So where's the solution to the 'Problem of Universals'?

And so here I am, still sitting on my thumbs waiting for an Objectivist theory of knowledge and not just a theory of concept-formation.

Could you define “knowledge?”

And since they are not existents (which, according to ITOE, are concretes)

I think if you re-check, you will see that that is false. I advocate using direct quotations, which tends to catch those errors. Straight lines, numbers, etc are all existents.

The concept “tree” is a concept of method used for communicating to you about a tree.

No, “tree” is a concept which reduces to particular wooden entities. Don’t confuse the things you can do with a concept – communicate or obfuscate X – with a concept which is in fact a method.

But the problem involves properties which are allegedly identical: if reason is a distinguishing property of man separating him from animals, then how do we know that the rational faculty in one man is the same as the rational faculty in any other men, such that all men may be classified under the same category of rational animal?

Your concern is misplaced; and I see you returning to that theme of “definition”. The fact of identification is primary, and definition is secondary. You don’t need to know that the rational faculty in one man is the same as the rational faculty in any other men, all you need to be able to do is identify a man.

And so here I am, still sitting on my thumbs waiting for an Objectivist theory of knowledge and not just a theory of concept-formation.

And yet, you can’t name any aspect of an epistemology that is missing from ITOE. I’ll help you with the one thing I know of – she did not develop the distinction between possible, probably and certain, which was done in OPAR. She did dispose of the so-called “problem of universals”, by proposing a theory of concept formation (which then leaves no unresolved matters of substance in the “problem of universals”).

Yes.

And this speaks to the problem of universals, as you state it above. The property of “redness” depends on how precisely you define (ostensively) “red,” as well as the context of identification. For instance, if you pointed to a bookshelf and said, “see those two red books over there?” I look, and based upon my personal conceptualization of the “ideal” red, look for two books that match that ideal closer than the other books. If I see a red book and a burgundy book on a shelf of blues and greens, I identify those as the “red books” you are referring to. There is no conceptual confusion there. Moving the fringe, if I look and see one red book and one orange book, I may have to come back with “You mean the red and the orange one?” which is a process of communication in which we synchronize our definitions of concepts. If you were to reply “no those are both red” then I might calibrate my communications with you, in a sort of unique dialect, in which the term “red” as used by and to you, subsumes my concepts “red” and “orange.” (Preferably, I would point out the difference between the colors of the two books, and try to come to an agreement on the meaning of “red” and “orange” but if you were color-blind, my redefinition of the term would be the only way to synchronize our concepts)

In regards to the straight line, the same process of definition holds true. If I drew three lines on a piece of paper, one curved and two generally “straight” (I will assume that your confusion is theoretical, and not conceptual), and asked you to measure the two straight lines, you would look at the three lines, identify the two which hold more closely to your concept of “straight” and measure them. If two of the lines were straight, accurate to the picometer, and one was straight, accurate only to the nanometer, you would have no confusion as to which lines I meant, assuming those accuracies were apparent to you. If they weren’t, or if the difference did not meet your conceptual threshold for differentiation (in terms of “straightness”), you might ask me what I mean by “straight.”

A particular “universal” is a property that is conceptualized by your rational mind, not necessarily by all rational minds. If you’re looking for a “universal” that is universal to all men, in absolutely, precisely defined terms, you are not going to find it. We all conceptualize properties based on our perceptions and rational processes, so there is naturally some level of disparity between any two men’s concepts, as held in their minds, and as synchronized by their terms. (In a manner similar to the observation that two clocks never agree with absolute precision, but both say sufficiently the same thing in terms of “what time it is.”)

Red and orange are precisely distinguishable from each other: red is a color in the wavelength range of roughly 625–740 nm; orange is a color at a wavelength of about 585 – 620 nm. (Source = wikipedia.)

The question for you seems to involve relativity and perspectivism. Straightness is defined relative to a standard of measure. But since that in itself only stands relative to some more or less fine degree of measure, an absolute degree of measure would be infinitely precise. I am not demanding that true knowledge conform to this perfectionistic standard, only that a relative measure must stand in comparison to some absolute standard, despite the fact that no such standard can ever be found in reality. In Rand’s terms, the concept of a straight line must omit the particular measurements, retaining just a few essentials: two points joined by a line that never deviates as it traverses whatever distance stands between them. So even if you allow for the slightest possible deviation you still do not have, by definition, a straight line, because it is the latter immutable definition that guides your thinking, not some arbitrary, relative standard of straightness that doesn’t properly “define away” the particulars (nanometers, etc).

I don’t believe that red and orange were originally defined scientifically, only intuitively (or ostensively). On such a subjective grounds everybody must simply find some basis for agreement. However, the problem of universals only asks if it is the same color classifiable under the same category ‘red’ when pondering two red books. Perhaps the colors should be called ‘red1’ and ‘red2’, since no two colors of red appear exactly identical. There is then no intersubjectivity question, the problem of universals isn’t concerned with that anyway. The question is why we always consider red as red, or better, why the redness in the one book falls under the same category of redness in all red books, and how we learned to generalize ‘redness’ in the absence of anything but intuitive, perceptual guidance, where concept-formation falls flat on its face. Rand thought that it was due to some sort of ‘implicit measurement,’ [itoe, 14] but this was going on long before anybody even had an inkling that color consists of measurable wavelengths of light.

As she stated in the Foreword, Rand intended that ITOE be a “summary of one of its [Objectivist epistemology’s] cardinal elements–the Objectivist theory of concepts.”

Dan

That’s true, she did state that. I wonder what the other cardinal elements are?

The point is that utility implies something real.

And ‘straightness’ implies an impossibility.

And ‘straightness’ implies an impossibility.

What is that you mean by “straight”? Doesn’t straight refer to a particular shape? A relationship between two or more points? What, specifically, is the “impossibility” you refer to?

Dan

First, it would be helpful if you told us to what you refer when you speak of one man having “the same” rational faculty of another man. Regardless, Rand tells us that the fact that men possess rational faculty is a characteristic that justifies us in regarding them as members of the same class. The degree of a man’s intellegence (assuming that is what you were refering to) is not an essential characteristic.

No two colors of red are exactly identical. How do you know to call them ‘red’? That answer is easy. But in the case of a rational faculty which you cannot even sense, the question becomes ponderous. Imagine that there are degrees of rationality, and as you know not everybody engages in identification and integration 24/7. Some people hardly seem to do it at all. Why are they still considered rational animals? Only because we idealize them into a mental compartment known as ‘rational,’ even when this requires a great deal of straining when trying to fit such square pegs into a round hole.

Could you define “knowledge?”

The sum-total of all that is known, which is awareness of facts and theories about reality.

What is that you mean by “straight”? Doesn’t straight refer to a particular shape? A relationship between two or more points? What, specifically, is the “impossibility” you refer to?

Dan

You missed some of my earlier posts. A straight line is the distance traversed between two points without ever deviating from the course. You can see that in reality straight lines only tend toward straightness, with straightness itself, having an infinite degree of precision in measuring off the path, serving as a standard with which to accomplish the task. But an infinite degree of precision doesn’t exist in reality, it is a mental construct.

Think about the concept of time. You cannot touch, smell, tastes, see, or hear time. However, by observing how an entity (such as the sky or a plant) was, is, and might be you can learn the concepts of past, present, and future. From those concepts you can infer the concept of time. You can even learn to measure time by relating it to changes in the attributes of an entity (i.e. reaching the concepts of night and day by observing changes in the sky.) Time is a unique attribute as it applies to all entities past, present, and future.

In physical reality, attributes do not exist apart from the entities that embody them. It is only through a process of abstraction that we deal with attributes.

The question then is, how does a property follow all the members of a class? For example, if you have two red books, the property ‘redness’ is shared between them as members of the class of red books. However, upon closer examination you

may notice that they are not precisely the same color red, that one instance of red is a little darker than the other. In order to classify the books under the same category of red it is necessary to ignore subtle perceptual distinctions. Here’s another example: again you are given two books, both books are identical in title, author, cover, publisher, and year of publication, such that you can say that they are both Atlas Shrugged written by Ayn Rand, paperback edition, etc. However, one of the books has its front cover torn off. How are the books identifiable under the same class, and why can they still be considered the same book?

The answer lies in the fact that there are many different alternatives in classifying specific entities. That a book may or may not be red, have a cover or not, etc; is irrelevant to what a book essentially is. In essence a book is stacked papers bound together along one side. Thus a universal property of all books is that they employ a method of binding a stack of papers together. From there we can discern different types of books and divide them into classes such as books with substantial printed information (such as magazines, textbooks, novels, booklets) and books without substantial printed information (i.e. notebooks, journals, photo albums etc.). Then we look at books with printed information and consider the classes of non-fiction and fiction.

Having chosen fiction, we organize the class of fiction book by author, then by title. Looking at the specific books we can compare the text and conclude that they share the same text, method of binding, and page layout and conclude they are the same book despite one missing the cover and copyright pages and thus are similar paperback editions of Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand. So in this route of classification they are properly in the same class with only a few minor differences that are irrelevant.

Another route is possible where after considering books with substantial amounts of printed information as opposed to books that are mostly blank, you consider only those printed books that have covers vs. those printed books that do not so as to distinguished between a stolen book and a legitimate one. In this case, the two editions of Atlas Shrugged are properly not in the same class though they are copies of the same book. In both cases the classification is correct, the difference lies in what classifications we considered to be important for our purposes.

Each class heading names the property that is universal for all entities subsumed in that class. However there are many different ways of classifying that can be broken down depending on how specific one wishes to make the list of requisite properties and what purpose we have classifying such entities. So it is possible of similar entities with similar properties to be in the same class or not depending on one’s purpose of classification.

Remember, one cannot say ‘entities’ without pronouncing ‘tities.’

And ‘straightness’ implies an impossibility.

Are you acknowledging that you do not use the term straight, or that when you do so it is meaningless? If you use it and mean something by it, then you need to introspect what you mean. I think my son was 4 years old or less when he could tell a curved line from a straight one. I warrant you can do the same. Either admit that you’re fooling yourself, or figure out what measurements you are using. This really isn’t rocket science!

I think if you re-check, you will see that that is false. I advocate using direct quotations, which tends to catch those errors. Straight lines, numbers, etc are all existents.

‘An existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events.’ [241]

In that case, ‘existent’ is synonymous with ‘concrete,’ which is whatever Rand said it is. It is difficult to integrate her notion that mental “events” are concretes too, which I would instead classify as tangibles (vs. the intangibles: products of conscious activity, etc). It was kinder of me not to quote Rand in this instance.

No, “tree” is a concept which reduces to particular wooden entities. Don’t confuse the things you can do with a concept – communicate or obfuscate X – with a concept which is in fact a method.

Is the concept of ‘concept’ a concept of consciousness or a concept of method?

Your concern is misplaced; and I see you returning to that theme of “definition”. The fact of identification is primary, and definition is secondary. You don’t need to know that the rational faculty in one man is the same as the rational faculty in any other men, all you need to be able to do is identify a man.And yet, you can’t name any aspect of an epistemology that is missing from ITOE. I’ll help you with the one thing I know of – she did not develop the distinction between possible, probably and certain, which was done in OPAR. She did dispose of the so-called “problem of universals”, by proposing a theory of concept formation (which then leaves no unresolved matters of substance in the “problem of universals”).

Only based on her personal definition of the problem, which is then easily knocked down as a strawman. She was concerned with finding the man-ness in men, when that is not the problem at all. ‘Where is the “manness” in men? What, in reality, corresponds to the concept “man” in our mind?’ Those questions do not properly spell out the problem, therefore she did not properly resolve it.

Is the redness of that book identical with the redness of this book?

Is the rationality of that man identical with the rationality of this man?

Is it the same property of red? Is it the same property known as reason?

If they are not identical, then how can they be classified together?

If they are identical, then how do you know it? This last question is, of course, truly a matter of epistemology. It is the question Rand failed to ask. She never asked it, thus she never got her epistemology off the ground.

Why are they still considered rational animals? Only because we idealize them into a mental compartment known as ‘rational,’ even when this requires a great deal of straining when trying to fit such square pegs into a round hole.

I do not know what you mean by “idelize[ing] them into a mental comparment”. It appears you are suggesting some kind of classification of men based, not on observable similarities but on some kind of psychological convenience.

Yet, we cannot intellegently speak of a “degree of rationality” without assuming the existence of a rational faculty.

Have you read Rand’s account of measurement omission in ITOE? This is a key tenet to Rand’s theory of concepts. You seem to either not be aware of the role of measurement omission in her theory of concepts or you have dismissed it out of hand. If you have read it and disagree, please tell us what specifically you find objectionalbe.

Dan

Think about the concept of time. You cannot touch, smell, tastes, see, or hear time. However, by observing how an entity (such as the sky or a plant) was, is, and might be you can learn the concepts of past, present, and future. From those concepts you can infer the concept of time. You can even learn to measure time by relating it to changes in the attributes of an entity (i.e. reaching the concepts of night and day by observing changes in the sky.) Time is a unique attribute as it applies to all entities past, present, and future.

In physical reality, attributes do not exist apart from the entities that embody them. It is only through a process of abstraction that we deal with attributes.

You are following Rand’s method of reducing the universal to the general or abstract, the property to the attribute. I am not concerned here with the attributes of entities, but with the universal properties pertaining to classes of entities.

The answer lies in the fact that there are many different alternatives in classifying specific entities. That a book may or may not be red, have a cover or not, etc; is irrelevant to what a book essentially is.

I am asking if the qualia of red in one instance is the same qualia of red in another instance. Thus color is relevant. If I am to classify them both under the category of red books, then how can I know that their redness places them in identical classes, that is, how can I know that the attribute of redness is a property they share in common?

As you see, this is a question of knowledge, of epistemology, and not merely of concept-formation, thus proving that Rand never got around to discussing the title of her own book.

In essence a book is stacked papers bound together along one side. Thus a universal property of all books is that they employ a method of binding a stack of papers together.

I don’t see how a method of binding a stack of papers could be considered a property or even an attribute of anything.

From there we can discern different types of books and divide them into classes such as books with substantial printed information (such as magazines, textbooks, novels, booklets) and books without substantial printed information (i.e. notebooks, journals, photo albums etc.). Then we look at books with printed information and consider the classes of non-fiction and fiction. Having chosen fiction, we organize the class of fiction book by author, then by title. Looking at the specific books we can compare the text and conclude that they share the same text, method of binding, and page layout and conclude they are the same book despite one missing the cover and copyright pages and thus are similar paperback editions of Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand. So in this route of classification they are properly in the same class with only a few minor differences that are irrelevant.

You have stated that they are similar editions, but not that their properties are identical such that they are classifiable under the same category. I wanted to know if they were the same book, not similar books.

The essence of similarity was the easiest part of ITOE to understand, it was a complete no-brainer, every mathematician knows it already. But the problem of universals isn’t that easy.

Another route is possible where after considering books with substantial amounts of printed information as opposed to books that are mostly blank, you consider only those printed books that have covers vs. those printed books that do not so as to distinguished between a stolen book and a legitimate one. In this case, the two editions of Atlas Shrugged are properly not in the same class though they are copies of the same book. In both cases the classification is correct, the difference lies in what classifications we considered to be important for our purposes.

Each class heading names the property that is universal for all entities subsumed in that class. However there are many different ways of classifying that can be broken down depending on how specific one wishes to make the list of requisite properties and what purpose we have classifying such entities. So it is possible of similar entities with similar properties to be in the same class or not depending on one’s purpose of classification.

Is ‘stolen’ versus ‘legitimate’ a valid distinction made about properties? Can a book have the property of being stolen goods?

Remember, one cannot say ‘entities’ without pronouncing ‘tities.’

Ok.

I do not know what you mean by “idelize[ing] them into a mental comparment”. It appears you are suggesting some kind of classification of men based, not on observable similarities but on some kind of psychological convenience.

Yet, we cannot intellegently speak of a “degree of rationality” without assuming the existence of a rational faculty.

Have you read Rand’s account of measurement omission in ITOE? This is a key tenet to Rand’s theory of concepts. You seem to either not be aware of the role of measurement omission in her theory of concepts or you have dismissed it out of hand. If you have read it and disagree, please tell us what specifically you find objectionalbe.

Dan

A theory of concept-formation does not do justice to the problem of universals. I have no problem with the discussion of similarity, its truth is a no-brainer. The easiest example is that of two similar squares possessing different measurements. In order to see that they are similar it is necessary simply to omit their particular measurements, retaining the essential fact of squareness (a figure with four equal sides having inner angles adding up to 360 degrees).

But the problem of universals asks this question: is the property of squareness of the one square identical to the property of squareness of the other? Are they identical properties, and how do you know?

Now you have a problem of epistemology, and not just concept-formation.

Are you acknowledging that you do not use the term straight, or that when you do so it is meaningless? If you use it and mean something by it, then you need to introspect what you mean. I think my son was 4 years old or less when he could tell a curved line from a straight one. I warrant you can do the same. Either admit that you’re fooling yourself, or figure out what measurements you are using. This really isn’t rocket science!

I never thought ITOE was like rocket science, that’s why I consider it the easy answer, or non-answer, to a difficult question that Rand never got around to asking.

Yes it is child’s play to intuit the difference between curved and straight (although some curved lines may look straight and vice versa, as many optical illusion problems have been designed to show). But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates from the course, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?

That is the problem of universals, the first question of epistemology which Ayn Rand never got around to asking.

Red and orange are precisely distinguishable from each other: red is a color in the wavelength range of roughly 625–740 nm; orange is a color at a wavelength of about 585 – 620 nm. (Source = wikipedia.)

You do understand why those are incomplete, and thus false definitions of the concepts “red” and “orange,” right?

You do understand why those are incomplete, and thus false definitions of the concepts “red” and “orange,” right?

I never said they were definitions, only that the colors are distinguishable in terms of their respective wavelengths. And anyway, I was more concerned with the perceptual distinction between the two colors, for which there is - precisely - no definable terms, thus there is no “true” definition. Since you cannot define ‘red’ or ‘orange’ in words - only by pointing - it looks as if we’re stuck with the scientific description after all. And since concept-formation requires at least two similar members of a set (“A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members”), the concept of ‘existence’ is no concept either.

Is the redness of that book identical with the redness of this book?

Yes, it is; they cannot be distinguished. (You could at least point us to the two things you’re talking about)

Is the rationality of that man identical with the rationality of this man?

Presumably you mean “the extent of acting rationally”; no, it is not. She behaves more rationally than he does.

Is it the same property of red? Is it the same property known as reason?

“Red” and “reason” are different things, so they can’t be the same as each other. The “red” of this book is the same as the “red” of that book.

If they are not identical, then how can they be classified together?

On the basis is their similarity.

If they are identical, then how do you know it?

Because I have sense organs. BTW there are no “qualia”.

You missed some of my earlier posts. A straight line is the distance traversed between two points without ever deviating from the course. You can see that in reality straight lines only tend toward straightness, with straightness itself, having an infinite degree of precision in measuring off the path, serving as a standard with which to accomplish the task. But an infinite degree of precision doesn’t exist in reality, it is a mental construct.

Must a person have infinite height in order to be “tall?” Does a 6’8" man only “tend towards tallness?”

The point is that all measurements are relative to standard of measurement. Your assumption that the standard of straightness is an infinitely straight line is as invalid as an assertion that the standard of “longness” is an infinitely long distance.

I never said they were definitions, only that the colors are distinguishable in terms of their respective wavelengths. And anyway, I was more concerned with the perceptual distinction between the two colors, for which there is - precisely - no definable terms, thus there is no “true” definition. Since you cannot define ‘red’ or ‘orange’ in words - only by pointing - it looks as if we’re stuck with the scientific description after all.

We’re not “stuck” with wrong definitions. Defining a color in terms of wavelengths specializes the context of the definition to pure light sources. Orange can be made up of pure orange light, or of pure red light and pure green light (as in your television) or of a random sample of wavelengths centered around the wavelengths you mention (as in the case of sunlight reflected from an orange book). Your mistake (in my opinion) is in making (presumably infinite) “precision” an attribute of “true” definitions. By that standard there are no “true” definitions, including, foremost, the definition of “true.” In which case we’d be having a hard time communicating right now. (Hmmm… perhaps you have a point)

And since concept-formation requires at least two similar members of a set (“A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members”), the concept of ‘existence’ is no concept either.

You realize you are asserting here that nothing exists. (or at least not more than one thing - your consciousness perhaps?)

[

](Forums - Objectivism Online Forum)Is the redness of that book identical with the redness of this book?

Yes, it is; they cannot be distinguished. (You could at least point us to the two things you’re talking about)

Two red books. I have stated that their respective shades of red are distinguishable, and in fact I have also stated that no two objects can be exactly the same shade of red down to the nth degree. But since your answer is ‘yes,’ my next question, which does involve epistemology, is, “And how do you know the two properties of redness are identical such that both books may be classified as red books?”

Is the rationality of that man identical with the rationality of this man?

Presumably you mean “the extent of acting rationally”; no, it is not. She behaves more rationally than he does.

The problem of universals is concerned with properties, so my question concerned the property of rationality supposedly held universally by all men. Is it always the same property identical to all men? The two books aren’t precisely the same shade of red, and every man acts differently according to the extent of his rationality. Nevertheless, their respective properties are considered identical: it is the same property of redness, such that all red things can be classified in terms of that universal property; and the same property of rationality, such that all men, no matter how irrationally they behave, can be classified universally as rational beings. The question then is this: how do we know it? On the basis of perceived similarities?

Is it the same property of red? Is it the same property known as reason?

“Red” and “reason” are different things, so they can’t be the same as each other. The “red” of this book is the same as the “red” of that book.

I’ll ignore the crack about red and reason being two different things, unless you were just Randizing the question into a strawman easy to knock down – like the question behind ITOE itself.

The property of redness is identical to both books, and yet there is a subtle though distinguishable difference in shade. On what basis can you then assert that the property of redness is identical?

On the basis is their similarity.

We know that the two colors are very similar, but how are the properties of color identical?

Because I have sense organs. BTW there are no “qualia”.

If you knew what you were saying there you’d never say it, because the latter implies that you have no sense organs, or they don’t function.

http://classes.colgate.edu/pgregory/phil34…glossary.html#P

“Qualia - Often referred to as ‘raw feels’, qualia are those subjective, qualitative properties of mental states such as sensations and emotions the ‘what it is like’ to see red, feel pain, be angry. Such mental states are thought to have intrinsic qualitative features by which we identify them through introspection.”

So apparently, if there are no qualia, then you have no idea what it is like to see red, feel pain, and be angry.