Ok, the stolen vs. legitimate was a bad example of what I was trying to illustrate as stolen implies a relationship (stolen from whom, stolen by whom) but not an inherent characteristic of the book.
Now as for whether or not they are the same book, I would say yes. The lack of a cover is a non-essential detail. What matters is the text. The same applies to red. That you have two different shades of red does not alter the fact that they are red. The idea of redness being applied is the same in both books although the specific instance of that red may be different.
As for method of book binding, replace method with type. Are the pages bound with glue, stapled, or both, etc? Now can you see how type of binding is an attribute of books? If not, then how are you defining attribute?
I’m not concerned with attributes except insofar as they can be considered properties universal to a class of entities. It helps that you changed ‘method of binding’ to ‘type of binding,’ since only the latter could be considered a property of books. Now, since you believe they are the same book, I have to ask about the nature of the relationship between your paradigm of the book and the actual book, since there is no perfect paradigm of the book matching with reality only in thought. I get two different answers from you which vary from case to case. In the case of the two books, they are identical, but in the case of the straight lines, you say below it is a floating abstraction.
The problem of universals poses such a paradox, in that both answers are “correct” until we may arrive at an understanding of the relationship between universal and reality. It is the unresolved issue which divided philosophers into two camps, empiricists and rationalists. Whether your answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ places you in one or the other camp, because it concerns your method of accounting for ‘ideal’ entities such as the paradigmatic representation of the straight line, and this has nothing to do with being an Objectivist.
But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?
You’re ass backwards in this.
I’ll keep that in mind. However, also keep in mind that this is a problem of knowledge, epistemology and not concept-formation unless you want to work on the problem of how to arrive at the concept of a straight line with no real examples of straight lines to operate from.
We infer what straight is from looking at objects that have that property. From there, we can look at a new object and apply the concept of straight to it and know whether or not it is straight. Thus the straightness is the same in every encounter of it. What makes that straightness the same is the process of measurement omission that occurs when forming/applying the concept. You start with a floating abstraction of what straight is and that is why you’re having the confusion. You’re introducing measurements that are irrelevant to the problem of perceiving something as being straight, or being red. By starting with the abstractions of ‘straight’ and ‘red’ you are in effect, treating these as first level concepts that exist apart from any specific entity.
In other words, only concretes exist. The abstractions we use to classify them do not. There is no such thing ‘straight’ or ‘red’ that exists in and of itself apart from any entity.
‘An existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.’ (ITOE2, 241)
So even according to Rand the class property of straightness exists, or to use your language, a ‘floating abstraction’ exists, despite the fact that it doesn’t exist physically as there is nothing to match the paradigm of what straightness is. The paradigm, of course, must have the line never deviating or else it is no longer a straight line, whereas in reality all “straight” lines deviate. The problem of universals is to determine its relationship to reality so that the property of straightness is no longer ‘floating.’
Okay. What is the difference between property and attribute? What is the difference between a a specific property of an entity and that property applied to the class of entities which subsume that entity? What makes a property universal as opposed to being just an attribute?
Attributes belong to entities, properties are attributes belonging universally to classes of entities; a property is “a basic or essential attribute shared by all members of a class.” http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=property
Apples share the property of being bruised easily. A bruise may or may not be a characteristic or attribute of a particular apple. Being shared by all members of the class converts attributes into universal properties. An attribute may or may not be a universal. If, let’s suppose, all apples were by their very nature bruised, then that attribute (bruisedness, the quality of being bruised) would be universal to the class of apples.