Sensations as components of perception.

Metaphysics and Epistemology
1

AndrewSternberg raised the following question on the premium thread on ITOE1:

The second, third, and fourth paragraphs of Chapter 1 in ITOE, discusses the distinction between the stage of sensations, of perception, and of conceptionalization:

And then AR says:

Does anyone know the science behind that discovery? Ayn Rand wasn’t a scientist, so how was she able to figure this out?

Ayn Rand uses the phrase “scientific, conceptual discovery” to imply that for one to be aware of ones own sensations and of sensations as such, one must use the tool of deduction. she explains that precepts are the given, the basis from which to draw deductive (and inductive) reasoning. The issue is scientific because it is not self evident and you have to use scientific methods in order to reach the conclusion that precepts consist of sensations just as a drop of water consists of H2O.

(Edited to format Quotes and to link back to original thread. - SoftwareNerd)

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Ayn Rand uses the phrase “scientific, conceptual discovery” to imply that for one to be aware of ones own sensations and of sensations as such, one must use the tool of deduction. she explains that precepts are the given, the basis from which to draw deductive (and inductive) reasoning. The issue is scientific because it is not self evident and you have to use scientific methods in order to reach the conclusion that precepts consist of sensations just as a drop of water consists of H2O.

[bold emphasis added.]

Andrew asked for the scientific evidence for the idea that perceptions are composed of sensations. I don’t know who made that discovery, in the history of science.

Andrew also asked how Ayn Rand, as a philosopher, presumably using philosophical methods, could learn a scientific fact. I would say that she could not make such a discovery working philosophically. What she appears to be doing is starting with a scientific discovery well known and well verified in her own time, and then philosophizing from that point. Every philosopher must make some scientific assumptions – for example, that the earth goes around the sun – in order to communicate with others in his (or her) own time. That need does not mean that those ideas are philosophical. They aren’t. They are scientific. Another example is discoveries in the field of history, as a special science. The idea of “the Industrial Revolution” is not a philosophical idea, but one created by the special science of history, specifically economic history.

Philosophy is the universal science, the one that deals with the basic issues that affect everyone, everywhere, at all times. That is its subject matter. Its methods are those available to everyone, everywhere, at all times: sense-perception (looking around, for example), thinking, and logic. The special sciences, by contrast, examine specific aspects of reality, aspects that might not be of interest to all individuals. The special sciences use special methods (such as the experimental method, in physics, perhaps) and special tools (such as x-ray machines).

I know of no way, philosophically, to prove that percepts are composed of sensations from individual nerve endings. Even the idea of nerve endings is a scientific discovery, not, so far as I know, a philosophical idea. Of course, I am using the term “philosophical” in the modern, Objectivist meaning.

P. S. – Where, if anywhere, does Ayn Rand suggest that one should deduce concepts from sense-perceptions? I doubt that she said that – because it makes no sense (pardon the unintended pun). Further, the proper term is PERcepts, not PREcepts.

3

Inducing that percepts are composed of integrated sensations doesn’t require scientific theory. It is the existence of a sensory stage of awareness in early stages of human development that must be induced, and it was not completely validated until relatively recent scientific discoveries. (My understanding, at least.)

Everyone is aware of their own sensations at all times; sensory data bombards you at every moment of your life. If you concentrate you can even isolate specific sensations, however, it requires concentration because once your consciousness has advanced beyond the sensory stage of awareness you automatically integrate sensations into perceptions; you don’t feel an isolated sensation of movement, then hard and smooth, you reach out and touch a table.

The perceptual stage is the given consciousness-wise; your mind performs perceptual integrations automatically, which is why the sensory stage prior to when you learned to make this integration must be induced by observing lower animals and very young children. The existence of sensations themselves, however, is obvious from every operation of your sensory apparatus.

4

There’s no clearly defined line seperating science from philosophy, especially when youre dealing with issues such as ‘how perception works’. As Burgess says, I assume she was taking a widely believed theory of cognition as a starting point and then building from there, rather than engaging in a priori speculation.

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Andrew also asked how Ayn Rand, as a philosopher, presumably using philosophical methods, could learn a scientific fact. I would say that she could not make such a discovery working philosophically. What she appears to be doing is starting with a scientific discovery well known and well verified in her own time, and then philosophizing from that point.

That implies that philosophy is impossible if there are no laid fundamentals in science. This is not true. Philosophy comes first, and gives the scientists the fundamentals for their work.

The issue of whether or not percepts are the given, and the basis for all reasoning is the question of whether or not they are valid. That they are valid is taken as a fact (read OPAR for reasons), because the alternative is that they aren’t, and that means that we are not able to deal with reality (revelations and divine interventions notwithstanding).