More material to think about regarding the blank slate:
“Research on the structure and development of the brain in animals supports Kant’s theory, at least for the perception of space; that is, spatial representation of the environment includes an innate component that predates any actual perception of the environment itself.”
– (an older revision of a) Wikipedia entry on Immanuel Kant
That is an utterly trivial statement. Having an eyeball is an innate component that predates any actual vision of the environment. Kant asserted (paraphrasing) that consciousness and the senses had an identity. Rand agreed with that. Rand disagreed that the identity of consciousness and limitations of the senses rendered anything existential intrinsically unknowable, or that inter-subjectivity could be a substitute for objectivity.
Regarding realism in psychology:
"Rand’s notion that we can observe reality directly (known in philosophy as direct or naïve realism)
Stop. Strawman, because Rand does not teach or favor naive realism. All she herself writes about perception is "…the arguments of those who attack the senses are merely variants of the fallacy of the “stolen concept.” {Foreword to ITOE, page 3) The detailed unravelling and painstaking refutation of representationalism in perception is done by Dr. David Kelley in The Evidence of the Senses ($9.99 pdf version available here).
Well if Gödel’s incompleteness theorem doesn’t conflict, why was it attacked in OPAR? Granted it was a single mention, but still.
It wasn’t attacked. The only thing close I could find was the following paragraph from the epilogue:
Modernist intellectuals are comparable to a psychopath who murders for kicks. They seek the thrill of the new; and the new, to them, is the negative. The new is obliteration, obliteration of the essential in every field; they have no interest in anything to take its place. Thus the uniqueness of the century behind us: philosophy gleefully rid of system-building, education based on the theory that cognition is harmful, science boastful of its inability to understand, art which expelled beauty, literature which flaunted antiheroes, language “liberated” from syntax, verse “free” of meter, nonrepresentational painting, atonal music, unconscious psychology, deconstruction in literary criticism, indeterminacy as the new depth in physics, incompleteness as the revelation in mathematics —a void everywhere that was acclaimed by the avant-garde with a metaphysical chuckle. It was the sound of triumph, the triumph of the new anti-ideal: of the unknowable, the unreachable, the unendurable.
The focus of the attack here is Modernism and the celebration of incompleteness in mathematics as if that implied anything about what world-view or philosophy was correct. It is an misuse of Gödel’s work and an abuse of logic to attempt to draw philosophical conclusions from it.
Something Kelley writes in Evidence of the Senses chapter six has a direct bearing on this.
It is typically assumed that justification occurs only at the level of propositional knowledge, that what justifies a judgment or assertion is another judgment or assertion according to the logic of propositions. Propositional justification is incompatible with any theory in which perception is a source of justification, such as the realist theory of perception presented in this book.
The massive abstraction which is mathematics is explicitly dedicated to propositional justification. The philosophical significance of the fact that Gödel was able to prove that any system of propositions was limited in what it could prove is simply that existence, life and the foundations of knowledge are not propositions. It is a megalomaniacal vanity to presume that starting from “Cogito, ergo sum” (or “A is A”!) that everything that exists or is true can be deduced.
More on Rand’s conflict with the theory of evolution – more striking excerpts:
Rand does not have a conflict with the theory of evolution because she does not have an opinion on it. The world would be a better place if everyone would refrain from commenting about subjects of which they know little, rather than posturing and bullshitting.
"The supposition of man’s physical descent from monkeys does not necessarily mean that man’s soul, the rational faculty, is only an elaboration of an animal faculty, different from the animal’s consciousness only in degree, not in kind.” (pp. 465-466.)
That is true as far as it goes. It is not necessary, meaning that it cannot be validly deduced, from the mere fact of descent from an earlier form that there cannot be a difference in kind (meaning “an important, essential, fundamental difference”). Consider also that “quantity has a quality all its own”.
“She goes on the same entry to describe those incapable of rational life as “sub-human” who need to be “enslaved” and “controlled.” (p. 467.)” [emphasis mine]"
–
http://rebirthofreas…Evolution.shtml
Now see, this is the problem with relying on Neil Parille, a non-objective commentator if there ever was one. He strategically paraphrases here and does not give the actual quote in order to make you believe Rand actually thought that. It is not Branden who lies, it is Neil Parille. I will quote the text in full:
Men’s intellectual capacities have always been so unequal that to the thinkers the majority of their brothers have probably always seemed subhuman. And some men may still be, for all the evidence of rationality, or lack of it, that they give. We may still be in evolution, as a species, and living side by side with some “missing links.” […]
We do not know to what extent the majority of men are now rational. (They are certainly far from the perfect rational being, and all the teachings they absorb push them still farther back to the pre-human stage.) But we do know that mankind as a whole and each man as an individual has a chance to <jrnl_467> survive and succeed only to the degree of their general and individual intelligence. That is all that a rational man can deal with, count on or be concerned with. Let him, without wondering about actual numbers or percentages of intelligence in others, act on the basis of “addressing himself to intelligence”-and he will win. And he will find that he does not have to fear stupidity. (Most men now are rational beings, even if not too smart; they are not pre-humans incapable of rational thinking; they can be dealt with only on the basis of free, rational consent.)
If it’s asked: what about those who are still pre-human, or near enough to it, and incapable of rationality as a method to guide their lives? What if such do exist among us? The answer is: nothing. Their way of living is not ours; in fact, they have no way of living, no method or means of survival—except through imitating us, who have acquired the human method and means. Leave us to our way of living, man’s way—freedom, individual independence-and we’ll carry them along by providing an example and a world of safety and comfort such as they can never quite grasp, let alone achieve.
We do this—but even if we didn’t, so what? If those creatures incapable of rational existence are sub-human, are we to sacrifice ourselves or be sacrificed to them? Are we to descend to their level? Are we to make them the goal of our existence, and service to them our only purpose? If these pre-humans are incapable of rational thinking and of independence, and therefore they need an enslaved, controlled, regimented, “protective” society in order to survive—we cannot survive in such a society. By definition, we are then two different species. Their requirements are opposite to ours. They’ll perish without us, anyway. But we will not he sacrificed to them. We will live in freedom—whether or not others will or can live that way.
Rand here merely entertains the implicit view of man inherent to socialism, that of a “pre-human … incapable of rational thinking and of independence” and therefore needing “… an enslaved, controlled, regimented, “protective” society in order to survive” presumably by their betters. (Reminder: this is the logic of socialism and the socialist ideal of a better person and Rand’s will differ massively. A critical plot point of Atlas Shrugged is that Rand’s ideal man would refuse the job of dictator when offered or even ordered on pain of torture). She concludes that even if it were true (and she never concedes that it is true) that would still not justify socialism for actual humans.