So where's the solution to the 'Problem of Universals'?

Must a person have infinite height in order to be “tall?” Does a 6’8" man only “tend towards tallness?”

The point is that all measurements are relative to standard of measurement. Your assumption that the standard of straightness is an infinitely straight line is as invalid as an assertion that the standard of “longness” is an infinitely long distance.

You are apparently just mixing up categories here, so I refuse the comparison of straightness with tallness or longness as invalid. The latter two are concepts of relative distance, straightness is not.

We’re not “stuck” with wrong definitions. Defining a color in terms of wavelengths specializes the context of the definition to pure light sources. Orange can be made up of pure orange light, or of pure red light and pure green light (as in your television) or of a random sample of wavelengths centered around the wavelengths you mention (as in the case of sunlight reflected from an orange book). Your mistake (in my opinion) is in making (presumably infinite) “precision” an attribute of “true” definitions. By that standard there are no “true” definitions, including, foremost, the definition of “true.” In which case we’d be having a hard time communicating right now. (Hmmm… perhaps you have a point)

I only made the point about infinity regarding straightness, and only because it is a mathematical problem. Infinity belongs to the mathematical realm, as do straight lines which are only mental constructs. There is no infinite standard to set for the property of color or reasoning, and they are not in the mathematical realm. In fact, I’m not even concerned with the idea of definitions, true or false, since it is topical to ITOE and I have already stated that such topics don’t answer the problem of universals.

You realize you are asserting here that nothing exists. (or at least not more than one thing - your consciousness perhaps?)

I am only showing the fact that, given Rand’s own method of concept-formation which requires the formation of a unit from two or more similar existents, “existence” is not a concept.

But since your answer is ‘yes,’ my next question, which does involve epistemology, is, “And how do you know the two properties of redness are identical such that both books may be classified as red books?”

Because I can see that they are the same, and indistinguishable. The evidence of the senses is primary, and we are only minimally concerned with different quantum states. When two things cannot be distinguished even at the sensory level in terms of their conceptual classification, they are clearly the same. This versus this is more interesting because they are distinguishable by the sense organs, but still subsumed under a single color (although you might also opt to assign them to different color species – I’ll leave that level of subdivision up to the art students). Recall that differentiation is optional, and only done when it serves the purposes of cognitive economy.

The question then is this: how do we know it? On the basis of perceived similarities?

Yes. Two or more units with shared similarities may be organised into a concept, omitting differences, based on those shared similiarities.

The property of redness is identical to both books, and yet there is a subtle though distinguishable difference in shade. On what basis can you then assert that the property of redness is identical?

Since in your quote you didn’t give an example, I took the liberty of finding two indistinguishable reds. Like this and this.

We know that the two colors are very similar, but how are the properties of color identical?

Whether they can be distinguished with the sense organs. For another example, a 100 Hz sine wave can be distinguished from a 101 Hz sine wave, and a 10,000 Hz sine wave cannot be distinguished from a 10,001 Hz sine wave. I can post examples if you’d like.

“Qualia - Often referred to as ‘raw feels’, qualia are those subjective, qualitative properties of mental states such as sensations and emotions the ‘what it is like’ to see red, feel pain, be angry. Such mental states are thought to have intrinsic qualitative features by which we identify them through introspection.”

Those are just sensations; we don’t need a new technical-sounding concept “qualia” to describe them.

A theory of concept-formation does not do justice to the problem of universals. I have no problem with the discussion of similarity, its truth is a no-brainer. The easiest example is that of two similar squares possessing different measurements. In order to see that they are similar it is necessary simply to omit their particular measurements, retaining the essential fact of squareness (a figure with four equal sides having inner angles adding up to 360 degrees).

But the problem of universals asks this question: is the property of squareness of the one square identical to the property of squareness of the other? Are they identical properties, and how do you know?

Now you have a problem of epistemology, and not just concept-formation.

Particular entities have attributes, but when considered members of the same class these attributes are known as properties. The problem of universals deals with the question of properties, not attributes.

I don’t understand the significance of calling something a “property” when considering it a member of a class, as opposed to observing or inferring attributes. When we identify things as members of a given class, we’re saying that they share a certain range of (explicit or implicit) measurements in common with one another; they possess the same attribute, but in different degrees and the abstraction includes these measurements by not specifying one particular measurement as necessary for something to be included in the class.

By specifying what’s essential about these units, that which explains all or most of the other attributes ascribed to the units, the need for finding out if identical properties exist seems to be a mood point. Or rather, it seems to make “property” out to be more like a metaphysical essence which conforms objects into being somehow “identical,” with the “problem” then being our ignorance as to whether this exists and how we know it does.

If Rand’s interpretation of the “Problem of Universals” is correct, or her correction about it being an epistemological rather than metaphysical issue is correct, then I think she has solved this problem. If your interpretation is correct, then I do not see how a solution could be made. Even “properties” like “red” are specific ideas, specific concepts–if there is no valid means of speaking about concepts, why bother discussing the validity of properties?

Also, you’ve stated that concept-formation does not solve this problem. What aspect(s) of epistemology, in your opinion, do?

I only made the point about infinity regarding straightness, and only because it is a mathematical problem. Infinity belongs to the mathematical realm, as do straight lines which are only mental constructs. There is no infinite standard to set for the property of color or reasoning, and they are not in the mathematical realm. In fact, I’m not even concerned with the idea of definitions, true or false, since it is topical to ITOE and I have already stated that such topics don’t answer the problem of universals.

I am only showing the fact that, given Rand’s own method of concept-formation which requires the formation of a unit from two or more similar existents, “existence” is not a concept.

I don’t have the relevant quote, but the concept “existence” is formed by observing things, and abstracting the fact that they “exist.” Like “7,” there’s no thing which is just “existence.” “Existence” is not a first-level concept, it is the highest-level abstraction, with its units being all entities, all events, all attributes, all actions, and all relationships. The same goes for the concept “identity” it has the exact same units as “existence”; namely, all things which exist.

“Existence” is irreducible; to form the concept “existence” one notes the similarity that objects/actions/etc. exist, with the difference being the comparison of these things not existing. The only way to discuss existence is to merely restate what it is, as is true of all axioms. Unless you disagree about Rand validated why “existence” etc. are axiomatic concepts, I don’t think your conclusion that existence is not a concept holds (actually, I don’t think it holds either way).

Ok, the stolen vs. legitimate was a bad example of what I was trying to illustrate as stolen implies a relationship (stolen from whom, stolen by whom) but not an inherent characteristic of the book.

Now as for whether or not they are the same book, I would say yes. The lack of a cover is a non-essential detail. What matters is the text. The same applies to red. That you have two different shades of red does not alter the fact that they are red. The idea of redness being applied is the same in both books although the specific instance of that red may be different.

As for method of book binding, replace method with type. Are the pages bound with glue, stapled, or both, etc? Now can you see how type of binding is an attribute of books? If not, then how are you defining attribute?

But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates from the course, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?

You’re ass backwards in this. We infer what straight is from looking at objects that have that property. From there, we can look at a new object and apply the concept of straight to it and know whether or not it is straight. Thus the straightness is the same in every encounter of it. What makes that straightness the same is the process of measurement omission that occurs when forming/applying the concept. You start with a floating abstraction of what straight is and that is why you’re having the confusion. You’re introducing measurements that are irrelevant to the problem of perceiving something as being straight, or being red. By starting with the abstractions of ‘straight’ and ‘red’ you are in effect, treating these as first level concepts that exist apart from any specific entity.

In order to conceptualize, a man must expend effort; he must engage in the kind of mental work that no stimulus can necessitate. He must struggle to relat, connect, process an ever-growing range of data—and he must leart to do it correctly. Further: in such processing the basic method he uses, measurement-omission, is dictated by the nature of his cognitive faculty, not by reality. The result is a human perspective on things, not a revalation of a special sort of entity or attribute intrinsic in the world apart from man. Take away the mechanism of human consciousness, and the realm of concepts, universals, abstractions is thereby erased. The concretes that exist, the objects of perception would still remain—as concretes; but the perspective that regards them as units would be gone. — Peikoff, page 111 of OPAR

In other words, only concretes exist. The abstractions we use to classify them do not. There is no such thing ‘straight’ or ‘red’ that exists in and of itself apart from any entity.

You are following Rand’s method of reducing the universal to the general or abstract, the property to the attribute. I am not concerned here with the attributes of entities, but with the universal properties pertaining to classes of entities.

Okay. What is the difference between property and attribute? What is the difference between a a specific property of an entity and that property applied to the class of entities which subsume that entity? What makes a property universal as opposed to being just an attribute?

[edited at 10:09 p.m to correct grammar]

Ok, the stolen vs. legitimate was a bad example of what I was trying to illustrate as stolen implies a relationship (stolen from whom, stolen by whom) but not an inherent characteristic of the book.

Now as for whether or not they are the same book, I would say yes. The lack of a cover is a non-essential detail. What matters is the text. The same applies to red. That you have two different shades of red does not alter the fact that they are red. The idea of redness being applied is the same in both books although the specific instance of that red may be different.

As for method of book binding, replace method with type. Are the pages bound with glue, stapled, or both, etc? Now can you see how type of binding is an attribute of books? If not, then how are you defining attribute?

I’m not concerned with attributes except insofar as they can be considered properties universal to a class of entities. It helps that you changed ‘method of binding’ to ‘type of binding,’ since only the latter could be considered a property of books. Now, since you believe they are the same book, I have to ask about the nature of the relationship between your paradigm of the book and the actual book, since there is no perfect paradigm of the book matching with reality only in thought. I get two different answers from you which vary from case to case. In the case of the two books, they are identical, but in the case of the straight lines, you say below it is a floating abstraction.

The problem of universals poses such a paradox, in that both answers are “correct” until we may arrive at an understanding of the relationship between universal and reality. It is the unresolved issue which divided philosophers into two camps, empiricists and rationalists. Whether your answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ places you in one or the other camp, because it concerns your method of accounting for ‘ideal’ entities such as the paradigmatic representation of the straight line, and this has nothing to do with being an Objectivist.

But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?

You’re ass backwards in this.

I’ll keep that in mind. However, also keep in mind that this is a problem of knowledge, epistemology and not concept-formation unless you want to work on the problem of how to arrive at the concept of a straight line with no real examples of straight lines to operate from.

We infer what straight is from looking at objects that have that property. From there, we can look at a new object and apply the concept of straight to it and know whether or not it is straight. Thus the straightness is the same in every encounter of it. What makes that straightness the same is the process of measurement omission that occurs when forming/applying the concept. You start with a floating abstraction of what straight is and that is why you’re having the confusion. You’re introducing measurements that are irrelevant to the problem of perceiving something as being straight, or being red. By starting with the abstractions of ‘straight’ and ‘red’ you are in effect, treating these as first level concepts that exist apart from any specific entity.

In other words, only concretes exist. The abstractions we use to classify them do not. There is no such thing ‘straight’ or ‘red’ that exists in and of itself apart from any entity.

‘An existent is a concrete. “Existent” is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.’ (ITOE2, 241)

So even according to Rand the class property of straightness exists, or to use your language, a ‘floating abstraction’ exists, despite the fact that it doesn’t exist physically as there is nothing to match the paradigm of what straightness is. The paradigm, of course, must have the line never deviating or else it is no longer a straight line, whereas in reality all “straight” lines deviate. The problem of universals is to determine its relationship to reality so that the property of straightness is no longer ‘floating.’

Okay. What is the difference between property and attribute? What is the difference between a a specific property of an entity and that property applied to the class of entities which subsume that entity? What makes a property universal as opposed to being just an attribute?

Attributes belong to entities, properties are attributes belonging universally to classes of entities; a property is “a basic or essential attribute shared by all members of a class.” http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=property

Apples share the property of being bruised easily. A bruise may or may not be a characteristic or attribute of a particular apple. Being shared by all members of the class converts attributes into universal properties. An attribute may or may not be a universal. If, let’s suppose, all apples were by their very nature bruised, then that attribute (bruisedness, the quality of being bruised) would be universal to the class of apples.

Attributes belong to entities, properties are attributes belonging universally to classes of entities; a property is “a basic or essential attribute shared by all members of a class.” http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=property

Apples share the property of being bruised easily. A bruise may or may not be a characteristic or attribute of a particular apple. Being shared by all members of the class converts attributes into universal properties. An attribute may or may not be a universal. If, let’s suppose, all apples were by their very nature bruised, then that attribute (bruisedness, the quality of being bruised) would be universal to the class of apples.

The “property” you refer to is still an attribute; it is our ability to regard the attribute as a unit that seems to be at the root of (at least one) complaint.

A particular apple may not be bruised; yet, as you correctly point out, the property of being easily bruised belongs to all apples. What allows for this shared “property”? The apples are easily bruised because of their chemical makeup–they share the same chemical composition that allows for being bruised. We may properly regard the apples’ chemical composition as an attribute and all apples (all apples that ever existed, exist now or may exist in the future) share the attribute.

Dan

Because I can see that they are the same, and indistinguishable. The evidence of the senses is primary, and we are only minimally concerned with different quantum states. When two things cannot be distinguished even at the sensory level in terms of their conceptual classification, they are clearly the same. This versus this is more interesting because they are distinguishable by the sense organs, but still subsumed under a single color (although you might also opt to assign them to different color species – I’ll leave that level of subdivision up to the art students). Recall that differentiation is optional, and only done when it serves the purposes of cognitive economy.Yes. Two or more units with shared similarities may be organised into a concept, omitting differences, based on those shared similiarities.Since in your quote you didn’t give an example, I took the liberty of finding two indistinguishable reds. Like this and this.Whether they can be distinguished with the sense organs. For another example, a 100 Hz sine wave can be distinguished from a 101 Hz sine wave, and a 10,000 Hz sine wave cannot be distinguished from a 10,001 Hz sine wave. I can post examples if you’d like.

Is the purpleness of one “this” the same purpleness as the other “this”?

Those are just sensations; we don’t need a new technical-sounding concept “qualia” to describe them.

Since the topic is properties as univerals, qualia is the appropriate word to use in this context according to the definition at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/qualia.

1 : a property (as redness) considered apart from things having the property : universal

2 : a property as it is experienced as distinct from any source it might have in a physical object

Redness is a quale, a universal property of red things.

Is the purpleness of one “this” the same purpleness as the other “this”?

Yes; there is just one purpleness. If something is purple then it’s “purpleness” is the same as that of any other purple thing.

So even according to Rand the class property of straightness exists, or to use your language, a ‘floating abstraction’ exists, despite the fact that it doesn’t exist physically as there is nothing to match the paradigm of what straightness is. The paradigm, of course, must have the line never deviating or else it is no longer a straight line, whereas in reality all “straight” lines deviate. The problem of universals is to determine its relationship to reality so that the property of straightness is no longer ‘floating.’

Any definition of straightness must be measured against the standard of “the most direct path between two points.” Assuming that two points exist in reality, there also exists in reality the most direct path between them.

The “property” you refer to is still an attribute; it is our ability to regard the attribute as a unit that seems to be at the root of (at least one) complaint.

Properties only hold for classes of entities, a distinction Rand failed to make in ITOE in which the developmental hierarchy never rose above the level of the “unit.” If she had upleveled the discussion just one more time, from ‘entity’ to ‘identity’ to ‘unit’ to ‘class’, she would have found herself on our turf and would have at last had grounds for discussing a problem she herself mentioned. Her question about finding the man-ness in men never got around to asking about man’s knowledge of universals. The question is not “what does the concept ‘man’ refer to in reality.” The answer to that is obvious, it refers to particular men. The problem of universals asks: “Is the property of man-ness in one man the same property of man-ness found in all other men, and how do you know it?” Now you have a question proper to epistemology. Now you have the problem of universals.

A particular apple may not be bruised; yet, as you correctly point out, the property of being easily bruised belongs to all apples. What allows for this shared “property”? The apples are easily bruised because of their chemical makeup–they share the same chemical composition that allows for being bruised. We may properly regard the apples’ chemical composition as an attribute and all apples (all apples that ever existed, exist now or may exist in the future) share the attribute.Dan

I’m asking if the property is identical for all apples, not if the property is shared by all apples. The question is to determine the nature of this universal, we already know of its universality, so when you say it is shared that adds nothing new to what we already think about apples.

Yes; there is just one purpleness. If something is purple then it’s “purpleness” is the same as that of any other purple thing.

The question then has to be, how do you know it? Because in reality there are as many purples as you can muster up examples of the color purple. Why can’t each one exemplify its own unique variety of purpleness?

The question then has to be, how do you know it?

Because I speak English and am aware of the meaning of “purple”.

Because in reality there are as many purples as you can muster up examples of the color purple.

No, there is just one purple. The objects may be physically different in terms of characteristic light wavelength, but they are still one and the same concept. Surely you at least understand that much of Objectivist epistemology. For example, what is the definition of “concept”?

Because I speak English and am aware of the meaning of “purple”.No, there is just one purple. The objects may be physically different in terms of characteristic light wavelength, but they are still one and the same concept. Surely you at least understand that much of Objectivist epistemology. For example, what is the definition of “concept”?

I know enough about it to say with certainty that Rand did not ask about any problem of universals, because it has nothing to do with finding the manness in men. Who knows where she even got that idea? I also know that finding the manness in men is not equivalent to asking what does the concept ‘man’ correspond to reality. ‘Where is the “manness” in men? What, in reality, corresponds to the concept “man” in our mind?’ [iTOE2, p. 2] The answer to the second question is easy: the concept ‘man’ corresponds with particular men. But where is the manness in men? Since ‘manness’ is a universal, a property shared in common by all men, is the property of manness psychological, physical, conceptual, subjective, objective, or none of the above? And where is the purpleness in purple? You say that there is just one purple. But I was not asking about the concept ‘purple,’ I was asking about the property concept ‘purpleness,’ and whether or not it is identical for all purple entities.

Any definition of straightness must be measured against the standard of “the most direct path between two points.” Assuming that two points exist in reality, there also exists in reality the most direct path between them.

“In reality” would include “in consciousness.” Are you saying that the answer is subjective?

Since ‘manness’ is a universal, a property shared in common by all men, is the property of manness psychological, physical, conceptual, subjective, objective, or none of the above?

It is objective and psychological. It is an objective recognition of mind-independent fact of reality.

But I was not asking about the concept ‘purple,’ I was asking about the property concept ‘purpleness,’ and whether or not it is identical for all purple entities.

A trivial distinction. “Purpleness” is just a linguistic form meaning "the concept ‘purple’, conveyed as an abstract noun. It’s a pretty productive formation process. Looking for nouns “in” other nouns is probably not worth your time.

I don’t have the relevant quote, but the concept “existence” is formed by observing things, and abstracting the fact that they “exist.” Like “7,” there’s no thing which is just “existence.” “Existence” is not a first-level concept, it is the highest-level abstraction, with its units being all entities, all events, all attributes, all actions, and all relationships. The same goes for the concept “identity” it has the exact same units as “existence”; namely, all things which exist.

“Existence” is irreducible; to form the concept “existence” one notes the similarity that objects/actions/etc. exist, with the difference being the comparison of these things not existing. The only way to discuss existence is to merely restate what it is, as is true of all axioms. Unless you disagree about Rand validated why “existence” etc. are axiomatic concepts, I don’t think your conclusion that existence is not a concept holds (actually, I don’t think it holds either way).

My reading of ITOE has it that “existence” is a collective noun encompassing everything that exists.

'AR:[T]he concept “existence,” at least the way I use it, is in a certain way close to the concept “universe”—all that which exists.

Prof. B: “Existence” is a collective noun almost.

AR: That’s right.’

I don’t see how ‘existence’ is almost a collective noun. Either it is or it isn’t. “Universe” is a collective noun, as in “there was a universe of stars in the sky.” But there is a category known as the “mass noun” under which “existence” could be subsumed.

‘The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation. The units of a concept were differentiated—by means of a distinguishing characteristic(s)—from other existents possessing a commensurable characteristic, a “Conceptual Common Denominator.” A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated.’ (41) How does this principle work for conceptualizing “existence”?

“In reality” would include “in consciousness.” Are you saying that the answer is subjective?

No. The most direct path exists in reality. Reality exists regardless of consciousness.

I am only showing the fact that, given Rand’s own method of concept-formation which requires the formation of a unit from two or more similar existents, “existence” is not a concept.

If two entities have the property of existence, then existence is a property, and therefore a concept. To say that “existence” is not a concept, is to say that no two entities have the property of existence, and therefore, that nothing exists, or at most one thing. Since your own consciousness is the thing that you can say with greatest certainty exists, then, at most your consciousness, but no more, “exists.”

‘The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation. The units of a concept were differentiated—by means of a distinguishing characteristic(s)—from other existents possessing a commensurable characteristic, a “Conceptual Common Denominator.” A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentiated.’ (41) How does this principle work for conceptualizing “existence”?

Again, I don’t have ItOE, but Rand states somewhere, perhaps the chapter on Axiomatic Concepts, that “existence” has no Conceptual Common Denominator.

Notice that your problem here relates to definitions : “existence” is an axiomatic concept; it has no formal definition, only an ostensive one. In other words, this problem you have has no bearing on the concept “existence,” if my understanding of the objective theory of concepts is correct.