Universals

38 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

I want to know if you consider units to be mental groupings with the universal, or are units already wrapped up into a unit, separate from your awareness? A different option?

Epistemologically, I don’t see any problem with Rand’s description of concept formation in Chapters 1 and 2, including as it pertains to units. One proceeds from viewing individual concretes, to generalizing them into a view of units of a kind.

Metaphysically speaking obviously all concretes intrinsically are units of a kind. Concept formation is just the inductive process of recognizing them as such and identifying the kind that they belong to.

If we had some sort of diaphanous perception (which we don’t) and had automatic mental access to the universal, then you would automatically see every concrete as the unit of its kind. But we don’t have innate knowledge like that, you do have to put in the epistemological work to unite concretes together as units and form the concept of the kind.

20 hours ago, intrinsicist said:

…you are denying that induction, or any generalized knowledge, is possible. Any concepts or propositions made that generalize outside of some specific set of concretes you’ve previously observed would be unjustifiable.

Consider this.

We don’t start out with such universals. Rather we begin with classes limited to previously observed things. We then introspect ourselves classifying new things with similar old things. We then identify the fact that we are classifying all these new things with the similar old things, and so we induce the proposition that all similar things will be classified together. Now we have our universal, our concept. And since we are not omniscient, it is subject to human fallibility and dependent on our context of knowledge.

21 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

Consider this…

What I said still stands: “you are denying that induction, or any generalized knowledge, is possible. Any concepts or propositions made that generalize outside of some specific set of concretes you’ve previously observed would be unjustifiable.”

McCaskey for example claims:

Quote

If you have good guidelines and follow them, you can be certain that someone absolutely cannot contract cholera unless exposed to the bacterium Vibrio cholerae, certain that all men are mortal, certain that the angles of all planar triangles sum to 180°, and certain that 2+3=5.

Well no, under your system, none of these is certain. No conclusion science has ever achieved can be described as true, or knowledge, or certain. They simply happen to be true under the concretes previously observed, and you predict it will continue to be so.

Yes, even with math. What, you’re certain that 2+3=5? At all times and in all places, universally? How? That may have held up under your previous observations, and you may predict that it will continue under similar circumstances, but as you said, all of your predictions are “subject to human fallibility and dependent on our context of knowledge”, and as you said, “we are not omniscient”, we haven’t observed every single instance that has ever occurred. 

@MisterSwigyou said explicitly, “By “universal” we cannot mean a concept that “holds true in all places and at all times.””

On 11/19/2020 at 3:52 PM, intrinsicist said:

“Concrete universals” is a contradiction in terms. You have, on the one hand, concretes, which are specific and particular, and on the hand, universals, which are abstract and general. A concrete would be something like “the man Easy Truth”. A universal would be “Man”, referring to all men at all times and places.

Agreed.

On 11/19/2020 at 4:04 PM, intrinsicist said:

That doesn’t necessarily mean they correspond to a real, metaphysical universal. Any contradictory proposition or invalid concept does not correspond to a real universal.

Here is where I get lost. Especially when you use the phrase “metaphysical universal”. As apposed to what? What is the nature of a non-metaphysical universal? A mental entity? So there are some non-metaphysical universals? So bottom line there are two kinds of universals.

It seems you have:

  1. Concretes (metaphysical)

Two types of Universals

A. Valid concepts (metaphysical universals)

B. Invalid concepts/contradictions (non-metaphysical universals)

Versus: there are concretes (metaphysical) and concepts (non-metaphysical)?

  1. Concretes

Two Types of Concepts

A. Valid ones

B. Invalid ones

The reason this works better is that “contradiction” is in fact a valid concept. It has no metaphysical referent, no metaphysical concrete that it refers to. But in fact it does refer to something real that is not metaphysical, in the mind or of the mind (non-metaphysical concrete  i.e. mental entity(metaphorically speaking)).

Similar to the concept “nothing”. A valid concept, yet non-existent (nothing is a non-existent i.e. there is no such thing).

19 hours ago, intrinsicist said:

Well no, under your system, none of these is certain.

Not true. I am certain of many things under my system, because my system does not depend on infallibility to achieve certainty. Being fallible, having the capacity for being wrong, does not mean I must always recognize a possibility that I am wrong. First there must be some evidence for that possibility in a particular case. I have the capacity to kill an innocent stranger. That doesn’t mean there is a possibility that I killed Nicole Simpson. Likewise I have the capacity to make a mathematical mistake. That doesn’t mean it’s possible that I made a mistake about two plus three equalling five.

Certainty is achieved when the evidence is sufficient to eliminate all reasonable doubt. In some cases this doubt can be eliminated fairly easily. It doesn’t take much effort to lay out two stones next to three stones and see with my own eyes that they total five stones. But if I’m trying to solve the problem of universals, I might never achieve certainty due to the enormous amount of abstract knowledge required to eliminate reasonable doubts.

On 11/22/2020 at 8:37 AM, MisterSwig said:

Not true. I am certain of many things under my system, because my system does not depend on infallibility to achieve certainty. Being fallible, having the capacity for being wrong, does not mean I must always recognize a possibility that I am wrong. First there must be some evidence for that possibility in a particular case. I have the capacity to kill an innocent stranger. That doesn’t mean there is a possibility that I killed Nicole Simpson. Likewise I have the capacity to make a mathematical mistake. That doesn’t mean it’s possible that I made a mistake about two plus three equalling five.

Certainty is achieved when the evidence is sufficient to eliminate all reasonable doubt. In some cases this doubt can be eliminated fairly easily. It doesn’t take much effort to lay out two stones next to three stones and see with my own eyes that they total five stones. But if I’m trying to solve the problem of universals, I might never achieve certainty due to the enormous amount of abstract knowledge required to eliminate reasonable doubts.

I don’t know how else to explain it… you’ve admitted there’s a possibility of being wrong, you’ve admitted that you don’t believe universals necessarily hold true, yet you’re saying you have certainty, that you can eliminate the possibility of being wrong, that you can eliminate all reasonable doubt.

Being fallible with respect to making mistakes is one thing. But you’re saying you can’t universalize at all, that any universal claim is unjustifiable. That inherently means that you cannot achieve actual certainty, you cannot remove all possible doubt about something holding true universally, at all times and all places.

If you haven’t proven something to be true then there is a reasonable doubt that it could be different at some other time or place. After all, you’ve declared that you cannot make justifiable claims for something at all times and all places.

If you’re making a universal claim about something at all times and all places, and you hold that such claims are invalid, cannot be justified, then how in the world do you have certainty about them? You’ve just said that you can’t do that, that you can’t make such general claims as true, certain, knowledge.

Universal claims are either justified or unjustified. You have to pick one. If they are unjustified then you can’t claim “certainty” and “the impossibility of doubt”. If universal claims are justifiable, and you have proven one, then you can claim certainty and the impossibility of doubt.

Either your claim about 2+3=5 is unjustified and therefore fallible, or else it is justified and therefore infallible.

It makes absolutely no sense to declare that some claim is unjustifiable, but also necessarily true and infallible.

14 hours ago, intrinsicist said:

…you’ve admitted there’s a possibility of being wrong, you’ve admitted that you don’t believe universals necessarily hold true, yet you’re saying you have certainty…

You put a lot of words in my mouth that I didn’t say. I said there needs to be evidence of the possibility that you’re wrong, just like there needs to be evidence for any proposition. A capacity for error doesn’t mean there is evidence of one. In the case of the swan example, one might point to the fact that other types of animals come in different colors, so suspecting there might be a non-white swan is reasonable; the definition might be too narrow. But if you don’t think of that, then your “all swans are white” universal will be wrong.

Also, my point about “holds true” was that it can’t be the basis for your proposition, because you haven’t seen the proposition “hold true at all times in all places.” That’s part of the proposition itself, it’s not part of the evidence for it. The evidence is limited to the observations you’ve made yourself or heard about, which includes only some times in some places. But, again, being subject to human fallibility doesn’t mean there is always a possibility that you’re wrong.

I think the problem here is that you’re a proponent of the Logos, and I am not. But now I’m mostly repeating myself, so I’ll move over to your new thread on metaphysical universals and consider your arguments there. 

Perhaps it would help if we have definitions of at least the following terms:

universal (noun)

universal (adjective)

certainty

possibility

15 hours ago, Doug Morris said:

Perhaps it would help if we have definitions of at least the following terms:

universal (noun)

universal (adjective)

certainty

possibility

To limit outside influence, I’m trying this without looking at a dictionary first.

universal (n) - a concept or proposition that identifies a class of similar things

universal (adj) - applicable or usable in all similar circumstances with the same relevant factors

certainty - the state of complete confidence in the accuracy of one’s evaluation or proposition

possibility - something that could be or could happen