occurs before before retention or vice versa; thus, we must assume that she means that they occur exactly simultaneously - in which case, Rand is in fact very explicitly saying that a group of sensations is retained by the brain of a living organism.
CONTRADICTION: Served up, hot and fresh. Come and get it.
Can you cite and quote a source for your contention that retention occurs post-integration?
“Although, chronologically, man’s consciousness develops in three stages: the stage of sensations, the perceptual, the conceptual—epistemologically, the base of all of man’s knowledge is the perceptual stage.”
That’s from PWNI, but I’m sure the equivalent is in ITOE.
Plus it’s clear she’s saying that 1) sensations aren’t retained, 2) perception is integration of sensations, so 3) a percept cannot be created after it is already stored. Perception is automatic, so it’s no problem that you cannot remember/recall/make use of sensations consciously. Understand that there is a separation between peception and the integration of sensations, Rand is making a notable distinction in terms of stages, not that sensation is continuous all the way up to perception or even conception. Hume, for example, said that there is sensation, and conception.