This brief introduction to objective morality is geared toward scientifically-minded, modern skeptic types, who reject mysticism outright, but embrace the is-ought dichotomy, and so affirm moral subjectivism. Seeing as I once identified with these types, I hope I can at least pique their interest, leading them to read more.
Let me know what you think, and feel free to offer this to others:
I disagree with the writer that there can be no objective moral truths. He claims that there can be no basis by which to promote one morality over another as being more objective. Yet a morality that, for example, asserts the existence of an invisible pink unicorn that is to be considered the highest purpose for one’s life, is demonstrably arbitrary and/or logically contradictory in its fundamental claims, and so should be rejected as such. Likewise, a morality that says that you can live 100 years by drinking Drano, is demonstrably false in its guidelines.
So we can reject moralities that assert false or illogical fundamental claims (e.g. the popular one about a non-physical Consciousness called God). We can also reject moralities that assert guidelines that demonstrably do not achieve their intended purposes or goals.
But what about those moralities that apparently do neither? What of those moralities that a) assert something physical and comprehensible as their ultimate purpose/goal, and B) offer demonstrably rational guidelines for pursuing that purpose or achieving that goal?
To be objective, the selection of that ultimate goal must also be neither arbitrary nor contradictory. The ultimate standard of value must rationally follow from the context that is created by teleological concepts (e.g. value, purpose, goal).
Morality is supposed to answer the question, “what should I do?” Such a question presumes a goal, but what is an objective goal? Given that the fundamental existential alternative that living creatures face (life or death) creates value, an objective, non-arbitrary morality would place one’s life as the goal, ie the ultimate standard of value. For humans, as opposed to plants/animals, that value system is not automatic - a person must choose to live in order for value to have any meaning. If you choose to live, an objective morality will tell you how to live, in the context of that choice. Your actions can then be morally - and rationally - judged based on their adherence to your life as the standard of value.
So, morality cannot tell you to choose to live, but if you do, it can tell you how to live in order to remain consistent with that choice.
This is probably an over-summarization. For a much more academic explanation, and an examination of historical alternative attempts at moral systems (e.g. intuitionism, subjectivism, intrinsicism, etc), you should check out Viable Values by Tara Smith, professor of philosophy at UT Austin. It is comprehensive, but is geared more toward academic philosophy, and so deals with a lot of jargon that philosophers have concocted over the years.
For an even more thorough read on this topic, look for Harry Binswanger’s treatise The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts.
If you’re not interested in all that, and just want the argument in more detail, probably check out Ayn Rand’s essay The Objectivist Ethics.